SOVIET IMPACT ON EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI MILITARY BALANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-557-6-2-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 28, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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28 May 1970
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT.- Soviet Impact on Egyptian-Israeli Military
Balance
Introduction
1. The introduction into Egypt of Soviet air
defense elements has added a new dimension to the
Arab-Israeli military equation, which hitherto had
been dominated by Israel's air supremacy. This
memorandum examines the scale of the Soviet involve-
ment, and discusses the roles which the Soviet forces
could play. The impact of the Soviet involvement
on the Middle East balance is then assessed'in terms
both of quantitative and qualitative factors. A
summary with conclusions is presented in the final
paragraphs.
The Scale of Soviet Involvement
2. UAR air defense capabilities have been
reinforced by the arrival in Egypt since late February
of Soviet forces comprising an estimated four to five
SA-3 regiments and three to five MIG-21 squadrons.
These elements at normal strength would number about
4,000 to 5,000 men.
COPY NO.
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4. Th' known SA-3 forces, including their radar-
controlled, ZSU 23-4 antiaircraft artillery comple-
ments amount to an estimated 2600-3700 men.
6. The three to five Soviet MIG-21 squadron
normally have a total corn lenient of 36--60 aircraft
and about 54-90 pilots. I
These squadrons would involve about
1,500 Soviet personnel.
Soviet Air Defense Roles
7. The immediate purpose of the Soviet air
defense deployments almost certainly was to support
.Nasir and protect Egypt from Israeli air attacks.
The extent to which Soviet aims go beyond Nasir's
mere survival are not yet apparent. A broader aim
may be to secure for the Soviets a strategic position.
in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.
-- The -- impact- of the Soviet involvement on the
r a
- Soviet self-retraint in pursuing their air defense
1-Israeli balance depends in large measure on
A
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role. They could confine their interests to 'defense
of the Nile Valley and Delta area, hoping simply to
deter the Israelis from further deep penetration
raids. Their presence would have more serious im-
pact if they attempted to extend their protection to
Egyptian forces-deployed in the Suez Canal area. The
.Soviets would upset the balance most seriously, how-
ever, if they extended their air operations over the
Sinai attacking Israeli ground targets.
Egyptian Air Defense Forces
9. Numerically speaking, the Soviet forces
represent a significant -- though not dramatic --
augmentation of UAR air defense components. The
UAR Air Force has an estimated 20 fighter-type
squadrons equipped with some 310-330 operationally-
ufficient
l
y are s
assigned aircraft. There probab
pilots to man these squadrons, but not all of them
would be combat-qualified.
Egyptian pilot losses
in combat and training have been heavy, amounting to
more than 90 in 1969 alone.
10. in addition, there are some 35 to 40 SA-2
battalions manned by Egyptian personnel. Since late
1969, a program to harden SAM sites in key areas has
been undertaken.
Israeli Air Power
11. Israel's Air Force has been greatly strength-
ened in the last two years by the addition of 40 US F-4
Phantoms and 88 A-4 Skyhawks. Ten more Phantoms -- of
-which six are reconnaissance versions -- and 12 addi-
tional Skyhawks are still scheduled to be turned over
to the Israelis. These planes enhanced the Israeli
capability to stage deep penetration raids into Egypt
and to carry out massive bombing attacks along the
Suez Canal. The Israelis now have a total of 81
__supersonic interceptor aircraft and about 175 ground
support aircraft.
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12. Israel's pilots and ground crews have
superior qualities. Israel's 500 jet pilots are
regarded as equal to those of the US Air Force.
Most of the pilots have combat experience and are
aggressive fighters. The Israelis are estimated to
be capable of getting off fivb sorties per day
whereas the Arabs can only get off about two per
day.
The Unstrikable Balance
13. The Arabs have always had a numerical edge,
which has been hitherto offset by Israeli qualitative
advantages. In terms of the so-called Western Front
-- the direct UAR-Israeli confrontation --- the air
equation has been near parity. The Egyptians have
120 interceptors ,against 81 for the Israelis, and
188 ground attack aircraft against 175. The addition
of at least 40 Soviet-manned MIG-21s raises the
Egyptian side of the interceptor ratio to 160 to 81.
14. Simple inventory comparisons are misleading,
however. The Israeli aircraft have superior per-
formance characteristics across the board. The
Israeli F-4 Phantoms and Mirage I11-Cs clearly out-
match the MIG-21 interceptors. Also, the A-4 Skyhwaks
-- and the Phantoms in a strike?role -- can deliver
more bombs over greater.distances than the Egyptian-
flown SU-7s and MIG-15/17s. Israeli pilots have .
been greatly superior to the Egyptians and, although
the Soviets may be an improvement, they lack combat
experience. The Israelis have better maintenance,
and keep a greater proportion of their aircraft
flying at all times -- about 85 percent for the
Israelis to about 75 percent for the Egyptians. Again,
the Soviets may do somewhat better than the Arabs,
but will be pressed to match the Israelis. Finally,
the Israelis cannot use their entire air force against
the Egyptians because they must keep some reserve to
deal with potential attacks from Jordan, Iraq or Syria.
15. A new factor in the balance is-the potential
impact of attrition on Israel in the event of a pro-
longed struggle for air supremacy. The Soviets are
-capable of maintaining a force of five interceptor
squadrons in Egypt almost indefinitely, and could
.exhaust the Israelis not. only in terms of aircraft
but also in terms of pilots.
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16. i4rael`s strategy for defeating the Arabs
has been based upon preemptive attacks. Israel has
always plained on fighting its wars on Arab ground.
To minimiz their casualties, the Israelis have de-
vised tactics designed to prevent the Arabs from
getting into.combat. Some of _these tactics were
dramatically demonstrated in 1967 when the Israeli
air force succeeded in virtually eliminating the
Egyptian air forces within a few hours after the
war broke out.
17. At least as far as Egypt is concerned,
this strategy is probably no longer tenable. Very
soon after the war the Egyptians began a widespread
program of building new airfields and hardened
more effective air defense system consistin o 2
and SA-3 missiles,
The possibility that the Israelis could repeat
their 1967 success has been substantially reduced,
and perhaps eliminated altogether.
18. This is the basis for Israel's present
hard-nosed attitude about sticking to the Suez Canal
line and not giving the Arabs any encouragement in
thinking that the Israeli position might soften.
The Israelis believe that possession of the Sinai
ground and air space compensates for their likely
inability to deliver another instant defeat to the.
Egyptians.
19. At the present time, Israel continues to
maintain air superiority over Egypt, at least in
the Canal area, and can still deliver punishing
bombing attacks on the Egyptians. This superiority
is reduced, however, by the reinforcement of the
Egyptian air force with Soviet-manned MIG-21s. The
psychological impact on both the Egyptians and
Israelis could be significant.
20. Soviet actions will determine whether the
balance of air power will continue to be favorable
to Israel. Soviet air patrols within the Egyptian
i teraar already have deterred the Israelis from
renewing their deep penetration raids. Although
------they have abandoned this facet of their air opera-
tions, the Israelis have declared that they do not
now intend to back off from hitting targets in the
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Canal area. If Soviet pilots are ordered to keep
bombing targets along the Canal,
the aa.x' wur"w. ll likely become a Russo-Israeli
affair. .~.. ...
21. If the Soviet pilots .now active in Egypt
should engage the Israelis, we believe that, in the-
initial encounters, Israel's pilots would hold their
own. At some point, Israel probably would either
back off from its attacks in the Canal area or ini-
tiate some new moves designed to make the Soviets
back off. ?1?ef-nse Minister Dayan has stated. that
Israel do? ~=