CHANGING ATTITUDES IN SOMALIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000110002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 29, 1998
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Changing Attitudes in Somalia
Document not found in
MORI
4/9/04
Secret
21 January 1970
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
SUBJECT: Changing Attitudes in Somalia*
21 January 1970
1. Somalia's Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), a
military junta which took power on 21 October 1969, has yet
to develop a real personality Its spokesmen have talked a
lot about eradicating corruption and incompetence at home,
living up to their international commitments (implying support
of the dissident Somali minorities in Ethiopia and Kenya), and
maintaining a policy of "positive neut ality" (non-alignment
with a lean to the left). But, apart from imprisoning former
Prime Minister Egal and some of his colleagues, restricting
the movements of the diplomatic corps (especially the Americans),
This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.. It was prepared
by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the
Office of Current Intelligence and the Clandestine Services.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CENT 1.3 A L INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
21 January 1970
SUB,TECT: Changing Attitudes in Somalia*
1. Somalia's Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), a
military junta which took power on 21 October 1969, has yet
to develop a real personality. Its spokesmen have talked a
lot about eradicating corruption and incompetence at home,
living up to their international commitments (implying support
of the dissident Somali minorities in Ethiopia and Kenya), and
maintaining a policy of "positive neutrality" (non-alignment
w'j la a lean to the left). But, apart from imprisoning former
F',,i.me Minister Egal and some of his colleagues, restricting
the movements of the diplomatic corps (especially the Americans),
This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.. It was prepared
by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the
Office of Current Intelligence and the Clandestine Services.
GROUP 1
Excluded from. automatic
downgrading and
S-E-C-R-E-T declassification
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and quietly expelling the US Peace Corps, the SRC has not done
very much. Its members seem to be still primarily concerned
with jockeying for position and guarding against possible
counter-revolutionary moves.
2. The SRC - composed of 20 Army officers and five police
officers - apparently represents most major viewpoints, regions,
clans, and educational backgrounds in the country. General
Mohamed Siad, titular head of the council and Commander of the
Armed Forces, is an opportunistic, unscrupulous, experienced
maneuverer with a reputation for resourcefulness. He has en-
deavored to portray himself to Western observers as a moderate
in contrast with other, younger council members. At the moment,
however, a clique of 13 junior officers (more nationalistic,
puritanical, and fed up with the establishment than their elders
appears to be iIL the ascendancy. We are not sure whether recent
anti-foreign moves resulted from their initiatives or Siad's.
Siad and his fellow senior officers will probably be opposed
by this younger group for quite some time, but we cannot yet
predict which faction or individual will. emerge on top.
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3. While this struggle for leadership goes on, the SRC
is in an anti-foreign mood, and US interests are threatened as
they never were under Egal's regime. This is partly because
the SRC appears genuinely afraid of an armed attack from
Ethiopia, which they tend to regard as an American puppet.
Egal, who visited President Nixon just before the coup, was
widely considered to be a protc6e of the bS. The revulsion
among junior officers against the corruption of his regime has
thus fueled anti-US sentiment.
4. The role of the Soviets in all this is difficult to
assess. As the principal suppliers, trainers, and advisers
of the Somali Army for several years, the Soviets have some
influence on the regime, particularly in military and security
matters. We don't know how much, partly because the Soviets
seem to prefer remaining in the background. Moscow has been
remarkably circumspect in its public pronouncements, charac-
terizing the SRC as less progressivt' than the new regimes in
Libya and the Sudan.
5. Beyond the broad aim of displacing Western and en-
hancing Communist influence, it is difficult to understand
precisely what the Soviets hope to get out of Somalia.
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Perhaps space-tracking stations (for which the Somali location
and climate are well suited) or facilities for the new Soviet
Indian Ocean naval flotilla. Moscow would certainly like to
have the US out
and would like to see Western influence reduced
in Kenya and Ethiopia, but it's hard to see how a strong position
in Somalia would lead toward these goals. Our best guess is
that the Soviets simply treated Somalia as a target of oppor-
tunity when they decided in 1963 to become its arms supplier.
They may also have moved to pre-empt the Chinese Communists.
Whatever their reasons, they seem still to be unsure of what
use to make of their presence there. They have been burned
before in Africa by becoming over-identified with particular
regimes (e.g., Ghana and Mali).
6. Moscow's apparent wariness in Somalia is probably
matched by that of the Somalis. Their suspicion and scorn
for those not fortunate enough to be born Somali is celebrated
throughout Africa and has probably registered with Moscow as
well. It is possible, of course, that SRC members may prove
to be more eager than their predecessors to link their fortunes
with foreigners. We consider this unlikely. The Somalis are
a fiercely independent lot and will probably remain so.
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I I
7. These same nationalistic tendencies will probably
be strong enough in the new regime to make it increasingly
difficult for Westerners to do business in Somalia. All
Americans in Somalia - be they diplomats, AID administrators,
or businessmen - are being watched carefully. The few US-owned
firms there have already encountered increased petty harassment.
In the past, however, the Somali governments have been practical
enough to realize that a country as fundamentally poor as
Somalia needs foreign investment and aid. We would guess
that the SRC will content itself with collecting higher taxes
and insisting that Somalis play a bigger role in the firms.
But nationalization, partial or complete, cannot be ruled out.
8. It is in the US interest, as adviser and arms supplier
to Ethiopia, to maintain the two-year old Somali detente with
Ethiopia and Kenya. The USSR also appears to think its
interests are served by Somali restraint. But the Somalis,
for their own reasons, may try to revive insurg,,.icy and under-
write sabotage in its neighboring states. The concept of a
"Greater Somalia," de-emphasized by Egal during his regime,
still has considerable appeal to Somalis. Hence, scrapping
some features of the detente might enhance the popularity of
the regime and satisfy aggressive Army leaders. The SRC is
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 e_r
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aware, however, that the Somali Army would be no match for the
Ethiopian, and we doubt that they would rush into a major con-
flict. They are likely to be further deterred from large
scale border skirmishes by their current preoccupation with
internal stability. The outlook is for increased tension on
the frontiers, some unpleasant incidents with the neighbors,
and in time a general deterioration of relations in the area.
9. We also think that the SRC is giving some thought to
breaking relations with the US. There is said to be considerable
sentiment on the SRC for doing so, and those who favor this
are genuinely afraid of US power and suspicious of all US
activities in the Horn. But the SRC is likely to draw back
from the brink, especially while it still has hopes for US aid
in 1970*. Expulsion, if it does occur, would probably not
greatly damage US interests in the area, but it would make it
more difficult to keep track of deve]rpments in this part of
the world.
x Current plans in Washington are for phasing out bilateral
aid to Somalia after fiscal 1970- Since 195)4, the US has
extended approximately $72 million in aid to Somalia.
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