CYPRUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-310-2-3-1
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 16, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP
February 16, 1972
Mr. John N. Irwin, II
Mr. Joseph Sisco
Mr. 0. Warren Nutter
Mr. James H. Noyes
White House Situation Room
Mr. Thomas Karamessines
Mr. John Walker
NSC: Gen. Alexander M. Haig
Mr. Mark Wandler
Mr. Richard Kennedy
Mr. Harold Saunders
*i * r****i ******T*****i **
Time and Places 3:15 p. m. - 4:04 p.
Sued Cyprus
Par tic i.p ants:
Chairman: Henry A. Kissinger
It was agreed that:
Mr. Sisco would prepare a cable, giving guidance to our Embassies
in Cyprus and Greece.
NSS, STATE DEPARTMENT REVIEWS
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Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Karamessines) Let's start with' your briefing.
Mr. Karamessines-read the -attached intelligence briefing.
Dr. Kissinger : (to Mr. Sisco) Joe, what do you think?
Mr. Sisco: I think we should continue to play out the same string we have
been playing.
Dr. Kissinger: Does that go for Popper, too? [referring to Nicosia 358,
February 16]
Mr. Sisco: Yes. If it's all right with you, though, I will get to this a little
later.
Dr. Kissinger: It seems to me that he is planning to do exactly what we told
him not to do on Monday.
Mr. isco would like to discuss this in a little whil.e.._.Inthe meantime
l
t
,.-
e
me review what we have done. First, we told the Greeks they were doing
something risky. Second, we told them that if they published the note, it
would make the diplomatic process of seeking a peaceful solution even more
difficult. Third, we have made it clear to Waldheim that we would support
a UN effort to gain control of the Czech arms. Our Ambassadors have been
told to play this whole situation in a low-key way.
Dr. Kissinger: What can Waldheim do about the arms?
Mr. Sisco: He has two basic ways in which to handle the situation. The
first is for the UN to actually take control of the arms. T hat, of course,
would be the action most favored by Greece and Turkey. The second is to
follow t he pattern which has been used during the last year -- periodic
inspection of the arms.
Dr. Kissinger: How has that worked out?
Mr. Sisco: It has been quite effective. I should point out, Henry, that
we have not discussed details with Waldheim. We just told him that any-
thing he can do would be good, and he has told the Greeks and Cypriots
that he is ready to do whatever is necessary. I think we should temporize
because the play is still between the Greeks and the Cypriots at the present
time.
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Dr . Kissinger: Joe, can you tell me what you think the Greeks are, doing?
What do they think they are doing?
Mr. Siscoc Let me try. First, though, I want to say that Tasca has not
gone in -- and I think we are playing it right. The Greeks evidently
assumed they had the mass support for their actions. But as the crisis
continues, the Greeks assume Makarios is taking steps to bring public
support to his side. I also think the Greek objectives are more tailored
now than they appeared to be when the note was delivered. You can see
this, in part, from the latest comments they - - especially Ambassador
Panay -- have made.
Dr. Kissinger: The objectives= are more tailored to what -- to control of
the arms?
Mr. 'Sisco: Possibly. There might also be some element of bringing
about a face-saving situation with regard to the make-up of a new government.
Dr. Kissinger: Why have the Greeks done all of this -- and why has
nothing happened?
Mr. Irwin: We don't really know, Henry. We have to figure out now what
we do next week when all of you are away. What are your feelings? I
think we should still hold off. If the Greeks move, they will probably
move fast. But even if Makarios is overthrown, we should not get involved.
What if the Greeks bungled a coup attempt? A civil war could follow, and
Greek mainland forces might intervene. What would the Turks do then?
The UN is seized of the desirability of resuming the talks and of, controlling
the arms --.but it will not get into the question of bargaining with
Gen. Grivas. Considering all of this, is there anything the U. S. cando
to encourage a more active UN role, or -- if there are military operations
-- should we take any steps vis-a-vis Greece?
Dr. Kissinger: And now the Soviets have entered the picture, too, with
their expression of support for Makarios.
