CHINA'S US POLICY 1983-90

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000300380014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: January 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence
Council
China's US Policy,
1983-90
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Secret
NIC M 83-10001
January 1983
Copy 4 0 0
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National
Intelligence
Council
China's US Policy,
1983-90
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Information available as of 3 January 1983
was used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
East Asia
This Memorandum was prepared by outside
contract. It was discussed with representatives of the
Intelligence Community and the National
Intelligence Council, but its judgments are those of
the author. Comments are welcome and may be
addressed to the National Intelligence Officer for
Secret
NIC M 83-10001
January 1983
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Secret
Postnormalization Euphoria, 1979-80 2
Bracketing the United States With the Soviet Union as 3
"the Two Hegemonists"
Decline in Reference to Strategic Relationship With the United States 3
Strong Criticism of US "Hegemonism" Toward Taiwan 3
Renewed Interest in Improving Relations With the Soviet Union 4
The Future-Two-Year Projection 5
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The Future-Eight-Year Projection
The US-Chinese-Soviet Triangle 7
Constraints on Pressing Taiwan Issue 9
Motivations for Pressing Taiwan Issue 9
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Secret
China's US Policy,
1983-90
Key Judgments In distancing themselves somewhat from the United States, reopening talks
with the Soviet Union, and reviving emphasis on the Third World, the
Chinese in 1981-82 reverted in fundamental respects to the position they
had held before the postnormalization US-Chinese euphoria of 1979-80.
Chinese rhetoric about the United States changed much more than the
substance of US-Chinese relations. Movement toward an arms supply
relationship between the two countries halted abruptly in the summer of
1981, and the dispute over US arms sales to Taiwan required protracted
and difficult negotiations in order to reach a compromise in August 1982.
Other bilateral relationships, however, continued to grow, particularly
those important to the Chinese goal of modernization, such as trade,
scientific and technical cooperation, and scholarly exchange.
The causes of the foreign policy change included:
? A growing feeling that China needed a more independent foreign policy,
less closely aligned with the leading capitalist power.
? Disenchantment with the US connection over the Taiwan issue, the
failure to obtain larger amounts of high technology, and an apparent US
tendency to take China for granted.
? Conservative opposition to corrupting influences from the West, particu-
larly from the United States.
? A desire to test Soviet willingness to ease tensions, with the expectation
that opening talks would raise Moscow's hopes and Washington's
anxieties, thus giving Beijing increased influence on both.
? Deng Xiaoping's vulnerability as chief sponsor of the US connection and
his need for domestic support for his reform program and personnel
changes, for making a compromise on the Taiwan issue, and for
preserving the substance of relations with the United States important to
modernization.
If Deng remains healthy and vigorous during the coming two years, he
probably will succeed in maintaining himself in power and strengthening
the position of his associates. A Dengist regime would be more favorable to
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US interests than conceivable alternatives, because of Deng's identification
with the US connection and his evident desire to preserve those elements of
it important to China's modernization. Modest improvements in Sino-
Soviet relations are likely, but a change in the Chinese perception of the
Soviet Union as the main threat to China is improbable. Deep-seated
suspicion of US long-run intentions toward Taiwan will persist and the
Chinese will watch closely the level of US arms sales to Taiwan, but a
Dengist regime is unlikely to press for additional US concessions on
Taiwan within the next two years.
In the period through 1990, the Chinese will continue to carve out an
independent role for China. The Sino-Soviet relationship may have mel-
lowed some, but China's geopolitical situation will almost certainly cause
the Chinese to continue to regard the Soviets as the principal threat to their
security. The gap in military capability between China and the super-
powers will probably be wider than it is today. Under such circumstances,
Chinese leaders will continue to value the putative strategic relationship
with the United States, but will wish to avoid the fact or appearance of
being too dependent on the United States.
