THE PRC AND ARMS CONTROL

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
41
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
October 7, 2010
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 15, 1971
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9.pdf2.23 MB
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/11 : LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9 MEMORANDUM. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OSD, DOS, JCS reviews completed INFORMATION June 15, 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGL 7 SUBJECTS The PRC and Arms Control At Tab A is an issues paper on the PRC and arms control which was prepared by ; 1.- DA for the NSC Meeting of March 25 on (SSMs 106 and 107. ACDA proposed in this paper that we take an appropriate opportunity to exchange. viewa? with the PRC on: a renunciation of force declaration; a Washington.-Peking hot line; information exchange on nuclear weapons safeguards; agreement not to possess biological weapons; Pugwash-type unofficial arms control talks; and a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss ace a1 war, command and control, and arrangements for emergency communication. You will recall that the conseltaus at the March 25 NSC meeting was that ACDA's proposals were not a matter of urgent priority. I have reserva- tions with respect to several of them, as follows: - The renunciation of force propoaal.'t Iries with it too many connotation a:. of than sterile debate in which vim, and the PRC engaged for so long over a renunciation of force agreement that touched on T Taiwan, and the failure to touch on Taiwan in its present wording might give the PR C grounds for deala-g: with Taiwan as an internal issue. Certainly the political effect on the ROC would be severe. -- An agreement not to possess biological weapons might cause the Chinese to bring. up the "germ warfare" charges which they made against us in the Kor, ,war. We certainly do not wish to rehash the past, and the ACDA paper ite,f lists more disadvantages than advantages. The five-power conference might smack too much to the Chinese of an effort to impose nuclear restrictions on them and hence objectionabl To Peking, the NPT and the Partial..Test Ban Treaty were :;nuclear blackmail, " i. e. efforts by the nuclear superpowers to restrict the ability of the lesser powers to develop their defensive capability. Ila T- :aNSITI E ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/11 : LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/11 : LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9 IKSI'I IVE At Tab B are the sections of NSSM 124 on next steps toward the PRC which list the groups of recommended options, including arms control options, we.rn ht wish. to follow. You will notice that the State, Defense, and CIA have hi 7nnucl the same reservations as I have had (although not for precisely the. same reasons), and list a information exchange on nuclear weapoi a,saf+ guards and Pugwash-type meetings under Group I; a Washington-P,. hot line under Group II; and a renunciation of force agreement and af`j'ive-power meeting under Group III. Itmigl*be noted that .r n ciation of force question is not strictly spe iri an ": ~ 'control option,s since it involves a much wider range lati ~at~ ~oi~r ~~ Tab C ii it n gs .a f~ spar on this issue which was prepared by low- up to the SRG meeting which preceded the ar h Z ;;NSC meeting. ' It points out the problems and disadvsts',rges with respect to the. R,od and opinion in other parts of +A i.a, '.*Ad s gjests,;rneans of haandling these reactions. TOP SECRET'ISENSITI"V E No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/11 : LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/11: LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9 - , ,,,.,, ? Number Lof_~y copies, series S ;CItE7'f LTriDIS UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY WASHINGTON Marc , 1971 OFFICE, OF MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, Subject: -China and Arms Control INFORMATION MEMORANDUM I attach our issues paper on "US--China Arms Control `Talks", which you a"sked about at the Senior... Review Group meeting on Friday, March 12. This is a planning paper. would presumably have to await Warsaw talks, except that Action in this field the.xesumption of the --._Ve have carried out one of the recom- milenc3ations. We suggested to the Romanians that ,they invite Chinese participation in Pug-wash, to be held in Bucharest this year. We are now developing with the State -Department a response to your request to Under- Secretary Irwin rpgardi-g rLnunciation of force declaration. - T The other proposals in the paper need inter-agency review. Attachment: Issues Paj,)er - "US-China Arms Control Talks" Group 1 - Err. e%"I"r /T r-,Dill automatic No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/11 : LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/11 : LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9 SECRET/7.11' D1S ISSUES PAPER SECRET/LDIDIS Group 1 Excluded from autornn ti_c No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/11 : LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9 cation downnradinry and No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/11 : LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9 . ..US--China Arms Control. Talks-. Renunciation of Force Washington-Peking Hot Line Information E:.change on Nuclear Weapon-, Safeguards. Agreement Not to Possess Biological Weapons 11 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/11 : LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/11 : LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9 -- After the. 17arsaw talks---with- Chia--resume-,--or- in-ano-t4er appropriate forum, the US should propose an exchange of views _ on one or more of the following arms control measures: US-China Arms Cozitrol:s 1955 about a re:iurnciation_of forc lE ration based on a ---draft , presented by. China' rfailed__to result in an agreement. While there has been some limited and general discussion of arms control at Warsaw; we have never made specific proposals which could pro'iide.the basis for an-exploratory dialogue or ..-r in::ormati.on exchange on nuclear weapons a ::enunciation of force dec-laration a- ~tashingtonking hot lir..e sa:eguards ag::eement not to possess biological weapons -~ Pi wash type unofficial arras control talks. -- a i.onference of the five nuclear powers to diuss accidental war, command and control, ? 'and arrangements for emergEncy communication. These meats Tres .have been selected 1 ecause they might pro vide some commo'i rgr'ou.nd 'between the US End the PRC where there has been none b.~fore. Discussions with China at Warsaw in for understandings or agreements with Peking on arms control matters. SECRET /T TflDX S From the 1J point of view, these proposals could carry forward the. Pre ;ident's policy of seeki'-~g improvement of relations with ?eking. Within the context of the triangular No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/11 : LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9 . No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/11: LOC-HAK-464-5-2-9 US-Soviet-China relationship, they would be a partial but . none t 1leless significant counterpoise to the special US-Sov iet rE presentec1 by SALE . They. would give meaning and content to our declared policy of n,:utraiity in the Sino-Soviet cor,fllct. Arms talks with .hc P1W would also favorably affect developments in Japan, alleviating Japanese concerns over Peking's growing nuclear capability and con- stricting those in Japan who might wish to rearm. Finally, as: Pek+ng:'s nu-clear-capability -grows it is-increasingly important and urgent that we find areas of possible consensus :-between the US and the PRC on-arms cone:-ol.. The PRC might value discussion of these measures because of their political significance, not necessarily for their SECRET/T.TM?Il)IS intrinsic arms control value. Peking m=_htbeli_eve that some responsiveness to US initiatives oil aims control, would be interpreted as signaling an interest in a change in US-PRC relations and would enhance Peking's bargaining power vis-a-vis Moscow. lusion against her. In- the somewhat longer run, the PRC may see the success 6f-bon-proliferation to be in its o;-7n interest, unproductive at this time to propose'me1, + f S fi'-; ?a3re i:y~ DET :f R ii - il L':?YY~ S 3 ~. ~-f ~ ~-i'5t~~ ' ~ ~ / k= re ~ 7 ~,?6- __R.uv.a., ,.L s.J -tuf.,:c ~ L~4 ~J:,s ~._ .ai1.L .i? : i'L`r.. .`.z. a cr .r: ,qtr o g Lri.. ~ ~ -: 4 ,~ 9: s n ~ ,_ s ? ;f Y / J ~ _ s J >~ i ~ ?` Z r y Y _. ? - _., t r - .:. .+ i a - [ }' tv 'fi. 6Z. ~:~ ~~.._ ,_,.t- ,~ +.:.l.~?S +t5 ' :? ::J''...r- f,i.: ?t c