DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: A THIRD TERM FOR BALAGUER?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 10, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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May 10, 1974
No. 1033/74
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT Dominican Republic: A Third Term for
Balaguer?
Summary
Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer is expected
to be reelected to his third consecutive four-year
term in the general elections on May 16. A recent
opinion poll shows the 67-year-old President leading
his closest rival by a 2-to-1 margin.
Balaguer,I
has broad backing in virtually all impor an
sec ors of the population. Business supports him
because his stable administrations have attracted
large amounts of foreign investment and spurred un-
precedented economic growth. His government's
stepped-up program to build housing for the urban
poor probably has earned it a significant number of
followers, and frequent whistlestop tours of the in-
terior appear to have solidified the support he has
long enjoyed among subsistence farmers who form the
largest voting bloc in the country.
Balaguer faces four challengers in his bid for
reelection. Two coalitions--one of the moderate right
and the other a right-left mix--reportedly believe
that their chances of defeating him are slim, and they
are concentrating on winning seats in
for congress g s8andec-
local governments to build suppa
tions. The other contenders are not expected to win
more than a few percentage points of the vote.
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Balaguer is not expected to change either his
domestic or foreign policies significantly if he is
retained in office. His immediate concern will prob-
ably be to curb inflation even though unpopular
measures will be necessary. The government's policy
toward foreign investment is expected to remain favor-
able, although Balaguer has talked about requiring
foreign companies to hire more Dominicans.
In a recent campaign appearance Balaguer suggested
that he might use a third term in office to set the
stage for moving the country from a "circumstantial
democracy" to a truer form of democracy. Whether this
is possible will depend primarily on his ability to
foster the growth of political institutions.
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The Road to Victory
The President's strong lead over his closest
rival seems to stem from the popularity the govern-
ment has gained as a result of a five-year economic
boom.
The Gross National Product last year increased
by 17 percent, but approximately 9 percent of this
increase was due to inflation. Much of the growth was
in the mining and construction industries. While
mineral exports have earned valuable foreign exchange,
stepped-up construction in urban areas has also paid
political dividends by providing jobs to the unskilled,
who in leaner times would be expected to vote for the
opposition. Moreover, a good share of government
revenues has been used to construct low-income housing
and other public works that directly benefit the poor.
Even though much of the economic development has
been in urban areas, Balaguer also remains popular in
the rural areas where most of the voters live. He
has personally identified himself with the limited
amount of government-sponsored construction in the
countryside, making frequent trips to small towns to
inaugurate new schools and health clinics. His sup-
port among the subsistence farmers has been enhanced
by the government's agrarian reform program that al-
ready has distributed a substantial amount of land to
tenant farmers and the landless poor. Balaguer has
promised to step up agrarian reform if reelected.
The President is expected to win, moreover,
because of the memory of the chaotic political situa-
tion during the early 1960s and the widespread belief
that he is the only leader who can maintain stability.
Many voters see the President as a low-keyed, no-
nonsense leader who has a well-earned reputation for
hard work.
During his second term, the President has indeed
shown the determination and skills his admirers as-
cribe to him. Frequently, he has cracked down on
opposition leaders for real or imagined affronts.
His public security forces and the military, which
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ardently support him, have relentlessly pursued ter-
rorist organizations, jailing or killing most of their
leaders. The last dragnet against suspected left-wing
terrorists was undertaken late last year, and was
apparently staged to ensure a peaceful climate for
the election campaign.
Balaguer has effectively played on the likelihood
of instability under any other government as the main
reason for his seeking a third term. He maintains
that any government other than his own would be divided
among contentious factions and suggests that squabbling
in the executive could possibly lead to civil war.
This rationale probably has become convincing to a
large part of the electorate because of the recent
schism in the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD),
the country's strongest opposition group. In addi-
tion, the ties that bind the two opposition coalitions
probably will evaporate after the elections because of
the disparate groups they include.
