REVIEW/SUMMARY OF NOMENKLATURA BY MICHAEL VOSLENSKY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001100080004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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-- The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
17 September 1984
Dear Clare,
I was much interested in hearing about your
reading during the summer and to supplement it I
send you a book I recently read and found to be
the most vivid description of how the Soviet
system currently works.
In case you don't feel like reading the book,
here's a summary.
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SUBJECT: Review/Summary of Nomenklatura by Michael Voslensky
I. Introductory Remarks
Nomenklatura by Dr. Michael Voslensky is unique in the
view it affords the reader of the inner workings of the
contemporary Soviet political system. The book provides
great insights into the workings of the Soviet system as a
whole, emphasizing the collective concern of the
nomenklatura (the ruling class) and its constraints on
individual leaders. This is of particular interest as one
addresses the issue of the personal strength, power and
authority of Konstantin Chernenko as general secretary
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as compared to
his colleagues in the Politburo and other elements in the
Soviet government and party.*.
According to Voslensky, Chernenko's election-as
general secretary-did not represent a.personal triumph.
It was*; nstead a compromise by the top. Soviet leadership
between two factions, neither of'which was powerful enough
in its own--right to successfully mount a candidate to
succeed Yuriy.Andropov.- On the one hand was the odd
guard, Gromyko and Ustinov; on-the other were the voices
of the future, Gorbachev and Dolgikh, Andropov's hopes
for the continuance of his legacy. What is seen today
issuing from the.Politburo is not a unified policy.
Instead, contradictory signals issue forth, representing
the struggles of factions, demonstrating the absence of
a firm hand at the helm and the consequent relative
autonomy of certain of-the Politburo members.
The months since Chernenko's'succession in February
have been rife with indications of this factional struggle:
--Speeches by various officials have indicated absence
of agreement in the Politburo over whether to resume high-
level negotiations with the U.S. Chernenko and Gorbachev
were the most positive on this point, Gromyko and Ustinov
more skeptical.
--Regarding Soviet-participation in--the Olympics, the
head of the Soviet Olympic Committee was firm in his
*For an explanation of the functions of the chief elements
of the party, we have included an excerpt from Nomenklatura
as Part II of this report.
q0
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assurances early in the year that Soviet athletes would
be in Los Angeles, until suddenly the policy switched.
--Soviet officials who--have expressed opinions about
Chernenko have not spoken with a unified voice. In fact,
many disparaging remarks about his lack of foreign policy
experience and the state of his health have been made.
--Speeches in which Chernenko has been mentioned
have ranged from restraint to enthusiastic praise.
--The economy and the need for reform has produced a
sharp debate, with the result that stagnation continues.
According to Voslensky, all this indicates that Chernenko
is not in complete control. Nor is any other single person.
While both Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov
appear to operate with a certain degree of autonomy, exercising
authority in.their respective- spheres of influence, they too
are operat_ing:within the constraints of the nomenklatura
collective.. .Toward..the,end of. his book, Dr. Voslensky
addresses the concerns of the omenklatura in the field of
foreign policy. He contends-that Soviet leaders genuinely
do not want a nuclear-war, not from a desire to-protect the
good citizens of the Soviet Union, but because they know
that the destruction brought about by a nuclear coffrontation
would also mean'the'end of their power, and probably even
their own personal demise. The nomenklaturist as portrayed
by Dr.-Voslensky is power hungry, striving to preserve and
enhance his power at all costs. What the nomenklatura
wants, then, is world domination for the Soviet Union
without war, victory over the West without fighting.
Dr. Voslensky contends that the Soviet leaders make a show
of pugnacity for the purpose of persuading the West that
communism is preferable= to catastrophe--and that the
Soviet threats are-nothing but abluff.