Mr. Irwin: That's right. Sadat also said something. We may have reached
the point where it is in our interest to ask the UN to take a more active
role.
foreign intervention in Cyprus?
Mr. Sisco: Not primarily. I have to hedge a 'bit here, but I think it
would be seen substantially in internal terms. It is well-known that the
Guard is commanded by 600 Greek officers who c we their primary loyalty
Dr. Kissinger; If the Cypriot National Guard moves, will it be seen as
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and Turkey have certain rights if the status quo is upset.
the terms of the London - Zurich accords, as you probably know, Greece
would be the azrect involvement of the Greek troops on the island. Under
to Athens. The line between internal action and international intervention
Dr. Kissinger: Does that include military activity?
Mr. Sisco: Yes. They can quell' civil strife. "
Mr. Karamessines: They can take actions to restore the provisions of the
agreement if those provisions have been upset.
Dr. Kissinger: Greece and Turkey would have better grounds for inter-
vention, then, if they say they want to solve the arms problem than if they
say they want to replace Makarios.
Mr. Sisco: Absolutely.
Mr. Irwin: Under the Treaty of Guarantees, Greece, Turkey and
Great Britain can move to restore the constitutional status quo.
Mr. Sisco: That's why the Greeks argue that the arms alter the delicate
balance on the island. It gives the Greeks some semblance of legality
under the London-Zurich accords.
Mr. Irwin: From the world point of view, a National Guard move would
be seen as a Greek move, largely because there are Greek forces stationed
with the Guard.
Mr. Sisco: Plus the ultimatum the Greek Government gave Cyprus..
Dr. Kissinger: What would it all mean? What would happen in the UN?
Mr. Sisco: In the UN, it would almost certainly mean a 100+vote for the
territorial integrity of Cyprus.
Dr. Kissinger: Wouldn't the vote depend to some degree on what the
National Guard did? If you extinguish a state, that's one thing, but if you
install a new government -- one which is broadly based - that's another
thing. What would the Soviets do?
Mr. Sisco: They would surely make loud noises in the Security Council.
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Dr. Kissinger; Why don't they do that now?,
government received expressions of support today from the Soviet Union
and Poland.' The Soviet Ambassador probably called on Makarios.
are together. I have a news item here which says th.e'Makarios
taking this whole situation very seriously - since Greece and Turkey
'Mr. Sisco: I don't think they are doing that now because Makarios is
Dr. Kissinger: How do you think the situation will develop? How long
can the situation continue in the,
-present course?.
Mr. Karamessines: The present course can continue for the next several
days. Makarios will try to string it out. Each passing day, though, puts
the Greeks in a more uncomfortable and embarrassing position.
Mr. Sisco: We surmise that -- there is no evidence far it.
Mr. Irwin: If the present situation drags on, there is no problem for- us.
But if it drags on -- and if the Greeks make a move -- then the question
arises about what we should do. Would it be better to wait and see what
happens, or would it be better to do what we can -- probably through the
UN -- to try to defuse the issue? If the arms issue can be settled, it
may be possible to force Grivas off the island.
Mr. Nutter: What will happen if the Greeks back down?
Mr. Irwin: Then I think it would become a question of what. Turkey would-do
-- because the arms issue would still have to be settled.
Mr. Sisco: That's right. The main thing is to get the arms under' UN
control. I can't conceive of the Greeks backing down without seeing, the.
-arms issue.settled.
Mr. Karamessines: Turkey undoubtedly feels the same way.
Mr. Sisco: They do.
Mr. Irwin; I lean to trying to get the UN to work out something. between
the Greeks and Cypriots rather than riding the whole thing out and hoping
for a good solution. No progress has been made so far.
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Mr. Sisco: You're right. They said in their ultimatum that they wanted a
new government on Cyprus. I think Tom's [Karamessines] proposal goes
too far right now. The Greeks won't come to us.
Dr. Kissinger: I get the impression the Greeks either know very well
what they are doing or they are colossally inept.
Mr. Sisco: In the two previous crises, they started out with thunderous
moves, and then they collapsed.
