DIPLOMATIC COURSE OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-460-3-3-4
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 5, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

19ML 0m, J -a
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.Respect to Cambodia
Recommendations:
resumption of diplomatic relations with Cambodia.
control and possibility of reversal at all stages--toa
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
February 5, 1969
14DDRANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Diplomatic Course of Action with
1. That you authorize a diplomatic course of action
that would envisage proceeding gradually--and with tull
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Wasnirg*oh. D.C. 20729
Approve
Disapprove,
DOS, DPMO
reviews
completed.
2. T see three possible means of initiating this course
of action.
willingness to issue a "border declaration" (described
(a) You personally could outline in a letter our
below) and to go further from there;
(b) We could say the same thing in a message
U.S. interests in Cambodia. This way your personal
from the U.S. Government to. the Cambodian Government,
delivered by the Australian Ambassador,. representing
intervention could be held in reserve.
(c) The third course, which I recommend, is that
you send a general personal letter to Sihanouk (Tab A),
to be followed shortly thereafter by a message through
the Australians dealing specifically with a border
declaration (Tab B),
Approve Disapprove
Discussion
As Mr. Helms noted in the NSC briefing on Viet-Nam,
Sihanouk's behavior since mid-1963 has rested on a judgment
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question remains of what to do about our relations..
of incidents and harassments in 1964 culminated in the
,suspension of diplomatic relations in May of 1965. Special
missions by Ambassador Bonsai in December 196.4, Ambassador
Bowles in January, 1968, and Eugene Black last September
have led to some improvement in understanding, but the basic
W
that we would eventually lose in South Viet-Nam. A series
.tions have included:
we think they add up to something significant. The indica-
contrary indications and harsh public denunciations...However,
with the U.S. As always, these have been interspersed with
given a number of signals of a new desire for better relations
In the past few months, Sihanouk has, in our judgment,
1. Approaches to the French, Australians, Indonesians,
and, most recently, President Marcos-of the Philippines, to
express interest in better.U.S.-Cambodian relations.
2. Release of the 12 American soldiers detained in Cam-
of a continuing U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, counter-
3. Remarks in,a press conference about the usefulness
doubtedly thought of it as a gracious gesture on his part.
bodia; althouh their release was long overdue, Sihanouk un-
balancing Chinese ambitions.
4. Dispatch of a Cambodian foreign service officer to.
reactivation of Cambodian membership in the Asian Development
Bank.
5. A noticeably more moderate reaction to recent border
incidents, including a serious and embarrassing one in which
a U.S. reconnaissance patrol destroyed a truck, killed eight
Cambodian civilians,.and captured a ninth.
6. Application for membership in the IMF and IBRD, and
as "custodian" of the Cambodian embassy building.
Washington to work under the aegis of the French Embassy here
7. Expressions of desire for private.foreign investment,
with the governor of the Cambodian central bank visiting New
several years of sporadic negotiations.
York to promote investment by U.S. firms.
8. Grant of landing rights to Pan American Airways
of ter
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On the other side of the coin, NVA/VC use of Cambodian
of power to control the situation and his constant need to
in the Cambodian Government. We cannot ignore these facts
but we believe that they reflect essentially Sihanouk's lack
territory has increased. Recent evidence suggests strongly
that Cambodia is indeed a major source of military supplies
for VC/NVA forces in South Viet-Nam and that the supply route
has a high degree of cooperation and connivance at high levels
appease Hanoi (and the NLF) as best he can.
On balance, we by no means read the indicators as sug-
However, he does seem to.have concluded that it istime he
gesting that he has now decided we are going to win in.SVN.
trimmed ship and hedged his bets.
Basic Options on Diplomatic Courses of Action
A basic question right at the outset is whether it is
of relations, and easing of the atmosphere in the meantime
to our -net advantage visibly to improve relations with Cam-
bodia and to move in the direction of a possible resumption
of relations. It is my conclusion that--subject to our
ironing out as many problems as we can--an eventual resumption
is to. our advantage.
To put the matter in'terms of a resumption of relations,
Advantaes
1. A resumption of relations, and to some extent any
the major advantages and disadvantages are as follows:
Lion would enable us to communicate more effectively than we
can now do through the Australians (who represent our interests
in Cambodia) or on occasion the French (who are helpful, but
to whose skirts we would not wish to be attached).
