LETTER TO RAY S. CLINE FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-13-1-31-1
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: March 31, 1971
• Content Type: LETTER

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19
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Ray:
March 31, 1971
Thank you for providing me your thoughts on both the WSAG
meetings on the LAMSON operation and on the need for a more
systematic approach to net assessments. As you point out,
the question is the best way of drawing upon the resources
available to the U. S. Government in reaching policy decisions.
Of course, this has been and continues to be a major considera-
tion in the functioning of the current NSC process.
I am sure we will continue to grapple with this and other such
problems as we go along and I appreciate receiving your views.
Warm regards,
/____7
Henry A. Kissinger
Dr. Ray S. Cline
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
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V 4P 1P
March 26, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY KISSINGER
FROM: Tom Latimer
SUBJECT: Ray Cline Letter to you on Laos Logistics
Ray Cline has written you giving his reaction to the two WSAG meetings
on the Laos logistics problem. (Tab A) He states that he was disturbed
"by the fact that none of you groat men on the WSAG seem to have done this
homework berme (his emphasis) rather than after the decision was reached
to launch the Route 9 operation. "
His purpose in writing to you has to do with the proper use of intelligence
in arriving at important decisions. In swan, he does not believe you are
drawing fully on the intelligence resources available "to make a coherent
assessment" of the probable developments that would result from various
alternative courses of action under study by the NSC. He has attached a
memorandum he prepared for the Under Secretary on exploiting intelligence
staffs for decision making. (Tab B)
The essence, of Cline's memorandum is a recommendation for systematic
preparation of "not assessments," I. s. studies which arrive at judgments
comparing American forces with hostile forces. He motes that NIE's
generally assess only foreign forces and developments and he quotes
Director Helms to the effect that he does not have the authority to prepare
net assessments.
In conclusion, Ray Cline advocates the creation of a new NSC Subcommittee
something like the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the early Kennedy years.
You are, of course, now receiving not assessments on specific problems
where it is deemed useful, including the LAMSON Operation. It may be,
as Cline states, that INR was not asked for its views prior to the initiation
of LAMSON but State was and made its contribution in the WSAG.
-_ The proposal for establishing a formal NSC subcommittee to
systematically prepare net assessments has some merit but
the same goal could be achieved either by continuing the pre.et t
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- rw.w.rWrx
ad hoc procedure via the WSAG or, where pertinent, by
instructing Director Helms to include such assessments
in key NT's such as the one on Soviet Intercontinental
Attack Forces.
At Tab C is a note from you to Ray Clint acknowledging the receipt of
bin letter.
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T L: igd: 3 / 26 / 71
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 V
W
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON
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CONFIDENTIAL
..
Dear Henry:
March 24, 1971
It was very enlightening--not to say amusing--to attend the two
of military operations in the Route 9 area.
recent WASAG meetings on the logistics systems in Laos and the impact
I confess that I was somewhat frustrated during the discussion,
because I felt that the "adversary proceedings" between CIA and DIA
prevented the orderly description of the intelligence system involved
and an estimate of what it could or could not do in the way of quan-
tification. It seemed to me that about 20 minutes of straightforward
exposition would have clarified things so that you need not have spent
four hours on it. Since I am familiar with the wayward-behavior of
interagency committees, these proceedings did not dismay me at all,
and certainly it is better to go deeply into things like this than
to let them drift on in vagueness.
I was disturbed, however,-by the fact that none of you great men
on the WTSAG seem to have done this homework before rather than after
the decision was reached to launch the Route 9 LAMSON) operation.
of the real military possibilities in Laos.
LAMSON operation will prove to have been "'successful" in the context
I was not consulted in advance on the wisdom of the operation by
anyone, so I have no personal stake in proving the decision right
or wrong. In fact, I think it was a good decision and I believe the
explaining them once they have been made. For your personal infor-
i?n reaching sound decisions and--perhaps equally important--in
merely to make you and the U.S. Government look as good as possible
alternative courses of action under study by the National Security
Council. This problem is inherently yours, and my interest in it is
assessment of probable developments that would result from various
fully on the intelligence resources available to you to make .a coherent
having to do with the proper use of intelligence in arriving at im-
portant decisions. It does not appear to me that you are drawing
The point r am writing to you about is a rather abstract one
mation only, to elucidate my main point further, I am attaching a
Mr. Henry Kissinger,
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs,
The White House.
r.rn[Cnhtnt mill rhn"rTrrMTTAI
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CONFIDENTIAL"
-2-
(SECRET ATTACHMENT)
Sincerely,
Ray S. Clin
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
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matters are too important to be Iett exclusively -GU tine miiri.ary
principles are relevant to such matters as estimating in advance
within-the framework of the State Department's operating procedures.
memorandum on exploiting intelligence staffs for decision-making
planners.
Attachment:
Memorandum on Net Assessments
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THE DIRECTOR or INTELLIGENCE AND REs1 tuCtt.
MEMORANDUM
'March. 8, 1971
To !The Under Secretary
.Through S/S
Cline
From INR - Ray S. Lill,
Subject : Factors in Making a Net Assessment of US and Soviet
Strategic Forces - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
This memorandum is in.response to your request to INR Deputy Director
Len Weiss for a discussion of the factors involved in making a net assess-
ment of US and Soviet forces.
In the intelligence and research community the term '?'net assessment"
is used to refer to a study which arrives at a judgment comparing American
forces with hostile or potentially hostile foreign forces. It might
describe the relationship between. existing Soviet and US forces and also
the likely development of future Soviet forces as a consequence of the
.Soviet perception of US force programs and policies.
