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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00787R000200150005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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el- Directorate of
416_ Intelligence
The Soviet General Staff:
Managing Change in
Military Doctrine
A Research Paper
Top Secret
SOV 86-10014JX
March 1986
Copy 379
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Directorate of To i Secret
Intelligence
The Soviet General Staff:
Managing Change in
Military Doctrine
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by
the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
European Assessments Division, SOVA,
Top Secret
so V 86-100I4JX
March 1986
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of I March 1986
was used in this report.
The Soviet General Staff:
Managing Change in
Military Doctrine
The Soviet General Staff determines the content of Soviet military
doctrine and has developed a highly structured system for review and
revision when needed. It also actively enforces compliance with doctrine
throughout the armed forces. Acting for the political and military leader-
ship, the General Staff decides which aspects of doctrine require examina-
tion and who will carry out the review. The steps through which changes in
doctrine are developed and implemented include:
? Military science plans. The General Staff prepares a five-year military
science plan for the armed forces. This serves as a basis for five-year
plans in the main staff of each branch of the armed forces, the military
academies, groups of forces, military districts, and fleets. The plans
direct research on the nature of warfare, force organization and capabili-
ties, planning and conduct of military operations, and the doctrine and
forces of prospective enemies. They set objectives for all areas of military
science research and assign specific tasks to the military science organs of
staffs at various levels of command and to military academies, schools,
and scientific research institutes. The General Staff reviews each of these
plans annually. It also prepares a five-year plan for the Warsaw Pact that
is based on the plan for the Soviet armed forces.
? Military exercises. The Soviets implement various aspects of their
military science plans during exercises, which they sometimes term
"experimental" or "special" if a new concept or weapons system is being
tested. Moreover, they use exercises to continue testing the validity of
their current doctrine. Military science research groups are formed for
many exercises to obtain information, analyze it, and make recommenda-
tions to the General Staff.
? Military regulations. These are compiled by General Staff officers and
combine combat and exercise experience with the ideas of military
theorists. Soviet writings and human sources assert that regulations are
valid statements of doctrine, reflect actual force organization and
capabilities, and constitute a code of laws governing the employment of
all the branches of the armed forces in wartime. The Manual for the
Conduct of Operations dictates how fronts, fleets, armies, and probably
corps are to plan and execute their operations; the Field Service
Regulations and various other combat regulations and manuals indicate
how divisions and their subordinate units are to fight.
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From a detailed examination of Soviet regulations and authoritative
writings, it is apparent that the primary factor that prompts the General
Staff to change doctrine is the technology?either in hand or emergent?of
the weapons and equipment used to wage war.
Their system affords the Soviets distinct advantages as well as disadvan-
tages. The General Staff can exercise practical authority in doctrinal
matters, not just provide guidance. This helps to ensure the compatibility of
doctrine with the force development process, in which the General Staff
also a s the rimar role.
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Contents
Page
Preface
iii
Key Judgments
V
The Importance of Soviet Military Doctrine
1
Role of the General Staff
1
Comparison With US Doctrine
3
Key Factors Affecting Change in Soviet Doctrine 4
The Historical Experience
5
Recent Developments
9
The East Europeans
16
Conclusions
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Implications
19
Outlook
21
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The Soviet General Staff:
Managing Change in
Military Doctrine
The Importance of Soviet Military Doctrine
Soviet military doctrine (voyennaya doktrina) governs
the planning for and conduct of military operations. It
is based on the principles of Soviet military science
and approved by the highest Soviet civilian and
military command authorities?in peacetime, the Po-
litburo, Defense Council, and Collegium of the Minis-
try of Defense?and therefore has the status of state
policy.' This process provides a Marxist-Leninist con-
tent that imbues Soviet military doctrine with a
political and moral authority not found in Western
concepts of doctrine, and makes it by definition both
"scientific" and officially sanctioned. It is also, ac-
cording to the Soviets, totally consistent with their
Marxist-Leninist world view and the political policies
of the Soviet Communist Party and state. We judge it
is the major factor in determining how the Soviet
armed forces are to be used in battle.