Dr Kissinger; But they have already stated they have additional objectives.
we ask if they want us to use our good offices to help settle-- the,, is-sue.
Mr. Kararnessines: Maybe we should have Tasca go to the Greeks and ask
them if they are really sincere in claiming that their only objective is
to bring the arms under control. If they say that is their only objective,
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Mr. Irwin:. That may be true, but it is different now because the Turks.
are there to bolster them.
is to bring about control of the arms, I think we can steer things- in that
Mr. Sisco: That is a big difference.
Mr. Noyes Is it likely there may be a joint Greci -Turk operation?
Mr. Sisco: I think if one side moves, the other side will also move.
Mr. Karamessines: I agree.
Mr. Nutter: We haven't encouraged them.
Mr. Irwin: Turkey and Greece both know we haven't interfere.d.. From
the brief cable we sent out the other day [State 025489], Makarios knows.
we had no information about a Greek move. Re may even. have. thought
we were instrumental in stopping the Greeks. We played, it just.-right.
Dr. Kissinger: That depends on what we want. If this is a game of chicken
and if we want Makarios to cave in, it should be done quickly. We may
have encouraged him to hang on. I am just speaking hypothetically.
Mr. Sisco: It is a game .._ and he is a good poker player.
Dr. Kissinger: There are a number of things we could do to make life easier
for Popper and his staff, but that may not be our objective. If our objective
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Dr. Kissinger: Makarios is a good poker player, as you say., But'why
should e give in now. If he were going to give in, he would wait-till--.
the .last moment and not tell us now.
Mr. Irwin: He is also
a stubborn man.
Dr. Kissinger: But he never had the Greeks and the Turks against him
ore. don't know how he will act.
Mr. Karam .essines: February 23 is a key data. That.' s. when new Turkish.
contingent moves into position on the island- They- may firing imhe-avy
guns with them.
Mr. Sisco: Tom is right. The 23rd could be the next crisis point. The
Greeks said they would move in heavy guns if the Turks did.
Dr. Kissinger: This could put some pressure on Makarios.
Mr. Irwin: To do what?
Dr. Kissinger: To yield the minimum he would judge necessary in order
to prevent that from happening.
Mr. Irwin: Do you mean giving up the arms?
Mr. Sisco: He could do that, and he could also ins.i t that. Griva:s- g-et off.
the island. And a short time after. this immediate, problem blows: over,
he could announce a change in the cabinet. I think, he can_ save- face-by
making some government change.
Mr. Karamessines: Makarios was reportedly planning to make a change,
anyway. But he said the crisis made it impossible to do it. now..
Mr. Sisco: Henry, I'd like to get your reactions to a couple of things.
If the Greeks come to us and say they want us to go to the UN, there is
no problem. Suppose, though, that they tell us they are willing to make
some kind of a deal. They ask us to carry a message to. the Cypriots,
which we do. Then the Cypriots ask us to carry a message back to the
Gareeks. We would be right in the middle before we know it. . What is your
instinct to us getting involved in something like that?
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step in. What would we do''
Dr. Kissinger: My instinct is to avoid getting involved and to see if the
UN can do it. Suppose the Greeks say they would be glad to see the UN
Mr. Sisco, They won't say that.
Dr. Kissinger: The consequence of our message-carrying will be that
we are drawn into a substantive position.
Mr. Sisco: That's exactly why I raised the point, Henry. If Makarios
comes to us, Popper should tell him that this issue- should be settled
between the Greeks and Cypriots. But what da we da if- both our-- allie s
come to us?
Dr. Kissinger: If that happens, we would be forced to carry messages
-- and to take sides. And if Makarios. reads into this that we are simply
acting as an errand boy, it wouldn't make Greece or Turkey happy. I
can talk to the President about all of this.. But as I just said, my instinct
is not to get involved.
Mr. Irwin: The question is whether we should encourage Waldheim to take
a more active role.
Mr. Sisco: Waldheim can play a more active role on. the` arms: control
issue, But. Greece and Turkey came to us because the other element
in the note - the element about a new government -- is something.