The President's own Reformist Party is monolithic,
having but one purpose, to serve his political ambi-
tion. He largely ignores it between elections. Other
than Balaguer, the party has few leaders of any conse-
quence; several who had the potential to rival his
leadership pulled out in 1970 in protest against
Balaguer's first bid for reelection.
Balaguer's hold on the voters appears to grow
out of the long tradition of caudillo-style politics
in the Dominican Republic, rather than the strength
of political institutions.
Ex-president Juan
Bosch, the only po i ician wno is believed to have
enough national stature to pose a serious challenge
to Balaguer, has refused since 1966 to run in elec-
tions because of alleged abuses of government
authority.
Balaguer's first term, from 1966 to 1970, was
marked by the vigorous use of the military and police
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to contain and eventually eliminate the political
turmoil that lingered after the end of the 1965 civil
war. During his second term, he has concentrated on
economic development and on avoiding actions that
could lead to comparisons with the corrupt and tyran-
nical practices of the Trujillo era. Before the
start of this year's campaigning, he met with oppo-
sition groups, pledged himself to honest elections,
and promised that the military will respect the out-
come. In addition, he has asked congress to lift a
ban against the Dominican Communist Party.
Groping for An Issue
The four opposition groups competing in the
elections generally have centered their attacks on
two issues: they charge that Balaguer's long stay
in the presidency is inimical to the development of
a true democracy and that the government is not re-
sponsive to the needs of the people. The left, in
particular, has been hitting hard at the so-called
voracious appetite of foreign investors who are
accused of taking huge profits out of the country.
Although the campaign has been full swing for
about two months,, a couple of leftist opposition par-
ties have held out the possibility that they will
boycott the elections at the last moment. They con-
dition their participation on the government's pro-
tecting them from harassment by government-sponsored
hoodlums and overzealous military commanders. In
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addition, they demand that the government stop unfair
campaign practices, such as the excessive use of
government-controlled broadcasting media, and release
so-called "political prisoners." Sporadic incidents
of violence have occurred, and if the left is so in-
clined it could use this as a pretext for abstention.
Some of the weaker candidates have already considered
this option.
Perhaps the strongest opposition ticket is the
Santiago Accord coalition, which groups a rightist
party with three parties of varying leftist persua-
sions. The Dominican Quisqueyan Party (PQD) repre-
sents the hard-core right in the coalition, while the
moderate left is represented by the Revolutionary
Social Christian (PRSC) and the Dominican Revolutionary
(PRD) parties and the extreme left by the Dominican
Popular Movement (MPD). Antonio Guzman, a long-time
member of the PRD, heads the ticket, while the vice
presidential candidate is PQD leader General Elias
Wessin y Wessin, who, ironically, in the 1965 civil
war opposed the then PRD president Juan Bosch. General
Wessin is campaigning from Madrid where he has been
in exile since 1972, when he was accused of plotting
to overthrow President Balaguer. Balaguer has declared
that Wessin will be allowed to return to the country
only if he wins the vice presidency.
The Santiago Accord reportedly does not expect
an upset win over Balaguer, but it does hope to win a
sizable number of seats in congress and local govern-
ments. Possibly the strongest fight the Accord will
give the governing Reformist Party is in the mayoralty
race in Santo Domingo. The Accord's candidate, Guarionex
Lluberes, is one of the most popular politicians in
the Dominican Republic after President Balaguer.
Santo Domingo prospered under him when he was the
Reformist Party mayor from 1968 to 1970. He quit the
party in 1970 when President Balaguer decided to run
for a second term. If he wins, Lluberes is likely to
become an irritant to the president and to use the
post as a launching pad to seek the presidency in 1978.
The PRD reportedly hopes to use the local govern-
ment positions it wins to dispense patronage jobs, to
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strengthen party discipline, and to attract additional
supporters. The PRD has not taken part in elections
since 1966, when it won 37 percent of the vote. Since
it will be seeking votes without the support of its
founder Juan Bosch, who bolted the party last November,
a strong showing is likely to be seen by party members
as the PRD's first step toward becoming an institutional
party able to survive personality clashes. A stunning
defeat, however, would seriously damage the PRD and
perhaps persuade some of its members to join Juan Bosch
and his new Dominican Liberation Party.
