(SANITIZED) TO PRIME MINISTER RAFAI OF JORDAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-168-4-11-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 14, 1973
• Content Type: LETTER

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/30: LOC-HAK-168-4-11-9
Revised d
hIA1 tat" PO /73
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XCTDS)
425-j-
Tab B
TO PRIME 1\AII\FISTER RIFAI OF JORDAN
OSD review
completed
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
In response to your message of July 26, I now understand that His
Majesty is no longer interested in acquiring the UH-1H helicopters as
part of the MAP funded modernization program. With respect to other
-equipment, we will know better what is possible once Congress has acted
on, this year's aid bill. We will, in any case, look into the possibility of
expediting the delivery of some of the equipment which you. have already
ordered and I have directed an investigation of MAP delivery schedules.
There is one other issue in this area on which I would appreciate
your views. We would be prepared in principle to provide another C-130
but the cost is $6-7 million, and funding presents a problem. In assessing
this problem it would be helpful to know (a) whether as a result of your
recent talks in Saudi Arabia you think the Saudis might fund this purchase
and (b) whether this is of high enough priority to warrant substituting it
for some other items in our FY 1974 grant program.
I have been folloi.ving your impressive efforts to deal with Jordan's
economic problems with great admiration. You have my best wishes.
State Dept review completed
NSC review
completed
25X1
With warm regards,
Henry A. Kissinger
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MORI/CDF
C05097956
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION 4254-X
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS) August 14, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
GENERAL, SCOWCROFT
o2
WILLIAM B. QUANDT 4-0/?
Message to Prime Minister Rifai
The attached package was sent back to me with a note to "add a
friendly sentence for Rifa.i." I have done this in the revised text
at Tab B, which should now be ready for dispatch to Amman.
You will also want to note the decision on page 3 (red tab) on asking
Defense to compare the costs of rehabilitating Jordanian tanks in Iran
or building a new facility to do the work in Jordan.
RECOMMENDATIONS: That you approve the revised text at Tab B
to Amman. 25X1
Approve
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Other
XGDS-3
DECLAS -Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH-Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY C OrCIL ;ACTION
/ 4254-X (Revised)
?? /1
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS 1 h .A.4ust 7, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUN RS
WILLIAM B. QU DT w
SUBJECT: Jordanian Arms Requests
During the Shah's visit, and most recently in a message to you from
Zayd Rifai [Tab A], several issues involving arms for Jordan have been
mentioned. A report on the Jordanian military situation has been prepared
by the team that visited Jordan last spring, and some of these issues are
discussed in detail in that report. This memo is meant to inform you of
relevant facts concerning several issues of arms for Jordan; to obtain your
approval of a reply to Zayd Rifai; and to explore alternative ways of
financing Jordanian arms requests.
Three Jordanian Requests
1. An additional C-130. Jordan has one C-130 and three C-119
transports. None of the C-119s is now flying arid the Jordanians
want to scrap the program and replace the three planes with an
extra C-130, which would cost between $6-7 million. If taken from
MAP funds, this would result in delays in delivering other equip-
ment. The Jordanians would like to trade the three C-119s for one
C..130, but even if this could be done there would be shortfall of
$4.5 million to cover. Defense feels that the C-119s can be made
operational and is prepared to send a team to Jordan to put them
in working order. One reason for doing this is that Defense is very
reluctant to provide another C-130 to Jordan now, since to do so
would require a diversion from some other source. The military
team that went to Jordan concluded that Jordan had no military
requirement for another C-130 and would be better served by
keeping the three C-119s operational, but it is not clear that the
team viewed Jordan's requirements in the broader regional context.
By contrast, the MAP team in Jordan and Ambassador Brown seem
XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/SENSITIVE x Gps
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SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
to support the Jordanian proposal to exchange C-119s for
C-130s. In accordance with your instructions, this issue is
included in the message to Zayd Rifai below. When we have
his response, we will give you an options memo for decision.
2. Rehabilitation of Jordanian tanks in Iran. Jordan has 21
M-47 and 153 M-48 tanks that King Hussein would like to convert
to diesel engines and larger guns. The process of rehabilitating
these tanks is costly and requires a special facility. As the
Shah said, Iran possesses such a facility and has done work on
M-47s and presumably could also handle M-48s. The cost per
tank for converting to diesel engines is about $100,000. I_Jpgunning
the tanks could add another $50,000. By comparison, a new
M-60 tank, of which Jordan has 50 and is about to receive 38
more, costs $330,000. Defense would like to see Jordan build
a tank rehabilitation facility, which could be done for about $4.5
million and would take two years to complete. Costs of rehabili-
tating the tanks in Jordan would be somewhat lower by comparison
with Iran, but in view of the relatively small number of Jordanian
tanks, it is not clear that the savings would be sufficient to justify
building a facility in Jordan.
