CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/02/13

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03169401
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RIPPUB
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U
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14
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January 27, 2020
Document Release Date: 
January 30, 2020
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February 13, 1958
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fzzzzzzzrzrzrrrzzzzzzzzrzzzzzz.izzm7 -Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 13 February 1958 Copy No. 137 CENTRAL IYTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO ED 22!))4> CLASS. UHANUED [0: T3 NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH:j HR DATY TOP SECRET EVIENNER:..T-1 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO31694017 pproved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 iwisk Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 1-4,4 %LI .1 13 February 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR threatens to obstruct Japanese fishery negotiations to force peace treaty discussion. Opposition to East German Communist boss Ulbricht continues. Moscow - TASS cautiously endorses Egyptian-Syrian union; USSR will probably recognize the new state. II. ASIA-AFRICA 0 Indonesia - Disunity among dissidents; government likely to engage in political and military maneuvering. King Saud and President Chamoun inform King Hussayn they will have to recognize Egyptian-Syrian union after 21 February plebiscite. 0 III. THE WEST Tunisia - Bourguiba will ask for immediate 0 evacuation of French troops. SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 \ \ \\ \ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 q../i N CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 13 February 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-Japan: The USSR is attempting to force Japan to discuss a peace treaty on Soviet terms by threatening to obstruct current fishery negotiations. Prime Minister Kishi has held that Japan is willing to undertake peace treaty discussions, if Japanese views on the southern Kurils territorial issue are accepted by the USSR. It is doubtful that Tokyo will change its stand on this issue�the major obstacle to a treaty--in order to gain fishing concessions. (Page 1) (Map) 9 ple_ East Germany: Last week's purge in the East Ger- man Communist party has not quelled opposition to party boss Ulbricht. However, as long as Ulbricht con- tinues to receive Soviet support, his opposition will not be able to unseat him or to bring about any significant changes in policy. (Page 2) *Egyptian-Syrian union�Moscow view: After a period of apparent hesitation and avoidance of comment, the Soviet news agency TASS has broadcast a cautious Soviet endorsement of the United Arab Republic. The Soviet government remains officially silent While the brief TASS comment fell short of the welcome previous- ly accorded the Egyptian-Syrian union by Chou En-lai, the Eastern European press, and the Ukrainian party newspaper, it suggests that the USSR is preparing to ex- tend recognition to the new state soon after Nasir is pro- claimed present. TOP SECRET N 'k-i3-1;;;a7(371iM;113T6Zia6-66M6Z) Aft" cr/tr Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO3169401 .3=ITL�T Nerli IL ASIA-AFRICA *Indonesia! Indonesian dissidents are not united on their future plans. The central government may attempt to exploit this disunity by sending some troops to areas where foreign economic interests are con- centrated, according to one late report. However, all factions desire to avoid open conflict, and a period of political and military maneuvering is probable. (Page 3) Saud to recognize UAR: King Saud informed Jor- dan's King Hussayn he will be unable to delay recogniz- ing Egyptian-Syrian union after the plebiscite scheduled for 21 February. Hussayn has received a similar mes- sage from Lebanese President Chamoun, Taiwan Strait: In the Taiwan Strait area, Chinese Communist air defense capabilities have shown progres- sive improvement during the past few months. This trend is discussed in the report of the IAC Current In- telligence Group for the Taiwan Strait problem, cover- ing the period from 9 January to 12 February 1958. (Page 4) (Map) I I I. THE WEST French-Tunisian situation: President Bourguiba Intends to ask the UN Security Council to order all French forces�including those at the Bizerte base-- to evacuate Tunisia. If France agrees publicly to such an action, Bourguiba will not press his appeal. The over-all evacuation would be staged over a period of time, but withdrawal from southern Tunisia, according to Bourguiba, would have to be !ralmost." though the French may relinquish their remaining posts In southern Tunisia, they are not likely under present cir- cumstances to give up Bizerte. (Page 5) 13 Feb 58 DAILY BRIEF 11 TOP SECRET \Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO3I69TO1L N N\ 0Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 PP% SAKHALIN S E A OF OKFIO TSK 01 5p 190 Statute Miles ? Nautical Miles KUNASHIRI SPSHIKOTAN 40. \ CY ,URUPP 80212 6 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 titll Tr 1.1LI1AL N .L .1J1L4 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC , USSR Presses Japan for Peace Treaty The USSR is using deadlocked negotiations on fishing rights as a means of compelling the Japanese to reopen peace treaty talks. Moscow probably hopes to farce the Kishi government to abandon its claim to the Soviet-oc- cupied southern Kuril Islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri-- the major obstacle to a peace