BLACK PROTEST AND RHODESIA'S FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000110041-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: August 29, 1998
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Black Protest and Rhodesia's Future
Secret
28 January 1972
Copy No.
84
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
28 January 1972
SUBJECT: Black Protest and Rhodesia's Future*
The intensity and extent of black opposition to
the proposed UK-Rhodesian settlement have come as a
surprise -- to the UK, the Rhodesian government, and
the world at large. This memorandum examines the
broader implications of the protests, which may mark
the opening of a period of renewed tension in south-
ern Africa.
Genesis of the demonstrations by Rhodesia's blacks
1. In late November, after almost a year of intense but low-
key negotiations, the UK and Rhodesia agreed to settle their
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of National Estimates
and discussed with other components of the CIA, who are in general
agreement with its judgments.
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long-standing dispute. In return for British recognition of
Rhodesian independence and the legitimacy of the white minority
government (and at least an implicit understanding that UK
sanctions would be ended), the Smith regime agreed to certain
conditions which would lead to a very gradual improvement in
the economic and political status of Rhodesia's blacks.
2. A major condition was British insistence that the
settlement be acceptable to the blacks, who comprise 95 percent
of Rhodesia's population. Smith turned down Douglas-Home's
proposal to hold a referendum. Finally, it was agreed that
the UK would appoint a commission to canvass Rhodesian opinion.
A further British condition was that Smith-release a numb;,r of
black nationalist leaders who had been held in detention, most
since 1965.
3. It was expected that the commission would hear a feo
negative voic,.s, but that black opinion would generally 'savo'r the
settlement terms. The regime particularly counted on suppo:
from the couple of hundred tribal chiefs, who are hand-picked and
salaried by the government to represent the 4 million blacks 80
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percent of the total -- who live in rural areas. So far as we
know, no one in London or Salisbury suspected how deep black
antipathies run, or that great masses would be willing to risk
arrest by engaging in open protest.
4. The 16-member UK Commission, headed by an eminent jurist,
Lord Pearce;,, arrived on 11 January. Meanwhile, leaders of black
groups opposed to the terms quickly formed a coordinating group,
the African National Couricill, to organize mass protest. A week
later, as the Commissioners set out to test the opinion of urban
blacks, they were met in nearly every major black town by large
crowds of Africans -- e.g., 6,000 in Gwelo -- voicing opposition
to the, settlement. More surprisingly, the Commission's early
sorties into tribal territories also showed almost unan:-nous
opposition. In more than 50 public meetings in the countryside,
only one of the puppet tribal chiefs ha:, voted in favor.
5. As the dcmonsi:rations in several black townships turned to
riots and looting, the government reacted viscerally with mass
arrests, both of rioters and of nationalist leade:-s, and temporarily
cane%Iled hearings by the Commission. The disturbances subsided
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by 23 January, leaving a total of 14 Africans dead and several
times that number wounded in the week of protest and violence.
The demonstrations, and the regime's sw:-:eping arrests, also threw
the Commission into confusion and left the settlement in doubt.
6. On 21 January the Prime Minister delivered a tough
speech to the nation. Moving in part to forestall charges of
softness from his right-wing critics, Smith affirmed the regime's
intention to continue taking "firm action whenever the need arises",
and said he had warned the British earlier that granting their
request to release political prisoners would lead to trouble.
While thus blaming Douglas-Home for the violence, Smith also re-
vealed his anxiety that the demonstrations might sabotage prospects
for the settlement. He warned the blacks that rejection would mean
a return to the status quo -- i.e., the racist Rhodesian constitu-
tion of 1969. He charged them with failing to see where their
self-interest lies, then asked:
"What greater proof could anyone have
of their lack of maturity, Zack of civiZi-
zation, their inability to make any con-
structive contribution?"
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In black townships, the sound of exploding myths
7. The riots have demonstrated several important facts.
First of all they demolished Douglas-Home's comforting delu-
sion that an orderly sampling could be taken of Rhodesian black
opinion. In fact there are no representative political leaders
or organs in Rhodesia through which the blacks could have made
their opinions known. Unauthorized political activity is sup-
pressed, black officials are appointed from the center, and black
leaders who openly oppose government policy are removed and jailed.
Demonstrations -- which are illegal in Rhodesia -- are the only
means left for expressing black political dissent.
8. White officials have helped -- probably inadvertently --
to provoke the demonstrations. Local authorities are reported in
several instances to have denied blacks permission to meet to discuss
the terms of the proposed settlement. In some outlying areas offi-
cials distributed vernacular summaries of the settlement and attempted
to explain its benefits; but members of the African National Council
and others who oppose the settlement were forbidden to speak to village
or tribal gatherings. The regime wanted a "yes" vote on the settlement
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question, and tried to keep the blacks from hearing opposing views.
