LOGISTICS AND FORCE DIVERSION/DESTRUCTION EVIDENCE ON SOUTH LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-449-4-21-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 16, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/02/28: LOC-HAK-449-4-21-
MEMORANDUM - -
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT:, Logistics and Force Diversion/ Destruction Evidence
Problem
on South Laos
CIA has provided its estimate of the current logistics situation in
South Laos and you have received DIA's rebuttal.
CIA maintains that:
- "There is a large amount of indirect evidence suggesting that
exceeded their quotas.
are reports from various Binh Trams that they have repeateaty
from BT32, which according to CIA is 'the highest ever noted in
enemy logistical traffic for a month." Other indirect evidence cited
the 108 ton per day average of 1970 versus the 140 ton average
through just one of. three passes in 1971. CIA surmises that if we
had data on the inputs through the other two passes, input could
run as high as 400 tons per day if one assumed proportional flows.
Another -intercept reports possibly 165 ens per day-arriving shipped
this year's tonnages will be higher [than last year's]." CIA cites
After adding to previous supply flows the increment required
that nightly move down the Ho Chi Minh trail seem adequate for
CIA at 20 tons per day) CIA says "Thus the ammunition and weapons
to replace the lost Sihanoukville flow (estimated rather glibly by
maintaining a hot war in Indochina."
assessment:
DIA's rebuttal argues as follows in an attempt to refute CIA's
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-- DIA has no evidence to support CIA's contention that this
year's flows will exceed last year's. DIA notes that thus far this
year input tonnages Fare comparable" to last year's while
throughput tonnages are well below those of a year ago.
DIA disagrees with CIA's inference that Binh Tram's
reports of goal fulfillment constitute evidence that the communist
supply system is reaching its goal.
The foregoing viewpoints constitute another episode in the continuous
intelligence scandal of the Vietnam war:
CIA and DIA could both be correct. CIA may be correct that
.this year's tonnages will exceed last year's if they mean input
tonnages. DIA also could be correct in asserting that throughput
is less. It clearly is thus far. Moreover, even if input is much
higher, losses to Lam S,:?n, supplies consumed by the much-enlarged
enemy force structure in South Laos, increased losses to more
effective truck killing AC-130s, offsets plus losses on offsets to
replace Sihanoukville, increased food shipments required to offset
food requirements previously covered from Cambodia -- all these
factors could yield a kv throughput than a year ago. The point is,
full analysis of these statements shows them to be half truths. No
single intelligence authority is responsible for putting together the
entire picture. This we are left with no full appreciation for what
we do know and do not know. Neither DIA or CIA is doing solid
analysis.
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W
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CIA and DIA rely, almost exclusively and advocate the
use of the collection techniques they control -
Neither agency
compares the evidence from all sources and makes basic
reliability judgements.
requirement constitutes a "hot war.'
effect that supply movements will allow the "hot war" to continue
without.ever saying what level of activity and associated supply
-- Both CIA and DIA refuse to face up to the fundamental
issues. Both CIA and DIA have refused to relate supply flows to
final end-use requirements: What throughput is required to support
what level of enemy activity? Yet CIA will offer a statement to the
operation. This framework encompasses two basic issues:
This can be done because they have not ventured very far. It is
easy to protect yourself with a phrase like "hot war. " They should'
be criticized for saying too little rather than too much.
I attempt below to lay out a comprehensive analytical framework
for an assessment of the situation in South Laos and the Lam Son
you with a candid and comprehensive assessment of the logistics
issue. Both agencies can and will defend their views successfully.
strongly believe that little will be gained by having a DIA/CIA
confrontation at tomorrow's WSAG. Neither agency has provided
too little to the latter. They deserve at at least equal weight in
assessing the situation in South Laos and its impact on the war in
enemy force diversion and force destruction.
logistics
in my opinion too much attention has been given to the former and
ludo - China.
I have attempted to piece together the data I had in hand to illustrate
portions of the analysis.
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w
Logistics Benefits
We need the following evidence to assess the logistics situation:
-.(1) Supply In uts and Throughputs for the 1970-71 Dry Season
(a) We need evidence on supply inputs broken down by week
and month and into pre -Lam Son, Lam Son, and post-Lam Son time
25X1 period These estimates should be given separately by intelligence
source etc.) and a final overall assessment
provided by CIA and DIA. Evidence on the accuracy of each
intelligence source should be provided. Some of this evidence is
available
thereafter fairly closely paralleled last year's effort in trend and
magnitude through February 1971.