The term voyennaya doktrina is routinely translated
as military doctrine but in many instances "national
security policy" would be a more accurate translation
of the Soviet meaning. Voyennaya doktrina encom-
passes the preparations for and the nature and objec-
tives of a future war, as well as the methods of
fighting it. Only the last would commonly be found in
a Western definition of military doctrine.
The Soviets view Western concepts of doctrine as
encompassing only what they define as the military-
technical component of doctrine?the planning and
conduct of combat operations. The military-technical
component is unstable, changes as conditions change,
and is contingent on the level of the technical and
industrial base of the nation. From the Soviet perspec-
tive, Western concepts lack the sociopolitical compo-
nent of doctrine that in Soviet doctrine is both stable
and deterministic because of its foundation in Marx-
ist-Leninist theory.
' In wartime, these authorities would be transformed into national
command organs like the State Defense Committee and Supreme
High Command formed during World War II.
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Role of the General Staff
The Soviet General Staff determines the content of
military doctrine by actively controlling the process
by which doctrine is revised and promulgated in new
military regulations:
? It determines the content of military science plans
in the armed forces, which serves as the basis for
developing changes in doctrine.
? It establishes commissions to review current regula-
tions and make changes in their contents.
? It controls the flow of information presented to the
Soviet national command authorities, thereby assur-
ing that all doctrine approved accords with the views
of the General Staff.
As the executive agent of the Supreme High Com-
mand, the General Staff also enforces compliance
with doctrine. General Staff officers have the primary
responsibility for drafting Soviet war plans, at least 25X1
down to division level, and the General Staff would
exercise operational control of the armed forces in
wartime. Thus, it can ensure that operations are both
planned and conducted according to doctrine.
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A front is a joint-forces command roughly equivalent to a NATO
army group and its associated tactical air force.
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Soviet Military Theory
The following definitions of the principles of Soviet
military theory have been drawn from authoritative
military writings:
Military doctrine is the official state view on the
nature of war, the likely opponents in a war, the
structure of the armed forces, the use of the armed
forces in combat, and the preparation of the country
for war. It is based on the principles of Soviet
military science and, in turn, provides general guid-
ance for military science research. It has two ele-
ments, sociopolitical and military-technical. The first
establishes the Marxist-Leninist context in which
warfare occurs; the second guides the planning and
conduct of combat operations.
Military science concerns the laws and nature of
armed conflict and the military preparations by the
country and armed forces for war. Its most important
component is military art, or how a war is fought, and
is composed of: (1) strategy?the planning and con-
duct of war as a whole, the training of the armed
forces, and the support of combat operations; (2)
operational art?the planning and conduct of opera-
tions by large forces; and (3) tactics?the preparation
and conduct of a battle.
Military scientific research is divided into four gener-
al areas:
? Military-political: The study of the military-theo-
retical tenets of Marxism-Leninism and the appli-
cation of these principles to research on military
issues.
? Military-theoretical: The investigation of the basic
problems of military science and art, especially the
preparation of the armed forces for combat, their
conduct in battle, and their logistic support.
? Military-technical: The development of new and
improvement of existing weapons and equipment
and the testing of their effectiveness and
compatibility.
? Military-historical: The examination of principles
and trends in the evolution of military art, and the
study of the experience of past wars and their
application to the present and future.
Military scientific work includes the synthesis of
research and experience and the introduction of new
principles into regulations; the development of mathe-
matical models of operations and battles and the use
of these in "forecasting" the results of combat; the
preparation of military science publications; and the
conduct of military science conferences.
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The Soviets use three types of orders: prikaz, direktiv, and
ukazaniye. The first is a simple, direct order from a commander to
his subordinates and carries neither explanation nor justification.
Only the commander and his chief of staff may issue prikazy. A
direktiv is an order that contains a brief explanation according to a
standard format. Direktivy are routinely issued by the staff in the
name of the commander. An ukazaniye is a detailed explanation of
an order drafted by an appropriate staff officer.
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Comparison With US Doctrine
In contrast to the Soviets, each branch of the US
armed forces develops its own "doctrine." The US
Army's new Air-Land Battle doctrine, for example, is
a product of the Army's Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) and its Command and Gener-
al Staff College. Moreover, the field manual describ-
ing the Air-Land Battle doctrine, Operations (FM
100-5)?unlike equivalent Soviet manuals?is an un-
classified publication. The doctrines of the US Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps also are the products
of their respective war and staff colleges and training
and operational commands. The US Government has
no officially approved state doctrine in the Soviet
sense, except for general statements of policy or
strategic concepts.
