YOUR NEXT MEETING WITH LE DUC THO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-41-5-12-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: November 15, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/25: LOC-HAK-41-5-12-7
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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URGENT INFORMATION
November 15, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: W. R. Smys e
SUBJECT: Your Next Meeting with Le Duc Tho
I assume Le Duc Tho will agree to meet with you in the near future,
as you suggested.
Though I cannot claim full familiarity with your exchanges during my
absence, I have a few thoughts that you may, want to review before we
send you a formal options paper from Stearman once a date is fixed.
The Prospects of a North Vietnamese Offensive
I find it difficult to agree with those participants in the recent NIE who
believe that the North Vietnamese will not launch a major offensive during
this dry season. There are now almost 300, 000 communist troops in South
Vietnam. More than two-thirds of these are North Vietnamese. More are
coming every week. It makes no sense for Hanoi to put this many troops
into South Vietnam if they are not going to be used very soon to expand
Viet Cong areas of. control, to try to bring down the GVN, and to improve
the t'PRGt' position in political talks. Hanoi has too many needs at home
to.send its young men to dawdle in the South.
I think we will certainly be subject to a.major offensive. In the old days,
the North Vietnamese always had to resolve the fundamental dilemma
between low-scale actions that got them nowhere and high-scale actions
that invited heavy American retaliation. The American Congress has
solved this for them. They also now have little incentive to wait for an
American election year. In fact, they may believe that we would be more
prepared to see Thieu go down now than in an election year.
I regard Thots. desire to see you as a confirmation of this intent. They
always like to talk while they are fighting. Even more, they like to listen.
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BYAUTH - HAKISSINGER
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/25: LOC-HAK-41-5-12-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/25: LOC-HAK-41-5-12-7
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You,can take your choice as to the type of offensive and as to the
areas of concentration. Sill Stearman thinks they need rice, which
points to an offensive in the southern delta and in ITT Corps as well as
in I Corps. The rice drive would precede a major offensive, since
they will :need the food. for fighting, and would take place mainly in
December. I think they would also like to take Hue, for all the obvious
reasons. It is academic whether they will attack all at once, as they did
in 1968 and 1972, or whether they will conduct the kind of rolling offensive
that came near to destroying the South Vietnamese forces in 1964 and 1965.
They would almost certainly choose the latter if our domestic situation
were better. Even nowthey may still prefer it.
Bill Stearman is sending you a separate memorandum to get the bureau-
cracy ready for what will happen. It would be nice if we had some
preparation.
Le Duc Tho's Objectives
I do not think Le Duc Tho will have anything stimulating to say about
Cambodia or Vietnam until the dry season has gone by or at least until
he can make some decent estimate of where his forces stand. However,
he wants very much to hear what you have to say. If Hanoi does' not
control the Cambodian communists (as some CIA people believe), it can
certainly increase its influence by demonstrating that it can use this
channel either to offer them a diplomatic refuge or to. legalize and con
firm a victory. Since the Cambodian communists have no access to you
(unless there is a file I have not read), this gives the North Vietnamese
some leverage. If Hanoi's. control of the Cambodian movement is greater
than CIA believes, it wants the channel with you for all the reasons for
which it was used in handling Vietnam.
Le Duc Tho's relationship with you has, however, advanced too far for
him to play obviously transparent games.. Although we have seen no
evidence that Hanoi's position on Cambodia has matured since your last
round, I assume Tho has to say something even though he cannot give
anything away in *the areas: that you find interesting (ceasefire and a real
political settlement).
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/25 : LOC-HAK-41-5-12-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/25: LOC-HAK-41-5-12-7
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He may talk about such subjects of direct mutual concern as a pull-
out.of forces after a settlement, or he may reiterate some variation
of the non-interference pledge that he offered you last Spring. His
imagination in devising this kind of material in areas that he does not
want to negotiate is so great that I hesitate to make specific predictions.
On Vietnam, I imagine he will try to talk about economic "normalization"'
(aid) and he may try to see if he can use us to put some pressure on Thieu
before or during an offensive.. I see little prospect that he will now give
us anything very real.
What Can We Gain?
We obviously want to slow down and perhaps forestall an offensive, but
our bluff is not as good as it used to be while their imperatives are more
urgent. I am not sure that we can make a very deep impression, but we
obviously must try. We must say things that will open a few doubts in
his mind, and that will also make clear that we will give Thieu all the
material help he needs.
There are some things we can say that will give little away and that might
position us for a decent chance to get something from the Congress, or if
we need to go public. We can talk. about ceasefire consolidation, about
elections, and about improvement of the control mechanism. We can build
a- record that we have done our best to try for genuine peace and it is Hanoi
who has blocked it. I agree with Peter Rodman that we should also see if
the GVN can make some helpful contribution.
This is not much to work with, but it could sustain us while we see if
skeptical estimates of Tho's intention are wrong.
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/25: LOC-HAK-41-5-12-7