EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IN THE OCTOBER 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-187-5-2-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 3, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/29: LOC-HAK-187-5-2-7
VA-44.17,--"" ? \`t \L? L 11,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
IAL USE ONLY
OSD, NSS Reviews
Completed.
MEMORANDUM FOR
November 3, 1973
5888
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: Evaluation of Intelligence Support in the
October 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict
In your memorandum of October 23 you recommended that a study
of the timeliness and adequacy of the intelligence support rendered
during the October Arab-Israeli conflict be undertaken by the NSC
Intelligence Committee Working Group. On the same date, the
Director of Central Intelligence reported he was initiating such a
study for consideration by the U.S. Intelligence Board. The corn-.
pleted study will be submitted to the NSC Intelligence Committee
for further review.
(LkoZi
Henry.A. Kissinger
cc: The Director of Central Intelligence
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111
MEMORANDUM 5888
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET/NOFORN October' 29, 1473
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: A. W. Marshall itirt(
SUBJECT: NSCIC Evaluation of Intelligence Support in the
Current Arab-Israeli Conflict
Clements has recommended to you as Chairman of the NSCIC that the NSCIC
Working Group undertake an evaluation of intelligence support during the
current Mid-East crisis (see Tab B).
? Several reviews have already been started which will meet both Clements'
and the NSCIC's needs.
? -- Colby instituted a major review throughout the intelligence
community. He has tasked the USIB Principals for support (see Tab C).
1 have talked with his staff, and he will submit the study to the NSCIC.
Clements' statt now is aware of this effort.
- I am conducting an evaluation of the intelligence support from
the perspective of the NSC staff. My views, which will be sent to you
later, will serve as your independent check on Colby's product.
-- Informal studies have been conducted by several military
services and elements of DIA. These will contribute to Colby's work.
Colby's study is acknowledged by Clements' people as meeting the require-
ments which Clements had in mind in sending to you the request for the NSCIC
to act. Colby is conducting the study in both his roles as DCI and Deputy
Chairman of the NSCIC.
Recommendation
t14444-1A44
That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to t4e?Iliryete noting that the DCI
is undertaking a review on behalf of the NSCIC, I will inform Clements'
people that this responds to his request.
SECRET/NC) ORN GDS
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??
NOFORN
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20301
ZZ OCT 1973
NSC 5888
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Evaluation of Intelligence Support in the Current Arab-Israeli
Conflict (U)
(SNF) I believe that it would be useful to have the NSCIC Working
Group undertake a study of the timeliness and adequacy of the intelligence
support rendered on the current Arab-Israeli conflict both before and
during the hostilities. In particular, I think such a study could well
address the following points:
- The adequacy of regional colte coverage prior to
and during hostilities in providing an accurat A epi tion of the situation
and the military capabilities of the combatants, as well as recommenda-
tion for any indicated adjustments in our collection capability and posture
in the area.
- The adequacy of the interpretation of the available intelli-
gence both before and during hostilities, in particular, the adequacy of
our interpretative effort in providing a forecast of a probable attack by
the Arabs as well as an estimate of relative military capabilities.
- The influence of Israeli inputs and judgments on our own
intelligence appraisals.
- Whether any of the arrangements for improved support
recommended in the recent Working Group report on crisis intelligence
support were put into effect, and how well these worked.
Tac
(C) As I stated in my earlier memorandum of y on crisis
intelligence support, I think it important that records be kept of the
intelligence actions taken during a crisis situation, so that we can later
7?' 31 Dec 75
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DES (,U LL
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reconstruct accurately how well our intelligence machinery functioned.
For this reason, and also to enable assessment while memories are
still fresh, I suggest that the Working Group take up the study immediately.
)1.?
Copy to:
DC1
Chairman, JCS
Deputy Secretary of State
Attorney General
7rPri
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OP IIP
:1'-:%
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
' 4: ,-?.:-:,,I.:.-4-^; !li
VVASH1NGTON, D. C. 20301
?,ir To du E
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MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Studies of Intelligence Crisis Support
(U) By memorandum of 23 May your staff requested comment
on the report of conclusions and recommendations of the Working Group
of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee, drawn from the
three post-mortem studies which the Group has completed so far on
intelligence support during crisis situations.
(5) I have reviewed these conclusions and recommendations and
am in general agreement with their substance. With regard to the need
for better two-way communication between policy-makers and intelligence
producers, my policy staff makes the point that in their recollection
this communication did function during each of these crises at a better
level of effectiveness than the Working Group report would lead one to
believe. However, the measures proposed for a more positive set of
formal arrangements for liaison and for monitoring the flow of
intelligence support seem sound and useful.
(U) I havethe following points to suggest as modifications and-
additions to these arrangements.
