(SANITIZED) SINO-SOVIETS US RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-20-4-23-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: February 11, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-20-4-23-9
INFORMATION
February 11, 1972
MEMORANDUM OR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: TOM LATIMER
SUBJECT: Soviet Sinologists Discuss Sine-Soviets
US Relations
The attached report contains some views
The Soviet policy of encirclement of China and the power structure
of the Chinese regime.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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co a
felt that China was reacting to the
Soviet encircierriont policy by inviting President Nixon to
China, by attempting to convince the nations of Southeast
Asia that Peking has no aggressive intent toward them, by
offering advantageous 0001102/1ie opportunities to Js-pan, by
contesting Soviet influence wherever possible and by
maintaining military pressure along the Soviet border.
agreed that the current Chinese regime is
exclusively a diuznvirats of Mao and Chou and that each is awaiting
the opportunity to crush the other.
? In that regard, Chou has staked his political future on the
new American policy while Mao has carefully left himself
room to denounce Chou if that policy fails.
?
think the U.S. is in a weak position
in regard to China because it has limited itself to dealings
with Mao and Ch.ou while the Soviets have good friends among
those who will succeed the current leadership.
MORI C03317497
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-20-4-23-9
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-20-4-23-9
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Regarding President Nixon's trip, did not think
It would bring an end to the Vietnam war, believe China
Is fully ready to withdraw support for Hanoi if the chines, could get
an advantageous package deal with the U.S.
-- Should concrete results be achieved from President Nixon's
visit to China, felt that the Soviet reaction
would take two forms: first, an attitude of increased
accommodation with the U.S. and secondly, a willingness
to appease Japanese desires.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-20-4-23-9
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-20-4-23-9
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-20-4-23-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-20-4-23-9
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-20-4-23-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-20-4-23-9
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-20-4-23-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-20-4-23-9
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