CHINA IN 1974 - 1975: THE END OF AN ERA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-120-6-18-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: August 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem
No Dissem Abroad
Background Use Only.
CHINA IN 1974 - 1975: THE END OF AN ER,A?
August 1975
SECRET
No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem
No Dissem Abroad
Background Use Only
MORI/CDF
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No Foreign Dissem/Controll.ed Dissem
No Dissem Abroad
Background Use Only
August 1975
?
Mao Tse-tong`s decade-long effort to establish a successor
leadership dedicated to achieving his revolutionary goals has
apparently ended in failure. The implications of this finding, if
true, appear momentous for China's future.
It implies that, after 40 years, the era of Mao Tse-tong -- an
era marked by .political turmoil and economic and social disruption ---
is drawing to a close in China. It implies a long-term shift toward
relative moderation and stability in China's political, economic and
social development.
These are the principal conclusions of this short paper which
summarizes a much longer research study "China in 1974 -- 1975:
The End of an Era"?" (OPR-205j in which the evidence is set forth to
support these judgements.
This effort to revolutionize the Party leadership began with
the Cultural Revolution in 1965 and persisted through the anti-
Confucian campaign of 1974. In October of last year Mao,
SECRET
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confronted with the prospect of nation-wide disorder, reluctantly
called for an end to the protracted period of mass struggle which.
he had initiated with the Cultural Revolution.
Although with implications for the national leadership, the anti-
Confucian campaign was intended primarily to increase the power of
Mao's revolutionary supporters at provincial and local levels of the
Party. According to a report by a Party Vice-Chairman outlining the
purposes of this campaign, opponents of Mao's leadership at these
levels, principally the military, were attempting to "reverse the
verdicts of the Cultural Revolution." Once again (as in the Cultural
Revolution) it was considered necessary to mobilize the masses to
"criticize and expose" bad elements in the Party apparatus who opposed
Mao's revolutionary policies and programs.
The anti-Confucian campaign was intended to be a smaller, con-
trolled version of the Cultural Revolution, but the reality of the
campaign as it unfolded in the first half of 1974 was quite different.
The. result of the anti-Confucian campaign in a number of provinces
was to revive the snarling, quarreling factions of the Cultural
Revolution, intent either an retaining their positions of dominance
ar on seizing the dominant: positions from their adversaries in the
local power structure.
The extent of the disorder produced by the anti-Confucian
campaign in 1974 is only now being recognized in the West. In
the more disrupted provinces, factional struggle (including armed
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vi.~\r ~a.?1
mpa~t of Antl~Confucian Campaign on Growth Rates in. Industry
+$%
1973-
1974
clashes) paralyzed the machinery of government, with provincial
leadership delegations once again called to Peking (a prominent
feature of the Cultural Revolution) for long periods of "study"
and "assistance" in solving their problems. Widespread social
disorder (crime,.corruption, hooliganism, even prostitution) and
economic disorder (continued strikes, the blockage of railway trans-
port, shortages of consumer goods and a flourishing black market)
reflected a general breakdown of law and order in the most seriously
affected provinces. ,Perhaps most alarming of all was the yearend
tally of economic costs of the anti-Confucian campaign: a signifi-
cant decline in steel production; a 50 percent drop in the rate
of increase in industrial. output (compared with the average rate
since 1965); and, for the first time in many years, a reported
deficit in the national budget.
Steel. Coat.
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The mood of China's top leadership was saber as it assembled
in early January ].975 to prepare for the National People's Congress.
The basic decisions concerning the new State Constitution, the govern-
ment structure and the appointment and dismissal of personnel were
made at an expanded Politburo session presided over by Chairman Mao
and then ratified, with further discussion, at a Central Committee
plenum held shortly thereafter. The speeches delivered at these
meetings and at the National People's Congress by China's top leaders
constituted a post-mortem not only for the anti-Confucian campaign
but for the Cultural Revolution as well.