Waldheim can't touch. It is not in his mandate,. and. L don't.think he_
would touch it with a ten-foot pole.
Mr. Irwin: He can't touch the Grivas issue,, either..
Mr. Sisco: That's right.
Dr. Kissinger: If the Greeks come to us and tell us to relax because they
are not planning any drastic actions, can we help them come up with a face-
saving solution?
issue and on getting Grivas off the island.. They-may- even insist: on our
Mr. Sisco: Yes, I think so, if they are prepared to cooperate on the arms
helping them.
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and if the problem goes tothe Security Council, we will have to part
company with Greece and Turkey.
Dr. Kissinger Can they do that? My instinct is to stay out of-the whole
thing as long as we possibly can., Otherwise, we will get nothing but
grief from Greece and Turkey (who may accuse us of a stab in the back).
and Cyprus and the Soviet Union. However, if outside forces intervene
Mr. Irwin: IS, as the situation develops, we feel we can avoid the use of
force by bringing it to the UN, we should support such a move.
Dr. Kissinger: Joe says,. though, that the Greeks don't want the UN.
Mr. Sisco: That's right. They may throw in a: ]cooker;. too.. They may
tell us that unless we do something, they and. the Turks might' have to use
force. It's a possibility, you know.
Mr. Irwin: The UN has already talked about resuming the intercommunal
talks and about the arms issue.
part of the note.
Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Irwin) On the ohe hand, the UN may be-able to
prevent the situation from deteriorating. On the other hand, the whole
problem could become worse if the negotiations= fail, and, the us.e: of. force
-may be hastened.
Dr. Kissinger: What have we told Waldheim?
Mr. Sisco: We told him that we know the Greeks and Turks have come to
him. We said we would welcome anything he could do on-the arms problem.
We haven't gone beyond that, and we haven't said anything about the other
Mr. Sisco: Even if the Security Council is in session, the Chinese__...
ma temper their public position because you are there, but I think the
Soviet Union and China will have,parallel positions.
piece of territory being split off from a country.
Mr. Sisco: And from the Soviet point of view, intervention would be
Dr. Kissinser: That's true. One thing the Chinese are allergic too is a
viewed as NATO aggression against a neutral country..
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Dr. Kissinger: What would be the issue in the Security Council if there
is no military intervention on the part of Greece or Turkey
Mr. Sisco: For one thing, there would be a condemnati3n of Greece for
the note. There would also be a reaffirmation of the territorial integrity
and political independence of Cyprus. There would not be any mention
of the Czech arms. In effect, it would be an effort to mobilize the
Security Council in support of the status quo.
Dr. Kissinger Why hasn't this been. done yet?
Mr. Sisco: Because Makarios is afraid of Greece and Turkey, working.
together. Also, he thinks that the Security Council action may push the
button on military intervention. If it goes to the Security Council, the
Greeks may feel they have nothing to lose, and they may make their move.
Dr. Kissinger: You are saying that the situation may become worse if it
goes to the UN.
Mr. Sisco Yes. Don't forget, either, that the Turks have the same
feeling about the UN as - the Israelis do.
Dr. Kissinger : If all this happens, what would we do?
Mr. Sisco: Send a cable to Peking. In the first instance, we. should tell
them that they should try to work it out themselves. Second, we can
try to move it to the UN. If that doesn't work, we would have- to see
what kind of role we could play ourselves -- although. I hope. it-wouldn't
.-come to that point.
Dr. Kissinger. Who would we send out there?
Mr. Sisco: We haven't gone that far yet.
Dr. Kissinger: If we send you, everyone would think you had, an under-.,
cover role in regard to the Egyptian-Israeli talks.
Mr. Sisco: If I got within 200 miles of Cairo, Sadat would send someone
to talk to me. We could go to the Greeks and ask them if they don't
really want the UN to handle the situation. Then Waldheim could quietly
get involved. This would be much 'better than having Cyprus bring it up
at the Security Council.