Net assessments need not be limited to the military sphere.. They
is between an intelligence "estimate,".which traditionally deals only with
foreign forces and developments, and a study which relates these matters
specifically to American strengths, weaknesses and courses of action.
are also applicable to political and economic problems. Thus, for example,
a net assessment of the Middle East situation would take into account the
interaction of the policies and courses of action pursued by the principal
powers involved, including the United States. The key distinction involved
In our view, such net assessments of Soviet and American strategic
agencies and Departments, with their differing interests and points of-
an existing institutional framework within which the several interested
Yet there, is no systematic preparation of such evaluations, nor is there
offensive and defensive forces (as well as of other situations) are a
valuable analytical tool to assist in making policy and. program decisions.
view, can regularly work to_prepare such assessments..
FORMAT AND SUBSTANCE
In the military sphere the net assessment should be an annual,
companion,document to the major National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's)
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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realistically such matters as a spiralling arms race. The policy decisions
on correct courses of United States action, as I have said, would not be
made in the net assessment itself, but left for consideration and action
the'likely inter-action of planned or estimated future force levels.
Such a study might point out opportunities and dangers implicit in pro-
jected courses of action, and also suggest alternatives. Such assessments
of future inter-actions would be speculative, especially. if projected over
any length of. time. Yet they are at the heart of any effort to analyze
In addition, the net assessment, as noted above, should consider
specific policy conclusions, leaving that to another and higher stage'
of decision-making. It would, however, highlight critical elements ink
the balance of forces.
.The net assessment, if done in this manner, would avoid reaching
aspect of the net assessment four dimensional.
strategic forces would have to be considered together. For example, the
SS-9 ICBM and US. ABM's ought to be .considered together, while US ICBM's
and the Soviet ABM would also have to be considered, thus making this
offensive and defensive forces,. intercontinental and certain peripheral
of US forces similar to those of Soviet forces in the NIE's. Strategic
on Soviet military forces. It would, therefore, require a discussion
elsewhere.
PAST AND CURRENT PRACTICES
Lately, some net assessments have been made under general NSC auspices
either in the DPRC, the Verification Panel or in various NSSM's.
.Components of the Department of Defense, such as JCS or an individual
command such as SAC also prepare net assessments for their own use.
During the early part of the Kennedy Administration there was a Net
Evaluation Subcommittee in the NSC. Later Secretary McNamara tended
to gather this function into the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
years. In the 1950's a JCS-CIA joint team was set up for this purpose.
.Net assessments of military forces have been attempted over the
As of now, there is no one locus in the DOD responsible for
making authoritative net assessments. There is likewise no established
procedure in the Department of State for cranking in political and
economic factors in net assessments of broad military developments
to specific problems at hand, rather than systematically.
but in these cases.net assessments are made irregularly and in response
and the work of the DPRC and the Verification Panel perform this function,
or complex international conflicts.. In some respects the NSSM process
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SECRET
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NIE's AND NET ASSESSMENTS
In NIE 11-8-70, on Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces, the
Intelligence Community came close to making a:net assessment, or, more
accurately, a series of net assessments on specific questions. For
example, in describing Soviet capabilities against Minuteman silos,
account had to be taken of the hardness of those silos. On a more
general plane, it was noted that future Soviet force levels probably
would depend in large measure on US force levels. Three illustrative
US forces-were described, and the possible Soviet reaction to each was
considered.
Nevertheless, the NIE is' not a true net assessment. In fact, this
was noted by USIB when it considered the estimate, and Mr. Helms indicated
some sympathy with the view that a net assessment, that is, a detailed
of Central Intelligence and Chairman of USIA, does not'have the authority
discussion of Soviet forces. He noted, however, that he, as the Director
forces, would be more useful to top policy makers than just a detailed
comparison and evaluation of US and Soviet strategic attack and defense
to prepare such a study.
The need, therefore, is to select a proper forum,-adequately
machinery (involving S/PC and INR mainly, but drawing in expertise from
all Bureaus) to make net assessments. on all foreign policy problems.
atic basis objective net assessmentson which policy and program decisions
can be made. For its own part, the Department of State should establish
reflecting inter-agency interests, for preparing on a regular, system-
In my view, the best inter-agency forum would be a new NSC Committee,
,work closely with it. It would be shielded as much as.possible from
pressure from policy and/or operational offices, and it would be staffed
to the Office of National Estimates in the intelligence field and would
be responsible solely for preparing net assessments. It would be similar
something like the old Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC. The group
would be separate from and independent of other NSC Committees, and would
by career professionals from the several agencies which would take part
in the net assessment process.
.'CONCLUSIONS
The expanded Soviet military NIE's have taken on some of the
characteristics of net assessments of Soviet and US forces, but they
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analyzing where we are and what is likely to happen in foreign affairs
of action. All of this is intended to give us a more systematic way of
program to study complex foreign policy issues involving Inter-action
among a number of nations all reacting to American policies and courses
out for the president and his chief advisors the major issues surfaced
by the net assessment and alternative likely courses of action. The
Department of State should tool up to support this process by establish-
ing systematic net assessment machinery and procedures inside the
Department, and should for its own purposes develop a net assessment
Finally, the annual net assessment of strategic forces should point
existing balance of US and Soviet strategic offensive and defensive
an appropriate inter-agency group, should describe and evaluate the
over-all net assessments of US and Soviet strategic forces be prepare
to assist top policy makers in making decisions in this area. This is
necessary because of the inter-action and relationship of US and, Soviet
cations--military, political and economic--of modern strategic weapons
'4
deployments, such as the Safeguard ABM, require that annual, objective
balance, the 'cost of modern strategic weapons systems and the rami f i -
are notrue comprehensive net' assessments. The current strategic
before we try to decide what to do about it.
have such net assessments, we can consider further how best to go about
it would be useful to discuss it with you. (We have not discussed our
After you have had a chance to think about this matter, I believe
RECOMMENDATION
setting up a system to make them.
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