treaty between the two countries. In the fishery negotiations which began on 13 January, the USSR has introduced proposals which would greatly hamper Japanese fishermen. On 5 February, Soviet of- ficials refused to discuss measures to safeguard Japa- nese fishermen from seizure by Soviet patrol boats ex- cept in a framework of peace treaty talks. Japanese Prime Minister Kishi announced on 12 Feb- ruary that his government is willing to undertake peace treaty negotiations with the USSR, but that they should not be linked with any fishing talks. His position, as stated last May, has been that Moscow must first accept Japanese views on the Kurils issue. Domestic pressure by fishing interests may now force Tokyo to allow the peace treaty and fishing talks to be linked. Tokyo probably will not, however, change its stand on the territorial is- sue despite the major importance to Japan of fishing in the restricted northwest Pacific waters. CONFIDENTIAL 13 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 `410�01 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 *aryl Opposition to Ulbricht Not Ended by 'Party Purge Opposition to Walter Ulbricht, the Stalinist boss of the East German Socialist Unity (Communist) party (SED), was not ended by last week's purge of three party leaders, Karl Schirdewan, second man in the SED hierarchy until he was purged, has many supporters in the provinces, and feels the fight has just begun. There is little likelihood, however, that Schirdewan and his supporters will be able to defeat Ulbricht or his policies as long as the East German leader enjoys Soviet SUDD ort. Ulbricht coordinated the purge with Moscow, and convinced the Russians that the Germans must still be handled with force and brutality. In an effort to maintain his control of the SED, Ulbricht will probably undertake an extensive purge aimed at elim- inating pro-Schirdewan elements and others suspected of holding revisionist or liberal views. here was no organized con- spiracy against Ulbricht, but that Schirdewan and other party officials had attempted "in a friendly manner" to persuade Ulbricht to revise his political and economic policies. Schirdewan favors German reunification, which the USSR refuses to consider, and believes East Germany should have more freedom in deal- ing with its own political and economic problems. SECRET 13 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIC;ENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 1 *11110 Noirie IL ASIA-AFRICA The Indonesian Situation Indonesian dissidents in Central Sumatra are split over their next move. Two key figures in the dissident roup, Colonels Simbolon and Lubis, have little hope of pushing through their original plan to form a provisional government. The central government in Djakarta may already be planning to exploit this disunity. Djakarta may sendllimited numbers of troops to areas where foreign economic interests are concentrated, to ensure continued foreign exchange remittances to Djakarta. A period of political and military maneuvering is probable, with all factions hoping to avoid violence. However, iso- lated incidents, possibly leading to localized conflict, could occur. President Sukarno is expected to return to Djakarta on 16 February. National party leaders plan to recommend to him the formation of a new cabinet led by former Vice President Hatta, Should Sukarno refuse, they will recom- mend that he at least drop two leftist ministers from the cabinet. SECRET 13 Feb 58 fkITbAI IkITCI I irIckirc DI II I CTIkl Page 3 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 0Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 �.a a gN TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION --+- TATOPU NANHAI (P) 2 _ - HUEHSHAN(T) AN ClPtit (P) ; , -C MACAO (PORT.) 114 116 ht�. HANK Mt Pi ) A H E nk C G SATE ITE 111 HUAINING SAT wens fon\ HOF ERT NANKING NGTU NG HONG KONG ILLK) ci -"^,- -'?" 4410044 - *".� Radioed under con ion - Selected road leo Chi combw (P) A (P) fin YINHSIEN ( is- I A obtra CHAN Wormhole Jule - PEKHu 15,000 -TAIN4(P) Triktbstung TUNGKONG 200 NAUTICAL NILES ariet wry:rove NILES irk 115 1}8 120 SYMBOL AIM LDS Writ * DELINEATED RUNWAYS RUNWAY SURFACE 0 7000 feet or over (P., - Permanent (T- - Temporary (W - Natural (UCi - Under Construction iLINX - Unknown * 6000 feet to 6999 feet * 5000 feet to 5999 feet 6 4000 feet to 4999 feet � Seaplane station 32-r, .,HIA WAN (P) FiGCHIA0 (P4 1NG (P31..-1.-4 \�,1041F-30'1' IA0 (P) 28 26 T 4 �1 000 R BASE - `4 22� STAILIS OF AIR FACILITIES OPERA nONAL Art facilities ranted di red are known or alai :Jared to be consistently used by military or CIVIIi8Il aircraft. OTHER - Air (*citifies printed in ,tack are those under construction, unserviceable, or on which the availability of information is such that the current status cannot be determined. *Delineated runways are explained as a defined or marked area on an airfield prepared or selected for landi la end take-off of aircraft. 12 FEBRUARY 1958 71213 1-1 17"7". Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 I vs i Report No. 113 of the IAC Current Intelligence Group for the Taiwan Strait Problem Covering the Period From 9 January To 12 February 1958 1. There were no significant combat operations in the area daring the pariod. 