THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM'S MR-2

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-450-8-6-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 7, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
ARMY, NSS
reviews
completed.
t,
'
GENT ACTION
January 7, 1972
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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. K1SSINGE
FROM:
Phil Odeen
SUBJECT: The Situation in Vietnam's MR-2
In view of the threatening situation in the MR-2 Highlands, we
took advantage of John Vann's presence in Washington to try to
better understand the problems and determine what action is
needed to reduce the risks of a major military or psychological
defeat in the coming months.
As you know, Vann is a 10-year Vietnam veteran and is the chief
U.S. adviser in MR-2. He was previously the pacification chief
in MR-3 and MR.-4.
The Near - Term Threat
Vann agrees with the CIA assessment -- the Central Highlands will
be the primary focus of VC/NVA activity in Vietnam over the next
two months. Infiltration to this area is up sharply and the 320th
NVA division is almost certainly enroute to the area.
Vann is convinced that the target of the NVA effort will be Kontum.
City and the town of Tan Can; the NVA is already preparing the
battlefield in this area as well as others. The timing will be just
before or after Tet (Feb 15) with Vann putting greater weight on the
later date. Vann believes a primary objective will be to create a
psychological impact prior to the President's arrival in China while
carrying on the strategy, enunciated by COSYN 9, of pressuring
ARVN out of the highlands.
Militarily, Vann welcomes the assault as he believes it can be handled
and the NVA .will take heavy casualties and consume scarce supplies.
The end result will be to reduce enemy pressure in other parts of
the area. However, Vann agrees that the U.S. press may well portray
the attack as evidence of the failure of Vietnamization. Konturn City
may suffer damage and portions might temporarily fall into NVA hands.
Militarily the impact would be minor, but the headline value could
be great.
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Vann thought all necessary actions were underway in Vietnam to
prepare for the attack. Reinforcements were available and airlift
and air support assets were adequate, The only further step that
should be taken is to get a new commander for the Vietnamese 22nd
Division, the unit that will get the brunt of the attack. As you may
recall, Laird's recent report on RVNAF Improvement and Moderni-
zation noted that there are now only two unqualified AR'VN division
commanders. Both are in MR-2.
Vann said he and the Vietnamese MR commander, General Dzu, had
repeatedly urged that General Trien, the 22nd Division Commander,
be replaced. Trien is a hopeless defeatest and his presence could
lead to a major defeat for the ARVN. Given the slightest excuse
Trien will try to withdraw from the major outposts, leaving them
to the NVA. In turn, Vann believes that no real disruption would
be occasioned by Trien'S removal and it would have an immediate
effect on the 22nd's combat capabilities. I believe the situation may
well warrant intervention on your part, and a backchannel message
to Bunker is enclosed (Tab A) urging that, if he and Abrams agree,
he riress Thieu to replace Trien immediately. I recommend signature.
John Negroponte concurs.
Other Interesting Points
Vann made a number of other interesting points, Which are summar-
ized briefly below. Relevant points will be incorporated in the VSSG
assessment and action paper we are preparing.
Strategy in MR-2
Vann is following a population-oriented strategy in MR-2. Full
control over the bulk of the people is preferred even if it means loss
of control over some lightly populated portions of the region.
Friendly forces are concentrated along the coast. The ranger camps
on the Cambodian border are merely to fly the flag and avoid giving
the enemy the political advantage of full control over a big area on
maps.
Vann expects to make significant pacification progress over the next
year because 90 percent of the population in MR-2 is on 8 percent of
the area. Thus far, he has held the control indicators steady at 55
percent, a better performance than MR-1 where control has dropped.
SECRET.
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The ARVN does not want to move against the enemy in isolated
jungle areas and the troops fight badly on such operations. Thus,
Vann's strategy is to let the enemy attack the prepared defensive
positions in the Highlands. When defending their bases, the ARVN
fights well. Vann argues that giving up territory merely makes
the enemies' supply lines longer.
VC/NVA Capability
Vann notes a real drop in the ability of the VC/NVA to carry out
ambitious plans for attacks and high points. He estimated that
they now carry out 20% or less of the military actions they are
ordered to undertake. This factor should be considered when read-
ing their often ambitious campaign plans.
Vietnamese Air Force
Vann has serious reservation about the VNAF, in part the result of
U.S. interservice rivalries. His criticisms were:
- The U. S. Air Force knows almost nothing about how to use
helicopters tactically. The Army has years of experience, but are
precluded from advising the VNAF, since it is an Mr Force respon-
sibility.
? ? VNAF fixed wing pilots are ill-trained. They have limited
close air support training, since the U.S. has always performed that
role for the ARVN.
The helicopter mix is wrong. The VNAF has no light observ-
ation helicopters (LOHs) even though they are much cheaer to buy
and maintain, only take one pilot, and can perform a large number
of missions the VNAF must use UH-ls for. He urges that the VNAF
helicopter force be expanded beyond the 500 level though the sub-.
stitution of LOHs for the UH-l. This seems like a good idea.
U.S. Residual Forces
A small U.S. residual force of 30,000 or so would be fully adequate,
if properly structured. His primary concern was that we provide
sufficient helicopters in the residual force. He also urged that we
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keep at least one adviser in each district and with each ARVN
regiment. He warned of the tendency to cut out the field advisers
while retaining large headquarters staffs at the MR and Saigon
levels.
In order to attract good U.S. advisers, he urges that families be
permitted to return to Vietnam. They would not be allowed in all
areas, but he felt the situation was ripe for families to be in the
major cities.
SECRET
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Jan. 12
Secretariat:
Hak has seen an LDX'd copy of the
attached. I box checked with the
Sit Room and they said the backchannel
message to Bunker was sent last night.
Louise
I.,
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BACK CHANNEL
KISSINGER TO BUNKER
We are growing increasingly concerned over the situation in MR-2.
Intelligence available here indicates a major attack in the Highlands
sometime in the next few weeks. I know you appreciate the distorted
coverage the U.S. press may tend to give to any ARVN set-backs as
a defeat of Vietnamization. There has, of course, also been speculation
that timing of anticipated high-points may in part be geared to President's
forthcoming visit to China.
We have fullest confidence in ARVN capacity to deal with any threat
which May materialize and know that General Abrams is doing whatever
may be necessary to assist them. I would, however, like to address
one specific problem which causes us some concern, namely the quality
of ARVN leadership in MR.- IL
Secretary Laird's recent trip and his latest report on the RVNAF
improvement program stressed the critical importance of good leadership.
He pointed out that the two ARVN divisions in MR-II are the only remaining
cases of unacceptable division commanders. You and General Abrams are
obviously in the best position to judge whether this remains the case and,
if so, the timing and extent of any leverage we might wish to exert on
Thieu to rectify the situation.
I would only comment that -Since- the only severe threat which appears
to be developing at this time in SVN is on the B-3 front, it is clearly in
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everyone's interest to have the best possible ARVN commander in the
Highlands. Command of the ARVN 22nd division will be especially
critical and you and Abrams may therefore wish to consider consulting
urgently with Thieu to see if anything can be done to replace promptly
the present commander with a more vigorous and highly regarded leader.
TOP SECRET
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