The aspirations of the nomenklatura to world hegemony
are not to be doubted, Voslensky maintains. While Europe
is of prime importance to the Soviets owing to its industrial
capabilities, it would be__aa mistake to dismiss Soviet
nomenklatura policy in Third World countries. The hostility
felt by these countries toward their former colonial masters
is skillfully played by the Soviet Union. Sloganizing
against the West has enabled the Soviet Union to secure the
systematic support of many Third World countries in the
United Nations and other international bodies.
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PART II. Excerpts from Chapter 6 - "The Dictatorship
of the Nomen latura"
The book provides insight into the nomenklatura in
general, its composition, interests and functions. It
is in Chapter 6, however, "The Dictatorship of the
Nomenklatura", that Voslensky focuses on the most
important political bodies in the Soviet Union: the
Politburo and the Secretariat. As the Soviet foreign
policy decisions which impact most heavily on the
United States are made in these two bodies, excerpts
from this chapter are offered below.
The Central Committee ,
The term Central Committee of the CPSU has various
meanings; it may refer to (i) the plenum of the CPSU
(i.e., all the members. elected to it.by the party congress).;
(ii) the-Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee;
(iii).The Central. Committee apparatus ...Theesupreme.organs
of state are the Politburo and the Secretariat,--...the
real government of the Soviet Union;.the Council of Ministers
has executive powers, but is not a government in the
political meaning of the term. An even more modes role is
played by the Presidium of the-Supreme Soviet, whiTh.is_a
symbolic body practically without real power. The
Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee are
the Soviet equivalent of a cabinet.
That they are the most important bodies in the.country
is shown by the prominence given to them in all Soviet
publications. When the country's leading political
figures are listed, the voting and non-voting members of
the Politburo and the secretaries of the'Central Committee
are mentioned first; the offices they hold are not mentioned,
for it is assumed that everyone knows them. Next come the
vice presidents of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the
vice presidents of the Council of Ministers, and other
eminent bureaucrats in the nomenklaturist hierarchy, with
the offices they hold.-
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Secretary General
There is a widespread view that the country is governed
by the Secretary-General of the Central Committee, but it
is mistaken. To convince oneself of,that, it is sufficient
to ask this question: If policy was autocratically laid
down by personalities as different as Stalin, Khrushchev,
Brezhnev, and Andropov, how did it.come about that the most
significant features of that policy remained unchanged?
The answer is that the country is governed not by the
Secretary-General but by the nomenklatura class; the policy
followed by the Central Committee is not that of the
Secretary-General but that of this class. The guidelines
of that policy were laid down by Lenin and Stalin, the
fathers of the nomenklaturist class, in conformity with its
requirements, and it is that which is largely responsible
for their reputation as autocratic leaders. They unquestionably
exercised paternal authority over a ruling class that was not
yet firmly in the saddle-, but as-we-have already pointed out,
at the same time they were dependent on it On the other
hand, Khrushchev and, to an even greater extent, Brezhnev
and Andropov, were never anything. but supreme executants of
the nomenklatura will.
The Secretary-General is the top nomenklaturis? and is
consequently the most powerful man in real-socialist society.
As Lenin noted a few months after Stalin's appointment,
immense power is concentrated in his hands. Anyone who tries
to assume leadership of the nomenklatura without being assured
of that position is inevitably thrown out, as happened to
Malenkov and then to Shelepin.
The question is not whether the Secretary-General has
great power (he has), but whether his power is the only one
in the country (the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the
apparatus being subordinate to him at differing levels).
He is the head both of the Politburo and of the'Secretariat,
but his relations with the directive organs of the nomenklaturist
class are not those of a commander and his subordinates.
Two phases must be distinguished in a Secretary-General's
relations with the Politburo and the Secretariat. In the
first, the members of both bodies will have been taken over
from his predecessor; in the second, most members of both
bodies will be his own proteges.
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Approval of his appointment to the post of Secretary-General
amounts to formal recognition of his sovereignty, but his
former fellows in fact regard him as an upstart who has managed
to overtake--them. At best, they regard him as rimus inter pares Hence the appointment of a new Secretary-General is invariably
accompanied by a reaffirmation of the principle of collective
leadership.
