CHOU EN-LAI VISIT TO HANOI
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-293-5-13-7
Release Decision:
RIFLIM
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
November 17, 2009
Sequence Number:
13
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 17, 1971
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/17: LOC-HAK-293-5-13-7
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEA ... 4:
FROM: -HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Chou En-Lai Visit to Hanoi
Chicom Premier Chou En-Lairs recent four day visit to Hanoi was
primarily to boost North Vietnamese morale in a difficult period.
Chinese promises and commitments, however, probably did not come
up to Hanoi wishes.
-- While Chou did not specifically rule out the possibility of
Chinese intervention in Indochina, he gave no indication that this was
at all imminent.
-- Chou promised all-out support to Communist forces in
Indochina, but his predictions of a Communist victory by the "Indochinese
people'.' minimized the necessity of Chinese intervention. He
characterized China's role in Indochina as that of a "reliable rear area. "
-- He also suggested that North Vietnam could take care of itself
if attacked.
-.- North Vietnamese delegates in Paris have stated several times
that a threat to North. Vietnam was a threat to China. Chinese media,
however, never reported these statements,
- The North Vietnamese probably wanted Chou to help deter
Allied attacks on North Vietnam by repeating the commitment to Hanoi
which the North Vietnamese delegates had claimed in Paris, but Chou
was not prepared to do so.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/17: LOC-HAK-293-5-13-7
.4 a .d
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/17: LOC-HAK-293-5-13-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-- On the first day of the visit, Chou would go no farther than to
state that enlarging the war in the "Indochinese area" posed a "serious
threat" to China.
The tone of the speeches indicated that the Chinese approached
the visit with reserve. The initial public ebullience of North Vietnamese
Premier Pham Van Dong thus soon became subdued -- suggesting that
the Chinese had dampened Hanoi's expectations in the initial talks.
-- The final communique stated that intensified Allied "aggression""
in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia "directly menaces" both North
Vietnam and China. This vague language probably represented a
compromise with the Chinese who are reluctant to commit themselves
more specifically.
- The communique repeated Chou's earlier statement that China
would not let the U. S. "do whatever it pleases" in Indochina and that the
Chinese would not flinch from "even the greatest national sacrifice" to
aid the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples. However, there were
no specifics.
The communique also stated that the "grave situation" resulting
from the expansion of the war had been discussed and "identical views"
had been reached on how to deal with possible U. S. "military adventures.
The communique gave no clue as to what these views are.
-- The communique did not mention increased military aid to North
Vietnam -- probably because a supplementary aid agreement had been
recently concluded in Peking; however, Chinese logistic support was no
doubt discussed.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/17: LOC-HAK-293-5-13-7