CABLE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM THE SECRETARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: May 12, 1974
• Content Type: CABLE

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1
NSITIVE 1300 0009Z MAY, 74 HANDLE
:: ;i L J,SIVELY f EYES ONLY
3 ? AY "3AY 12, 1974
3R GEN. RAL, SCOWCROFT
0... THE SECRETARY
PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO
PR ES I DE NT?3
MORI/CDF
C03344629
I.. I PRESENTED TODAY TO ASAD 14E LATEST. ISRAELI MAP WHICH DRAWS
L I N E AROUND KUNEITRA AND.=INCLUDES TWO SLICES WEST OF THE.'
THAT EXISTED AT THE TIME OF: THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR.. WHILE ASAD DID
1 r w z CT i HE PROPOSA ., HE TOOK STRONG EXCEPT ION TO IT AND ASKED FOR
IN THE LINE WHICH GO BEYOND THE SYMBOLIC MOVES OF AT
J T O 4. KILOMETER WEST OF THE OCTOBER LINE WHICH WERE EMBRACED
Tr{>_ ISi'AELI PLAN. ASAD STRESSED IN PARTICULAR THAT WITH THE ISRAELI
LINE RUNNING THROUGH KUNEITAk,A, COULD NOT SEND IN ANY SYRIAN
a L.IA.N SINCE THEY WOULD BE UNDER TREAT OF ISRAELI GUNS AND POSITIONS
SURRC JNDING HILLS, AND HE NEEDED MORE LANDS WHERE HE COULD
kMTTLE HT 5 PEOPLE IN VARIOUS VILLAdES IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH..
WJJ THINGS IMPRESSED ME IN. PARTICULAR ABOUT THE ASAD MEETING:
cA) 'I (5 t THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WANTS AN 'AGREEMENT BUT HAS A PROBLEM
I'?tf 1 ALONG PEOPLE WHO HAD THOUGHT. OF "ISRAELIS AS DEVILS FOR 26
",' A. ; AN (3) HE USED THE MEETING TO, BRING IN KEY LEADERS IN HIS
~~I4I:STR,TTON -THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE,: THE CHIEF OF. THE AIR FORCE
'i" CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE IN.ADDITION TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER--
6V1,_,4U-3 WAY TO dUILD`A CONSENSUS-
I 'SET FOR THREE HOURS THIS EVENING WII.T,H PRIME MINISTER MEIR
;R CEaLLEAGES AND GAVE THEM A FULL REPORT OF THE ASAD MEETING.
~ .UV A. :TRH ` aU TH ,_wf'J z..I_T_ .V `x TEAT lOi~I f pE. LL T M_
OF HOW ESSENTIAL IT, IS:,FOR THE ISRAELIS TO LOOK AT
THE RESULTANT DECOUPLING OF,, SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE ARABS, AND
THE .POSITIVE TRENDS THAT HAVE.DE,VELOPED IN THE MIDDLE EAST OVER
i lia SIX :1ONTHS. 13Y THE SAME.. TOKEN: ...I PAINTED THE REALISTICALLY
f:'r K :3JTUATIO' THAT WILL FACE THE ISRAELIS -- AND US -- IF THE DISEN-
~:,' w2REEM NT FAILS, AND WE LOSE CONTROL OVER THE DIPLOMACY AS
,aI,,1'13ER OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA. AGAIN I
THE THEME, WHICH 1 HAVE REPORTED. .TOYOU IN SOME DETAIL IN"
A SCI A0'RS'E!'1"
? ? ; 1 . il,;~ ;ELF dT AGREEMENT IN A BROAD .POL.ITICAL CONTEXT. RATHER
t T?IE AR II PL AND NARROW TACTICAL, CONSIDERATION IDERATION. AND
T ULE OVER ONE OR TWO KILOMETERS 'HERE AND. THERE. I DOUBT THAT
t44 ""10,3 JF AN IMPRESSION. ,
I HAVE ASKED. FOR A FURTHER MEETiNG, WITH MRS. MEIR AND HER KEY
: I'. 'T ?Y MBERS FOR 10100 A.M. TOMORR.O MORNING BEFORE SHE
HER FULL CABINET. I .P1,AN 1 1 VERY: STRONG TERMS TO INSIST
C): 3ICER SOME CHANGE IN AND AROUND- THE KUNEITRA AREA WHILE
J:4. TO THE . HILLS. WE HAVE, IN MIND A UN BUFFER BELT OF A
'iL~YIF,T ER OR SO AROUND THE CITY.. , SO..NALY, `I HAVE ASKED THE
iAELI 3. TO REEXAMINE THEIR PREBE L,TvNE OF DISENGAGEMENT, BOTH
v:)nTH; AJD SOUTH, TO SEE WHETHER F THER',ADJUSTMENTS CAN BE MADE SO