The second coalition in the elections is to the
right of center, and composed of the Democratic Inte-
gration Movement (MIDA) and the Amiama Tio Independiente
Group (GIAT).
The coalition's political p a -
form is not very i erent from the government's.
About the only issue it is campaigning on is that
Balaguer's repeated election to the presidency is re-
tarding the development of true democracy.
The coalition's presidential candidate is Francisco
Augusto Lora, who served as Balaguer's vice president
from 1966 to 1970 before he bolted the Reformist Party
to protest the President's decision to run for reelection.
Lora will be running his second campaign for the
presidency. The second spot on the ticket is held
by Luis Amiama Tio, another former member of the
Reformist Party and a former minister without port-
folio. Despite the candidates' earlier ties with the
Reformist Party, they are not expected to cut signifi-
cantly into the Reformist vote. It is likely, however,
that if the coalition remains in the contest, it will
draw votes away from the Santiago Accord, which al-
ready has complained that the Lora-Amiama Tio ticket
has hurt its fund-raising efforts among the poor.
The two remaining participants in the presidential
elections are the small right-wing People's Democratic
Party (PDP), and the Movement of National Conciliation
(MCN). Both parties have generally collaborated with
Balaguer and frequently have accepted cabinet posts.
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The parties are little more than vehicles to promote
the personal ambitions of their leaders. MCN leader
Jaime Fernandez and PDP leader Homero Lajara Burgos
are the candidates of their parties. Neither is ex-
pected to win more than a few percentage points of
the vote.
Outlook
Assuming that President Balaguer is reelected on
May 16 , it is not likely that he will significantly
alter the current policies and programs of his gov-
ernment. His immediate initiatives will probably be
directed toward drafting measures to combat the high
rate of domestic inflation caused mainly by increases
in the costs of imported petroleum and food. The
President has indicated that he will first try to stem
inflation by readjusting price and wage control measures
that were too touchy to handle in an election period.
In addition, he reportedly will try to reduce the
country's dependence on food imports by encouraging
more agricultural production. Any surplus in agri-
cultural output could generate additional foreign
exchange to help pay for oil imports. With this in
mind, Balaguer is likely to press ahead in implementing
his agrarian reform program.
Foreign investment has been the primary source
of capital for the Dominican Republic's sustained
economic growth over the past five years, and Balaguer
is not likely to take measures that would scare f
vital capital.
in campaign
appearances a nas a en e the importance of foreign
capital in the development of the republic.
Balaguer has spoken in his campaign about using
his third term as a transition period to bring about
a truer form of representational government in place
of what he calls the present "circumstantial democracy."
He reportedly would favor a strong two-party system
with constitutional guarantees against abuse by the
party in power, perhaps patterned along the line of
the Liberal-Conservative agreement that brought political
stability to Colombia.
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Chances that he will succeed in this endeavor
seem bleak, however.
I Even the President's past
eight years in office apparently have not strengthened
the prospects that his own Reformist Party will sur-
vive post-Balaguer elections. The development of
leadership in the party has been discouraged by
Balaguer's denying the party even rudimentary control
of patronage jobs or an important role in his admini-
stration. Until November, the key opposition group,
the PRD, likewise suffered from the leader-
ship of its founder Juan Bosch. Bosch bolted the
party after a challenge had been mounted against his
autocratic rule.
Perhaps the most that Balaguer might realistically
be expected to accomplish during his third term is to
preside over four more years of relative political
stability and economic growth. To have provided 12
years of peace and quiet would be no small accomplish-
ment in the Dominican Republic and might produce a
carryover effect into the term of Balaguer's successor--
if indeed he steps down in 1978. Whenever Balaguer
leaves, however, the best hope for stability in the
Dominican Republic probably will be in finding another
caudillo who can provide the same sort of benevolent
but firm leadership.
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