NORTH VIETNAM'S TRUCKS AND THE WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-13-2-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/09: LOC-HAK-558-13-2-6
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/09: LOC-HAK-558-13-2-6
 North Vietnam's Trucks and the War
coo
introduction
Throughout the war in Indochina, trucks supplied by Hanoi's
Communist patrons--principally Communist China and the USSR--
have played a vital role in the enemy's logistical activities both
within North Vietnam itself and in Laos. Allied air strikes--
concentrated since 1968 along the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern
Laos and to a much lesser extent in North Laos--have exacted a
large toll in trucks destroyed, but heavy imports of trucks into
North Vietnam have offset these losses. The ruck inventories
currently maintained by Nor h Vietnam a about double the lev
n,a , floe ear. r&_o_f_JhA war. This memorandum
reviews the present evidence of truck inventories and locations
in North Vietnam and Laos. It also presents an overview of
reported truck destruction since 1965 and the import levels that.
have enabled. the North Vietnamese to cope with their heavy truck
losses.
Trucks in North Vietnam
Since the cessation of bombing in 1968, North Vietnam has
concentrated its stock of trucks in large storage areas in northern
North Vietnam, many in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. During
1971, the number of trucks in these parks was the highest ever noted,
reaching a peak level of about 6, 000 trucks in October 1971. These
unprecedentedly large truck inventory holdings were probably due,
at least in part, to the 1971 floods, which may have led the North
Vietnamese to store trucks. in these holding parks to avoid the
disrupted transport system farther south.
The largest park at that time was at Dong Dane. on the North .
some , rue s 'in storage. Other large truck par areas are at
Hanoi where 500 -rue cs were o bserve u In
-- Le Nhuong near Kep airfield northeast of
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Mai Thinh, also near Kep, which held 500
trucks as of January 1972
An Khe, near Haiphong, which for years has
330 been a prime holding area for vehicles
arriving.through the port. It held only. 330
trucks in October--a reflection of the shift
in the past year or so from seaborne imports
to rail imports;
Xuan Mai, about 25 miles west of Hanoi in. a
military training area, which always holds
large numbers of vehicles, had some 1, 300
trucks in December 1971: .(because Xuan Mai
probably is a repair and training as well as
storage facility, some of these. trucks are not
in "storage" in a strict sense).
In all, there are more than 50 areas 'in northern North Vietnam
where trucks have been stored at one time or another. The smaller
ones usually hold under 50 and the larger ones several hundred trucks.
This large number of dispersed truck parks and the infrequent
photographic coverage of North Vietnam has made it difficult to keep
close tabs on the inventory levels at many of these locations. In
general, it appears that in recent years there has been a shift from
use of- the Haiphong port area for storing trucks to areas near the
Hanoi-Doug Dang rail line, the main overland link to China. It has
been difficult to establish a seasonal pattern to the level of stocks, if,
in fact, there is one. Apparently the enemy plans well in advance.
The increased truck inventory noted throughout 1971 probably
reflected, in part, increased deliveries to compensate the truck
losses sustained during Operation Lam Son 719 in southern Laos
during February and March. It also undoubtedly reflected an
accumulation of trucks in preparation for the 1971-72 dry season.
The higher level of imports projected for 1972 suggests that the
enemy is already preparing to counter anticipated heavy truck
losses during this dry season.
Trucks in the Laos Panhandle
The Communists maintain 'a substantial inve'ntoryof vehicles
in the Laos Panhandle for use in zn.oving supplies (and at times
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personnel) along the Ho Chi Minh trail toward Cambodia and South
J- 14
000 t 3. th o , 00 actual number probably
in southern Laos is
~i;ra.,g~.. The size of the truck
end of
interdiction campaign against transportation routes and vehicles.
This bombing has caused the North Vietnamese to keep on hand
only sufficient trucks to sustain the required levelp of logistic
activity.
The bombing has also made the Communists disinclined to
establish large concentrated vehicle parks in the Laos Panhandle.
Instead, vehicles are dispersed along the entire logistics corridor,
under the control of transportation battalions. subordinate to the
major logistic entities. The level of activity undertaken in a given
area of the Panhandle determines the size of its vehicle inventory.
Thus, in the northern Panhandle where logistic activity is heaviest,
a logistic entity may control as many-as 300 vehicles. Farther south,
as the level of logistic activity decreases, vehicle inventories also
decrease.
,
inventory in a }Pan candle is constrained by the concentrated air
The standard practice followed by the Communists is to
disperse vehicles within a given geographic area in the Panhandle
as much as possible. Despite this. dispersal, however, some
relatively small vehicle parks exist where vehicles can be stored
when not in use or taken for repair or maintenance; but these can
consist of only a few acres of cleared land under heavy jungle
canopy, or one of the many camouflaged caves near some. major
routes. They seldom would contain more than 10 to 20 vehicles at
any one time. Similarly, the life-span of a vehicle storage area
In southern Laos may be relatively short: with constant aerial
reconnaissance and bombing underway, the continual establishment of
new truck parks is a necessity.