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The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), unlike the Soviet
General Staff, do not establish (or even approve)
doctrine for the individual services. Nor does the JCS
maintain operational control of the US armed forces,
although by law the Chiefs are responsible for their
"strategic direction." The commanders of the respec-
tive regional and functional unified and specified
commands exercise operational control on behalf of
US national command authorities, the President, and
Secretary of Defense. The JCS, however, serves as the
principal military adviser to the President, Secretary
of Defense, and National Security Council. It also
establishes doctrine for joint operations and training,
prepares plans for strategic operations, and reviews
the plans of the unified and specified commands. This
enables the Chiefs to exert influence over the planning
of military operations, although not necessarily over
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Therefore, the Joint Chiefs lack the General Staff's
authority to promulgate doctrine and impose it on the 25X1
various services. The US armed forces plan and fight
by employing several distinct doctrines, although
these are compatible in many respects. Furthermore, 25X1
US commanders traditionally have interpreted mili-
tary doctrine in a creative manner, frequently using it
mainly as a guide and departing from it as the
situation dictates. Unlike his US counterpart, a Soviet
officer incurs significant risks if he departs from the
regulations. 25X1
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Key Factors Affecting Change in Soviet Doctrine
Authoritative Soviet writings state that the most
important factors affecting the principles of opera-
tional art and tactics are the:
? Nature of the operational environment. The meth-
ods for conducting an operation can vary drastically
if it occurs in an urban area, on the steppes, in the
desert or mountains, in a tropical climate, or at sea.
? Degree of mobility of the forces and their ability to
maneuver. Forces that are mobile, such as motor-
ized rifle or self-propelled artillery units, can ma-
neuver on the battlefield more rapidly than forces
that are less mobile, thereby improving their capa-
bility to avoid destruction and achieve combat
objectives.
? Firepower of the forces. This, too, can vary drasti-
cally depending on the number of weapons available
and whether conventional or nuclear weapons are
employed.
An unclassified study sponsored by the Office of Soviet Analysis
supports the conclusions in this paper regarding the factors leading
to change in Soviet doctrine. The study, entitled Historical Analy-
sis of the Use of Mobile Forces by the USSR, was done by the
Center for Strategic Technology, Texas A&M University.
Top Secret
Figure 2. Joseph Stalin
As chief of the Soviet wartime national command
authorities?the State Defense Committee and
the Supreme High Command?Stalin played the
dominant role in determining military doctrine.
He personally reviewed regulations and manuals
submitted to the Stavka of the Supreme High
Command by the General Staff His five -perma-
nent operating factors- formed the basis of Soviet
military thought until his death in 1953. These
factors were the (1) stability of the rear, (2)
morale of the army, (3) quantity and quality of
divisions, (4) quantity and quality of armament,
and (5) organizing ability of command personnel.
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Authoritative military writings also consistently em-
phasize the importance for military doctrine of such
factors as Soviet national policy, enemy policy and
doctrine, geography, and combat experience, whether
Soviet or that of another state.
The Historical Experience
Although many changes in doctrine,
have been evolutionary, the Soviets
consider those caused by the development of nuclear
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Figure 3. Mikhail Frunze
Peoples Commissar of Military
and Naval Affairs (1925)
Chief of the Staff of the Workers
and Peasants Red Army (1924-25)
Mikhail Frunze was a prominent military theo-
rist during the early years of the Soviet state. His
numerous books and articles on military affairs,
which he analyzed according to the principles of
Marxism-Leninism, helped lay the foundation of
Soviet doctrine. Frunze was an army and front
commander during the Russian Civil War, and
he has been referred to as the "Soviet
Clausewitz.
warheads, ballistic missiles, computers, and modern
communications to be revolutionary.
