CABLE TO HENRY A. KISSINGER FROM ALEXANDER HAIG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-490-9-11-6
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 10, 1972
• Content Type: CABLE

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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: 1---6- 10
T 0 P S E C RE T SENSITIVE 10090OZ ? 72 VIA CAS CHANNELS (BUNKER)g.i
CALL COLONEL KENNEDY TMMMIATELY UPON RECEIPT
APND FLASH TO KISSINGER AT KEY BTSCAYNE. INFORM KENNEDY
TO CALL KEY,BTSCAYNE AND HAVE THIS FLASH MESSAGE DELIVERED
DIRECTLY TO KISSINGER UPON RECEIPT REGARDLESS OF THE HOUR.
FROM: HEIG SAIGON, 0256 FLASH
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
BUNKER ' AND I SPENT TWO HOURS WITH THIEU AND NHA STARTING AT
11:00 AM SAIGON TIME NOVEMBER 10. THIEU READ THE PRESIDENT'S
LETTER VERY CAREFULLY MAKING MARGINALIA AT csEY PLACES. I THEN EXPLAINED
TO HTM IN DETAIL THE GENERAL HARACER OF THE CHANGES WE INTENDED TO
SEEK, COVERED THE GAME PLAN AND THEN EXPANDED AT SOME LENGTH ON THE
REASONS WHY IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THIEU COOPERATE WITH US IN THE FINAL
STAGES. I HIT VERY STRONGLY THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS FAILURE TO DO SO
AND, IN EFFECT, PRESENTED HIM WITH AN ULTIMATUM.
AFTER COMPLETION OF THIS LENGTHY PRESENTATION, DURING WHICH THIEU
CONTINUALLY CONDUCTED A CONVERSATION WITH NHA IN VIETNAMESE, THIEU
STATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE MORE DETAILS ON THE SPECIFIC CHANGES
WE WERE GOING TO SEEK, NOTING THAT PRINCIPLES WERE NOT SUFFICIENT FOR
HIM TO MAKE THE KIND OF DECISION WE WERE ASKING FOR. HE STATED
THAT WHEN YOU BRIEFED DURING YOUR LAST VISIT TO SAIGON THINGS LOOKED
RATHER GOOD BUT WHEN THEY READ THE ENGLISH TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT,
THERE APPEARED TO BE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN WHAT YOU SAID AND WHAT THEY
READ. THEN WHEN THEY READ THE VIETNAMESE VERSION THESE DISCREPANCIES
GREW AND BECAME MORE SERIOUS. HE STATED THAT THIS CAUSED GREAT DIFFI-
CULTY NOT ONLY IN SAIGON BUT IN ALL OF THE CAPITALS THAT YOU VISITED
WHERE ORAL BRIEFINGS WERE GIVEN. INILIALLY, MOST WERE ENTHUSIASTIC
BUT WHEN THEY READ THE COLD PRINT THEY LOST ALL CONFIDENCE. THIEU
STATED HE DID NOT WANT THIS KIND OF DIFFICULTY ON THIS OCCASION.
I TOLD -THIEU IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT WE WOULD, OF COURSE, WORK
WITH HIM AS WE DEVELOPED SPECIFIC LANGUAGE BUT THAT HE .MUST UNDERSTAND
THAT I'WAS NOT HERE TO NEGOTIATE WITH HIM BUT RATHER TO DISCUSS WITH HIM
THE CONTENTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WHICH CLEARLY ENUNCIATED THE
GENERAL DIRECTIONS THAT THE PRESIDENT INTENDED TO PURSUE ON THE IMPOR-
TANT OUTSTANDING ISSUES THAT REMAINED. I STATED THAT WE HAD MADE THE
DECISION TO PROCEED AND NOW IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR US TO KNOW IN
PRINCIPLE WHETHER OR NOT HE WOULD COOPERATE WITH US. I POINTED OUT
THAT WE '!ERE BEING SUBJECTED TO COUNTLESS CONFLICTING HIGH LEVEL VIEW-
POINTS WHICH PURPORTEDLY REPRESENTED THIEU'S THINKING AND WHICH WERE
BEING PROVIDED TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESS WITH INCREASING REGULARITY.