The objective of the new Secretary-General is to concentrate
unrestricted power in his own hands, and he is in an excellent
position to do so. The major difficulty is that everyone is
aware of his intentions. He cannot, at any rate at first,
afford to get rid of his enemies in the Politburo and the
Secretariat, because the latter, having reached the top level
in the nomenklaturist class, will each have a large number of
vassals. So he has to be on excellent terms with them all;
every single one of them must regard him as a lesser evil.
Meanwhile he must use his ingenuity to form a coalition against
those who stand in his way and eventually get rid of them,.
at the same time doing everything he can to secure the appoint-
ment of his own followers-to leading positions. The usual
method is to have his vassals appointed to positions that
give access to the highest nomenklatura posts.
The Politburo
The president of the Council of Ministers and the principal
secretaries of the Central Committee are now assured of a
place in the Politburo, as are the president of the KGB
and the Defense and Foreign ministers, the first secretaries
of the biggest federated republics (Ukraine and Kazakhstan),
those of less important republics, who enjoy the privilege
in turn, and finally the first secretaries of the Moscow
and Leningrad party committees. This is an example of the
trend toward conservative stability and the establishment
of definite rules that accord with the wishes of the nomenklatura
class.
Since it no longer consists of a clique of friends, but of
persons selected more or less on a representative basis,
relations inside the Politburo are extremely complex.
Appointments to important posts are always painfully protracted,
because relations of strength in the Politburo are delicately
balanced.
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It would be wrong to conclude from this that those who
gain entry to the Politburo and remain in it are a collection
of incompetents. On the contrary, they have to possess
an extra qualification, that of being able to conceal their
real political talents while not creating the impression of
being incompetent or insufficiently qualified. Though all of
them except the Secretary-General seem colorless, the members
of the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat are very
How does the Politburo work?
It meets once a week, on Thursdays, in accordance with
the practice initiated by Lenin. There was nothing fortuitous
about the choice of that day; it enables a report of the
proceedings, including the resolutions passed,to be printed on
Friday. Copies are in the hands of the heads of the administrative
offices concerned first thing on Monday morning, and the latter
are able to see to their execution.
The form in which questions. submitted for decision to the
Politburo and the higher organs of the nomenklatura are drafted
was laid down by Lenin, and his instructions are still in force.'
The following rules applied to the drafting of submissions to
the Council of People's Commissars:
(a) The subject matter must be briefly stated. A
simple indication (of the type re so-and-so) is not sufficient;
the full implications of the question must clearly emerge.
(b) What action is it suggested that the Council of
Commissars should take? (E.g, grant funds,-pass a particular
resolution, etc. The raiser of the issue must state clearly
what he wants.)
(c) Does the question come within the competence
of other commissars? If so, which? Any written documents?
That is the form in.which questions submitted to the
Politburo still have to be presented.
Brief minutes are taken of Politburo and Secretariat
meetings; they merely state what resolutions have been passed
and give no clue to the nature of the discussion; they are the
only official documents that exist about these meetings.
The resolutions are put in a thick file in a dark red envelope
and brought by KGB courier to all the members of the Central
Committee. The latter keep them in their safes and return
them with their signatures to confirm that the contents
have been noted. Really secret resolutions are not circulated
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in this way; they are put in a so-called "special portfolio",
and the minutes of the meeting mention only the number of the
resolution and the administrative office that submitted it,
stating that the resolution is in that portfolio. Members of
the Central Committee apparatus in responsible positions have
access to it (they lost that privilege after the events in
Czechoslovakia in 1968). The files are then destroyed, except
for a few copies that are kept in the Central Committee records
and are eventually handed over to the, party record office
in the Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism.