If Deng survives beyond the middle of the decade, he should be able to es-
tablish his group firmly in control and by the end of the decade either Hu
Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang will probably have emerged as the principal
leader. Under Dengist leadership bilateral relations with the United States
probably will expand substantially but unevenly. Expansion of relations
will be hampered, however, by the built-in constraints that severely impede
the Chinese leaders' efforts to instill the efficiency and dynamism needed
to modernize a nation of 1 billion people. Should the Dengists be replaced
by more ideological and inward-looking leaders, the expansion of US-
Chinese relations would be much slower.
The odds are high that the Chinese will bring pressure on the United States
again before 1990 to end arms sales to Taiwan completely or at least get
agreement to a date when they can be certain they will end. The
importance to China of the US relationship may constrain the Chinese
from pressing the issue to the point where they are forced to downgrade re-
lations, but it would be unwise to assume that result, given the emotional
content of the issue and its weight as a weapon in domestic politics. A crisis
over Taiwan could be precipitated by a succession struggle on the island in
which large numbers of Taiwanese demanded independence, an unlikely
but possible development. Direct negotiations between Taipei and Beijing
are unlikely during this period, but there will probably be an increase in
trade and other forms of intercourse between the two that holds open the
possibility of eventual unification and diminishes the risk that Beijing will
shift from conciliatory to coercive policies toward the island.
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China's US Policy,
1983-90
Background
Chinese policy toward the United States during the
past 12 years went through three distinct phases: first,
the prenormalization phase, 1971-78; second, the
postnormalization euphoria, 1979-80; and, third, the
reversion to a less euphoric view of US-Chinese
relations, 1981-82. In each phase Chinese policy
toward the United States was significantly affected by
major international developments and by domestic
political struggles. Common concern with Soviet ex-
pansionism undergirded the relationship, while differ-
ences over Taiwan-in 1982 still only partially re-
solved-periodically strained it.
Prenormalization, 1971-78. The opening to the Unit-
ed States in 1971, engineered by Mao Zedong and
Zhou Enlai, was a crucial step in China's reentry into
the world community after a period of withdrawal
marked by extreme Sinocentrism, xenophobia, and
ideological posturing. China's entry into the United
Nations and its establishment of diplomatic relations
with Japan and many other countries greatly expand-
ed the scope for China to be active on the world scene.
Its policies became increasingly sophisticated and its
diplomats increasingly skillful.
The Soviet Threat. China's primary motivation in
opening relations with the United States was to
counter the Soviet threat after the Soviet occupation
of Czechoslovakia and the clash with the Chinese on
the Ussuri River, although the sense of Soviet forces
as an imminent military threat soon declined; by 1973
Chinese leaders referred to the Soviets as "feinting to
the East in order to attack in the West."
The two superpowers are the biggest international
exploiters and oppressors of today. They are the source
of a new world war. They both possess large numbers
of nuclear weapons. They carry on a keenly contested
arms race, station massive forces abroad and set up
military bases everywhere, threatening the independ-
ence and security of all nations.... In bullying others
the superpower which flaunts the label of socialism is
especially vicious.
Deng Xiaoping speech to UN General Assembly, 10
April 1974
The "Three Worlds" Thesis. In a 1974 speech at the
United Nations, Deng Xiaoping put forward Mao's
"three worlds" thesis, categorizing the two superpow-
ers as the "first world," the developed nations as the
"second world," and all other countries, including
China, as the "third world." According to this thesis,
the two superpowers were "contending and colluding"
and their contention (permanent, not transitory like
collusion) was the main threat to peace. The Chinese
characterized the Soviet Union as the more dangerous
of the superpowers, being on the offensive, while the
United States was on the defensive. They criticized
the United States as insufficiently aware of the Soviet
threat and too weak in dealing with it. They were
particularly critical of the policy of detente and arms
control negotiations between the superpowers. They
spoke approvingly of NATO and the US-Japanese
security treaty and stressed the importance.of com-
mon opposition to Soviet expansionism.