I STATED THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR US TO BE INFORMED WITH RESPECT TO
THIFU'S INTENTIONS THAT WE ARE PREPARED FOR EITHER EVENTUALITY AND
THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO PROCEED WITH A SETTLEMENT NOW
WAS UNSH5KEABLE AND INEVITABLE.
T1{IE!J SEEMED TO BACK OFF9 SENSING THAT WE WERE HEADING TOWARD
SOME FIRSTCLASS BRINKMANSHIP. HE STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT
WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO GIVE HIM CHAPTER AND VERSE BUT THAT IT WOULD
BE MOST HELPFUL IF WE COULD ANSWER SOME GENERAL QUESTIONS WHICH HE
AND HIS ADVISERS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT, SUCH AS THE SIZE OF THE ICCS9
WHEW IT WOULD BE IN PLACE, WHEN THE CEASEFIRE WOULD TAKE PLACE WITH
RESPECT TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT, HOW THE POLITICAL PROCESS WOULD OCCUR,
WHEN WE VISUALIZED UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTHIWOULD TAKE PLACE,
ETC. HE STATED THAT HE HAD A MEETING SCHEDULED WITH HIS NSC THIS AFTER-
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-11-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-11-6
NOON IN WHICH THEY WOULD DISCUSS THE SITUATION. HE WOULD THEN LIKE TO
HAVE ME MEET SOMETIME TONIGHT, AFTER 9:00 PM SAIGON TIME, WITH
TWO OR THREE OF HIS KEY ADVISORS TO SEE HOW MANY OF THE OUTSTANDING
QUESTIONS 'YE COULD CLARIFY TO ASSIST HIM IN CONSIDERING THE BROAD
QUESTION AT ANOTHER MEETING WITH HIS NSC THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE TOMORROW
MORNING SAIGON TIME. FOLLOWING THIS MEETING, THIEU SAID HE WOULD MEET
WITH ME AT 3:00 PM SAIGON TIME AND PROVIDE ME WITH AN ANSWER TO THE
PRESIDENT'S LETTER.
MY JUDGMENT NOW IS THAT THTEU CANNOT BRING HIMSELF TO AN OPEN
BREAK WITH US. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE WILL EXERCISE EVERY PLOY IN
HIS DICTIONARY TO ACHIEVE FURTHER DELAY, HOPEFULLY WITHOUT A COMMIT-
MENT..I ALL OF THIS TENDS TO SUGGEST THAT HE INTENDS TO GO ALONG IN THE
,FINAT ANALYSIS BUT WE HAVE BEEN FOOLED BEFORE AND MAY BE FACED WITH
A FIRM NO TOMORROW AFTERNOON.
IN THE INTERIM, GIVEN THE SUSPICIOUS NATURE OF THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE, I THINK IT WOULD SERVE OUR PURPOSE TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS
POSSIBLE AS WE CAN ON THE QUESTIONS THAT THEY HAVE. WITH RESPECT TO
THE SPECIFIC POSITIONS THAT YOU WOULD TAKE IN THE PARIS MEETINGS, WE
HAVE TWO OPTIONS. THE FIRST (OPTION A) IS TO MERELY GIVE NHA A
WRITTEN VERSION OF THE TALKING POINTS WHICH I USED THIS MORNING ON
THE MAJOR CHANGES. THESE, AS YOU KNOW, ARE GENERAL IN CHARACTER
BUT WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO REASSURE THIEU. THE SECOND OPTION (OPTION B
WOULD INVOLVE OUR ACTUALLY GIVING THE SPECIFIC CHANGES YOU INTEND TO
PRESS FOR ON THE MAJOR ITEMS CONTAINED IN THE TALKING POINTS. IN EACH
CASE, WE WOULD GIVE THE MINIMUM OR FALLBACK POSITION AS AGREED UPON
WEDNESDAY IN WASHINGTON. THE DISADVANTAGE OF THIS IS THAT THIEU
WOULD THEN HAVE A SCORECORD TO ASSESS YOUR EFFECTIVENESS IN PARIS AND
BEFORE THAT TIME HE MAY DEMAND OTHER CHANGES WHICH WILL BE EVEN TOUGHER
TO MANAGE. THE ADVANTAGE IS THAT WE WOULD BE DEALING IN A MOST FORTH-
RIGHT WAY WITH THIEU AND I THINK TAKE A LARGE STEP TOWARD ELIMINATING
CURRENT SUSPICIONS WHICH ARE VIRULENT.