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Dr. Kiss in er: If he does distribute the arms, could Greece and Turkey
intervene?
e, am worried about Makarios distributing the
Mr. Sisco: We are, too, and we're watching the.situaEtion.
Mr. Sisco: If he did that, the fat would be in the fire. Greece would
probably unleash the National Guard, which is basically loyal to Athens.
Dr. Kissinger: What about the point Tom [Karamessines] made earlier?
Would it be possible for Tasca to ask the Greeks if control of the: Czech:
arms is their principle objective?
Mr. Sisco: I don't think we should be that specific. W"e could send a
message to Tasca, asking him if he detects any changes in Greek objectives.
We can tell him to talk to Palamas and try to feel out the current situation.
We shouldn't go beyond that point, though.
Dr. Kissinger : That sounds okay to me. Will you send a cable over here
for clearance?
Mr. Sisco: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: What about Popper? Can we calm him down?
Mr. Sisco: Yes. We can send him a cable telling him not. to see. Makarios
We can authorize him to see Clerides, to get a current reading. of. the
situation. We should tell him not to take any initivea to. see: anyone
else. If he receives any initiatives, though, her aboard:: ask us, fo instructions.
Dr. Kissinger: I have the impression he will make sure that Cleride s take s
the initiative.
very intelligent. He also follows orders.
Dr. Kissinger: I'm not saying he would disobey orders. He would just
Mr. Sisco: No. That wouldn't happen. Popper is an activist, and he is
see that the initiative came from Clerides.
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Mr. Sisco: Popper is playing it straight.
Dr. Kissinger: The Embassy personnel always want to be well-liked by
the people they are accredited to -- and this is only normal.
Mr. Sisco: Henry, this ha- always been an effective and efficient Embassy.
When something has occurred, they have always found out about it and
let us know. Popper'-s worry is that the Embassy's pattern of reaction
in this crisis has evolved differently from the way it has in other crises.
He is worried that Makarios will read something into that. I think we
can tell him to see Clerides and to use the meeting as a listening exercise
to find out where the talks stand. Popper can live with instructions like
that.
Mr. Sisco: Sure.
Dr. Kissinger: What about his staff? Can it be restrained?
Dr. Kissinger: It makes sense to me.
Mr. Sisco: I can put it all in one cable for you.
Dr. Kissinger: What about Turkey?
Mr. Sisco: Handley is alright. Turkey is off to one side, anyway. Also,
their Ambassador came in to see me yesterday.
Dr. Kissinger: I will go along with you. If you think Turkey is not the
principle mover, you don't have to include Handley in the cable.
Mr.._ Sisco: It .doesn't really matter. Handley will give m_e some indicators-
next week, if we need any.
Dr. Kissinger: Next week will be a happy week -- with this crisis, and
Vietnam, among others. At any rate, the food should be good.
Mr. Sisco: We have a delicate situation, here. We will do the best we
can.
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Dr. Kissinger: I realize that. While I have you all, together, let me
say that we hope to get some action on the Bangladesh humanitarian assistant
package. Could vie- delay making the announcement until after the China
trip? 'Can the program start right away, though?
W. Sisco: I will check with Maury [Williams].
Mr. Irwin: My inclination is to go ahead with the program before we make
the announcement. But that would depend, in part, on the discussions you
have with the Chinese.
Mr. Sisco: How much will we contribute? Has the President decided?
Dr. Kissinger: His inclination is that we give 33 1/3 percent of the
total contribution, with the understanding that. 175, 00.0 tons of: food-grain
could start- moving without an announcement.
Mr. Sisco: I see no problem with that.
Dr. Kissinger: I will try to get a decision from. the President.
Mr. Irwin: What about recognition of Bangladesh?
Dr. Kissinger: The paper is with the President.
Mr. Sisco: I've got one other thing, Henry, What about the Hussein
problem?
Dr. Kissinger: I made a recommendation,. but I: don!t-have an--answer: yet.
I recommended an informal stag dinner.
