LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 29 SEPTEMBER 1977[SANITIZED] - 1977/09/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03016882
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: September 29, 1977

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Latin America
.10NAL AND
1TICAL ANALYSIS
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LATIN AMERICA
29 September 1977
CONTENTS
3.5(c)
Argentina: Troubles in the Junta 1
4
6
8
10
12
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by
the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with oc-
casional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence and
from other agencies within the Intelligence Community. Comments and queries are
welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
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Argentina: Troubles in the Junta
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3.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)
President Videla, who has proceeded with great
caution for more than a year to consolidate his politi-
cal position, is coming under increased pressure from
his junta partner, navy chief Admiral Massera. The
opportunistic admiral is generally identified with the
hard-line current of opinion that espouses authoritarian
measures in national security and civilian politics.
Massera has long disapproved of the army's predominance
in the junta and throughout the government. He has tried
in the past to unsettle Videla, whom he views as indeci-
sive, ineffective, and too willing to compromise. The
President continues to have substantial support both
within and outside the military.
In recent months, Massera has been openly critical of
the administration's economic policies and recent state-
ments by Videla alluding to the preeminence of the army.
Interservice rivalry is characteristic of the Argentine
armed forces, particularly between the army and navy,
and personal ambitions often supersede ideological or
policy differences. Nevertheless, it is increasingly dif-
ficult to conceal friction, and the increased media cov-
erage of the latest flareup within the junta may portend
an escalation of the conflict. Massera's divisiveness
may make it more difficult for the junta to agree on and
implement national policy.
The navy in recent days has assumed a high profile
as a defender of Argentine sovereignty, and Massera no
doubt will exploit this position in his differences with
Videla and in his personal quest for added prestige.
The Foreign Ministry--controlled by the navy--de-
livered a stiff protest to Chile last week over alleged
4 violations of territorial waters and unauthorized over-
flights in southern Argentina, where there are boundary
problems with Santiago. Massera's recent declaration
..:2-- that the navy "is prepared to prevent any geographical
mutilation of the nation within its area of responsibility"
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clearly was designed for internal political consumption.
Rising tensions with Chile evidently are confined pri-
marily to the navy. High-level officers in the army and
air force participated in the Chilean independence cele-
bration in Santiago at the same time the Foreign Ministry
was making its protests.
The somber warnings to Chile and the highly publi-
cized seizure last week by Argentine destroyers of sev-
eral Soviet fishing trawlers operating within the 200-
mile territorial limit create a hard act for the army to
follow.
In addition to its image-building exercises, the
navy is rumored to have engineered a number of recent in-
cidents designed to discredit Videla. The small magazine
Conviccion, which many believe is linked to the navy, re-
cently attacked Videla's trip to Washington, likening
the signers of the Panama Canal treaty to "lackeys"
heeding a call from the "boss." An executive order last
week banned publication of the magazine for three months.
opposed Videla's travel plans 3.3(b)(1)
from the outset, but were diverted from
directly attacking the President by the well-publicized
success of his visit, also is respon-
sible for spreading rumors that Videla entered into
special agreements with US officials during his trip 3.3(b)(1)
without prior consultation with the junta.
A minor, but representative sample of Massera's
tactics is an extraordinary meeting of admirals that he
called at the same time as a regularly scheduled meeting
of Videla's cabinet, two of whose members are admirals.
In addition, the US Embassy in Buenos Aires reports
speculation that the navy maneuvered the disappearance
of Alfredo Bravo, the teacher's union leader and a human
rights advocate who was kidnaped while Videla was out of
the country. Rumors label Bravo's disappearance as an
attempt to embarrass the President on the human rights
issue precisely at a time when he was endeavoring to im-
prove the country's image. The official admission of
Bravo's detention last week represents not only a de-
parture from the handling of similar cases in the past
but also a victory for the moderate point of view.
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Whether or not Videla blames the navy for incidents
such as the Bravo case, he recognizes them as attempts to
discredit his regime and apparently is determined to put
an end to such activity. Another heretofore rare instance
of the government "going public" on a disappearance
occurred early this month with the official confirma-
tion of the detention of a Jewish family suspected of
subversive connections.
The military consensus for Videla's rule has always
been fragile. Junta members in the past, however, have
shown a remarkable ability to turn back from the brink
of confrontation.
Nevertheless, outbursts of interservice friction
will necessarily slow policymaking and implementation be-
cause the President must move with caution on all fronts
to preserve his and the army's support. Videla clearly
will have to be increasingly alert to attempts by Massera
to undo his position, and he will have to divert his
attention from policy matters that he wants to address
as chief executive.
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