CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03007380
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 15, 1961

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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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15 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. 'Laos: Situation in Laos as of 0400 EST (Page t)
2. USSR:
in Soviet anti-ballistic missile program.
;Page tt)
3. Congo: Hammarskjold worried over possible incidents
following arrival of Indian UN contingent in the Congoo(Page tt)
4. Burma: Prime minister tells Khrushchev situation in
Congo "calls for greater ratirr than lesser efforts" by
UN. rage tt)
5. Belgium: Spaak critical of Belgian Government's policies
in Congo. (Page ttt)
6. Communist China: Oil shipments received from USSR
during February; i norts from nonhl7n sources appar-
ently tapering off. (Page ttt)
7. India-Communist China: Minor border incident likely
to generate further protests in New Delhi. (Page iv)
8. Morocco: Rabat to receive additional military equipment
from USSR. (Page tv)
9. Saudi Arabia: King requests US agreement to abrogation
of Dhahran Airfield pact. (Page ty)
10. Argentina: Army chief reported determined to oust Presi-
dent Frondizi within the next 20 days. (Page v)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
15 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*Laos: Government troops a few miles north of the Phou e
Khoun road junction, consisting of four infantry battalions plus
support elements, are encountering persistent artillery harass-
ment and infiltration by Kong Le - Pathet Lao elements, and fr
may be forced to retreat to new defensive positions. Intercepted4
enemy operational messages reveal that an effort is being made q (9
both north and south of the road junction to stampede the nu-
merically stronger but confused government troops into a
general rout. This would open the way to a possible attack on
Luang Prabang, presently defended by eight battalions. At
the same time, the messages indicate the extended nature of
the enemy's effort in terms of both men and supplies; one mes-
sage cautions against the danger of a sudden government counter-
attack in the rear. To the south on route 13, three battalions
of Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces have been ordered to press the
battle_ toward yang Vieng.
q_leports from the American country team in Vientiane
raise the question whether military events are overtaking the
political situation. The country team states that the Vientiane
government, probably because of the deteriorating military
situation, appears anxious for an early ceasefire and may even
be thinking of some political compromise to win quick Communist
agreement; the government also appears hopeful the US would
go along with an international conference to ratify the actions
of any international commission. General Phoumi has indicated
he is no longer willing to press ahead with a reorganized govern-
ment headed by the king. The many rumors circulating in Vien-
tiane reflect growing fear over the trend in the military situatioq
(Backup, Page 1)
1
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USSR: An advance in the Soviet anti-ballistic missile ABM
ram
firingsof missiles on 2 and 4 March into the Sary Shagan
complex. (Backup, Page 4 ) (Map)
Congo: Hammarskjold is increasingly worried over the
possibility of incidents in connection with the arrival of the
Indian UN contingent, whose first units are to fly into Leopold-
ville on 16 March. tie told American officials on 13 March
that it was of great political importance that the Indian opera-
tion be carried out, in view of the heavy prestige commitment
of Nehru and the Indian military. According to a letter to Am-
bassador Stevenson on 12 March, he also recognizes that the
Congolese hostility toward the UN results from the Congolese
belief that the 21 February Security Council resolution author-
izes the disarmament of the Congolese army and the imposition
of UN trusteeship. He apparently feels that this attitude, rein-
forced by the anti-Asian feelings connected with Dayal, might
focus on the Indian troops, Hammarskjold also believes, al-
though he admits he has no specific evidence, that the recent
military incidents in the Congo and the outcome of the Tanana-
rive conference resulted from a Belgian-inspired plan to build
up a political and military basis of resistance to the UN.
Burma-USSR: Prime Minister Nu's reply to a letter from
Khrushchev of 22 February rejects the Soviet charges that
Hammarskjold is responsible for what has hann ned in the
Congo. Nu told Khru-
shchev t it wnue ne agreea belgium ana ner p oteges" bore
the major responsibility, he believes "the situation in the
Congo calls for greater rather than lesser efforts on the part
of the United Nations." Nu declared that Burma will support
the Security Council resolution authorizing the UN to use force
in the Congo "in any way open to us." He agreed with Khrushchev
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that the enlarged membership of the UN necessitated structural
changes, but contended that such changes should not be dealt
with in the context of the Congo problem. Nu's position on these
issues is similar to that of Indian Prime Minister Nehru. (TOP
'Backup, Page 6)
Belgium-Congo: Former NATO Secretary-General Spaak,
in a conversation with the American charg�n Brussels, voiced
strong criticism of the Congo policies of the Belgian Govern-
ment and was very pessimistic regarding the role of the UN.