THE DECISION ON WHICH OPTION TO PURSUE DEPENDS ON YOUR AND THE
PRESIDENT'S WILLINGNESS TO LAY IT ON THE LINE DURING MY TRIP. IN THIS.
MORNING'S MEETING, I BROUGHT IT TO THE POINT OF CONFRONTATION. THERE
IS NO DOUBT IN THIEU'S MIND THAT A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM HIM MAY WELL
RESULT IN BILATERAL ACTION BY US. HE OBVIOUSLY AVOIDED, AND I BELIEVE
INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO AVOID, THIS KIND OF A RUPTURE. IF YOU WISH ME
TO PUSH IT TO THE HILT, I WOULD STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE TAKE THE
SECOND OPTION. IF ON TH OTHER HAND, YOU WANT TO HOLD OFF RISKING A
FINIAL BREAK DURING MY VISIT THEN THE MORE GENERAL APPROACH IN OPTION A
WOULD MAKE MORE SENSE. IF I DO NOT HEAR FROM YOU BEFORE OUR MEETING
TONIGHT, I WILL USE OPTION A SINCE THIS IS ESSENTIALLY A REPEAT OF MY
ORAL PESENTATION THIS MORNING.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-11-6 4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-11-6
w
ED YOUR GUIDANCE ON HOW FAR .I CAN GO ON TECHNICAL
N
E
I ALSO
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HOW WE VISUALIZE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
AfREEMENT ITSELF. BUNKER, NEGROPONTE AND MYSELF WILL CAVEAT EACH
ASWER IN ANY EVENT TO BE SURE WE ARE PROTECTED. WE WILL NOT MAKE
POLICY BUT WHEN WE HAVE DISCUSSED AN ISSUE SUCH AS THE APPROXIMATE
SIZE OF THE ICCS I THINK IT SERVES OUR PURPOSE TO BE AS FORTHCOMING
AU POSSIBLE. ALONG THIS LINE, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE OF VALUE TO GIVE
THIEU A COPY OF THE DRAFT PROTOCOL ON THE ICCS PREPARED BY SULLIVAN.
SINCE HE HAS ALREADY OFFICIALLY CIRCULATED THIS, WE SHOULD PROBABLY
STICK WITH HIS VERSION. WE CAN POLICE UP POSSIBLE CHANGES AT A
LATER DATE AND THE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR STAFF DRAFT
AND SULLIVAN'S WHICH YOU HOLD THERE IN KEY BISCAYNE ARE NOT THAT
DIFFICULT TO MANAGE. I AM SORRY TO DISTURB YOU AT THIS HOUR BUT I AM
SURE YOU RECOGNIZE HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT I HAVE YOUR GUIDANCE
BEFORE ENTERING TONIGHT'S MEETING. IF IT IS NOT AVAILABL, I INTEND TO
PROCEED AS OUTLINED HEREIN SO THAT THIEU WILL HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO
EXCUSES FOR FAILING TO BITE THE BULLET TOMORROW AFTERNOON.
THE MEETING WAS TENSE BUT NEVER EMOTIONAL AND DESPITE THE
FRAN)(NESS OF THE DISCUSSION IT NEVER LOST CORDIALITY. THIEU SEEMED MUCH
MORE CONTROLLED AND CONFIDENT THAN DURING THE OCTOBER DISCUSSIONS.
WARM REGARDS.
OPR NOTE: THIS MESSAGE IS "HAIGTO 3"
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-11-6 10