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Political Turbulence. Domestic politics were turbu-
lent during this period. Just two months after Henry
Kissinger had visited Beijing in July 1971 to arrange
the opening of US-Chinese relations, a fierce political
struggle ended with the death of Lin Biao, Mao's
chosen successor, accused of having tried to usurp
power. Had Mao and Zhou been unable to overcome
Lin and his military supporters, the opening to the
United States probably would not have occurred. A
seesaw struggle ensued between a group headed by
Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, representing rehabili-
tated party leaders disgraced during the Cultural
Revolution, and the Gang of Four, representing those
who had risen to power over the prostrate bodies of
the disgraced. This struggle was not resolved until
after the death of Mao and the fall of the Gang of
Four in the autumn of 1976. Deng emerged in 1977 as
the most powerful political figure, but was still far
from having fully consolidated his position when
normalization was agreed upon in late 1978.
Deng's Role in Normalization. During the negotia-
tions leading to normalization, Deng was engaged in a
complicated political maneuver to oust Hua Guofeng
and other adversaries and place his chosen successors
in key positions. He used success in normalizing
relations with the United States to increase his politi-
cal influence, thereby committing his personal pres-
tige to the US connection and leaving himself vulner-
able to later criticism for not having resolved the
question of US arms sales to Taiwan at the time of
normalization. Deng's ascendancy enabled him to win
support for the normalization agreement and place his
personal mark on the subsequent rapid development
of US-Chinese relations, but opposition to too close an
embrace of the United States had by no means
disappeared.
Taiwan Tactics. This period began and ended with
compromises on the Taiwan issue, spelled out in the
Shanghai communique in February 1972 and the
communique on normalization of relations in Decem-
ber 1978. Each time, the Chinese made clear that the
compromise was only a step en route to their ultimate
goal of unification of Taiwan with the mainland and
served notice that further concessions would be de-
manded of the United States on the issue.
Postnormalization Euphoria, 1979-80. Normaliza-
tion set off a wave of pro-Americanism in China,
reciprocated by a "China fever" in the United States.
Deng's highly acclaimed and publicized visit to the
United States was followed by a stream of high-level
visits back and forth. Relations of all kinds bur-
geoned: trade, scholarly exchanges, tourism. The two
governments signed numerous agreements providing
for cooperation in a wide variety of fields. For months
after Chinese television viewers had raptly watched
Deng's visit, favorable articles about the United
States appeared in the Chinese media. Young people
were particularly enthusiastic and the number want-
ing to go to the United States to study soared.
Criticism was muted-for example, Chinese criticism
of the Taiwan Relations Act and US criticism of the
Chinese military "lesson" to Vietnam.
The rapid development of Sino-American relations
during this periood was reinforced by heightened
strategic concerns on the part of both countries
arising from Soviet support of Vietnam's invasion of
Kampuchea in December 1978 and the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan a year later. The Chinese media
and Chinese officials in private conversations stressed
the importance of a united front against Soviet "hege-
monism" among China, the United States, Japan,
Western Europe, and the Third World. Media and
private reference to the "three worlds" thesis and the
danger of war from contention between the "two
hegemonists," the United States and the Soviet
Union, disappeared. Defense Secretary Harold Brown
visited Beijing, and Vice Premier Geng Biao, secre-
tary general of the Chinese Communist Party's Mili-
tary Affairs Commission, visited Washington. The
United States agreed to consider sales of dual-use
technology and some types of nonlethal military sup-
port equipment to Beijing.
It is said that there are close relations between China
and the United States. It is not true. We know very
well that the United States is still an imperialist
country.... Currently it is in a defensive position: it
wishes to keep what it gained. The USSR is on the
offensive.
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China regards as very important the development of
relations with the United States, not just in the fight
against Soviet expansionism and hegemonism, but be-
cause the development of relations is important to
world peace and stability.
Zhao Ziyang to Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki,
September 1982
"Course Correction, " 1981-82. Beginning in 1981
and becoming more pronounced during 1982, the
Chinese foreign policy posture toward the United
States and toward the world reverted in a number of
respects to that which had prevailed during the mid-
1970s. The reversion appeared in authoritative
speeches, editorials and articles in the media, and
private comments by senior leaders. The formulations
varied over time and between individual spokesmen
and were often more sophisticated in their analysis of
world trends than in the mid-1970s. The principal
elements of the revised foreign policy posture are
discussed below.