If the Shah were willing to pick up expenses within Iran as he
seemed to be saying, the main costs to be covered would be for
engines, gun tubes and transportation, which could come to
p0 million for all of Jordan's M-47s and M-48s. These funds
could obviously not come out of FY 1974 MAP without causing
serious disruption in the F-5 aircraft program. Apart from covering
some local costs, the option of rehabilitating Jordanian tanks in
Iran has the advantage that work could be started early. On the
other hand, if Jordan were to acquire its own facility, there would
be added benefits through savings on maintenance costs for tanks
and wheeled vehicles, and Jordan might also earn some hard
currency by working on Saudi equipment. The way to nail this down,
however, is to ask Defense to do an options paper based on a
careful cost-benefit analysis.
Another issue recently raised by the King with Ambassador Brown
is replacements for 40 Saladin armored cars that Jordan wants to
sell to Yemen. As replacements, we offered to sell 40 M-48 A-1
tanks at extremely low prices ($22,000 per tank). These are
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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SECRET/SENSITIVE _(XGDS)
gasoline powered tanks, however, and the King wants the more
expensive M-48 A-3 diesel model instead ($209, 000 per tank).
The M-48 A-1 could be provided from reserves, whereas the
M-48 A-3 would have to be taken from our active inventory which
Defense is reluctant to do. Ambassador Brown feels that we
must come up with M-48 A-3s at discounted prices if we hope to
have Jordan provide Yemen with the Saladins. The bureaucracy
will be developing a position on this issue over the coming few
days. You should be aware of it in case we receive an appeal from
the King or Rifai to weigh in. with Defense to get them to release.
M-48 A-3s as replacements for the Saladins. If the M-48 A-3s
are approved, their price will exceed what the Jordanians are
being paid for the Saladins and therefore will add pressure to the
FY 1974 MAP budget for Jordan.
RECOMMENDATION: That General Scowcroft ask Defense to
compare the costs and benefits of rehabilitating Jordanian tanks
in Iran and in Jordan. On the basis of this analysis, specific
proposals should be developed.
Approve
Other
3. Message from Rifai. Prime Minister Rifai, in his usual way,
has sent you a sharp message [Tab A] complaining that equipment
delivered under the MAP modernization program rarely arrives
on time. Actually the program as a whole is going very well, with
only a few delays caused by the fact that last year Congress appro-
priated less money for MAP than requested. The helicopters
mentioned by Rifai as a specific case in point are apparently no
longer of interest to Jordan. The King has told Ambassador Brown
that be is no longer interested in receiving the-Lill-1H helicopters,
but is adamant in wanting another C-I30 and accelerated delivery of
F-5Es and M-60 tanks. At some future date he wants to acquire a
more advanced helicopter.
The extra C-130 is mainly a question of funding. The Jordanians
themselves should be asked to make the choice of whether to cut
back on other programs in order to allow funding of another C-130
from MAP. With respect to the F-SEs, accelerated delivery to
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/30: LOC-HAK-168-4-11-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/30: LOC-HAK-168-4-11-9
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Jordan would require delays for Iran and Saudi Arabia. We do not
carry these aircraft in our own inventory, so diversions from that
source cannot be made. The M-60 A-1 tank could be diverted from
our own forces, over great protests from the Army, or taken from
production earmarked for Israel. The tradeoffs are difficult in.
any event.
We do not need to respond directly to Rifai's concerns about
helicopters, and we do not want to encourage further appeals of
this kind. But it does seem worthwhile to address broader issues
of arms su
?
ly to Jordan. Consequently, we suggest that you reply
25X1
RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the message at Tab B
25X1
Approve
Other
Comment: Several issues are now under review within the bureaucra6y
involving arms for Jordan. State and Defense are likely to agree on
another C-130 for Jordan, M-48 A-3 tanks as replacements for the
Saladins, and will make some efforts to accelerate delivery of F-5Es and
M-60 tanks. The C-130 and M-48 A-3s will involve added costs, while
the F-SEs and M-60s could require diversions from other sources, such
as Iran, Israel, or our own forces in the case of the M-60s. When the
FY 1974 program for Jordan becomes clear and the associated costs are
apparent, we will provide you with an options memo on how to handle the
financing.
1,7
Concurrence: R. T. gennedy
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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