Some historical examples will illustrate how the vari-
ous factors, particularly technology, have altered doc-
trine as stipulated by General Staff officers in the
regulations or reflected in authoritative Soviet mili-
tary writings:'
? The 1936 FSRs codified V. K. Triandafilov's theory
of the "deep operation," in which aircraft, tanks,
and motorized infantry in concert were to strike
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Figure 4. MSU Mikhail N. Tukhachevskiy
Chief of the Staff of the Workers
and Peasants Red Army (1925-28)
Marshal Tukhachevskiy was one of the founders
of Soviet military thought. He believed that
doctrine is driven primarily by technology. He
was a prominent member of the commissions that
drafted the 1925, 1929, and 1936 Field Service
Regulations. Tukhachevskiy was a chief propo-
nent of the combined-arms "deep operation" of
the 1930s that was the precursor of today's
"strategic operation," which is to be conducted
by all branches of the armed forces to the depth
of a theater of military operations.
nearly 300 kilometers into the enemy rear.' Faulty
force organization and a shortage of modern equip-
ment, however, contributed to the Soviet inability
to implement this doctrine in the months following
the Nazi invasion.
? Several versions of the FSRs, incorporating the
latest combat experience, were drafted during
World War II. Considerable emphasis was placed
on the employment of new armored forces (includ-
ing the T-34 medium and KV and JS heavy tanks),
The Soviets were not the only proponents of such theories.
Capt. B. H. Liddell-Hart, Gen. Heinz Guderian, Col. Charles de
Gaulle, and others advocated the employment of combined arms,
with emphasis on the support of armored operations. These theories
were adopted initially by the Germans and became common
practice during World War II.
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often as "mobile groups" used to complete or
exploit the breakthrough of enemy defenses. The
lessons of the war were subsequently "confirmed"
in the 1948 FSRs.
? Manuals on the conduct of nuclear warfare were
issued for the first time in 1954 for at least the
operational and tactical levels of command.
? A discussion of conventional and nuclear operations
was combined for the first time in the 1959 FSRs.
These also incorporated organizational changes al-
ready in effect in the Ground Forces, notably the
abolition of rifle corps and the establishment of
motorized rifle divisions during the mid-1950s. The
Soviets instituted these changes to reflect the com-
plete mechanization of the Ground Forces and to
facilitate effective troop control.
? The 1963 FSRs emphasized the primary role of
nuclear weapons in combat. This almost certainly
was in response to the de lo ment of im roved
delivery systems
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These changes in doctrine have included major reap-
praisals of the way the Soviets view nuclear warfare.
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Soviet writings assert that the major impetus for
changes in doctrine during the last two decades has 25X1
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ventional weapon systems, as well as an increase in
their numbers.
These weapons included the FROG-7 rock- 25X1
et, BMP infantry combat vehicle, 122-mm self-pro-
pelled howitzer, and tanks equipped with antinuclear
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Figure 5. MSU Boris M. Shaposhnikov
Chief of the Staff of the Workers
and Peasants Red Army (1928-31)
Chief of the Soviet General Stuff
(1937-40, 1941-42)
Marshal Shaposhnikov was a military historian,
theorist, and author of the classic on military
leadership, The Brain of the Army. He was an
advocate of a strong General Staff "correspond-
ing to the direction of war and preparation for
it. In 1941 he was reputed to have organized the
Stavka of the Supreme High Command and to
have planned the defense of Moscow from the
Germans. Stalin and Foreign Minister V. M.
Molotov attended his lectures at the General
Staff Academy during the 1930s.
protective devices and better armor. The increase in
firepower and the greater range, accuracy, and mobil-
ity of these weapons were expected to improve the
overall operational effectiveness of the Ground Forces
in conventional or nuclear combat.
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Figure 6. MSU Georgiy K. Zhukov
Chief of the Soviet General Staff (1941)
Deputy Supreme Commander in Chief of the
Soviet Armed Forces (1942-45)
Minister of Defense (1955-57)
Marshal Zhukov was the most celebrated soldier
in Soviet history and the primary executor of
military doctrine during World War II. His
campaigns against the Japanese and Germans
also led to substantial changes in doctrine, mili-
tary science, and the Field Service Regulations.