While Spaak does not feel that all Belgian political advisers
should be withdrawn from the Congo, he favors immediate re-
moval of the military "adventurers" and tte progressive removal
of paramilitary and military personnel. Recent reports indicate
that of the 200-230 Belgian officers and NCOs serving in the
ICatanga army, only 30 have so far been ordered back to Belgium.
In addition, there are several hundred advisers and technicians
in ICatanga and elsewhere. The embassy comments that Spaak,
who is running for parliament on the Socialist ticket in the 26
March national elections, will remain cautious in voicing any
public criticism of Prime Minister Eyskenes government because
of Socialist participation in the original Brussels round-table
conference which outlined plans for the independence of the Congo.
As a member of a Social Christian - Socialist coalition govern-
ment that may be formed following the elections, Spaak would
exercise a more stringent influence over the control of African
affairs.
Comniunist China: Recenemessages indicate that Soviet
deliveries of petroleum to China in February were at a level
comparable to that of the same month last year. Although talks
on 1961 trade and future economic relations are still underway,
these deliveries from the USSR suggest that the Chinese have re-
solved their indecision over petroleum imports and that they will
continue to purchase large amounts of Soviet POLO Chinese im-
ports of petroleum from nonbloc sources appear to be tapering
off. (SECRET SABRE) (Backup, Page 8)
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India - Communist China: The border incident revealed by
Defense Minister Krishna Menon on 14 March, while apparently
only a minor skirmish between Indian and Chinese border
guards, may set off new protests in the Indian Parliament
and increase New Delhi's determination to remain unyield-
ing. Menon said that a Chinese soldier had been captured
by an Indian patrol four miles inside the Himalayan state of
Sikkim. 'lie incident, probably resulting from Chinese re-
connaissance activities, E� one of several along this sector of
the Tibetan frontier reported since November,1 but the only one
publicized by Indian officiag In view of the-deadlock in diplo-
matic efforts to solve the border dispute, New Delhi may feel
It expedient to keep Peiping under pressure by playing up its
"aggressive" activities. Peining will Probably minimize the
Incident,
(I)
ubDi-c-iviorocco:
addiflonal military equipment destined for Morocco�of types
and amounts not yet determined�is now being processed at
the Soviets arms port of Nikolaev. In addition, Rabat has
announced that two Soviet experts have arrived in Morocco "at
the reqiest of his majesty's government" to examine the pos-
sibilities for constructing a shipyard on the Mediterranean. Their
arrival apparently is a result of economic aid discussions during
the visit of Soviet President Brezhnev to Morocco in February.
4 WI
aa,uai Aram: c4ing ba,uct, casting about tor a "success" to
bolster his administration against supporters of Crown Prince
Faysal, has asked that the US agree to his announcing immediately
abrogation of the Dhahran Airfield agreement. Prior to his dis-
issal as prime minister by the King last December, Faysal had
asked the US to "study" changing the status of the airfield. Saud's
emissary to the American ambassador asserted that members of
the pro-Faysal faction are preparing to attack the King through
propaganda releases in other Arab states alleging that Faysal was
dismissed because he wanted to abrogate the airfield agreemeng
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rab propagandists will seize upon any adjustments made by the
ITS on the Dhahran agreement as an opportunity tn citpn nn thpir
attacks on base rights in Libya and Moroccq
(Backup, Page 9)
*Argentina: [Army Commander-in-Chief General Carlos
Toranzo Montero told a close associate on 11 March that he
has decided to oust President Frondizi within 20 days,
No reason was reported, although
Toranzo Montero has been bitterly critical of Argentina's recent
offer of "good offices" to ease US-Cuban tensions. The Army .e_#
chief, recently conferred with Army
commana posts outside of Buenos Aires and decided, after
putting a few uncooperative officers under house arrest, that he
had sufficient support for a coup. Army promotions late in 1960
placed his supporters in key positions. Frondizi reportedly is
aware of Toranzo Montero's plotting through a line tap on the lat-
ter's telephone, and the army chief who has now been informed
of this tat). may have tn ehanceP hi g n1anQ-1
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Situation in Laos
Reports reaching Vientiane from Laotian military sources
emphasize the role of North Vietnamese personnel in the current
fighting,
These reports, while not claiming that regular units as such are
involved, do indicate the presence of such personnel in sizeable
numbers, with the North Vietnamese troops acting as shock
troops and the Pathet Lao taking over for exploitation. Although
Laotian sources are prone to exaggerate the scope of Vietnamese
involvement, it is probable that North Vietnamese are lending at
least some tactical direction.
a Soviet general seeking a meeting with Kong Le.
