JORDAN'S KING HUSAYN SINCE THE ZARQA MUTINY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100060001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1974
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 1288/74
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1, 1974
Jordan's King Husayn
Since the Zarga Mutiny
King Husayn has endured the hostility of his
neighbors, insurrectionary plots, countless assas-
sination attempts, and outright warfare between
his Palestinian and Bedouin subiects.
The
future course of Jordanian affairs depends very
heavily on what Husayn does or does not do, on who
has his confidence and who does not, and, ulti-
mately, on how he feels about himself and his
country. Husayn's handling of the Zarqa mutiny
may be a gauge of his present temperament and of
his behavior during the critical period ahead.
The Mutiny
In early February elements of the Jordanian
army's elite 40th armored brigade mutinied while
King Husayn was out of the country. Although the
unrest was largely contained to the garrison town
of Zarqa just north of Amman, the rebellious troops
won widespread sympathy among the lower ranks of
the army as well as the civilian population by
demanding an immediate military pay raise, a general
rollback in consumer prices, and the dismissal of
two of the King's closest advisers, Prime Minister
Zaid Rifai and Army Chief of Staff Sharif Zaid bin
Shakir.
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11.652, exemption cat 0 gory-
?5A(1). (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on.
L Date Impossible to Determine
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The mutiny never became a direct threat to
Husayn and quickly subsided once the King inter-
vened personally to ease the soldiers' economic
plight. Nevertheless, his inattention to a number
of long standing grievances among enlisted men and
junior officers contributed significantly to the
unrest.
The Zarqa disorders at least momentarily jolted
Husayn into action, forcing him to deal with matters
d not done
h
h
a
e
of concern to his troops in a way
for some time.
Troubled King
Looking outward a year ago, King Husayn seemed
to see two of Jordan's most important tasks as
repairing relations with Egypt and Syria and per-
suading Kuwait to resume its much-needed subsidy
payments, which were suspended during the 1970-71
conflict with the fedayeeno His patience and per-
sistence finally paid off when Cairo and Damascus
agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations with
Jordan shortly before the war last October. After
the King sent two armored brigades to Syria during
the fighting, Kuwait relented as well and resumed
and even increased its annual financial assistance
from $40 to 55 million,
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Despite these successes, the last year has
been a difficult one for Husayn, both politically
any Bedouins
cular were unhappy about the amnesty and feared for
a time that the King, in his efforts to woo Sadat
and Asad, might permit the fedayeen to return to
Jordan in force.
The selection of his close confidant and long-
time personal, friend Zaid Rifai to be prime minister
a year ago has not helped matters.
Husayn's efforts, moreover, to pursue his
claims to the Israeli-occupied West Bank initially
encountered resistance from many East Bankers
(including Hassan) as well as other Arab leaders.
The King reacted bitterly to the decision of the
Arab summit conference last November to designate
the Palestine Liberation Organization as the "sole
representative of the Palestinian people," in
effect disregarding Jordan's own claims to the
Palestinian-populated West Bank. He has found
his dealings with Sadat since the October war
especially frustrating. The Egyptian president
has held him at arm's length most of the time,
while maneuvering to persuade the fedayeen to
participate in the peace negotiations. Sensing
that US support, for his claims to the West Bank is
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lukewarm as well, Husayn has been in need of
constant reassurances that US support and financial
assistance will continue. In fact, he was on his
way to Washington seeking such assurances and more
aid when the Zarqa mutiny broke out.
Increasing Isolation
Husayn has drawn increasingly out of touch
with the army and the tribal supporters of the
throne.
Those in the palace and army who hoped that
the Zarqa mutiny would shake Rifai's hold over
Husayn have been bitterly disappointed. Husayn
refused to blame his prime minister or his chief
of staff for the conditions underlying the mutiny.
If anything, Rifai seems in a stronger position
now than he was before the trouble, while the
influence of his chief rival, Crown Prince Hassan,
has continued to decline.
As if to emphasize this, Husayn went out of
his way shortly after the mutiny to express his
continued confidence in his prime minister and
saw to it that Rifai received prominent local news
coverage during Secretary Kissinger's visit to
Amman in early March, eclipsing the Crown Prince.
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The Army
Perhaps nothing suggests the current mood of
apathy in the army better than the King's reception
at the recent Army Day celebrations. Compared with
the enthusiasm with which he was greeted by the
troops a year ago, his welcome this time was little
more than perfunctory.
Since Zarqa, King Husayn has taken several
steps to improve conditions in the army. In addi-
tion to granting a pay raise immediately after the
mutiny, he has tried to improve PX/commissary.and
medical services for enlisted men. He has ordered
replacements for cheap, defective boots that were
a cause of dissatisfaction. The King has also
assumed the personal debts of noncommissioned
officers as he did for senior officers before the
mutiny. He has ordered Bin Shakir to give top
priority to barracks construction; probably the
major morale problem facing the army at present is
the lack of adequate housin
In spite of his avowed intention to spend more
time with the troops, however, the King has seen
little of them since Zarqa. Husayn has left the
day-to-day running of the army largely in the hands
of Bin Shakir, whose answer to the discontent has
been to clamp the lid on dissent and to feed the
troops heavier doses of discipline. Moreover,
Bedouin officers and men, raised in a tradition
of direct access to the tribal leader, remain
frustrated by Bin Shakir's cold chain-of-command
system and by the wall of Westernized officialdom
around the King,
It is no wonder, then, that morale is low and
the troops are apathetic--a situation Husayn seems
unaware of or unwilling to recognize despite the
fact that several hundred junior officers and
enlisted men with technical skills have chosen to
leave the army over the past few months for better
paying jobs in the Persian Gulf states or Jordan's
private sector.
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The Cloudy Future
For all his problems, however, Husayn does not
appear to be in any immediate political danger.
One of the lessons of the Zarqa mutiny would seem
to be that his Bedouin army still chose to turn
to the King to redress their grievances. Although
the Crown Prince's standing with the army and
tribes has. increased since Zarqa as Husayn's has
continued its downward spiral, neither Hassan, nor
his uncle Sharif Nasir, whose popularity seems
even greater, is likely to try to depose the Kin
Nor is the army ready to support such a mov
The Saudis' recent decision to help Jordan
out financially has lightened the King's load,
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