Enemy Truck Losses
During 1971, the Air Force reported nearly 18, 000 trucks
destroyed and 7, 000 damaged, based primarily on pilot observations.
The Washington intelligence community has long recognized pilot
reporting of truck losses probably overestimated the actual `
situation. Thus, it has applied a deflation formula to derive a
figure called "effective" losses. The formula-~-effective losses
equals 75% of trucks reported destroyed plus 25%6 of those reported
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Vietnam. The current estimate of the truck inventory maxnta e
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f the ca ability of the North Vietnamese to
damaged -allows or P
repair trucks and for. inaccuracies in pilot reporting. Using this
formula, there have been nearly 48, 0.00 truck losses during the
years 1965-71 as shown in the following tabulation. *
Effective Losses
Total 470600
1965 400
1966 4#000
1967 5,300
1968 0#500
1969 6,000,
1970 7,206
1971 15,200
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Even this deflation formula may overstate truck losses,
however. Since the beginning of the war, it is estimated that North.
Vietnam has imported 36, 400 trucks, or about one-fourth less than
the calculation of effective truck losses. However, its current
inventory of roughly 18, 000-23, 000 trucks is about double the
inventory of 10, 000-12, 000 maintained during the early years of the
war. Another possible cause of this apparent discrepancy--besides
the overstatement of truck losses--is the fact that truck import data
may be understated. Thus, it has never been possible to equate
losses in any given year to import and inventory levels.
Although it is difficult to estimate the number of truck losses
(with any precision), there is no doubt that they have been increasing
substantially in recent years. The 15, 200 effective losses in 1971
were more than twice those in 1970, and almost treble the 1967 level
of 5, 300. The sharp increase in recent years is primarily attributable
to the concentration of the air campaign against targets in southern
Laos and to increased use of the highly effective truck-.killing AC-130
For a detailed breakout of truck losses, see Appendix A.
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and AC-119 gunships. 's'he high level of talanned truck import
1972 from thh [XSSR?-- about50a -~ some 4Qo Brea#ertian the.
previous high of 4, 000 trucks?importt. a oxr h..e,, " T ...n 96.. is
m part a reflec lion of the effectiveness of these unsbips.
_. 4?J CIA. r+9 rrrlll~.
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xm.ports
Hanoi's ability not only to maintain its truck inventory but
to increase it over the past few years, in the face of the heavy losses
to air attack, is attributed to the ingenuity of its maintenance personnel
and more importantly to the support of. the Bloc.
North Vietnam's Communist allies have willingly supplied the
trucks needed for the enemy's logistical effort throughout the war.
North Vietnam has imported by sea and rail more than 36, 000 trucks
since 1965 as shown in the tabulation below:
Estimated Truck Imports
.Units
Total 36,400
1965
3,500
1966
4,700
1967
.. 6, 800
1968
4$700
1969
6"800
1970
5,900
1971
4,000*
* Preliminary
The USSR provided about half of the total, ' Communist China
about one-fourth, and Eastern Europe the remaining one-fourth.
Truck imports nearly doubled from 3, 500 in 1965 to a peak of more
than 6, 800 in 1967 as the war escalated. Although imports apparently
have dipped below this level in three of the four years since 1967,
there have never been any indications that trucks were in short supply
in North Vietnam or that Hanoi's requests for trucks have been refused.
The distribution of truck imports by country of origin is
shown in Appendix B.
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Furthermore, the relatively low figure for 1971 probably will rise
when more complete information becomes available later in the
year on imports from the USSR.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/09: LOC-HAK-558-13-2-6
Appendix A
Communist Truck Losses in North Vietnam and Laos
Destroyed
Effective Losses**
1965
358
519
399.
:
1966
4, 035.
A.,732
3,959
1967
6,042
2,886
5,254
1968
21$243
4, 206
:9,478
1989
6, 868
3, 224
5,960
1970
8,0016
4, 922
1,243
1971
17,757
7
,15,150
Total
54, 319
26,816
470,543
As reported by 7th Air Force.
Effective truck losses are computed by taking. 75 the number
of trucks reported destroyed + . 25 the number of trucks
damaged.
Llama,ged
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pe] B
litorth Vietnax~r~ is T~stima Ix sports of Trucks
B3 Countt;7 o Cori
396.5-71
96
1966
1
196
Units'
8.
`otal
36 40
1.970
1_997
U
4-=.700
70
o
.800
5
900
S SR
East
r
18"400.
1 000
,0.00
4,000
2,200
'
.
3, ,900
,
3
500
_
2
e
n Eura e'
PRA
500
200
700
600
11300
1, 700
,
1#200.
000
0
800
8, 50?
1, 300
1,200
I, 204
1, 200
1820 0
1,0200
1 200
Prelunina
estimate for 1971
paucity on ra shipments, The Soviet trade handb
i il
autu
e b e of the
k
oo
, availabl
t probably show higher totals.
y next
Limited data has been avilabie o
PR
n
C truck shipments since 1985. It ha a bee
agreed by CIA and nT that :nn
n
`rA vaw-uzs a reasonable estimate for'
e for s since 1965
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