1. I SAW THIEU THIS MORNING AND GAVE HIM LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT AS CONTAINED REFTEL

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-490-9-20-6
Release Decision: 
RIFLIM
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
March 3, 2011
Sequence Number: 
20
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 19, 1972
Content Type: 
CABLE
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PDF icon LOC-HAK-490-9-20-6.pdf420.24 KB
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/03: LOC-HAK-490-9-20-6 1972 NOV 19 nm 3 29r~cr A0 -4 06 SENSITIVE 190910Z'NOV 72 VIA CAS CHAWNELr(BUNXER) FRO$e A I ASSADOR i ? -MOON B 7f, IMMEDIATE TOt THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER REF1 1011; "r.25 1 SF"CTInN I nF 2 1. ' I IAV TWIEU THIS MORNINOO AND GAVE HIM LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT AS C'NTAI5ED REFTEL. THIEU READ THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER CAREFULLY, BUT AS WTflAL MADE 40 COMMENT. HE' THEN HANDED ME LETTER DATED NOVEM- OER 19 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT, TEXT OF WHICH-FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPH it THIEH SAID THAT HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE TWO POINTSt 1) IN THE MATTER OF THE NCRC THE GVN IS MAKING A CONCESSION rN AGREEING THAT BOTH SIDES SHALL HAVE EQUAL REPRESENTATION ALTHOUO14 T'RE NLF REPRESENTS ONLY ABOUT TEA PERCENT OF THE ROP1'LATIOR* 2) THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF OVA TROOPS IS A VITAL MATTER FOR T"E SV$, HE REALIZES IT IS DIFFICULT FOR U4 ,SINCE WE HAVE BEEN EN!IAGED SA CLOSELY FOR A LONG PERIOD IN THE PRIVATE NEGO- TIATIONS AND BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT HANOI HAS NEVER BEEN WILLING TO ADMIT THE PRESENCE OF THEIR TROOPS IN THE SOUTH. NF RELIEVES, THEREFORE, THAT NVA WITHDRAWAL COULD BE ACHIEVED BY TYE GUN S1J6GESTION FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF "NON-, SIVI'M VIETNAMESE TROOPS", THUS OBVIATING THE MENTION OF NVA TROOPS TO THE SOUTH. THERE WOULD STILL REMAIN NVA TROOPS IN VC "NITS WHO VOW COMPRISE 70.-SB PERCENT OF THESE UNITS; IT ILL BE TMPOSSIBI.E TO IDENTIFY THESE FILLERS EXCEPT BY "tYAMINIING THEIR TEETH" (I ASKED WHETHER, LIKE HORSES, ONE Ctlr,ri..D TELL THEIR ATE BY THE SAME PROCESS). THE GVN PROPOSES TROT ITS OWN TROOPS AND NLF FORCES ALSO BE.DEMOBILIZED ON A IKF FOR ONE BASIS AND THAT THEY RETURN "TO THEIR NATIVE PLACES". I cOrPFNTED THAT THE OVA FILLERS WHO MOULD THEN BE DEMOBILIZED MIGHT THEN RETURN TO NORTH VIETNAM, BUT THIEU SAID THEY WOULD'NOT RETURN NORTH; THEY WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN-IN THE SOUTH, WHICH THEY WILL BE: rLAD TO DO,' ENJOYING A BETTER cTiNDARD OF LIVING HERE WHILE CARRYING ON COVERT ACTIVITIES 'N INSTRUCTIONS FROM HANOI. ?. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTERt ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY DOS Review Completed. SAIGON, NOVEMBER 19, 1972 DEAR R. PRESIDENT, I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER DATED NOVEMBER 14, 1972, ANn I P#VF STUDIED IT VERY CAREFULLY OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS9 rY COLLARORATORS AND I HAVE GONE OVER THE REVISED DRAFT AGREFMFaiT AND ANALYZED THE PROPOSED'CHANrES WHICH YOU HAVE O CAREF"ELY EXPLAINED TO ME, I.