STATUS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-15-17-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: June 7, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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V
MEMORANDUM 2255
NATIONAL SBCLJRITY ; COLINCIL
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR.- SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM
W. R. Smyser,
AC LION
June 7,.1974
SUBJECT:. Status of North Vietnamese Troops in Laos
We have .received a CIA memo regarding the current status
of North. Vietnamese troops in Laos. It indicates that some
troops have been withdrawn but that many. remain. (See Tab B.
sign the attached memorandum for the President. (See Tab A.)
Approve Disapprove
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SECRET - XGDS
I I C AS XMPDET;.BYAUTH - HAKISSINGER
Recommendation
That you
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2255
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
INFORMATION
THE PRESIDENT
HENRY A. KISSINGER
Status of North Vietnamese
Troops in Laos
CIA has sent us a memorandum that reviews the current situation
of North Vietnamese troops in Laos. The memorandum gives the
following facts
Hanoi has reduced its forces in Laos from an estimated
83, 000 in February, 1973, to .a present level of 47, 000.
-- The heaviest percentage cut has been in northern
Laos, where North Vietnamese forces have been reduced
from 22, 000 to 10, 000,
In southern Laos, on the other hand, the North
Vietnamese forces have only been cut from 61, 000 to 37, 000.
-- This indicates that about three-fourths of all North
Vietnamese forces in Laos are now in the southern panhandle
and are principally occupied with sustaining the infiltration
route to South Vietnam.
.CIA believes that Hanoiwill probably maintain.a sizeable military force
in Laos although there are indications that at least some additional
North Vietnamese units will be withdrawn permanently or during the
upcoming rainy season. Hanoi wants to keep forces in Laos to sustain.
pressure on the Lao Government and to keep up the access routes into
South Vietnam.
SECRET XGDS
DECLAS - IMPDET; BYAUTH - HAKISSINGER
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w wr
We also have some indications that Hanoi is using its presence in
Laos to exert pressure against U. S. bases in Thailand. A recent
Pathet Lao statement charged that Thailand was violating the Laos.
agreements by permitting U. S. bases in its territory. It suggested
that the situation in Laos would be calmer if U. S. bases in Thailand
were closed. Other material out of Hanoi indicates that Thailand
cannot count on improved relations with North Vietnam until American
bases are closed or their use severely restricted. Hanoi is apparently
still concerned about the threat implied by our bases in Thailand, but
the North Vietnamese leaders seem to have concluded that they can
generate more pressure against our presence in Thailand by keeping
their own troops in Laos than by complying fully with the Laos
agreements.
SECRET
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Office of the Director
June 4, 1974
MEMORANDUM '0R: Major General Brent Scowcroft, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT Status of North Vietnamese Troops in Laos
1. Attached are three copies of a memorandum discussing the
status of North Vietnamese troops in Laos and the reason Hanoi has
not withdrawn them. This memorandum was produced at the request
of Mr. Colby and has been coordinated within the Central Intelligence
Agency.
2. We are sending copies to the other members of WSAG, to
Secretary Schlesinger and to the Directors of DIA and INR.
George/A. Carver, Jr.
:Deputy for National Intelligence Of.ficets
.Attachment
Copies 8-10
SECRET
NSC #2255
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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June . 3; 1974
Status of North Vietnamese?Forces in Laos
The Laos Provisional Government of National Union was
l
estali
ashed
on April 5th, 1974, marking the beginning of the stipulated 60 dad period
rin
c
whi
h all
tai
i
u
c
re
n
g
ng fore-Len troorrs ,ware to be withdrawn from Laos.
combat troops. including those in 6 infantry. regi Pmts and about
sox nta =.4 an estimated 47,000 more the three-fourths of which are
1ni.ntai'1 3.. e.r...6-Z....... T....r /___ _? r_ _ . __ _
w. c:n llJPLP I 4 L= Z!
?7" L.L1U. l
24 hours before the June 4th deadline, line, 'North Vie.tnamese:troops on Laotian
?l
Includes personnel in antiaircraft units.
? intelligence has dropped off significantly and as a result,'we.no longer
hive a timely and: complete picture of Communist forces in Laos. Thus, it
is possible that some North Vietnamese units may have withdrawn undetected.
Since the February 1973 Laotian-cease-fire our knowledge of Communist'
Copy No.
S E C R E T
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 SECRET,I
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2. At the time of the Laos cease-fire, Hanoi had some 83,000
troops stationed in Laos, with most (61,000) committed to.the protection
antiaircrat regiments from the panhandle as. well 'as 17,000 engineer'
316th Infantry Division from northern Laos,. three infantry and nine
Vietnam, reducing the strength of both combat and administrative services
personnel by more than 40 percent.. These withdrawals included the entire
drawn from Laos to North Vietnam or to Communist strongholds in South
Since then, about 36,000 North Vietnamese military personnel have with
and support of the North, Vietnamese logistics system in the Panhandle.
probably will -;temporarily withdraw. additional..rear...services.,-troops -from
a permanent basis. Nevertheless, in the next month or so the Communists
be part of a traditional rainy season drawdown. In southern Laos, there
has been no recent evidence of impending North Vietnamese.withdrawals on
3. There have been tenuous indications that other North Vietnamese
logistic units in northern Laos may be withdrawing, but the moves could
the Laotlan. lanhandie as the rainy. season. takes', full effect and .logistic
an3* :eveizt,'-Aanax probably will maintain a 'sizable military.
certain that' Hanoi, will ii t ? abandon it. -The continued maintenance of
,capability to support their forces in South'Vietnam, and it is almost
logistic corridor is still an integral part of overall North Vietnamese
.revealed North Vietnamese troops in the province will be permanently
stationed there -- disguised as Pathet Lao (PL). In southern Laos, the
October. To the south in Rhammouane Province,
the two remaining infantry regiments will remain there at least until
orce - in -Laos.' :In: northern Laos, recent? intercepts ?. indicate . that . one of.
this system will require a large; permanent manpower commitment.
Why the North Vietnamese Remain in Laos
.5. There are several reasons for Hanoi's determination to keep
substantial numbers of its troops in Laos. The'bulk of the North Vietnamese
forces serve to support the Communist effort against South Vietnam -- Hanoi's
.number one priority in Indochina. Hanoi has spent the past year assidiously
improving its road and infiltration system in the Lao panhandle, .and?there
is little likelihood of Hanoi abandoning this area as long as the fighting
continues in South Vietnam and Cambodia.
S E C R E T
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hedge against potential rightist military moves against the areas controlled
"6'.". In northern Laos, the North-Vietnamese-presence enables Hanoi
to exercise considerably-influence over the PL. It also serves as a
the PL until the North Vietnamese are convinced that their Lao clients
can hold their own against the Lao Army and. do .reasonably well in ,future
by the PL or the news coalition government- itself. Hanoi evidently plans
to continue training, advising, and to some extent logistically supporting
general elections.
political and military interests in the new coalition government.
.namese presence is'probably welcomed by the,PL-as protection for their
Vietnamese leave. For the time being, at-least,'a continued North Viet:
7. For their, part, the PL have shown no. interest in having the North
S E C R E T
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