3. Even a small U.S. representation would give,us some
intelligence and information gains. If it progressed. to the
point where've had good military attach6s there, with freedom
to travel, we might in the end learn a great deal more
of his previous position, and is in my judgment the foremost
advantage of moving in this direction.
2. Some form of diplomatic relations or V.S. representa
improvement of our relations, will be construed in the area
as a clear sign that Sihanouk thinks we will come out on top.
This could have significant favorable consequences in view
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in the face. of Hanoi's clear and implacable opposition. These
are brides that he will cross only if he moves significantly
farther in his estimate of the outcome in Viet-Nam, although
the fact that we have resumed relations could at the eventual
down the supply activities now taking place through Cambodia.
4. What. I do not put forward as a significant advantage
is any early hope that even the fullest'resumption of diplo-
matic relations would basically change the military situation
or Sihanouk's degree of complicity in the supply line. Nor
do I believe that it would cause him, for example, to get be
?hind an enlarged. and effective International Control Commission
--while the fact that we were watching might operate to tone
claim that any diplomatic course of action can do much to
stage be a helpful' additional factor. But I do not wish to
change the military problem.
Disadvantages
1. Our visible pursuit of a diplomatic course of action
prior to any decision to undertake diplomatic action.
along the borders. The views of the Department..of Defense. on
such a course of action are attached (Tab C). They conclude
that the full range of courses of action should be evaluated
directed _at easing our.- relations must, to..a significant degree,
inhibit any expansion in the authority our forces now have to act
necessary, because the proposed diplomatic course of action
inhibits only.major new. military actions of a. kind which I do
not think we should take.in any case. The suggestion in the;
OSD/.joint Staff memo for neutralization of the Cambodia/South
Viet-Nam border is fraught with enormous practical difficulties
that a. study of the, full range of. courses of action is
I have read the OSD/Joint Staff comments, I do not think
in the unlikely event that agreement of the many parties
which rule it out. as a solution to the immediate problem even
involved could. be obtained.
.representatives in Cambodia will experience some indignities.
2. Under almost any circumstances, U.S. diplomatic
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The Prince is bound to denounce us from time to time, and
might in fact do'this a bit more as a smokescreen for prac-
tical moves in our direction. We will need steady nerves,
and will have to be prepared to live with some degree of
embarrassment.
3. Much more serious is the possibility-of physical
violence or.a renewed break by Sihanouk. Despite the.
relatively calm view he has taken of several recent incidents,
we simply cannot be sure that we can avoid some really major
incident to which he would feel tempted to react.-.I believe
we can partially guard against this possibility by quiet
talks before we'reach a decision on.the resumption of rela-
tions. Sihanouk has already told the French Ambassador that
he would not treat our. representatives as "hostages,' and
would take a more. understanding view of border incidents which
might occur after a U.S. border declaration. But an element
of. risk in this direction would remain in any circumstances.
Net Judgment
From the foregoing,'I conclude that it is to our'net .
advantage to move in this direction and it could be to our
advantage to go all the way to a full resumption of relations,
if'we have prepared the. way properly.
If this basic judgment is accepted, it leads to the
question of pace and timing. To move rapidly or impetuously
is obviously unwise. To sit tight and do nothing is in my
judgment a neglect of opportunity.
Thus, the option worth following seems to me to be a
careful and step-by-step sequence.of moves, keeping us in a
good public position at all times and designed to lead
eventually to a resumption of relations--but without early
commitment and with the clear chance to review and change the
course of action if it is not doing what we hope for.
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Specific MIeche=ics
The first step would be a declaration of respect and
territorial integrity of Cambodia within its present frontiers.
Sihanouk has repeatedly stated that such a statement,. along
lines issued by more than 40.countries, is the only pre-condition
recognition of the sovereignty, independence, neutrality and
to improvement and resumption of relations.
This border declaration adds only the four underlined
words to what we have consistently said. It commits us to
Viet-Nam, and Laos concerning the present location or basis
in the minor-disputes that exist vis-a-vis Thailand, South
In particular, it does not commit us for or against any position
nothing more than, is already in the United Nations Charter,-
of Cambodia's frontiers.