Obviously., this failed.
9. The demonstrations have also shown the world the deep
gulf that exists between Rhodesian blacks and whites. The offi-
cial image of a benevolent white regime guiding contented and
politically apathetic natives toward a better future now lies
shattered.
10. The most surprising development has been the rapid emer-
gence of effective black leadership and organization in the eight
weeks since Smith and Home announced the terms of the proposed
settlement. At that time the blacks were widely thought to be
fragmented, almost leaderless, and frightened into political
dormancy by the Rhodesian security apparatus. Most of the known
opposition leaders have been in jail for years; some were released
at British insistence before the present sampling began. Thousands
of blacks took part in the demonstrations, which occurred in a half-
dozen major towns and cities, some separated from each other by 500
miles or more. The demonstrations showed clear signs or planning and
organization. In most instances they were timed to occur with the
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local arrival of Pearce Commission members. In a few cases they
seemed to be related less to the settlement question than to more
immediate local issues: in one instance a miners' strike, in
another to rumors that local beer was being watered. Overall,
their success suggests a capacity for planning, coordination, and
communication among black organizations and commL'nities, far greater
than the government had any knowledge of.
11. As for the settlement, the demonstrations have driven
home the point that the agreement was drafted by UK and Rhodesian
white leaders representing predominantly European constituencies.
Blacks neither participated nor were consulted. Hence it should
come as no surprise that many blacks view the terms as unresponsive
to their grievances and aspirations and, therefore, unacceptable.
But the demonstrations will have an impact far beyond the immediate
issue of acceptability.
Political prospects: things took different now
12. Before the demonstrations, a UK-Rhodesian settlement seemed
to hold the best chance -- though a small one -- for creating an environ-
ment in which racial cooperation and black progress might develop.
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Rhodesia's whites looked forward to a reduction in racial tensions,
and to broader acceptance, both from black Rhodesians and from other
countries, of white minority rule for the indefinite future. The
demonstrations and riots have changed all this. Now, settlement or
no, Rhodesian politics seem certain to be dominated for the next
several years by black-white antagonism.
For white Rhodesians
13. The extreme right-wing members of the Rhodesian Front,
Smith's own party, have been only lukewarm, at most, toward the
settlement, which they feel goes too far. Their acquiescence re-
flected a conviction that the terms will prove not to be binding:
one rightist MP praised the proposed constitutional guarantees for
blacks as so loose that an ox-cart could be turned around in them.
14. For most white Rhodesians Smith's hard-line speech
of 21 January offered needed reassurances that the government is in
control, and that no threat to white minority rule will be tolerated.
Many will be disappointed if the settlement with the UK falls through,
but are not likely to blame this on Smith. So long as he continues
to crack down hard on black dissidents -- and he has both the will
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and the means to do so -- he probably will not be seriously hurt
politically. Meanwhile, the few white voices in Rhodesia which
have been calling for relaxation of harsh racial policies and for
a halt on the march toward apartheid are likely to go unheeded for
a long time to come.
b. For black Rhodesians
15. Rhodesia's blacks have proved to themselves and the
world that they are not a docile and pliant mass, as they had been
pictured. The demonstrations have prc:iably brought them a new feel-
ing of solidarity; an awareness of their capability to organize, to
protest, and to confront the regime. It also brought a sense of
power and exhilaration, and renewed hope for change. But there is
a price for all this. A wave of arrests and detentions is already
underway, and most of Rhodesia's black nationalist leaders are
likely once again to end up in jail or in exile.
16. It is too early to judge whether the past two months
of relative political freedom allowed black leaders time enough to
establish durable political structures. It is also unclear at this
stage just what roles the long-dormant Rhodesian black liberation
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movements played in the recent events.* The record of these groups
is a dismal one, marked by personal and tribal bickering and by
utterly ineffective attempts to organize violent action against
the Smith Regime. The movements have attracted only a small and
fluctuating rank-and-file membership, consisting mostly of illit-
erate tribesmen. They are hard to motivate, and tend to respond
to the rigors of guerrilla life by going back home. Ill-equipped
and often untrained, such guerrillas are no match for the Rhodesian
security forces and their network of informers. Guerrilla bands
usually are rolled up within a few days of crossing-the borders
into Rhodesia.
17. The two main black liberation groups, ZANU and ZAPU,
are reported to have buried their long-standing differences at least
long enough to cooperate in organizing some of the recent protest.