Revival of Mao's "Three Worlds" Thesis. Although
not prominently featured in the full 1974 form, this
conceptualization was occasionally referred to as the
basis for Chinese foreign policy, and the most impor-
tant elements of the new posture were consistent with
it.
Bracketing the United States With the Soviet Union
as "the Two Hegemonists. " Hu Yaobang's speech to
the 12th Party Congress in September 1982 attacked
the rivalry of the two superpower "hegemonists" as
the main source of turmoil in the world. Zhao Ziyang
in his toast to Margaret Thatcher lumped the United
States and the Soviet Union together as the "super-
power hegemonists." Most articles and statements on
this subject painted the Soviet Union in darker colors
than the United States, but some dropped the line
that the Soviet Union was the greater danger. None
revived the earlier view that the superpowers were
"colluding" as well as "contending." In private con-
versations with US officials, Chinese officials have
been defensive about the "two hegemonists" line and
have stressed the danger of Soviet "hegemonism"-
which, in their conversations with officials of nations
friendly to the United States, they have also contin-
ued to emphasize the need to oppose.
Decline in Reference to Strategic Relationship With
the United States. The trend toward a publicly ac-
knowledged arms supply relationship with the United
States that had been developing until the summer of
1981 abruptly halted when the Chinese suspected that
the United States hoped to ease pressures on the issue
of arms sales to Taiwan by providing arms to China.
By the summer of 1982 they had stopped referring
publicly to the strategic relationship with the United
States, although they referred to it privately in con-
versations with countries friendly to the United
States, often coupled with complaints about US policy
on Taiwan and technology transfer.
Strong Criticism of US "Hegemonism" Toward Tai-
wan. From late 1980 on, Chinese concern over the
Taiwan issue increased until it came to dominate US-
Chinese relations during most of this period up to the
joint communique of August 1982. The Chinese
served notice that they will watch closely US perform-
ance in reducing arms sales to Taiwan, as provided in
that agreement.
Continued Expansion of Bilateral Relations With the
United States. The Chinese shift in posture toward
the US role in the world and the US-Chinese strategic
relationship has not affected the continued expansion
of substantive bilateral relations. Those aspects of
relationships with the United States important to the
Chinese goal of modernization-such as trade, scien-
tific and technical cooperation, and scholarly ex-
change-have continued to grow. By late 1982 some
10,000 Chinese were studying in the United States.
Arrangements were proceeding for the involvement of
US firms in large-scale offshore oil exploration, coal-
mining, and hydroelectric power projects. The Chi-
nese recently purchased seven additional Boeing com-
mercial aircraft. Deng and others have said that these
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relations would continue, even if there were a retro-
gression in the overall US-Chinese relationship be-
cause of differences over Taiwan. With the expansion
of relations, however, has come an increase in specific
problems in these relations, with the Chinese com-
plaining about US import controls, high-technology-
export restrictions, and individual defection cases.
Renewed Interest in Improving Relations With the
Soviet Union. Talks that were broken off after the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were reopened amid
signs that the Chinese hoped to gain some practical
advantages from a lessening of tensions, increased
trade, and cultural and scholarly exchanges. Publicly
they called on the Soviets for "deeds not words" with
respect to the major issues of troops on the Chinese
border, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, and privately they
deprecated the prospects for any significant move-
ment on these issues.
Increased Emphasis on the Third World. Chinese
analyses of world trends have described the Third
World as the main arena of contention for the
superpowers. The Chinese have increased their propa-
ganda and diplomatic support for Third World. causes,
but not their economic aid to Third World countries.
While criticizing US policy toward the Third World,
their main concern has continued to be Soviet influ-
ence in the Third World, and they have followed
policies parallel with those of the United States in
opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan and Indochina.