$ YOUR. LETTER. IN THE SPIRIT OF THE CORDIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE'DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, T VOQMB LIVE TO CONVEY TO YOU THE CONSIDERED VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC Of VIET NAM ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH WE DEEM OF VITAL IMPORT'ANC11M10THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NANt 1 00 T1&: STATUS. OF THI '!:NORTH VIETWAP SLXNOW4 A ExlfRNeL FoRCE$ THE itnRtN VTETt1AM!1* TRQ'O1 '' ~tl "DE; "' UNAM11TOUt"1SI, VTTFRDRAWII FRO[R'`1fl TH=`VTiET'I$WA't1k~T W, O*CLUSTON. OPr.TI CEA,IEJIRE. nF ITs No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/03: LOC-HAK-490-9-20-6 R ASR NNRNEET :r M c r WE FAN SMTT TQ I{ 'Ass ADOIR 13UNI !R ' DAYS V IET NAt~':,; DRAWA1. O WfSOUTW rOR!E Wi re AWHILE'' THE IDEA OF THE WITHDRAWAL - OF THE NORT THUS , VIETNAMESE TROOPS -IS THERE* THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IS NOT rEATIONSED 9Y'409 Its' THE. At REEMENT. COMCE'RNINO THE DEMOBILIZATION OF THE OPPOSITE FORCES TN SotrTP VIET NAN .09 A ONE=TO-ONE BASIS, aE BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MENTION THAT THE DEMOBILIZED TROOPS SHOULD RETURN TO THEIR NATIVE, PLACES, TO. DEAL WITH: THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY ELEMENTS INCORPORATED IN THE SO-CALLED, VIET'.CONG UNITS. THIS. CONSTITUTES ALREADY A SUBSTANTIAL CDRcESSIONFROM 'OR SIDE'. BECAUSE THE NORTH 'VIETNAMESE TROOPS, AS AGGRESSORS,, SHOULD HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN PRIOR TO THE ALLIED.` TROOPS. IN THIS REGARD, MAY I RECALL THAT AT THE 7 ALLIED .NATIONS SUMMIT CONFERE1CE, HELD ON MANILA IN OCTOBER 1966, THE PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN AGREED THAT ALLIED TROOPS ARE' TO BE WITHDRAWN ONLY SIX N!`ONTHS AFTER-THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS TO NORTH VIET NAMN I WOtJLD LIXE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE NORTH VIFTNA11ESF. TROOPS TO NORTH VIET NAM IS -THEBASIC POINT FOR THE REPU.L-IC OF VIET RAM, AND WE CANNOT. SEE HOW THERE CANt.RE AN HON'ORABLE PEACE IF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE AGGRESSORS IS -NOT DEALT WITH CLEARLY, AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE .CEASE-FIRE. P. CONCERNING THE POLITICAL PROVISIONS, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM CONSIDERS THAT. THE FUNCTION OF THE, COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD SHOULD BE DESCRIBED CLEARLY* AS AN '*ADMINISTRATIVE ORGAN IN CHARGE.: OF THE ELECTIONS".' THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET'NAN IS WILLING TO K:AYE AN IMPORTANT CONCESSION IN ACCEPTING TO HAVE THE NLF PARTICIPATE ON A 51/501 BASIS IN THE COUNCIL.OF. NATIONAL RECON? CILIA.TIO;N AND CONCORD WHILE THEY CONTROL ONLY :A VERY SMALL PERCENTAnE OF THE POPiILATTON. BUT,' ON THE GROUND OF PRINCIPLE, WE CANNOT ACCEPT TO GRANT THE RLF THE STATUS OF "EQUALITY" WITH THE L#CAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUSLTC' OF VIET' NAM,, THEREFORE WE CO N:S IDER THAT THE WORD "EQUALITY" AS PROPOSED I N ARTICLE 9F, SHOULD. BF DELETED. ALSO, AS WE NAVE POINTED OUT ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE "S COMPONENTS" FORMULA FOR THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD, BECAUSE IT IS' ARTIFICIAL, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THIS 19 A POLITICAL CONTEST BETWEEN THE tOP SECRET:SE~S~~ No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/03: LOC-HAK-490-9-20-6 EXCLUS!VPiS ONL' No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/03: LOC-HAK-490-9-20-6 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~ EXCLUS!. YES ONLY T 0. P S F C R E T SENSITIVE' 19f?10Z NOV 72 VIA CAS CHANNELS (RUNNER) FROM: ' tAI ASSADOR BUNKER SATOOR 0276 ' IMMEDIATE T+01 T14F WHITE HO11SE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. XISSINGER FINAL SECTION OF TWO GOVERNMENT OF THE REPflRLIC OF VXET NAM AND .THE NLF, " AND NOT A THREE-CORNERED CONTEST. 3. AS REGARDS THE COMPOSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND St1PERVISIO!, WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT ITS COMPOISITIONN, AS CONTEMPLATED IN THE PRESENT DRAFT, 19 SER1O!1SLY I 'R.ALANCED "BY THE MEMBERSHIP OF TWO COMMUNIST COUNTR-tES, POLAND AND HUNGARY, BECAUSE IT ASSURES IN ADVANCE AT LEAST 51 PER CENT OF THE 'VOTES ,FOR THE 'COMMUNIST SIDE. THIS WILL HAVE VERY GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM BECAUSE.THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION WILL UNDERTAKE. NOT ONLY THE SUPERVISION OF THE CEASE-RTRF, BUT ALSO' THE SUPERVISION OF THE ELECTIONS WHICH WILL DETERMINE .THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET NAMN THEREFORE, WE PROPOSE THAT THIN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTRIL AND Sw!PERVI.SION BE COMPOSED OF 4 NEUTRALS, AND SU40EST TYF FOLLOWING COUNTRIESi AUSTRIA, CANADA, FINLAND, AND SWITZERL4 ND. THE RFA'SON WHY WE FIVE PRIORITY TO THE.ABOVE MENTIONED COUNTRIES OVER INDONESIA IS THAT, LIRE INDIA, INDONESIA HAS EXCHANIED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH NORTH VIET RAN WHILE IT HAS .REFUSED SA FAR TO ESTABLISH SIMILAR RELATIONS WITH THE 'REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. 4. OR THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO.BE CONVENED AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE, WE FEEL THAT ITS USEFULNESS WILL BE FULLY JUSTIFIED ONLY IF IT IS HELD AFTER A CEASE-FIRE PAS BEEN ALSO CONCLUDED IN LAOS AND CAMI..rDIA, SINCE ITS ESSENTIAL ROLE IS TO GUARANTEE PEACE IN INDOCHINA. RESIDES, LAOS AND CAMBODIA LOGICALLY SHOULD BE FULL PARTICIPANTS AT THE CONFERENCE. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THERE ' ARE, SERIOUS PROBLEMS ON THE DELEGATIONS OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES, BECAUSE IT IS WELL KNOWN TWAT THERE IS ONLY ONE LEGAL GOVERNMENT IN. LAOS AS WELL AS IN CAMBODIA. 5. ON TH GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE AGREEMENT, WE BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD LAY DOWN ABLIGATIONS FOR BOTH SIDES, AND, NOT ONLY ON THE VICTIMS OF. AGGRESSION. BOTH SIDES`IN THIS CONFLICT, NORTH VIET NAM AS WELL AS SOt1H.VIET NAM, HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT. PEACE. IN INDOCHINA SHO-ULD' BE RESTORED ON THE BASIS OF THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 1'934 ,AND ISIS GENEVA AGREEMENTS.. THE