We'could indicate our. willingness to make a border declares
Lion either by aletter from you. or through. diplomatic channels.
1. A letter from you, as compared to a message through
diplomatic channels, has the following advantages:
(a) Sihanouk in recent months has "many -timiii,mAde
it clear that he attaches special value to communications
crew, the message from President Johnson undoubtedly helped-
from the President.. In the. case of-the release of theLCU
the atmosphere immensely.
with no possibility that Sihanouk would think, as he has tended.
to do, that he is hearing from the State Department but-that
the Defense Department and the U.S. military in Viet-Nam have
of your policy toward Cambodia. You alone-can convey these
(b). At-the outset of your, Administration, it is in
any event appropriate for you to lay down fundamental points
If our judgment is wrong or the particular events of the
As with all else, there are arguments to the contrary.
Sihanouk is notorious for making everything he gets public,
a different policy.
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moment are unfavorable, he will take it out on you personally
2. A second possibility is a sounding carried out by the
--although I must say that he will do this sooner or later in
any event if he is in the mood.
Australians on our behalf. This would have less immediate
impact than a letter from you, but it would have the advan-
tage of reserving such a letter for use at some future stage
border incidents occurring after the issue or a aeca.aration.
heads of state, on such points as his reaction to future
more specifically than is possible. in a correspondence between
our instance might offer an opportunity to probe, a little
which the Australian Ambassador would have with Sihanouk at
Lary operating authorities... Moreover, the conversata.ons
and it would defer to a later stage any inhibitions on-mili-
.personally in a course of action that. could prove fruitless,
when its value might be greater. It would not involve you
3. _ recommend a course which combines the advantages
and avoids most of the disadvantages of both these.tactics.
It would begin with a letter from you in general terms, merely
expressing polite regards and. avoiding discussion of specific
This would be followed by an approach by the Australian
would improve the prospects for, without involving you in the
problems (Tab A). Such a letter would gratify Sihanoukand
'Ambassador along the lines.of Tab B, which allows an extra
:.degree of explicitness.
letter and before we proceed with the specific approach through
However, simultaneously with the despatch of your general
the Australians, we must put South Viet-Nam, Thailand, and
Laos on clear notice of what we are doing., We would assure
them privately that a border declaration does not commit us
to any position on specific disputes over border demarcation.
On issuing the declaration, we would say publicly only. that
it speaks for itself, and that we would make similar declara-
tions with respect to Laos, Thailand, and the Republic of Viet-
Nam if they.so requested. (Any, further public comment might
lead Sihanouk to charge that we were hedging on our declaration.
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have to go through the exercise carefully and hold our fire
that this move would be construed as "soft." But I think we
to Southeast Asia generally--so that there'is little chance
firmness in our Viet-Nam commitment, in Paris, and in relation
have been exceedingly difficult. However, the latest indica-
tions--even from Thai Foreign Minister Thanat--are that they
will understaad and accept what we are trying to do. . I
believe you have already established a basic posture of
A year ago, such notice to Cambodia's-neighbors might
until we have the returns in hand.
Beyond these opening moves, I am much more tentative at
bring us back into line with most of our'allies,and might
procedures, and would have a few positive-advantages beyond
improving U.S.-Cambodian relations; for instance, it would
It does not commit us to make any change in our present
for. ..a border declaration, then we.would go. ahead and---issue it.
this point. If Sihanouk responds'that of course he is ready
simply cannot now forecast the precise sequence of:moves that
our protecting power--as we are now doing in.many of the.
Arab countries. We can test the water at every step, but I
would proceed carefully and slowly. For example, we. might
send in our first representatives attached to the embassy of.
came to the point of actually resuming relations, and that we
we.would make clear that we had a lot to discuss before we ever -.
In issuing a declaration and in all.contacts In - whatever. channel,
help.lessen Sihanouk's extreme sensitivity about his frontiers..
would be indicated.
If of course the Prince ridicules your letter or other-
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many quarters by the visible evidence that we had tried.
wise displays. a negative stance, then we stop in our tracks.
I think our losses would be minor, and counterbalanced in
William P. Rogers
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