Reasons for the 1981-82 "Course Correction. "In
large part the policy shift in 1981-82 seems to have
been a rocking back to a position more comfortable to
most Chinese leaders than the uncharacteristically
close embrace of the world's leading capitalist power
that prevailed in 1979-80. Sinocentrism and national
pride demanded an independent foreign policy stance
based on an evaluation of national interests that often
diverged from those of the United States. Most
Chinese regarded their dependence on the Soviet
Union in the 1950s as having been humiliating and
ultimately damaging to Chinese interests. From their
viewpoint, overdependence on the United States
would also be unwise. Third World countries were
increasingly criticizing China for neglecting their
interests by lining up with the United States.
Disenchantment With the American Connection.
Pressures for a foreign policy position more in harmo-
ny with Chinese concepts of China's proper place in
the world were augmented by irritation with the
United States. Chinese leaders were stung by unoffi-
cial American comments that China needed the Unit-
ed States more than the United States needed China
and that it had no place else to turn but to a strategic
relationship with the United States. They did not
want Americans to believe that they could take China
for granted. Officials, including Deng himself, in-
creasingly expressed disappointment with US-Chinese
trade, especially the difficulty of obtaining high-
technology items. Their disappointment seemed real,
although doubtless exaggerated for effect in custom-
ary Chinese negotiating style.
The Taiwan Issue. While not the prime cause of
China's foreign policy shift, the Taiwan issue contrib-
uted substantially to it by increasing open criticism of
US policy and disenchantment with the American
connection. The highlighting of the FX question
toward the end of the Carter administration and pro-
Taiwan statements by highly placed Americans prob-
ably triggered the Chinese decision that the dispute
over arms sales to Taiwan, unresolved and defined in
deliberately ambiguous terms at the time of the
agreement on normalization, could no longer be left
dangling. Once the arms sales issue had become
highly visible, Taiwan could not be placed on the back
burner again without significant US concessions.
"Bourgeois Influence."The opening to the West, and
to the United States in particular, disturbed conserva-
tive leaders who felt that it brought into China
corrosive influences that caused an increase in corrup-
tion, the spread of a "decadent" lifestyle among the
youth, and a general decline in faith in Marxism and
in the party. They demanded a campaign against
"bourgeois liberalism" to combat these evils.
Deng 's Problems. These developments placed Deng
Xiaoping in a difficult position. As chief sponsor of
the American connection, he was vulnerable to critics
of that connection. He was engaged in a complex and
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difficult set of political maneuvers to overcome oppo-
sition to his reform measures and place his supporters
in key positions throughout the party and government.
He also recognized the need to maintain the substance
of the bilateral relations with the United States
because of their importance to his modernization
goals. He needed concessions from the United States
on the Taiwan issue in order both to quiet his critics
and to avoid jeopardizing substantive relations with
the United States.
Testing the Soviets. As doubts about the American
connection increased among the leaders, conditions
ripened for an effort to ease tensions with the Soviet
Union. The Soviets were harried by problems in
Poland and Afghanistan, plagued with economic diffi-
culties, and approaching a leadership succession. They
probably seemed to the Chinese less threatening and
more likely to make concessions than in the past. At
the very least, responding to Soviet overtures would
put some strain on Soviet-Vietnamese relations and
show the Americans that China was not to be taken
for granted. Moreover, recent US policy had dis-
played a thoroughgoing anti-Soviet attitude and little
taste for detente. Talks between Moscow and Beijing
were unlikely to make the United States less deter-
mined to oppose Soviet expansionism in places where
such actions coincided with Chinese interests. The
Chinese could afford to take US anti-Sovietism for
granted. By raising Moscow's hopes and Washing-
ton's anxieties, Beijing could gain greater influence on
both.
Deng's Victory. In the end Deng achieved much of
what he wanted: he obtained some of the flexibility
needed from the United States on Taiwan; he
strengthened the positions of his supporters in the
party and government, although he had to make
compromises on policy and positions to do so; he
turned aside the criticisms of the corrupting influ-
ences of the West by himself backing the campaign
against "bourgeois liberalism"; and he averted dam-
age to the bilateral relations with the United States
important to modernization.