(5) First, I note that the Working Group report recommends
(paragraph 13, pages 4-5) that the DCI appoint a senior representative
for crisis liaison and monitoring of support to the NSC machinery, and
that this individual should, as his primary qualification, have'h broad
understanding of the region in which the crisis is centered" (underscoring
mine). It seems to me that this focus on regional expertise misses the
point. In the first place, the DCI's man should be sufficiently senior
to speak for the DCI and have access to the same official levels, if
need be, as the DCI himself does. This face-to-face contact is the most
effective means of solving the fundamental prtiblern of communication
Classified by
1.-XEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
LXECUTIV ORDER 11052. EXEMPTION OATEGORY-.4-.....
DECLASn$:1 t2,Detvrmine
,0 ?l'
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errinT
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.between high-level users and producers. To insure this personal contact,
a level of seniority above that normally occupied by a regional expert
is called for. Second, those crises in which the U.S. is involved take
on their primary importance in terms of the potential confrontation
between ourselves and other major powers. The region provides the
setting, but the local issues are transcended by those of the great power
relationships involved.
(S) Elsewhere (page 3), the Working Group report speaks precisely
to this point when it notes that intelligence analysts (who are regional
specialists) have lacked a sufficiently broad perspective on the crisis,
- especially on Soviet and CPR roles and intentions, and have failed to
share the broader concerns of the policy staffs whom they support. I
would suggest, therefore, that sufficient seniority to act as alter ego. for
the DCI and a broad knowledge of current national security issues be ?
substituted for regional expertise as the primary qualifications for the
DCI's senior crisis liaison and support monitoring officials.
(S) With regard to post mortem studies of future crisis situations,
I suggest that these be prepared for by adopting procedures in advance
of future crises which will enable better reconstruction of what actually
happened than can be obtained from the memories of participants and
normal administrative records. Purposeful, albeit informal, records of
intelligence actions should be compiled at the time they happen, if we
are later to measure accurately how well intelligence responded, and
what improvements are needed.
(U) I also suggest that future studies take up some of the crisis -
intelligence support which did not surface in the examples studied so far.
Specifically, the problems of simultaneous crise-S in different areas and
of communications with policy staff echelons below the NSC machinery
and those outside of Washington might well be addressed.
(5) As a last point, I believe that a more positive approach should
be taken to study and decide on problems of third party support than is
contained in the report. Since our reliance on such support during a future
crisis is already evident, we should study each such situation now, and
make definite policy decision on quid pro 222, security policies, confidence
2
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levels expected, ?and other key aspects. This reduces the need for ad hoc
decisions to be made hastily as a crisis impends or. proceeds.
(U) I suggest that the NSCIC inClude the above points in their
guidance on the report to the DCI.
--- Signed
P, CLEMENTS JR,
?
3
? QCYIPPT ?
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MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals
SUBJECT: Post Mortara on Arab-Israeli Conflict
taact=79
23 OCT 1913
1. I have asked the Intelligence
CoMmunity Staff to review :the intelligence community activities
pertaining to the current conflict in the Middle East.- DIU study
will review our actions before the outbreak of :hostilities and the
intelligence support provided to national consumers during the crisis.
2. I.recluest that you provide assistance to the Intell1genc2 ?
Community Staff in their effort. Specifically, I have in mind the
after-action reports that you are undoubtedly preparing for your own
organizations; these reports will be Very helpful. :Additionally, I
ask that working level analysts and managers be available for inter-
views as the preAsure of the crisis slackens. The final report will
b2 contidared as * USTB agenda item at an appropriate time in the
next morth or sc.
OCl/IC/PRG
Orig- USIB/S
1-ER
1-DOCI
1-D/DCl/IC Chron
1-Subject--
W. E. Colby
Chairman
? r?.?,...777,7,....71r,.1
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25X1
25X1
25X1
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL IP
MEMORANDUM FOR
SUBJECT:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
THE NATIONAL SECU Y COUNCIL
INTELLIGENCE CO ITTEE
Evaluation of In ligence Support in the Current
Arab-Israeli ronflict
The Director of Central Intell
Chairman of the NSCIC, is
support to the policyrnake
1973. This study will b
guidance to the intelli
future periods of in
once, acting in his capacity as Deputy
nducting an evaluation of intelligence
during the Arab-Israeli conflict of October*
reviewed by the NSCIC for the formulation of
once community as to the needs of policyrnakers in
national tension.
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IP
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SUBJECT:
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Evaluation of Intelligence Support in the
October 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict
I4rave-oeee4..fed your memorandum of October 23 4,4*-??14eh you
recommended that a study of the timeliness and adequacy of the
intelligence support rendered during the October Arab-Israeli
conflict be underttkeR by thejMC Intelligence Committee Working
Group. . .
")."--,--, frl'af:
. ...ray ? ? ? ? ? 3, the Director of Central
Intelligence i4.}..si4o4t.?? e was initiating such a study for considera-
tion by the U.S. Intelligence Boar 1-ka-ttstrorztivt-svd-that:The
completed study will, be la temb?of the NSC Intelligence
Committee4?00.-
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: The Director of Central Intelligence
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/29: LOC-HAK-187-5-2-7