GOVERNMENT..OF THE REPUDLIC :OF VIET 'NAM CONSIDERS THAT THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 1') 4 GENEVA AGREEMENT ON VIET NAM SHOULD BE REESTABLISHED I N ThE KFr_No _Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/03: LOC-HAK-490-9-20-6 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/03: LOC-HAK-490-9-20-6 THAT IT SHOULD -LAY D1WN ABLIt3ATIONS FOR BOTH SIDES, AND- NOT ONLY ON THE ' VICTIMS .OF - AGt3RESSION. BOT1 SIDES TN THIS CONFLICT, NORTH VIET NAN AS WELL ' AS SOtrrHH VIFT NAM, HavE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT. PEACE IN INDOCHINA 5n0Un0, B RESTORED, ON THE BASIS OF THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF TI 1954.;,AND, 1942. ' GENEVA AGREEMENTS, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ' . REPUBLIC OF VIET NAN CONSIDERS THAT THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF':,' IN THE?`NEV' AGREEMENT, SPELLING - OUT THE BILATERAL OBLIGATIONS OF PARTICULAR .10 TME' CLAUSES PROHIBITING THE JOINING OF 'ANY MILITARY ALLIANCE OR 'MILITARY BLOC, THE MAINTENANCE: BYFOREIGN POWERS OF MILITARY BASES, TROOPS, MILITARY ADVISERS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL eF THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES* 1 AM` CONVINCED. THAT THE ABOVE POINTS ARE ESSENTIAL 'TO A JUSTv HO810RABLE AND DURABLE PEACE. WE HAVE BEEN FIGHTING THIS .WAR. FOR `SEL74-DEFENSE FOR OVER- A DECADE 'AND ' HAVE MADE ENORMOUS `SACRIFICES IN 'THIS STRUGGLE. IN ALL CANDOR. I DO NOT COMPREHEND WHY THE BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH' FOR YEARS WE HAVE HELD AS IND3SPENSABL.E FOR. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GENUINE PEACE SHOULD AE, NOW RA iFICED JUST TO MEET CERTAIN CLOSE DEADLINES WHICH THE ENEMY HAS IMPOSED ON US, OR WHICH WE HAVE ;IMPOSED OR OURSELVES. N3 'PEQPLE, ARE LONGING FOR PEACE MORE THAN OUR TWO PEOPLES, AND 'I AM MOST ANXIOUS TO.' BRING. PEACE TO MY PEOPLE ,AS SOON AS' POSSIBLE. HOWEVER,' PUBL'I.C OPINION AND HISTORY WILL JUDGE US 00. THE KIND PF PEACE WHICH WE-SMALL BRING ABOUT. i DO NOT THT.NX THAT I CAN ADF'QUATELY EXPLAIN TO YOU THE G ?VER 1P+?EVT, Of THE ,REPUBLIC OF' VIET NAM' S VIEWPOINTS THROUGH LETTERS AND MEMORANDA. T PROPOSE TKFREFORE 'TO' SEND. TO YOU A SPECIAL 'MTSSARY TO CONVEY TO YOU IN 'GREATER DETAIL THE ' VIEWS' OF THE 11VERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC-- OF VTET,VAN :ON THE PEACE "FTTLE ENT., IT IS MY EARNEST HOPE .,THAT YOW WOULD: GIVE A FOVORAPLE~RESPONSE TOW THIS .PROPOSAL, _ IN '.VIEW OF ~ ITS VITAL IMPORTANCE : TO 9E NEARO i,R HULL. THEREFORE, I' SHALL 'APPRECIATE IT GREATLY IF, TO THAT EFFECT?' YOU WOULD ACCEPT AS ,MY SPECIAL'EMISSARY,, EITHER FAREI" N MINISTER IRAN VAN LAM OR MY SPECIAL 'ASSISTANT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,. OR, NGUYEN PHU DUC, AT YOUR CONVENIENCE# ADA THIF11 JOINS ME IN EXTENDING TO MRS. NIXON AND YOU OUR WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS AND OUR BEST WISHES FOR COT I tt(,'T"D 1OOD HEALTH. HT5 EXCELLENCY RICHARD M. NIXON . PRESIDEK`T of.THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THE WNTTE HOUSE, WASHINGTON D.C. SI NCERELY,, /5/ THIEU No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/03: LOC-HAK-490-9-20-6 __11 V