The Secretariat
In the past few years, the number of secretaries. has
varied between ten and twelve. The Secretary-General's
responsibility covers the whole field; the other secretaries
are responsible only for their special fields; e.g., party
organization, ideology, national defense, industry, agriculture,
the international Communist movement. Under Stalin there was
also a secretary-for personnel and another for state security:
Nowadays personnel-work is.divided up among the various
divisions of the Central Committee, and the Administrative.
Department comes under the secretary responsible for party
organization. As we-have already pointed out, all the
members of the Politburo are of, equal rank in the., arty
hierarchy except the Secretary-General, whose primacy is
admitted; in the Secretariat, however, there is a definite
hierarchy.
The first dividing line is between secretaries who are
also members.or non-voting members of the Politburo and those
who are not; the difference is so great that they could well
be called secretaries and undersecretaries.
The differences in status among Central Committee
secretaries are strictly taken into account when draft
resolutions are circulated. These are not submitted to all,.
or even most, of the secretaries, as the approval of only
five out of twelve is required for a resolution to be
adopted. The general department of the Central Committee,
which is responsible for circulating the drafts, first
obtains the approval of the secretary in whose province it
comes, and then arranges things so as to obtain the signature
of at least one or two of the senior secretaries. The heads
of. the general department are men of great experience who
know all about the likes and dislikes of the Central Committee
secretaries and are thus in a position to hold up resolutions
or even cause them to fail.
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Each Central Committee secretary has a small secretariat
of his own. The seniors have two assistants and two
secretaries, and the juniors have. to manage with one assistant
and two secretaries. The secretaries' secretaries work every
day from morning till night to cope with the day's workload.
Like the secretaries' assistants, they belong to the
Secretariat nomenklatura and are entitled to kremliovka
rations*and a vertushka.**The.secretaries' assistants have
the rank of candidates for the position of deputy head of a
Central Committee division, and the secretaries that of
candidates for the post of head of a desk.
The Central Committee Apparatus
The Central Committee apparatus exercises power by the
nomenklaturist class not only by keeping the "directive
organs" informed and drafting their resolutions; it also
gives orders.
*Kremliovka coupons entitle. the bearer to "medical. nutrition".
Three coupons per day can be exchanged at the Kremlin canteen
for meals whose helpings are so generous that a single portion
is enough to feed a whole family. Many nomenklaturists
prefer to exchange their kremliovka coupons for food baskets
full of luxuries normally unobtainable in Moscow.
**A special government telephone line.
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'PART III. Summary of the'Book
The following is a summarization of the remainder of
the book in which Voslensky dissects the whole of the
Soviet Union's ruling class body.
Introduction
Nomenklatura is a masterful analytical study of the
ruling class of the Soviet Union, a ruling class created by
Stalin, numbering today around 750,000. Voslensky points
out that the domestic policy of the nomenklatura class is to
consolidate its dictatorial power, and its foreign policy
is to extend it to the whole world. The nomenklatura
has some positive achievements to its credit, Dr. Voslensky
tells us, but it is becoming more and more parasitic. Its
contribution is nil and its stubborn desire for world
domination involves the grave danger of world war. To banish
this danger, the world not under Moscow's domination needs
a determined. and fearless policy of peace and security.
Dr. Voslensky's representation of the nomenklatura
rings with authenticity for he writes from personal experience
inside the system. He is a prominent Soviet historian, a
graduate of Moscow University with extensive p.ostgfaduate
study in the Soviet Union and the GDR. He has occupied
various positions in.the Soviet Union including professor
in the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, executive secretary
of the Disarmament Commission, vice chairman of the Bilateral
Historians Commission, member of the Soviet Committee for
European Security, and professor at Lumumba University,
Moscow. ,=He-defected-wi-thout-public notice in West Germany in
1972. In 1977 he was expatriated by the Soviets and he moved
to Austria. Now he is director of the Institute of'
Contemporary Soviet Research in'Munich, West Germany.