Zhukov was an advocate of modernization
throughout the Soviet armed forces while Minis-
ter of Defense. Khrushchev feared his popularity
and dismissed him from the Politburo and De-
fense Ministry
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Recent Developments
During the 1980s the Soviets have been instituting
major changes in their command structure and the
organization of their armed forces. These changes
have included the activation of three new theater high
commands, the reorganization of Soviet air and air
defense forces, and the experimentation with the
operational maneuver group (OMG) concept.' In ad-
dition, the Soviets continue to introduce new weapons
and equipment and experiment with the structure and
employment of their forces.
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These developments indicate that the Soviets are
instituting new principles of operational art and tac-
tics?that is, the General Staff is revising some
aspects of Soviet doctrine, at least for joint operations.
They are attempting to establish provisions for the
employment of their forces that will (1) take advan-
tage of technical advancements, (2) respond to the
capabilities and perceived intentions of their prospec-
tive enemies, and (3) allow them to operate more
effectively on the battlefield of the future.
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Figure 7. Army Gen. Sergey M. Shtemenko
Chief of the Soviet General Staff (1948-52)
General Shtemenko was Chief of the Operations
Directorate of the General Staff during World
War 11. His books, The Soviet General Staff
at War and The Last Six Months, describe
how the Soviet high command functioned. As
a proponent of "scientific" methods,
he defined the role of the Geheral Staff in
formulating military doctrine.
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Lessons learned in Afghanistan probably have also
encouraged General Staff planners to make a ro ri-
ate changes in the regulations.
(Since the sociopolitical element of
Soviet doctrine rejects the concept of antipartisan
activity, the Soviets typically resolve this dilemma by
declaring their partisan opponents to be bandits or
mercenaries.) Presumably, revisions growing out of
the Afghan experience would include provisions on
the use of helicopters, the conduct of intelligence
operations, and other activities essential to antiparti-
san warfare.
The Falklands conflict also appears to have impressed
the Soviets with the necessity of controlling the air in
modern naval combat and the threat posed to surface
ships from antiship cruise missiles. These lessons, too,
may have led to changes in doctrine and, as a recent
report indicates, helped convince the Soviets that they
should proceed with the construction of an aircraft
carrier capable of supporting conventional takeoff and
landing aircraft
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Figure 10. MSU Vasiliy D. Sokolovskiy
Chief of the Soviet General Staff (1952-60)
Marshal Sokolovskiy was best known for his
book Military Strategy, which appeared in three
editions during the 1960s. It discusses the
changes in technology and forces over time and
their impact on military art and doctrine. Soko-
lovskiy was chief of staff to Marshal Georgiy
Zhukov during the Battle of Moscow, 1941-42.
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Figure 11. MSU Matvey V. Zakharov
Chief of the Soviet General Stuff
(1960-63, 1964-71)
Marshal Zakharov was a staunch advocate of
modernization throughout the Soviet armed
forces. He believed that the "revolution in mili-
tary affairs" had radically altered the nature of
warfare and that military science and doctrine
must keep pace with technological developments.
Zakharov was chief of staff of an army, various
fronts, and the High Command of the Northwest-
ern Theater of Military Operations during World
War II.
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Military Regulations?A Code of Laws
The Peoples Commissariat of Defense proceeds
on the assumption that a manual is not an order
effective only for a brief period. A manual of
regulations is a code of laws governing the Red
Army for years. Therefore, before a manual is
issued it should be carefully checked, and com-
rades from the front should be called in to assist.
It was in this way that the Infantry Field
Manual was issued. And the same procedure
should have been used in submitting these man-
uals for approval so as not to make mistakes and
so that, later on, military personnel would not be
groundlessly punished for violating defective
regulations ... .
Joseph Stalin
quoted in The Last Six Months by Army General
Shtemenko.
The 1944 Ground-Attack Aviation Combat Op-
erations Manual required that each pilot always
maintain his position in the overall formation,
and leaving formation was viewed as a criminal
offense. [Emphasis added.]
Marshal of Aviation Nikolay
Skomorokhov
Tactics in Combat Examples: The Aviation Regi-
ment (Voyenizdat, 1985, JPRS-UMA-85-028-L, 18
December 1985).
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The East Europeans
Coordination with the East Europeans in military
science work is managed through five-year and annu-
al Warsaw Pact military science plans. Like the
Soviet plans, these are?at least primarily?the re-
sponsibility of Soviet General Staff officers, who
prepare the Pact plans while serving on the staff of the
Combined Armed Forces (CAF).
