THE SOVIET-INDIAN TREATY: EXERCISE IN "FRIENDSHIP DIPLOMACY"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-210-5-21-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: August 11, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/19: LOC-HAK-210-5-21-9
N
11 August 1971
SUBJECT: The Soviet-Indian Treaty: Exercise in
"Friendship Diplomacy"
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APPLY
The Soviet-Indian friendship treaty--a project
which was-first considered more than two years ago--
was concluded at this time in large measure to take
care of an immediate Soviet concern--i.e., the fore-
stalling of another Indo-Pakistani war. It was orig-
inally conceived of by both sides as an essentially
anti-Chinese document. As a result of its signing,
Moscow probably believes it has gained much ground
against its rivals, China and the US, and taken a
long step toward solidifying its position in India
ann the whole reuiuu.
The Indians, like the Soviets,-were attracted
to the idea of a treaty two years ago because of its
anti-Chinese implications. In the present circum-
stances, they are hoping that the treaty will serve
to inhibit Pakistan and limit Chinese intervention.
They probably expect that Moscow would immediately
suspend all assistance to Islamabad if war broke out.
with Pakistan, and that it would actually take "ef-
fective measures"--not merely consult--if either
Pakistan or China attacked India.
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How 'It' All' Began
1. The idea of a treaty was first broached by
the Soviets over two years ago, in a clearly anti-
Chinese context.
4. More importantly, however, the Soviets had
.broken their logjam with the Chinese. In September-
1969 Kosygin traveled to Peking, and the two sides
agreed to work toward normalizing their state-to-
state relations and to hold talks about their border
problem. A treaty with India at that time would have
derailed Moscow's efforts to defuse the crisis with
the Chinese.
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5. Talks on the treaty, however, apparently
continued wet into 1970 and reportedly ceased only
when Mrs. Gandhi, preoccupied with domestic issues,
decided in mid-1970 that her countrymen were not
ready to accept such a departure from India's tra-
ditional policy of nonalignment.
The Crisis Revives the Treaty
6. Precisely when discussions resumed is not
clear
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9. This effect could prove transitory, however,
and over the longer run the treaty could even be ma-
nipulated by Mrs. Gandhi's opponents in such a way
as to defeat the short--term turnoses for which it
was signed, and make it more iIi f1CUi'~. Gi "LT-
viets both to restrain the Indians and to avoid be-
.coming overinvolved. It would seem that Mrs. Gandhi
cannot indefinitely have the best of both worlds.
Currently, she is stressing Moscow's new support for
India. Her opposition is likely to point precisely
to this factor in calling for more forward military
action on India's part with regard to the situation
in East Pakistan. If this happens, it will be dif-
ficult for Mrs. Gandhi to call public attention to
the fact that Moscow has made clear its desire that
--India undertake no precipitate action.
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The View from New Delhi
11. By concluding the friendship treaty the
Indians have bought both time and insurance as they
confront the problem of war with Pakistan. Mrs.
Gandhi had come under mounting pressure to recognize
"Bangla Desh," but a hasty recognition might have led
to an unwanted or poorly timed war. By concluding
the treaty, she has dealt her critics at least a short-
term setback. The Indian Government probably feels
that the treaty puts the Chinese and the Pakistanis
on notice that India does not stand alone. In the
Indian view, it even offers, with its references to
"third parties," a veiled warning to other powers
against interference in Indian policies and actions
toward Pakistan.
12. The Indians are specifically hoping that
the treaty will serve to limit Chinese intervention
should Indo-Pakistani hostilities break out. If the
Chinese do intervene, the Indians probably expect
that the Soviets would move,act.ively--not merely
"consult -to help protect India's security. The
Indians may also hope that the conclusion of the
treaty may even instill in the Pakistanis a greater........
sense of urgency to halt the refugee flow and estab-
lish stable conditions in East Bengal. If India
later decides upon a military solution, Mrs. Gandhi
probably expects that the Soviets would honor that
section of the treaty which provides for the with-
holding of "any assistance to any third party (Pak-
istan) that engages in armed conflict with the other
party."
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A Preliminary Assessment
18. Though the treaty was surfaced to take
care of an immediate need, the concerns which orig-
inally p..ompted Moscow to seen u4~a
still valid. The Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969
brought home to Moscow the necessity of shoring up
its position in Asia, particularly in India. Prep-
aration for the treaty was only one of the steps
that Moscow took throughout 1969 and 1970 to improve
the Soviet position in the subcontinent. Kosygin's
proposal for a regional trade and transit agreement
and. Bre zhnev' s call for a "sys te: of collective se-
curity in Asia" both proved to be nonstarters and
were subsequently shelved until "conditions ripen."
19. Moscow no doubt has been aware that China's
smiling diplomacy has been practiced on the Indians,
and that the Indians have not reacted negatively to
the Chinese approaches. During Pakistani President
Yahya's trip to China last fall, Premier Chou En-lai
reportedly alerted Yahya to the possible upgrading
of Chinese-Indian diplomatic relations. The Soviets
may not have known this or of the fact that Chou
sent a personal message of congratulations to Mrs.
Gandhi on the results of the Indian elections (via
the Indian charge in Peking), but they cannot but
have noticed the shift in Chinese propaganda over
S E C 1ULT
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the past year or so. There have been no polemical
attacks on Mrs. Gandhi during this period, and prop-
aganda broadcasts supporting the Naga insurgents
have virtually ceased. Moreover, the Chinese Na-
tional Day message to the Pakistanis in March was
notable for its absence of any reference to the
Kashmiri peoples' "just struggle." The Soviets
therefore are probably pleased that the present
crisis has afforded them the opportunity to get
the Indians nailed down. It is very much in the
style of the present Soviet leadership at impor-
tant junctures to,push.for a bilateral treaty that
can serve as a dramatic political demonstration of
the existing character of the USSR's relationship
with a given ally or friend.
.20.1 It is probably too soon to gauge the ef-
fects the treaty will have on Soviet - West Paki-
stani relations. (According to press accounts, the
initial Pakistani reaction was to invite Gromyko to
stop off in Islamabad to explain. Gromyko report-
edly declined the invitation, probably because he
wished to avoid lessoning the favorable impact the
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if the issue was ever really in doubt---tne pre-
eminent position India enjoys in the eyes of Soviet
policymakers. It does not necessarily mean, how-
ever, that the Soviets have completely written off
the West Pakistanis. Since Tashkent, the Soviets
have been quite adept at developing and maintaining
their "special relationship" with India while simul-
taneously improving their position in Pakis,1-an.
Though Moscow's policy since the present crisis be-
gan has been publicly pro-Indian, the Soviets have
been careful not to completely cut their ties to
--the Pakistanis. (Just ten days ago Pakistani Pres
ident Yahya congratulated the US and the USSR for
the correctness of their policies during the present
crisis.) Although the Soviets, for example, have
tried to give the Indians the impression that Moscow
is exerting economic pressure on the West Pakistanis,
there is no evidence that this is so. In fact, work
proceeds apace on the $200-million steel mill that
Moscow agreed to build in West Pakistan last year.
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21. The Soviets do believe, however, that the
crisis will only be stabilized when the East Paki-
stanis are granted a substantial measure of autonomy.
They have made clear their preference that this be
accomplished under moderate Awami League leadership.
Gromyko's apparently successful effort to prevent
Indian recognition of Langla Desh suggests, however,
that Moscow still. hopes that a satisfactory resolu-
tion of the problem can be achieved with Yahya.
Moscow shares India's fears that over the longer run
pro-Chinese-extremists might come to the fore in the
East Bengali separatist movement and set up an inde-
pendent state under Chinese tutelage.
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