Supply input to the trail system got off to a late start due to the
prolongation of the wet season into October 1969. The supply input
weekly average rate caught up to last year's rate in December and
Average
Weekly
Tons Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mali-Mar 9) 'T'otal
1969_70* 221 2024 1660 2768 3155 2273 44,394
1970-71 184 1124 1752 2830 2812 2978 41,301
Notes: * 1969-70 input does not include tonnage shipped via Sihanoukville.
Problems like the following would be resolved by an analysis like that
outlined above.
March 1971 total input of 5956 tons departs greatly from 1970 trend
which was downward at 4546 tons from a February 1970 input of 12, 619
tons. February 1971 input was 11, 248 tons. Normally in March the
Mu Gia Pass route begins to phase down. However, this year input
remains higher than usual at Mu Gia Pass, indicating continued high
level of input activity. Input this March at Ban Karai Pass was 1208 tons,
and input at the DMZ was 1644 -- most of which it is believed is destined
for enemy forces opposing the Lam Son operation.
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-- This evidence would tend to support a judgment that supply
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inputs in 1970-71 will exceed 1969-70 levels if it is true that the late
monsoon forced the enemy to start his effort about a month later this
year. On the other hand, - did phase one of the offensive end a month
later than phase one a year ago? Has the acceleration of the enemy's
effort due to Lam Son put him back on last year's timetable?
-- Do we know enough to resolve the proportionality dispute
between CIA and l7IA on the relative importance of the three passes?
CIA ventures a guess of equal proportionality. Is DIA's assertions
that we don't know the best we can do?
throughput of supplies estimated arriving at points of entry into
South Vietnam and Cambodia is only 21% of the level of last year.
(b) Evidence on throughput estimates in 1970 should also be
provided broken down as described in (1) above. Serious problems
underly the following series provided- by DIA which shows that
Weekly
Av . Oct Nov
'Does not include tonnage arriving via Sihaoukville in 1969-70.
pluss losses on offsets to overcome loss of Sihanoukville, and losses to
what information is available on: supplies consumed in South
Laos, supplies destroyed by bombing, and by Lam Son, supply offsets
weather, etc,
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account for.the We monsoon this year.
-- how the series would look if it were seasonably adjusted to
Such an a .lysis, would raise problems like the following:
-- CIA may be correct in its assertion that "tonnages" (read
correct in asserting that throughput will be less.
input s this year will exceed last year's. But DIA could also be
-- Truck kills have soared this year, primarily due to the fact that we
should have required a turnover of inventory three times this dry season.
now have 12 AC-130 gunships operating as opposed to only one last year.
The AC-130 gunship is credited with 70% of truck kills. It takes about
2, 500 trucks to operate the trail's logistic system. At the current rate
of kills, there should be a turnover of truck inventory about every three
weeks. Even if we accept DIA's estimate that 75% of damaged trucks
can be repaired and returned to service, the current rate of truck kills
Weekly
Avg. T ruck
Kills Oct Nov Dec
Mar, (thru 9 Mar
Total (to 9 Mar
4138
7219
-w How has the loss of Sihanoukville increased the throughput (and
for the. losses the enemy would bear in South Laos?
thereby input) requirement? Does CIA's 20 ton per day estimate account
(c) Can a special input /throughput series be designed to assess
the impact of Lam Son operation, e. g. , a BT32/ D x'34 comparison
before,. during and after the operation?
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-- (2) Total Enemy Logistics Requirements via the Trail for Alter-
calibrate the range of offensive activity would be to examine previous
dry season flows before past offensives, adjust these to compare with
1970-71 Trail conditions and making alternative assumptions about
stockpiles, estimate what types of military activities in 1971, the current
throughput would support.
It is possible that input and throughput in 1970-71 dry season
will exceed 1969-70 levels and the enemy could still fall short of meeting
last year's requirement for combat. This might be the case if the 1971
increment did not offset what in the past was obtained via Sihanouville.
The ultimate test of the significance of the logistics effort is not how it
coin ares with last year's but the level of combat activity it will sustain.
levels, e. g.,. protracted war, general offensive, two MR offensive. DIA
and CIA have shied away from such an estimate even though they have
the individual data pieces necessary to accomplish it. A useful way to
native Strategies /Activity Levels and. the Implied Input /Thr?ou h ut
Requirement.