He is the author of five books and 450 other publications
(most in the USSR before his defection) and is internationally
recognized as one of the foremost experts on the internal
affairs of the Soviet Union. This book was originally
published in German in 1980.
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Definition and Composition of the Nomenklatura
The nomenklatura is defined as a list of key personnel
positions, appointment to which is made by higher authorities
in the party. Every nomenklaturist belongs to the nomenklatura
of a definite leading party agency. It is this agency that
appointed him, and it alone can dismiss him. (In practice,
however, once on the nomenklatura list, one can expect never
to be removed.) Thus, ministers and ambassadors belong to the
nomenklatura of the Politburo; deputy ministers and directors
of institutes belong to that of the Secretariat of the
Central Committee.
This book, therefore, is a study of the ruling class
in the USSR. Voslensky has divided the nomenklatura into
three categories: (1) leaders of the party, komsomol,
trade unions and other social organizations and their
subdivisions (numbering altogether about 100,000 by Voslensky's
estimate); (2) heads of state administration and their
deputies, belonging to the state apparatus,.not the party
apparatus (150,000); (3) key positions in economy, scientific
and learned institutions and education (400-500,000).
Together with their family members they number about three
million or 1 1/2 percent of the population of the Soviet Union.
The most important selection criteria for the nomenklatura
is political, not professional. To illustrate this point,
Voslensky creates a hypothetical situation where.an "Albert
Einstein", who is not a party member, and an "Ivan Stupidov",
who is a member of the CPSU, are competing for the same
scientific nomenklatura position. It is awarded to Stupidov
because his political qualifications are superior to Einstein's.
Privileges that come with belonging to the nomenklatura
greatly increase the total value of the position's salary,
which is considerably above non-nomenklatura salaries to
begin with. Vacations for nomenklaturists are twice as long
as those for the ordinary Soviet worker, they are cost free,
and special, better class accommodations are provided.
There are special food stores for nomenklaturists who
receive coupons allowing them to get their food there.
The selection is better and one does not have to battle the
crowds. And when the nomenklaturist is ill, better health-
care is available for him. In short, life is easier and more
luxurious for the nomenklaturist.
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Voslensky tells us that it was from Lenin's corps of
professional revolutionaries that Stalin created the
nomenklatura. The country was so large that the. organization
of professional revolutionaries alone was not large enough to
govern it, to fill all the responsible positions. Applicants
rushed to fill the positions and all that was required was
that the applicant not be of noble or bourgeois origin and
that he must' be a member of the party or komsomol. The key
to Stalin's historic ascent was that be succeeded in concentrating
all appointments to key positions in the country in his own
hands and those of his apparatus.
The apparatus of the KGB belongs completely to the
nomenklatura, as does that of the diplomatic services. In the
Interior Ministry (MVD) and other ministries, there are
nomenklatura posts side by side with others. Khrushchev
is reported to have stated that Stalin and Beria had placed
the state security agencies above the party and the state.
After Stalin's death, the party leadership undertook a purge
of the state security agencies, securing their submission
and depriving them of their freedom of action against the
nomenklatura. From being a mysterious monster of which
everyone was terrified, the KGB turned into what it is today,
a secret political police force closely linked with and
subordinate to the party apparatus. The submissio4 of
the KGB to party control is best exemplified by the appointment
in 1967 of Yuriy Andropov to be the head of the KGB. His
reputation at that time was that of a loyal party man who
would bring the KGB firmly into party control.. He did that
and more. Under Andropov's tenure, the power structure of
the KGB was increased, responsibilities expanded, strength in
numbers grew, the image of the KGB both, at home and abroad
was improved, methods refined, and we saw the tentacles of
the KGB spreading, working their way into all areas of Soviet
bureaucracy. For example, in Azerbaijan between 1969
and 1972 under the guise of an anti-corruption campaign,
KGB men were appointed to 1,983 responsible nomenklatura
posts.