Mr. Sisco: Great. I take it, too, that the Iran visit is in good shape
again.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
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16 February .1972
I. The situation has shown little movement over
the past two days. Makarios continues to
stonewall, delaying giving the Greeks an
official answer to their note- in the meantime
stimulating open expressions of Greek Cypriot-
support and quietly augmenting his personal
security forces. -
II. The next move would appear to be up. to the
Greeks. They have been uncommunicative with
US and UK officials about their intentions.
A. Yesterday Athens released the text of the
note it delivered to Makarios, describing
it as an appeal rather than an ultimatum..
B. Greek Foreign Minister Falamas professes-
that Athens' main concern is that the
Czech arms be turned over to the UN forces e
but the arms issue was probably a pretext
for a Greek move to oust Makarios.
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In any event
the Greeks, having failed to rally sub--
stantial. Greek Cypriot opinion behind
them, may be considering more forceful
action.
D. Greek Ambassador Panay?takos reportedly
has met with several. bishops on the island,
presumably to seek their support, in
opposing the Archbishop.
III. Makarios believes that time and international
opinin are on his side, but he is said to be
aware that the fight is not over.
A. Makarios reportedly will delay his reply
to the Greeks for several days, while
Glafcos Clerides, a close adviser to the
Archbishop continues efforts to mediate
between Athens and Nicosia..
Makarios supporters, from villages and
schools demonstrated yesterday and today
in support of the Archbishop.
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C. Greek Cypriot communists publicly sided
with Makarios today.. A Communist party
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Makarios had previously warned C:oxmunists
and left-wingers to lie low, but we have
no_reason to believe he would be upset
by their unsolicited support.
It appears that right-wingers, but not
Grivas elements, have. also aided with the
Archbishop. Glafcos Clerides, the head
of a right-wing party and a close adviser
to Makarios, has been successful in rallying
such support for the Archbishop.
_.pains not to antagonize Greece unnecessarily.
leader condemned Athens demands, but took
E. Makarios told his advisers that he expects
Athens to make an assassination attempt
on him next.
The Makarios forces are prepared for
pro-Grivas demonstrations, but so far none
have materialized.
IV. Ankara so far seems content to stand aside,
awaiting the results of Greek pressure on
Makarios.
.
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No DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSE.M
HANDLE AS STATE DEPT BXDIS
Ankara is making public its position
that the .Czech arms must be turned over
to the 124 forces.
B. Turkey's clandestine radio on Cyprus
predicted that an end of iakarios seemed
to be in sight, and said that it is very
probable that Greece and Turkey, as
guarantor powers, May soon join forces
in the matter." This is the first mention
of any possibility of Greek--Turkish action
over the Cyprus events.
C. Unconfirmed press reports indicate that
Turkey has placed its forces in southern
Turkey on alert. This would include the
39th Division which has long been slated
for military reaction to events on Cyprus.
V. in Greece, there still are no indications of
troop alerts or other military preparations
for possible intervention.
vi. On Cyprus itself, there has been no significant
change in the status of military forces,
NO POR.nIrl-?`I DTS.9rM/t3ACF:''YR0UND USE ONLY
1,10 DI 'SEM F nOA/CONTROLLED DISSEM
HANDLE AS STATE DEPT EXDIS
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/03/26: LOC-HAK-310-2-3-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/03/26: LOC-HAK-310-2-3-1
SECRET
No DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLIsD V150 i
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACEGROUND USE ONLY
although :each-side appears to be improving
its.readiness posture.
A. The creek Cypriot police, the Greek-con-
C. The Archbishop's personal guard and the
Cyprus police force at his residence in
the old city have been augmented.
trolled_Cypriot National Guard, and the
Turkish Cypriots remain on alert.
The Greek Army contingent reportedly is
reinforcing the Cypriot National Guard..
Guard units have quietly deployed to posi
tions from where they could move against
Makarivs quickly.
5
NO FOREIaN DISSFM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
NO DISSEM ROD/CONiTROLLED DI a SE;.I
HANDLZ AS STATE DEPT EXDIS
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/03/26: LOC-HAK-310-2-3-1