In order to assess the significance of various throughput levels
we need to know what they might imply for possible enemy activity
(3) . Other Logistics Evidence.
on the following:
Also relevant to our overall logistics assessment is evidence.
-- Local logistics shortages, e. g. , in MR's 1. or Z of
South Vietnam.
-- What is the significance of recent changes in manpower
-infiltration for the logistics estimate?
-- Individual Binh Tram reports on goal achievement and
What is the significance of data on the expanded trail
network in South Laos and the enemy's use of new roads, etc. ?
- What do data on the mix of supplies (food, POL, ammunition,
etc) tell us about current logistics capabilities compared with past experience?
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What do the enemy's efforts to defend the Trail tell
With the foregoing analysis, we could move to assessments
us about its importance to him?
Lam.. Son. Such criteria should include the following justifications for
of Lam Son in which one could have some confidence. The data need
to be judged against alternative logistics success criteria for
It cut the aggregrate level of logistics throughput in
level of combat and/or to consume stockpiles.
1971 and thereby forced the enemy to operate at a lower overall
The local disrupture efforts in MR 1 and 2 denied the
enemy offensive opportunities this dry season.
The delays caused by Lam Son (and the late monsoon)
devote more resources that could be used elsewhere to restoring
in the dry season.
.~- The operation into South Laos forced the enemy to
caused the enemy to cancel operations in Cambodia and elsewhere
because supplies did not arrive in time to begin offensive operations
damage and expanding the Trail.
Force Division and Force Destruction Benefits
In my judgment, the strongest justification for Lam Son
would rely on.a force diversion/destruction rationale. Very briefly the issues are
- (1) Did the Lam Son Operations 'pre-empt a Highland's
reported in the February 25 Washington Post to have offered such a
evidence that had ARVN not entered Laos, enemy units there would have
mounted an offensive in the highlands of MR 2. General Abrams was
by diverting forces designated for such offensives? There is some
and/or MR 1 or Cambodia Offensive
pre-emptive justification for Lam bon.
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(4) Concluding Logistics Assessment.
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take advantage of MR' Z short supply line.
A P. O. W. from the 64th NVA Regiment reported his unit,
which entered South Vietnam in early January, was headed for the
highlands to take part in an offensive. However, after arriving at
Ban Dong in. Laos on February 11, this unit was ordered to defend the
area against ARVN attacks. A high level rallier reported in early
August 1970 of enemy plans to mount a priority offensive in MR Z against
areas from which U. S. units had redeployed (the highlands) in order to
We also have a report that units headed for Cambodia
were held up in South Laos because of Lam Son.
diverted to South Vietnam and Cambodia.
the long term. One might argue that the Laos effort was crucial if
ARVN's threat was to be credible and the enemy's forces were not to be
In general, there is a serious question whether the enemy's
roughly 35, 000 combat troops in. South Laos are all fully occupied for
For a judgment an the force diversion benefits of Lam
Son we need a complete OB appraisal and P. O. W., rallier and other
reports on enemy intentions and movements for forces in South Laos.
Most of this evidence is readily available.
exhibited strange fluctuations. Possible these may in part be ue to
Lam Son which..might be credited with disrupting,.t o enemy' s effort
to build-up his forces for combat.
(2) Did Lam Son disrupt the manpower infiltration
effort? The enemy's 1970-71 manpower infiltrations effort has
status of enemy units to arrive at an assessment of the enemy units put
to pull together the data on ARVN-inflicted casualities, losses to air
Infiltration data are readily available for such an assessment.
(3) ARVN and U. S. air support have hurt some NVA units
badly, possibly placing them out of service for the dry season. We need
out of commission by Lam Son.
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 Other Benefits and the Costs of Lam Son.
Other benefits to Lam Son that should be weighed
include possible improvements in ARVN effectiveness.
Increased NVA mobilization attributable to Lam Son.
Other more general risk/cost considerations are:
Risk of Chinese intervention,
Cost to Laotian neutralith,
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Possible control losses in South Vietnam pursuant
to ARVN diversions to Laos (thus far these appear to be slight).
-- Losses in ARVN combat effectiveness due to
enemy attacks in Laos.
-.Increased political oppisition to war in U. S.
An assessment of the foregoing logistics and force diversion/
-destruction considerations would provide a sound basis for an initial
judgment on the utility of the Lam Son operation.