Voslensky equates the authority of the armed forces
under the Ministry of Defense with the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. He contends, however, that while the power of the
military could be immense, the nomenklatura takes appropriate
steps to counter any potential threats to its authority
from that source. These special measures include separating the
internal police and border troops from the rest of the army,
putting them under KGB or MVD control; indulging military
nomenklaturists with special privileges so that they have
no reason for envying party officials; and following an
unwritten rule that military nomenklaturists must be apolitical.
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The masters of the nomemklatura are not Marxists by
Voslensky's definition, in spite of the lofty touting of the
principles of Marx. Soviet ideology passes over in silence
a whole series of Marxist principles, and in Voslensky's
view Marx would have turned away in disgust from the system
the Soviets have established. Leninism, unlike Marxism,
is not a theory or hypothesis, but a strategy and tactics for
the seizure of power decked out in Marxist slogans. The
nomenklaturists are not Leninists; the real Leninists
were shot forty years ago in the cellars of the NKVD. The
ideology of the nomenklaturist class is Stalinist chauvinism.
Entering the Nomenklatura
How does one become a part of the nomenklatura?
Obituaries of nomenklatura officials in the Soviet press
suggest that the enormous majority of first-generation
nomenklaturists were of peasant origin. In the early days
of the Soviet state, nomenklatura positions were handed out
by Stalin and his apparatus to those with the proper political
credentials. Today the trend is toward nomenklaturists
obtaining nomenklatura posts for their children. An enter-
prising young man can still work his way into a nomenklatura
position by first of all joining the-party, then establishing
a reputation for ambition and a willingness to do,.anything
to obtain the desired appointment. He cultivates those who
can be useful to him, showing a special doglike devotion
to the man in his chain of command whose position gives him
power to propose new members of the nomenklatura. Voslensky
takes us on a journey with just such an aspiring young
careerist, the fictional Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov, and we watch
him cultivating his group chief with obsequious behavior,
achieving the desired nomenklatura appointment and
then always striving to rise to a yet higher position.
Although..the privileges that come with a nomenklatura position
are considerable and make life easier and more enjoyable,
what matters most to the nomenklaturist is power.
Factions
It is impossible to make one's way in the nomenklatura
class without a great deal of support. It is essential to
join a faction in which everyone helps everyone else while
at the same time trying to undermine rival factions.
Nowhere is this factional rivalry more visible than in
the struggles for power in the Kremlin. Herein lies the
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weakness of the nomenklatura, the inability to guarantee an
orderly and routine succession of power. Voslensky shows us
the factional struggle with its subtle intrigues-that was
underway even before Brezhnev's death, distinguished by
Andropov's KGB disinformation network spreading the idea
that Brezhnev was on the verge of dying. Further, it is
incomprehensible to Voslensky that the very experienced
Soviet censors somehow could no longer prevent television,
film or photo shots of Brezhnev that showed him looking helpless
an impotent old man. Andropov was able to get Ustinov's
support, making possible his succession to the post of
general secretary. Andropov persuaded his opponents to vote
for him. But he persuaded.them KGB style--that it would be
in their own personal best interests not to oppose him.
Voslensky tells us that corruption is rampant in the
Soviet Union. Even though nomenklaturists are forbidden to
accept bribes, they do so frequently, on a large scale,
and punishment is rare and mild. The indulgent attitude
toward corruption can be attributed to the solidarity among
the nomenklaturists, all of whom are equally keen to add
to their material wealth. Voslensky contends that Andropov's
anti-corruption campaign was designed mainly to exert control
over the nomenklaturists.
Conclusion
Voslensky makes no predictions for the future. He has
given us an insider's view of the ruling class-of the
Soviet Union, its strengths and weaknesses, its goals and
aspirations. It is his hope that this book will contribute
to our understanding of the nature of the nomenklatura
and enable us in the West to deal more effectively with those
who constitute its ranks.
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