East European exercises are conducted within the
context of the Warsaw Pact five-year and annual
military science plans, thus ensuring that they will
focus on issues of interest to the Soviets.
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Figure 12. Soviet T-34 tanks and infantry during World War II.
Figure 13. Soviet helicopter and tank operations
in Afghanistan.
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? The current or imminent introduction of new weap-
ons and equipment into both Soviet strategic and
theater forces requires that all the relevant regula-
tions be updated to reflect new force capabilities.
Among these new systems are the T-80 tank, the
SS-21 and SS-23 SSMs, the MIG-29 Fulcrum and
SU-27 Flanker tactical fighters, several new classes
of general purpose submarines and ships, and the
SS-X-24 and SS-25 intercontinental ballistic
missiles.2?
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Figure 14. MSU Dmitriy F. Ustinov
Minister of Defense (1976-84)
As Minister of Defense, Marshal Ustinov cham-
pioned modern management techniques for the
Soviet armed forces. He was a strong advocate of
adopting new technologies.
Conclusions
The Soviet system for reviewing doctrine and institut-
ing necessary changes succeeds in organizing a pro-
cess with disparate elements in a coherent way. The
system responds to developments in technology,
events, combat experience, and changing perceptions
of the enemy. It also produces doctrine that is evolu-
tionary in most respects.
although the nature of
war has changed, Soviet perceptions of its objectives
have not. Many of the principles of operational art
and tactics, even in the 1980s, bear a striking resem-
blance to those of World War II. Still, modern
nuclear and conventional weapons can destroy the
enemy in a manner that has revolutionized warfare,
and Soviet doctrine has changed to take the destruc-
tive power of these weapons into account.
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New US and NATO technologies and capabilities
clearly influence Soviet doctrine more than any
changes in Western doctrine, which are afforded
much less emphasis in Soviet writings
This may be explained, at least in part, by
the Soviet view of our doctrine as lacking a "scienti-
fic" basis. The Soviets recognize no Western military
science equivalent to their own and contend that the
sociopolitical elements of Western doctrine, as a
reflection of capitalism, are not scientific in the
Marxist-Leninist sense of the term.
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Soviet views on the importance of doctrine and regu-
lations, in contrast to those of the US military,
indicate that Soviet commanders would be less in-
clined to improvise in battle than their US counter-
parts. This does not mean that the Soviets would be
unable to adjust or that they would not act because it
was not in the regulations. Rather, Soviet actions
probably would be more predictable because of the
rigid fashion in which regulations are to be interpret-
ed. The historical record strongly suggests that this
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Figure 15. MSU Nikolay V. Ogarkov
Chief of the Soviet General Staff (1977-84)
Marshal Ogarkov is known for his expertise in
science and technology and his views advocating
their incorporation in military doctrine. He is
author of Always in Readiness To Defend the
Homeland, the recently published History Teach-
es Vigilance, and numerous articles discussing
the development of military thought and the
Soviet armed forces. Ogarkov is now Commander
in Chief of Forces of the Western Theater of
Military Operations.
would be the case.
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Outlook
For years, the Soviets clearly believed that a war
between the Pact and NATO would almost certainly
include the large-scale use of nuclear weapons by both
sides, even if only conventional weapons or limited
nuclear strikes occurred at the outset. The Soviets
sought to develop the forces and the concepts for their
employment that, under conditions of nuclear war-
fare, would afford them the best possible chance of
achieving their combat objectives.
Several factors suggest that a major shift in doctrine
is in progress, one that may be more fundamental
than the revision of some of the principles for joint
and combined operations. The development of new
battlefield technologies?especially precision-guided
munitions?and the introduction of operational ma-
neuver groups, reconnaissance strike complexes, and
integrated fire tactics indicate a substantial Soviet
interest in kee in combat in Europe at the conven-
tional level.
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These themes have become more prominent in mili- 25X1
tary writings as Soviet theater nuclear 25X1
capabilities have grown. The Soviets may see their
improved capabilities as providing a more effective
deterrent against NATO's use of nuclear weapons.
The Soviets, nonetheless, are continuing to improve
the capability of their forces to conduct operations at
all levels of intensity, whether conventional or
nuclear.
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