T HAT
AT .THE SYRIANS CAN HAVE, RETURNED TO. T A:.:;.NUMBER Of VILLAGES FOR
:SwTTLE'MENT PURPOSES. NEITHER OF THE, ABOVE ;CHANGES WOULD IN
AiY SWAY . AFFECT ADVERSELY THE STRATES.I 'PG ITION OF THE ISRAELIS ON THE
33LAN HEIGHTS. ' I AM NOT AT ALL CERTAIN THAT: THIS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT
TO L:T A SAW S NEEDS, BUT I- BELIEVE ,It. IS, `.IMPORTANT THAT .I TAKE
Os ETHING ALONG THESE LINES BA-CK TO. D4M$SCUS ON TUESDAY. IF IT
FA IL3, WE W ILL HAVE. TO SUSPEND T-HE T.ALO .,IN THE LEAST DAMAGING WAY.
5. I- DO NOT ASK YOU TO DO ANYTHING fORE N THIS MATTER AT THIS
i I`^F SINCE I BELIEVE YOUR MESSAGES OVER ?T" ,SCENT DAYS HAVE BEEN MOST
HH:LPFJL. ? I HOE THE ISRAELIS WILL TAKE A',BROAD VIEW.
)~'A R'0 REGARDS.
? y No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1
w
SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY / EYES ONLY
HAKTO
Sunday, May 12, 1974
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM; THE SECRETARYV 4e-
Please pass following message to President:
1. I presented today to Asad the latest Israeli map which draws
the defense line around Kuneitra and includes two slices west of the
line, that existed at the time of the October 1973 war. While Asad did
not reject the proposal, he took strong exception to it and asked for
adjustments in the line which go beyond the symbolic moves of at
most one kilometer west of the October line which were embraced
in the Israeli plan. Asad stressed in particular that with the Israeli
defense line running through Kuneitra he could not send in any Syrian
civilians since they would be under threat of Israeli guns and positions in
the surrounding hills, and he needed more lands :,where he could
resettle his people in various villages in the north and south.
2. Two things impressed me in particular about the Asad meeting:
(a) I had the impression that he wants an agreement but has a problem
bringing along people who had thought of Israelis as devils for 26
years; and (b) he used the meeting to bring in key leaders in his
administration- -the Ministe ,of Defense, the Chief of the Air Force
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1
w W
and the Chief of Intelligence in addition to the Foreign Minister an obvious way to build a consensus.
3. I met for three hours this evening with Prime Minister Me it
and her colleages and gave them a full report of the Asad meeting.
In particular I stressed the positive benefits that would result from
a successful disengagement agreement to Israel, to the US diplomatic
effort s, the resultant decoupling of Soviet support of the Arabs, and
all of the positive trends that have developed in the Middle East over
the past six months. By the same token I painted the realistically
stark situation that will face the Israelis -- and us if the disengage-
ment agreement fails, and we lose control over the diplomacy as
well as a number of the key developments in the area. Again I
stressed the theme, which I have reported to you in some detail in
Ok
past messages1en how essential it is for the Israelis to look at
the disengagement agreement in a broad political context rather
than the marginal and narrow tactical consideration and
quibbles over one or two kilometers here and there. I doubt that
I made much of an in}pression.