This is the first indication
of the presence of a Soviet military figure in Laos.
[-Soviet airlift operations into Laos have recently been stepped
p. Soviet IL-14's continue to average about eight flights per day
o the Plaine des Jarres area, but since 9 March there has been
n increase in the number of Soviet LI-2's flying to Xieng Khouang.
The last of the Soviet AN-12's which arrived in North Vietnam on
3 March returned to the USSR on 11 Marclp
[According to the chief, PEO, the Communists have stepped
up their logistical support to the highest daily rate reported during
the past three months. On 12 March PEO estimates that 150 tons
of supplies were brought in overland from North Vietnam and about
70 tons were brought in by air.
eight Soviet IL-14s, four
oviet ana one ortn Vietnamese AN-2 to Xieng Khouang.
Although this is an increase in aid activity, the number of planes
involved could not have brought more than 28 tons of supplies and
there is no evidence that any other routes were flown3
The three-man cabinet level delegation from Vientiane which
arrived in Phnom Penh on 14 March for additional talks with
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Souvanna Phouma reportedly is empowered to agree to a later
conference between representatives of the Boun Oum govern-
ment, Souvanna Phouma, and the Pathet Lao. The delegation's
immediate concern is to discuss with Souvanna different methods
for bringing about a cessation of foreign interference in Laos.
If a decision can be reached on this, it will be brought to the
attention of "the great powers" through their ambassadors in
Phnom Penh.
Souvanna Phouma, meanwhile, has sent for Quinim Pholsena
--minister of defense, finance, and foreign affairs in the rump
government at Xieng Khouang--to join him in Phnom Penh to re-
ceive unspecified directives to be carried out during Souvanna's
absence on his upcoming world tour. This request was sent on
11 March following Souvanna's talks with Phoumi but before he
had learned of the impending visit of a second Vientiane delegation.
It was forwarded on Souvanna's behalf by the North Vietnamese
commercial delegation in Phnom Penh to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in Hanoi for further relay to Quinim.
North Vietnam and the Xieng Kliouang "government" have
moved to put their relations on a more formal basis. Hanoi an-
nounced the appointment of a "economic and cultural representa-
tive at the Laotian Kingdom" on 13 March and reported that a
Laotian economic and cultural representative had presented his
credentials in North Vietnam. Claiming to represent Souvanna
Phouma as the "lawful government of Laos," the Xieng Khouang
group is consolidating Communist political control over northern
Laos. Recently it agreed to exchange economic and cultural
missions with Communist China as well as North Vietnam. Be-
fore he fled Vientiane last December, Souvanna agreed to cross-
border trade with North Vietnam. Probably to support their
professions of "neutrality," however, neither Souvanna nor his
Xieng nouang "representatives" have formally recognized Hanoi
or Peiping. North Vietnam and Peiping can circumvent this
technicality with the exchange of economic and cultural officials.
5n 14 March, Hanoi announced that rallies will be held through-
t North Vietnam between 15 March and 30 March to condemn "US7
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10315 2
Stalingrad
Rangehead
Kapustin Yar
Vladimiravka.
POSSIBLE SOVIET ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE ACTIVITY:
TEST RANGE FACILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH
MISSILE FIRINGS OF 2 AND 4 MARCH.
Kapustin Yar missile test range
Down range launch points associated with
Sony Shagan test complex operations
Tyura Tam.
ICBM/Space
launching facilities
Impact Area 1-1
Sary Shagan test complex
Sary Shagan
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q. nterference in Laos and South Vietnam." In late January, the
ro-Asian Solidarity Council passed a resolution calling on
embers to observe 15 March as a day of anti-American demon-
strations to mark the "Afro-Asian peoples' solidarity with
people of Laos)
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'welp# bLL,Ixt,
Possible Advance in Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile
*Test Program
suggests that they were not launched from
Kapustin Yar rangehead. It is possible that they were launched
from an unidentified site 300 n.m. down range from Kapustin
vnr Thp launch was confirmed in each case
Anti-missile research activity has been under way in the
Sary Shagan area since 1957. Missiles fired from the Kapustin
Yar rangehead, (1,100 n.m. distant) SP-2 (350 n.m. away), and
SP-5 (500 n.m.) have been used as targets for the collection of
re-entry data and the testing of equipment.
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the missiles fired in March are believed to have traveled.