States has changed, while the substance of the rela-
tionship-with the exception of the suspended arms
supply discussions-has been preserved. Some evi-
dence exists that Deng may have made concessions on
rhetoric to preserve the substance, but it is by no
means certain that Deng is opposed to the reposition-
ing of China in world affairs: in rhetoric, in opening
talks with the Soviet Union, or in emphasis on the
Third World. The shift could be viewed as a typical
Dengist pragmatic response to trends in world affairs
that gives China greater leverage on both the Soviet
Union and the United States and places Deng in a
better position to draw on the powerful force of
Chinese nationalism to bolster his position and that of
his chosen successors in the continuing domestic
political maneuvering.
The Future-Two-Year Projection
Leadership. The prospects for stable development of
US-Chinese relations in 1983 and 1984 would be best
under the continued leadership of Deng Xiaoping,
even though the lengthy negotiations and serious
differences over Taiwan seem to have produced per-
sonal distrust on his part of the US Government.
Nevertheless, his identification with the US connec-
tion and his evident desire to preserve those elements
of it most important to China's modernization pro-
gram provide some assurance that US-Chinese rela-
tions would fare reasonably well, provided he and his
associates maintained or strengthened their ascendan-
cy in the political system.
Pragmatic Policies. Dengist policies such as greater
reliance on market forces and material incentives, the
expansion of foreign trade, the encouragement of
foreign investment, the invitation to US oil companies
to develop Chinese offshore oil, the training of large
numbers of scholars and students in the United
States, and the carrying out of a wide variety of
scientific and technological cooperation arrangements
seem more likely to advance US-Chinese relations
than policies that would be chosen by possible alterna-
tive leaders.
The foreign policy shift of 1981-82 is notable for the
extent to which the rhetoric used about the United
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Deng's Prospects. If Deng remains healthy and vigor-
ous over the next two years, he probably will succeed
in maintaining himself in power and strengthening the
positions of his associates. Deng's death during this
period, however, would create great uncertainty and a
probable power struggle, for Hu and Zhao would not
by then be sufficiently entrenched to be unchallenge-
able. During such a power struggle, Chinese foreign
policy would be less predictable and US-Chinese
relations might become an issue in the struggle. In
any case, the instability and uncertainty would hinder
the smooth expansion of those relations.
Geopolitical Interests. Whether or not Deng and his
associates remain in ascendancy, the Chinese percep-
tion that the Soviet Union is the main threat to China
is unlikely to change. A dramatic rapprochement
during this period is most improbable, because of the
intractability of basic differences, but the Chinese
have positioned themselves to gain greater leverage in
the US-Chinese-Soviet triangular relationship by
moderating their policy toward Moscow and distanc-
ing themselves somewhat from Washington. They will
follow a two-track policy toward the Soviet Union and
the United States, criticizing each harshly for policies
with which the Chinese disagree, but promoting those
bilateral relationships that promise to benefit China.
Rhetorical inconsistencies will also occur, as illustrat-
ed by the conciliatory gestures made to Moscow on
the 60th anniversary of the USSR, promptly followed
by a strident denunciation of the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. Barring any new aggressive action by
the Soviet Union, the outlook is for modest improve-
ment in the atmosphere between Beijing and Moscow
and in bilateral interchange, far below the level
prevailing in Chinese relations with the United States,
Japan, and Western Europe. While not highlighting
China's strategic interests in common with these
countries in opposing Soviet expansionism as they did
in 1979-80, the Chinese probably will continue selec-
tively and privately to stress the importance of such
strategic cooperation.
Military Modernization. Recent indications that the
Chinese are placing increased emphasis on military
modernization, such as the contract with the British
to modernize Chinese destroyers and increased inter-
est in French weapon systems, probably do not pre-
sage an early revived interest in obtaining US weap-
ons. The Chinese will hold off while watching the
trend of US arms sales to Taiwan. In any case, they
are more interested in creating a capability to produce
their own modern weapons than in acquiring weapon
systems from abroad. Consequently, they can be
expected to continue and perhaps to increase their
pressure on the United States to loosen further the
restrictions on technology export, so that they can
obtain the "dual use" technology most urgently need-
ed for modernizing their military production.