4. I have asked for a further meeting with Mrs. Meir and her key
Cabinet members for 10:00 a. m. tomorrow morning before she
reconvenes her full Cabinet. I plan in very strong terms to insist that
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1
 - - No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1
1 w
-3-
they consider some change in and around the Kuneitra area while
holding on to the hills. We have in mind a UN buffer belt of a
kilometer. or so around the city. Secondly, I have asked the
Israelis to reexamine their present line of disengagement, both
north and south, to see whether further adjustments can be made so
that the Syrians can have returned to them a number of villages for
resettlement purposes. Neither of the above changes would in
any way affect adversely the strategic position of the Israelis on the
Golan Heights. I am not at all certain that this would be sufficient
to meet Asad's needs, but I believe it is important that I take
something along these lines back to Damascus on Tuesday. If it
fails, we will have to suspend the talks in the least damaging way.
5c,, I do not ask you to do anything more on this matter at this
time since I believe your messages over the recent days have been most
helpful. I hope the Israelis will take a broad view.
Warm regards.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1
SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY/EYES ONLY
Sunday, May 12, 1974
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: THE SECRETARY
lp
Please pass following message to President:
1. 1 presented today to Asad the latest Israeli map which draws the,
defense line around Kuneitra and includes two slices west of the line
that existed at the time of the October 1973 war. While Asad did not
reject the proposal, he took strong exception to it and asked
the October line which were embraced in the Israeli plan. Asad
stressed in particular that with the Israeli 4defense line r4g4h4-wp--
t Kuneitra he could not send in any Syrian civilians since
they would be under threat of Israeli 'guns and positions in the sur-
rounding hills and he needed more lands where he could resettle
his people in various villages in the north and south.
2. Twothings impressed me in particular about the Asad meeting:
-$ f e w"I 7wY'11 11'~ r Nen 111 S r -a Q-ae~a ~ r_`
(a)
ra
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1 G
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1
w w
11
Cabinet members for 10:00 a. m. tomorrow morning before she reconvenes
change in and around the Kuneitra area while holding on to the
hills.
buffer belt of a kilometer or so around the city. Secondly, I have
asked tlrt to reexamine their present line of disengagment, both
fiorth and south, to see whether further adjustments can be made
so that the Syrians can have returned to them a number of oix villages
for resettlement purposes. hk:i Neither of the above changes would
in any way affect adversely the strategic position of the Israelis
on the Golan Heights. I am not at all certain that this would be
sufficient to meet Asad's needs, but I believe it is important that I
5. I do not ask you to do any-thing more on this matte rsince I
believe your messages over the recent days have been most helpful.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1
4. I have asked for a further meeting with Mrs. Meir and her key
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1
Chancr and (b) he used the meeting
to bring in key leaders in his administration --. the Minister of
Defense , the Chief of the Air Force and the Chi f of Intelligence
in addition to the Foreign Minister--wbi f %s=toa'- -fi_
00-A *0"
3. I met for three hours with Prime Minister Meir and her
colleagues and gave them a full report of the Asad meeting. In
particular I stressed the positive benefits that would result from
a successful disengagement agreement to Israel, to the US
,2464. 414,J2~-. t
diplomatic efforts, a'4 x er decoupling of Soviet support of
the,Arabs, and all of the positive trends that have developed over
the past six months. By the same token I painted the realistically
stark situation that will face the Israelis --- and us if the
disenagement agreement fails and we lose control over the diplomacy
as well as a number of the key developments in the area. Again I
stressed the theme )which I have reported to you in some detail in
alp-
past messages how essential it is for the Israelis to look at the
disengagement agreement in a broad political context rather
than the marginal and narrow strategic tactical considerations
and quibbles over one or two kilometers here and there". ,G~-z~-r/~'
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/07: LOC-HAK-260-1-28-1