Although Mao might cling to the fiction (as he did in his
January Politburo speech) that "the great upheavals" of the Cultural
Revolution had "disor anized the ene and to red the masses "
g mY ~ ~
the thrust of these speeches by China's top leaders (including Mao)
was just the opposite. Instead of "disorganizing the enemy," the net
effect of the eight years of disorder of the Cultural Revolution had
been to disorganize the Forty and in this way disorganize Chinese
satiety. Instead of "tempering the masses," the net effect o# the
Continued disorder of the Cultural Revolution and the anti-Confucian
Campaign had been to stimulate mass discontent, expressed in insistent
demands for higher wages and improved living Conditions.
The Central theme of these speeches in January 1975 by Mao,
Chou En-lai, and their two principal administrators, Teng Hsiao-
ping and Chang Chun-chiao, was the urgent need for "unity and
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stability." To achieve unity, it was necessary first to exonerate
many high-ranking Party and military leaders who had been "falsely"
charged and brought down -- allegedly by Lin Piao - during the
Cultural Revolution; and second, to apply a policy of leniency
towards Lin's military associates who had been the principal targets
in the anti-Confucian campaign.
Stability was to be achieved by establishing a more orderly
political system and less erratic policies, including the recognition
and protection of such "bourgeois rights" as private plats and private
ownership in the rural sector and "distribution according to work" in
the economy as a whale. Although Mao made it clear that he wanted
to prepare the way, by means of a nation-wide ideological study
campaign, far the "restriction" of these "bourgeois rights" at some
time in the future, he also conceded in his speech that it was
necessary to protect these rights for the present.
The most important purpose of the current campaign -- "study
the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat" -~- is to re-
establish discipline and order throughout China. The best indication
of Peking's resolve to restore order following the National People's
Congress was the decision to use force to suppress unruly elements
that continued to disturb public order. As the ultimate weapon for
exercising all-round dictatorship, the Peaple'S Liberation Army is
once again playing an important role in this concerted effort to
restore order throughout China.
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t
A more moderate policy line, also adopted in the interest of
"unity and stability," was revealed in Chou En-lai's government
work report to the National People's Congress. In education, Chou
implied that the program of reforming higher education had failed
to take into account China's future economic needs and that remedial
steps would be taken soon. With respect to economic policy, Chou
disclosed that after a decade devoted primarily to revolution, China
was once again focusing its attention on fang-term economic develop-
ment. In his discussion of foreign. policy, Chou indicated that
national interest, rather than concern for revolution abroad, would
continue to be the dominant consideration in China's foreign policy.
Some obser
ers
ti
thi
hif
v
, no
ng
s s
t toward a more moderate
policy line and the apparently meteoric rise of Ten Hsiao- in
g P g
(who had been the second most prominent casualty of the Cultural
Revolution), have proclaimed the arrival of a new era in Chinese
politics. With bath Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai failing in
hea~.th and out of public view for long periods of time, these
observers interpret Teng's high visibility and strategic position
at the center of the Party, government and military apparatus to
mean that China has already entered an era characterized by new
policies and a new style of leadership ---- "the era of Teng Hsiao-
ping.'" This interpretation, based on the premise that Teng has
now surpassed Mao and Chou to became the most powerful leader
in China, appears at the very least to be premature.
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?
In evaluating the present relationship among Mao, Chou
and Teng, it is certainly relevant to point out (what is not
generally known) that Mao Tse-tung has been directly and personally
responsible for the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping in a lengthy
process extending over the past eight years.
How is one to explain this seeming paradox -- that Mao (who
describes himself as a "center-Leftist") should have led the way
in restoring Teng Hsiao-ping (a center-Rightist) to a top position
of leadership in China today? In theory, this can be explained in
terms of Mao's well-known belief in the efficacy of thought reform
in dealing with erring comrades ("first carry out struggle and
thoroughly wash away mistaken thoughts... second, help them correct
their errors, enable them to find a way out.") Amore convincing
explanation is that Mao has demonstrated over the years that he
values and relies upon leaders from both sides of the political
spectrum -- those leaning toward the Left whose strong suit is their
activism and revolutionary commitment and those leaning toward the
Right who excel in ability and experience. Just as he has relied
upon Chou En-lai in a close, cooperative relationship extending
over 4~D years, so does Mao need and rely upon Teng Hsiao-ping now
that Chou has been forced through illness to give up his role as
the chief executive in China's political system.