Bilateral Relations. Over the next two years the web
of relations between the two countries probably will
continue to thicken, particularly if economic recovery
in the United States by 1984 offers China an expand-
ing market for its exports. More specific problems will
crop up, however, as relations expand and some may
create significant strains in the relationship. Substan-
tial numbers of defections by government-supported
students or scholars in this country, for example,
would create strong suspicions on the part of Chinese
leaders that the US Government was clandestinely
encouraging them, especially if many requested politi-
cal asylum and were assisted by Taiwan-connected
individuals. An appeal for political asylum by one or
more of the children of senior Chinese political lead-
ers would strain relations, particularly if they or other
defectors joined groups promoting democracy in Chi-
na, such as the backers of the magazine China Spring.
Why Deng made a personal appeal to the US Govern-
ment to return defecting tennis star Hu Na is unclear,
but the failure of his appeal cannot help but create
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greater suspicion in his mind that such defections are
officially encouraged.
The Future-Eight-Year Projection
The 1979-80 honeymoon in US-Chinese relations has
passed and will not return. The exaggerated expecta-
We hope that the US Government will sincerely carry
out what it has promised and actually, not perfunctori-
ly, reduce its arms sales to Taiwan.... The fundamen-
tal obstacle to the development of Sino-US relations is
the US "Taiwan Relations Act...... If the decision-
makers in Washington insist on handling the relations
between both countries in accordance with this US
domestic act, Sino-US relations, instead of being fur-
ther developed, will certainly face yet another grave
crisis.
Taiwan. Taiwan will remain the primary obstacle to
improvement in US-Chinese relations. Deep-seated
suspicions of US long-run intentions toward Taiwan
will persist. In addition to watching closely the trend
in US arms sales, Chinese leaders will be highly
sensitive to any action, however insignificant in itself,
that appears to them to lend an official air to US-
Taiwan relations.
A Dengist regime is less likely to press for more
concessions on Taiwan during this period than an
alternative, although a Chinese perception that the
United States was not abiding by the commitment to
reduce the level of arms sales to Taiwan would
produce strong reactions. An attempt to make Taiwan
an issue in the 1984 US presidential election cannot
be ruled out, but it seems unlikely that Deng would
seek another test of strength with the present adminis-
tration by pressing for more US concessions within
the next two years.
The sudden death of Chiang Ching-kuo could produce
a succession crisis in Taiwan, new initiatives from
Beijing on the unification question, and heightened
tension between China and the United States on the
Taiwan issue. If Chiang remains in power through the
two-year period of this projection, however, domestic
developments in Taiwan are unlikely to complicate
US-Chinese relations.
tions and muting of differences that marked that
period will be replaced during the 1983-90 period by a
hard-eyed (although not necessarily accurate) assess-
ment of national interests on each side and much
tough bargaining. The range of possible improvement
or deterioration in the relationship is substantial and
the trend difficult to predict, but certain constants
will persist.
While we Chinese people value our friendship and
cooperation with other countries and people, we value
even more our hard-won independence and sovereign
rights. No foreign country can expect China to be its
vassal, nor can it expect China to swallow any bitter
fruit detrimental to China's interests.
Deng Xiaoping speech to 12th Party Congress,
1 September 1982
Chinese World View. Whatever the nature of their
leadership, the Chinese will maintain a highly Sino-
centric view of the world, and Chinese nationalism
will strongly influence their behavior as they strive to
achieve an international role for China worthy of its
size and past greatness. They probably will continue
to see world politics as dominated by superpower
rivalry, but with a further decline in the ability of the
superpowers to influence or dominate other countries.
Their relations with each superpower will contain
contradictions. Chinese diplomacy is likely to become
more skillful and sophisticated as China's leaders
become more experienced in managing such contra-
dictions and advancing Chinese interests from an
independent stance.