The problems that plagued them in the past, however, will probably
persist; and it is unlikely that any of these groups will pose a
credible threat to the regime in the next few years, at least.
* Rhodesia's two major tribes, the Shona and NdebeZe, are represented
respectively by ZANY (Zimbabwe African National Union) and ZAPU
(Zimbabwe African Peoples Union). Years of detention and exile,
squabbling among the remaining Zeaders, and efficient Rhodesian
police work reduced the activity of these organizations to nil.
Recently a third group, FROLIZI (Front for the Liberation of
Zimbabwe) was formed by members of both ZANU and ZAPU. Its
effectiveness has yet to be tested.
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18. Meanwhile, few of Rhodesia's blacks will nurture
any illusions that the government is likely to make significant
concessions on segregation and civil rights. Whether or not the
UK approves the settlement, the blacks are in for a long period
of repression.
c. For UK-Rhodesian relations
19. Smith has already accepted the risk that his harsh
security measures may scuttle the settlement with Britain. He
aroused widespread indignation among the British government and
press by the preemptive arrest of a former liberal Rhodesian prime
minister, Garfield Todd, and his daughter. Indeed, Douglas-Home
sent a special envoy to Rhodesia to inquire into these arrests
Smith',:: temporary prevention of further sampling in the tribal
territories annoyed the Pearce Commission. The sampling has since
been allowed to resume, though probably subject to more restrictive
security precautions, and Lord Pearce has declared his intention to
stay on until the process has been completed,
20. For the Heath government the recent developments
have been a sharp setback in its Rhodesian policy. Until the
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demonstrations started, Heath seemed well on the way toward ful-
filling a campaign promise to try to end the messy impasse with
Rhodesia. The sanctions are costing the UK something on the order
of $100 million a year, but accomplish almost nothing. Probably
more compelling has been the strong sentiment -- particularly among
Heath's Tory constituents -- favoring a normalization of relations
with the British settler regime in Rhodesia.
21. But there are constraints on how far Heath can go in
seeking an accord. The British public is generally sympathetic to
the aspirations of black Rhodesians, and it probably would not stand
for an agreement which they clearly and overwhelmingly opposed. And
unless there is a sudden turnabout in buck sentiment and a massive
show of support for the )roposed agreement, it is hard to see how the
Pearce Commission could find the black response anything but negative.
22. If the settlement falls through, Heath will be
criticized by the opposition for failing to consult Rhodesia's
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blacks before the terms of a settlement had been fixed. But most
of his constituents, and probably most of the British public, would
accept his claims that he has done his best to find a solution to a
difficult problem; that a solution has eluded not only his regime,
but the Labour government which preceded it; and that the problem may,
in fact, defy solution for some time to come. In the absence of a
settlement Britain and Rhot!csia will probably seek a gradual, piecemeal
normalization of their relations short of recognition
23. Any hopes in Salisbury or London that a phased and
stretched-out settlement would allow the Rhodesian question to fade
from world attention have been dashed by the black protests. Indeed,
the current spotlight on Rhodesian events comes as an unexpected bonus
to the black African states. The current Security Council meeting in
Addis Ababa is expected to focus attention primarily on the southern
Africa question.
24. The implications of black protest in Rhodesia will
receive much attention at the Addis session. Most African nations
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see little to choose between non-settlement and a settlement reached
over black Rhodesian protest. In the latter event the UK will come
under more criticism; in either case UN members -- especially the
US and other countries with global economic clout or with signifi-
cant economic interests in Rhodesia -- will be urged to repudiate
the white minority regime in Salisbury and to continue applying UN
sanctions. Any US moves to dilute its sanctions will attract more
attention in the months ahead.
25. The success of the demonstrations also will encourage
a number of African states to seek greater support for Rhodesian
black liberation movements. Attempts are likely to be made to
enlist UN involvement through scholarships and medical and technical
assistance. But the Rhodesian events will stimulate more talk than
action. We doubt that Rhodesian insurgent activity will be much more
effective in the future than in the past.
26. Thus the Rhodesian black demonstrations have not brought
anything radically new to international relations. Rather they have brought
the Rhodesia issue intn sharper focus and have made it appear more urgent,
so that other countries' dealings with the Smith regime will come under
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greater scrutiny and criticism during 1972. This will complicate
US relations with both black and white governments in Africa.
27. The longer run implications of the protests, how-
ever, are more serious. The events in Rhodesia, occurring almost
simultaneously with an unprecedented -- and apparently successful --
month-long strike by Ovambo contract-workers in Southwest Africa,
suggest that southern Africa is in for increased political ferment
and racial tension.
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