IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET SA-5 UNITS IN SYRIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001002360017-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: January 18, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
18 January 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT:. Implications of Soviet SA-5 Units
in Syria
Attached herewith is an analysis of the security
implications of Soviet SA-5 units about to be deployed
in Syria and the probable motivation behind this sub-
stantial commitment to Soviet prestige.
A companion piece will be completed shortly
dealing with the likely Israeli reaction.
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
P
18 January 1983
IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET SA-5 UNITS IN SYRIA
Summary
We have strong reason to believe the Soviets
are now sending air defense personnel to Syria to
man the two SA-5 complexes being established
there. We also believe that it is likely that
Moscow's military presence in Syria will extend
beyond the SA-5 units, themselves, although
evidence for this is circumstantial at the
moment. We anticipate that the Soviets will
operate early warning and low-altitude air defense
systems protecting the SA-5 sites, play a greater
role in Syria's air defense in general,. and
possibly deploy a contingent of their own fighter
..The introduction of the SA-5 system reflects
a qualitative increase in Moscow's commitment to
Syria. By deploying a system that can challenge
Israel's air superiority, the Soviets are tying
their prestige more closely than ever to Syria's
military fortunes and are running a far greater
risk of being drawn into Syrian-Israeli
hostilities.
This memorandum was prepared by the Current Support, Theater
Forces and Strategic Forces Divisions of the Office of Soviet
Analysis, with a contribution from the Defensive Systems Division
of the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research. It'has been
coordinated with the Office of Near.East/South Asia Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Director, Office of Soviet . Analysis
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The move is apparently designed to reverse
the setback the Soviets suffered as a result of
last summer's Israeli invasion of Lebanon, when
the USSR was reduced to the role of an ineffectual
bystander and Soviet weaponry was discredited. It
appears aimed at regaining for Moscow a position
of influence in the region, countering the US
military presence there and thwarting Washington's
current dominance of the Arab-Israeli peace
process.
Soviet Motivations
Israel's thrashing of Syria's Soviet-equipped forces in
Lebanon last June and the perception in Damascus that Moscow
responded ineffectively strained relations between the USSR and
Syria and damaged Soviet prestige internationally. Moscow felt
compelled to reply to the widespread criticism of its weaponry by
publishing an unusual defense of Soviet arms. In the face of
these challenges, the Soviets evidently concluded last summer
that restoring both their credibility and the relationship with
their most important ally in the Middle East warranted a
substantially greater military commitment to Syria.
The Syrian air defense network has been the focus of Soviet
efforts. Since last summer Moscow has delivered an array of its
most advanced air defense equipment, along with additional
.,advisers. technicians and, now, operational units. The SA-5 is
the-latest component of this comprehensive upgrading-of the
The Soviet leaders, by introducing the SA-5 and--we
believe- their own personnel to man it, probably want to send
message to:
Syria
That they are determined to bolster its
military capability against the Israelis
and are willing to.stan.d beside it in the
defense of?Syrian.air space.
Other Arabs -- That the USSR is a reliable ally and an
-effective counterweight to Israel and the
US.
Israel -- That it can'no longer attack with impunity
Soviet allies.in the Middle East.
The US
That it should rein in the.-Israelis and
take notice that the Soviet'Union intends
to playa major role in the region.
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Friend and
foe alike -- That Soviet weaponry, contrary to the
negative reporting it received last
summer, deserves a healthy respect.
We believe Moscow's primary goal is to refurbish its
.credentials--severely tarnished by its inaction in the Lebanese
crisis--as a power to be contended with in the Middle East. The
Soviets probably view their establishment of a greater military
presence in Syria as a counter to. US military involvement ia
Lebanon and in the Sinai Peninsula. Moscow views both US
contingents as "bridgeheads" for American. military intervention
throughout the Middle East. The Kremlin presumably hopes that
its move will hinder the realization of US-sponsored Lebanese and
Arab-Israeli peace settlements. It may calculate that increased
Soviet backing for Syria will make Jordan's King Hussein and PLO
chief Arafat think twice about pursuing a peace formula--based on
President Reagan's initiative--that Damascus opposes. The
Soviets probably also hope that, ultimately, their action will
force the US to deal with the USSR as an equal in the Middle
East. In short, Moscow is seeking to be a power that, once
again, must be negotiated with in determining any Middle East
To the Syrian audience, the SA-5 is a particularly
.persuasive means of demonstrating Moscow's commitment. It
enables the Soviets to claim that they have offered up a system
that plays a critical role in their own homeland defense, that
the Syrians are the first recipients of the system,. and that its
long range capability addresses a significant gap in Syrian air
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Although we estimate that the SA-5 has the capahilitv.to
engage high-flying Israeli targets over Lebanon and northern
Israel, we have no evidence as to the actual engagement
guidelines under which Soviet troops will operate. It is
possible that the Soviets may commit themselves only to the
defense of Syria, in which case they would aim to avoid becoming
involved in a limited Israeli Syrian air clash over Lebanon and
almost certainly would not initiate hostilities. Should the
Soviets decide to include Lebanese airspace in their air defense
umbrella and fire on Israeli aircraft there in case of another
major Syrian-Israeli conflict, they will invite an Israeli attack
on the complexes, with the attendant risk of further
The Soviet Role
Several factors have led us to our judgment that the SA-5
complexes at Homs and Dumayr will be operated by Soviet
personnel:
The decision to deploy the SA-5 units to Syria was probably
made about the time Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal
Ogarkov,
visited the country in late July.