The almost unanimous view of Chinese officials concerning
Teng's new role supports this judgment. As Teng himself has
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explained on several occasions, that role is one of carrying out
"specific tasks" under the leadership of Chairman Mao and Premier
Chou. Despite their infirmities, Mao and Chou appear still to be
the central figures in a leadership (see attached figure) in tran-
sition from the old to the new.
As Mao Tse--tong (who is 81 and very frail) reflects on
the developments of the past decade, his failure to cultivate and
put in positions of authority reliable revolutionary successors must
be his greatest disappointment. In December 1970 he had told Edgar
Snow that "it was wrong to judge his success in renewing the
leadership -- (by looking) -- at the national or provincial levels"
where "many of the old cadres were back... (in)... both the
Part and the administration." ther it was "
y Ra the new leadership
thrown up by the Cultural Revolution at the county level" --~ "men
in their twenties, thirties, forties and even fifties who would
be the next generation of provincial and national leaders'? -- to
whom he was now looking, Mao informed Snow, for the "reliable
heirs" to his revolutionary ideals.
If Mao was resigned to the return of "old cadres" to a
dominant position at the national level in Peking, he tried once
again in the anti-Confucian campaign to redress the balance of
power in favor of youthful Cultural Revolution activists at the
provincial and local levels. But this effort through "mass struggle"
to increase the power and influence of Mao's revolutionary "heirs"
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CHINA'S T4P LEADERS; A Capsule Description
The Aging Mao Tse-tong
His health and policies failing, he presides over the end of an era.
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The Youthful Wang Hung-wen
Once Man's favorite, his present status is not clear.
The Left-leaning Chang Chun-chiao
He checks and balances Teng Hsiao-ping.
The Ailing Chou En-lei
He devotes his limited energy to matters of high policy.
The Right-leaning Teng Hsiao-ping
He manages dey-to-day affairs.
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at the provincial and local levels also failed.
It might be argued, of course, that the youthful Leftist Wang
Hung-wen and the older, Left-leaning Chang Chun-chiao (members of
the Standing Committee of the Politburo) and the Leftist ideologues
Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan (full members of the Politburo) do
constitute revolutionary successors whom Mao has put in place at
the very top level of the Chinese leadership. But these Leftists
are in the minority in these top Party organs; and Chang Chun-chiao,
the most solidly based of the four, is inferior to Teng Hsiao-ping
in all three hierarchies of Party, government and military leader-
ship. Moreover, the political fortunes of Wang Hung-wen and Chiang
Ching (better known as Madame Mao) appear to have declined as a
consequence of the failure of the anti~onfucian campaign. If this
is true while Mao still lives, the outlook is not encouraging for
this more radical contingent in China's top leadership once the
source of their power .and influence, Mao Tse-tong, is gone.
It might further be argued that, so long as Mao lives, there
is always the chance of another shift to the Left in policy to
promote revolution at the expense of order and production. After
all, this has been the pattern of Chinese politics since 1949 -- a
pattern of alternating Left--Right swings in policy as Mao has pro-
ceeded on a zig-zag course toward his revolutionary goal of a
selfless, egalitarian, authentic Communist society in China.
This time, however, Mato is old and sick, and a considerable period
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of time is needed to recover from the most recent effort (the anti-
Confucian campaign) to promote his revolutionary programs in China.
What is more, it is clear that, even while Mao still lives, the
process of transition to a new, more pragmatic leadership has
already begun. These new leaders appear to be much more interested
in transforming China into a modern, strong socialist state than in
fulfilling Mao's revolutionary goals. If so, then China is indeed
nearing the end of the era of Mao Tse-tong, and about to begin a
new era of relative moderation and stability in national development.
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S E C R E T
S E C R E T
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