SOVIET INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-46-4-4-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 16, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

ME~,_ No-Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-46-4-4-2
ECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: A. Denis Clift
SUBJECT: Soviet Internal Political Situation
C.4 Aa "
ACTION
May 16, 1974
There have been several rumors in recent days that Brezhnev's position
has been imperiled by recent setbacks to Soviet foreign policy.
Working with State/INR (Hyland) and CIA, I have prepared the information.
memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab A noting the.
rumors and advising that there is little to support them and that Brezhnev
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-46-4-4-2
would still appear to be firmly in control of the Soviet leadership.
The memorandum may be of interest to the President on the eve of his
meeting with the high-level delegation of Soviet Parliamentarians.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.
0132-
 MEM No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-46-4-4-2
THE WHITE HOUSE W
SECRET/SENSITIVE INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Current Soviet Leadership Situation
Summar .
A careful reading of the evidence does not suggest that recent developm_ ents
have generated such conflict in the Politburo as to threaten Brezhnev's
position; to alter the leadership balance in other ways; or to call into
question Soviet commitment to detente.
While Brezhnev has not been too much in evidence for the past several
days, it is probable that he has been participating in deliberations on
a number of important issues including the upcoming Supreme Soviet
elections, a possible CC Plenum and review of the USSR's long-range
economic plan. His most recent message to you on the Middle East would
serve to confirm that he is fully in command on his internal front,
Background. Recent events -- the accession. of Wilson, the death of
Pompidou, the resignation of Brandt, and US initiatives in the Middle
East -- cannot help but have generated unforeseen, thorny problems for
the Politburo. But while the Soviet leaders must currently feel that 'the
results of their detente policy have both positive and negative aspects,
the advantages of detente in their eyes, such as recognition of Soviet
superpower status, most likely outweigh its disadvantages. There seems
to be a fairly solid consensus behind Brezhnev's detente app proach and he
himself appears well entrenched. He was at center stage on May Days
easily outdistanced his colleagues in the number of honorary nominations
to the Supreme Soviet, and continues to receive ever more laudatory
praise from them.
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)_
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-46-4-4-2
&ECRET/SENSIT -2-
There are, however, observable differences of view in the leadership.
Individual leaders vary in the warmth of their public endorsements of
detente, though none have voiced opposition. At a lower level, there
are signs of a debate over such issues as the attainability of victory
in nuclear war which is reminiscent of the conflict which raged under
Khrushchev. There are also several recent anomalies from standard
practices for which we have no satisfactory explanations, such as the
failure of Brezhnev or any other leader to give a May Day speech and
the last minute cancellation of the celebration of the 250th anniversary
of the USSR Academy of Sciences to which hundreds of foreign dignitaries
had been invited.
Conclusion. It does not appear that a major struggle is developing: the
economy is generally performing well, even allowing for somewhat
lowered crop prospects, the Solzhenitsyn controversy is abating, and
dissent is increasingly controlled.
Age and ill health remain as the most likely possibilities for any change
in the Soviet leadership over the near term. Brezhnev is now 67 and,
while his health is reasonably. good for a man of his years, his stamina
is declining. He continues, however, to lead an active public life and
on May 12 addressed his wartime comrades-in-arms.
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-46-4-4-2