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Soviet actions in Egypt. in 1970 during the War of Attrition
raise the possibility that the Soviets will.also deploy a
contingent of their own fighter aircraft to Syria to support the
air defense operation. In their decision to send SA-3 units to
Egypt at that time, the Soviets viewed the deployment of their
own fighters as a necessary part of the package. They would
probably restrict their flight activity to the interior of
Syria. Some 60 aircraft were involved in the Egyptian
deployment, and a similar number could be sent to Syria. If this
has been part of Moscow's decision, the aircraft should be
delivered shortly, since the Soviets would probably. want the
aircraft combat-read -b the time the missile sites are
operational.
25X1
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Response to an Israeli Attack
-Moscow has probably calculated that Israel will be deterred
from a preemptive strike against the SA-5s by the Soviet military
presence and the political costs of such an unprovoked attack on
Syrian territory.
I'At the
same time , Soviet leaders had to calculate that there' would be a
high risk of an Israeli attack, and they almost certainly have
made contingency plans.
25X1
25X1
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As was the case in Egypt during the War of Attrition, we do
not expect the Soviets to announce the presence of their own
forces in Syria. Soviet proclamations instead will emphasize
that Moscow's aid has been restricted to the legitimate self-
defense needs of Syria. This policy offers a degree of
flexibility that would not be available if the honor of the
Soviet Armed Forces were publicly placed on the line.
If the Israelis were to strike the SA-5 units bul the attack
failed to destroy the complexes or resulted in significant
Israeli losses, Moscow could claim a victory. In this case, the
Soviets probably would quickly replace any destroyed equipment.
A strike that destroyed the SA-5s with few Israeli losses
would be an acute embarrassment for the Kremlin, even though the
resultant increase in tensions would probably achieve one of the
Soviet goals--further discrediting the US in Arab eyes and
derailing US-sponsored Lebanese and Arab-Israeli peace
settlements. The Soviets would mount a vigorous political
campaign to encourage international outrage over the Israeli move
and divert attention from their own military failure. But in
order to avoid a collapse of its credibility in the Middle East,
we believe that Moscow would have to rebuild the complexes and
bolster their capability to withstand attack. This likely would
include strengthening the low-altitude air defense sites around
the SA-5s and, if they have not already done so, having Soviet
fighter units defend the complexes. This level of augmented
defenses, however, probably would not, be sufficient to prevent
determined Israeli follow-on strikes from again knocking out the
SA-5 system. But the Soviets might calculate that the Israelis
would not continue to pay the high military and political price
of the repeated attacks-that-would be necessary to keep the
system suppressed.
At the same time, we believe there is at least an even
chance that Moscow would try to go beyond these steps in response
to a successful Israeli attack against the complexes and, similar
to its experience in Egypt in 1970, assume a more direct role in
running the entire Syrian air defense network. This act would
probably. be accompanied by the introduction of substantially more
SA-5 units and assets for their protection.
Implications
Beyond the obvious risks of an. Israeli attack on the SA-5
complexes, the Soviet move has broader implications.
It has seriously complicated the achievement both of a
withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and of progress on
President Reagan's peace initiative. Even if further hostilities
are avoided temporarily, the Soviet move will probably restore
Syria's confidence in its ability to withstand an Israeli attack,
which will hinder the achievement of Lebanese and Arab-Israeli
peace settlements.
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By introducing SA-5 units to Syria, Moscow is putting its
prestige more on the line in the Middle East than at any time
since its deployment of air and air defense units to Egypt in
1970. It is signaling Israel, just as it did then, that an
attack on the USSR's ally could very well result in an engagement
with Soviet forces. This, in turn, would greatly increase the
risks of a US-Soviet. confrontation.in the region. If Israel
accepted the Soviet challenge and was successful, the Soviets
would be put in the position of either escalating their military
presence or suffering a humiliating defeat.
Moscow's:move suggests that it will demand a larger voice in
Syria's military strategy. the
Soviets hold the Syrian military leadership--and Syrian forces in
general--in very low regard. Given this view, the Soviets
probably would not be willing to risk their own personnel and
military prestige on a poorly conceived or adventuristic Syrian
operation.
we believe that a prerequisite
to the deployment of the SA- units was greater Soviet
involvement at the highest level of the Syrian military
establishment. Substantial risks will remain, however, no.matter
what assurances the Soviets receive. If Syria becomes involved
in a battle with the Israelis for whatever reason, the Soviets
could hardly refuse to allow the SA-5s to be used and expect to
maintain their credibility.
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