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Burma Supports the United Nations' Action in the Congo
Prime Minister Nu told the Burmese parliament on
13 March that the Union Government believes that the
United Nations, "with all its shortcomings," offers the only
hope of restoring stability and security to an independent
Congo.
While Nu's answer to Khrushchev on 11 March was less
specific than Nehru's�failing to defend Hammarskjold by
name or to offer reinforcements to the United Nations Congo
Command--it reiterated Burma's consistent support for the
United Nations. In 1950 Burma backed UN intervention in
Korea, and, unable to spare troops, sent token tonnages of
rice as its contribution; in 1956 it supported the UN resolu-
tions against both the Soviet Union in Hungary and the United
Kingdom, France, and Israel in Suez; in 1960, it sent a
small unit to serve with the UN in the Congo. The unit was
withdrawn in early 1961.
Although Burma was disappointed in 1953 when the
United Nations failed to brand Nationalist China an aggres-
sor for its support of the irregulars in Burma, it still--as
a neutral with no military alliances�looks to the United Na-
tions as its main source of assistance in the event of a for-
eign attack. When Burma supported a draft resolution which
described the Soviet intervention in Hungary as "genocide,"
the Burmese representative to the UN explained his country's
position by stating: "There, but for the grace of God, go we."
Nu's support for Khrushchev's proposal to reorganize the
United Nations structure is probably not intended as an attack
on either klammarskjold or the secretariat. Instead, it is
more likely that Burma is looking for a reorganization of the
Security Council to increase the representation and influence
of the nonpermanent members and, if possible, to eliminate
the permanent members' veto powers.
With reference to the recognition of a Congolese govern-
ment, Burma's position is identical to that which it has adopted
toward Laos. Burma is withholding action, as it is not satisfied
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Nos IVY isswiL
that any claimant actually exercises gover 11
beyond a limited segment of the country.
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'vossolLCIIt*rfoof
POL Shipments From USSR to Communist China
POL shipments
through the important border transshipment point at Manchouli
were at a high level at least for a short time in February.
there was a backlog of 610 tank cars con-
taining about 23,000 tons of POL at Manchouli on 16 February.
Peiping advised Moscow on 23 February that the situation had
returned to normal and asked that deliveries not be stopped.
In February
1960, Manchouli was handling 7,000 to 8,000 tons of POL a
day, and reported a backlog of 30,000 tons. Evidence of other
POL deliveries by the Soviets
shipments of POL from Rumania
to China by tanker in March and April. These shipments were
to be charged to the Soviet account.
Since October 1960, about 80,000 tons of POL are known
to have been shipped to China from nonbloc sources. These
imports, of only marginal significance in terms of China's
total domestic demand, nevertheless were the first such con-
tinuing purchases outside the bloc. Since August 1960 informa-
tion on the level of POL shipments from the USSR--known to
have been high up to that time--had virtually ceased. Peiping
displayed an unusual reluctance to make known its 1961. POL
requirements to the USSR. There has been no recent informa-
tion on further purchases outside the bloc, and, inasmuch as
there is evidence that the Chinese had sent the Soviets their
1961 POL requirements by 17 February, China will probably
continue to rely on the bloc for most of its POL imports.
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King Saud Requests Immediate Abrogation of Dhahran
Airfield Agreement
Since the dismissal of Crown Prince Faysal as prime min-
ister last December, his backers and those of King Saud have
been engaged in a struggle for power in Saudi Arabia. The pro-
Faysal group, which apparently includes a majority of the in-
fluential Saudi princes, has already engineered the ouster of
two of the King's trusted advisers. The group is now in Jidda
with Faysal and is reported conspiring to return Faysal to
power as prime minister. Saud appears to be frightened and
is taking extraordinary security measures. In his desperation,
he is willing to go to almost any lengths to preserve his posi-
tion and might announce a unilateral abrogation of the agree
men
Loyiginally negotiated in 1951, the airfield agreement was
renegotiated in April 1957 for a term of five years. In return
for "operational facilities" at Dhahran the US Government prom-
ised to improve the airfield, build port facilities at Dammam,
train Saudi Air Force personnel, and provide a military advis-
ory group for the Saudi Army as well as limited training for
naval personnel. The US agreed to provide grant aid for the
1957-62 period amounting to $70,000,000. At the present time
there are 1,400 US Air Force and 18 Navy personnel at Dhahran.
A Military Assistance Group of 155 men is stationed at Tail)
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Now# 'gad
THE PRESIDENT CONFIDENTIAL
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investi'gation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman .
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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