2. Chinese Communist air defense capabilities have shown progressive improvement during the past few months. There has been a noticeable increase in the frequency and scope of Ground Control Intercept attempts by Chinese Communist jet fighters against Nationalist jets overflying the China mainland. This intensified ef- fort to counter Chinese Nationalist air activities is primarily a re- sult of additional fighter coverage. in Southeast China, While these factors reflect a tightening of Chi- nese Communist air defenses and are chiefly attributable to Chi- nese Communist willingness to challenge Nationalist air operations, the Chinese Communist Air Force, with an estimated 1,625 jet fighters, is still believed to be deficient in many areas. Sufficient numbers of all-weather fighters are lacking; pilot proficiency is relatively low; and major logistic sup- port is still dependent on the USSR. 3 the port of Amoy now is open to Japanese shipping. It is probable that the Chinese Communist motive in open- ing the port to the Japanese was in part a desire to embitter rela- tions between Japan and Nationalist China The Chinese Nationalists on 3 February issued a statement reiterating their "port closure" of all China mainland ports and warned that foreign shipping entering the Taiwan Strait should inform Nationalist officials in advance. If Japanese shipping does commence using Amoy, the Nationalists probably will confine their protests to the diplomatic field. Brit- ish ships since last August have been entering Amoy without inter- ference. 4. Chou En-lai, in his foreign policy address on 10 Feb- ruary, devoted considerable attention to the charge that the US was attempting to create acceptance of the status quo on Taiwan and thus to bring about a "two Chinas" situation, which he termed "abso- lutely unacceptable." Chou reaffirmed Peiping's determination to gain control of Taiwan but did not discuss the means by which this is to be accomplished. --T-4912-SEC-RE-T 13 Feb 38 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 011.A.011E. *410 III. THE WEST Total French Evacuation of Tunisia Sought by Bourguiba The American Embassy in Tunis reports that President Bourguiba plans to ask the UN Security Council to order the evacuation from Tunisia of all French forces, including those at the Bizerte base. Bourguiba would be willing to re- frain from the UN appeal if assured that France will publicly agree within a few days to evacuate its forces. A phased withdrawal over a period of time would be acceptable to Bourguiba, but he insists that French evacuation of southern Tunisia must be "almost" .immediate. Prior to this formulation of Tunisian aims, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold had advised Tunisian delegate Mongi Slim to "play for time" before formally requesting a Security Council meeting. Free World delegations are seeking to de- vise some type of UN machinery which would ease the impact of future incidents. French Premier Gaillard's defense before the National Assembly of the military action which created the crisis suggests the French Government will be unable to make any major concessions to Tunisia, and is not likely to evacuate Bizerte. The establishment of a UN observer patrol along, the Tunisian-Algerian border--similar to those used during the dispute between Greece and'its Balkan neighbors--has been suggested. France, sensitive to any "internationalizing" of the Algerian question, would most likely refuse to allow the patrols on the Algerian side of the border, and Tunisia has pointed out that such patrols would not be able to prevent incur- sions by air. An arrangement similar to the UN Emergency Force now de- ployed along the Egyptian-Israeli border probably would not be acceptable to France. Moreover, the Tunisian incident is not yet sufficiently critical to encourage UN members to contribute troops and equipment for another UNEF. However, some kind a UN action is inevitable. SECRET 13 Feb 58 CENTRAI INTFI I InFNCF RIII I FTIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401 fl-41(5/ V.L JULFILILL 'V 1 .111.1A Nero 41100 DISTRIBUTION THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Operations Coordinating Board Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director Appro7e-d'roiriielas7:279708/.10 C03169401 \ \ . � Approved for Release:\2019/08/20 C0\3169401 - \ %1111, WI LI%Li CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 13 February 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC � USSR-Japan: The USSR is attempting to force Japaff to discuss a peace treaty on Soviet terms by threatening to obstruct current fishery negotiations. Prime Minister Kishi has held that Japan is willing to undertake peace treaty discussions, if Japanese views on the southern Kurils territorial issue are accepted by the USSR. It is doubtful that Tokyo will change its stand on this issue�the major obstacle to a treaty�in order to gain fishing concessions. (Page 1) (Map) East Germany: Last week's purge in the East Gar- man-COMmunist party has not quelledn-pposition to party boss Ulbricht. Howe r�as long as Ulbricht con- tinues to receive Soy' -dupport, his opposition will not be able to unst4ffFii or to bring about any significant changes icy. (Page 2) Egyptian-Syrian union�Moscow view: After a period of apparent hesitation and avoidance of comment, the Soviet news agency TASS has broadcast a cautious Soviet endorsement of the United Arab Republic. The Soviet government remains officially silent� While the brief TASS comment fell short of the welcome previous- ly accorded the Egyptian-Syrian union by Chou En-lai, the Eastern European press, and the Ukrainian party newspaper, it suggests that the USSR is preparing to ex- tend recognition to the new state soon after Nasir is pro- clainAlljapresident. UAR: King Saud informed Jor- dan- s King Hussayn he will be unable to delay recogniz- ing Egyptian-Syrian union after the plebiscite scheduled for 21 February. Hussayn has received a similar mes- sage from Lebanese President Chamoun. \\\ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169401k, \� \ \�,,��%,� Li _