The US-Chinese-Soviet Triangle. In 1990, China will
still be much weaker militarily than the Soviet Union
or the United States; indeed, the accelerated arms
race, even if checked in some areas by arms control
agreements, will probably widen the gap between
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Chinese military capability and that of the superpow-
ers. China's geopolitical situation will almost certainly
cause Chinese leaders to continue to regard the
Soviets as the principal threat, although relations with
the Soviets may have mellowed and some progress
may have been made toward solution of the Afghani-
stan and Kampuchea problems.
Under such circumstances Chinese leaders will con-
tinue to value the putative strategic relationship with
the United States and its allies-Japan and the
NATO countries. They will want to avoid, however,
either the fact or the appearance of being too depend-
ent on the United States strategically. How far they
will wish to pursue the relationship will depend on a
number of factors: the imminence of the Soviet threat,
the consistency and reliability of US opposition to
Soviet expansionism, US willingness to contribute to
Chinese military capabilities by supplying technology,
and the state of the Taiwan issue. Changes in the
nature of the Chinese leadership could also affect
attitudes toward a strategic relationship with the
United States. More ideologically inclined and in-
ward-looking leaders than the Dengists would tend to
keep China more distant from the United States,
although they would not draw closer to the Soviets
either.
Bilateral Relations. If Deng survives beyond the
middle of the decade as China's predominant political
figure, he should have time to establish his group
firmly in control. In that event, either Hu or Zhao
probably will emerge as the new leader by the end of
the decade. As discussed in the two-year projection,
US-Chinese relations will develop further under such
leadership than under less pragmatic, less outward-
looking leaders.
Under a Dengist leadership, US-Chinese bilateral
relations important to Chinese modernization-trade,
investment, technology transfer, scientific and techni-
cal cooperation, and training of scholars and students
in the United States-will continue to expand, proba-
bly substantially by the end of the decade, but
unevenly. Expansion of US-Chinese relations will be
hampered by the built-in constraints that severely
impede the Chinese leaders' efforts to instill the
efficiency and dynamism needed to modernize a
nation of 1 billion people. Such constraints include:
? The difficulty of energizing China's lethargic and
ponderous bureaucracy.
? Constantly shifting economic policies, as leaders
argue about and experiment with methods of arriv-
ing at the proper balance between administrative
controls and market forces, centralization and de-
centralization, military and civilian expenditures,
and investment in heavy industry, light industry,
and agriculture.
? Continuing pressures to limit contacts with foreign-
ers and the influx of foreign influences, to make
China more self-reliant.
? Widespread cynicism, lack of confidence in the
party, and the spread of corruption and resort to
"backdoor" deals.
Progress probably will be made, but at a pace slower
than plans call for-which will hold back the expan-
sion of US-Chinese bilateral relations. Pockets may
exist-for example, in offshore oil production-where
the bilateral relationship expands much further than
in other areas. To the extent that particular areas of
bilateral relations expand, however, more concrete
problems will arise, and these, if handled insensitively,
will sour the tone of the relationship.
Taiwan. Chinese spokesmen are fond of referring to
the Taiwan issue as "a cloud over the US-Chinese
relationship." The cloud may become darker or
lighter during the coming eight years, but it will not
go away. It will continue to be the critical issue that
must be contained if it is not to damage the
relationship.
On three previous occasions China has reached a
compromise with the United States on Taiwan, each
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Secret
time retreating from its maximum demands in order
to reach agreement, but serving notice that further
US concessions would be demanded in the future. The
odds are high that the Chinese will bring pressure on
the United States again before eight years are out in
an effort to end US arms sales to Taiwan completely
or at least to get agreement to a date when Beijing
can be certain they will end.
Constraints on Pressing Taiwan Issue. Several factors
constrain the Chinese from pushing the Taiwan issue
to the point where they must downgrade relations
with the United States because of failure to reach
agreement. The importance of the strategic relation-
ship as a counter to the Soviet threat would be
weakened; bilateral relations important to Chinese
modernization might be impaired, despite efforts to
insulate them from the effects of the Taiwan dispute;
and, to the extent that Americans became disenchant-
ed with the Chinese relationship, support for an
independent Taiwan might grow.
Motivations for Pressing Taiwan Issue. Yet it would
be a mistake to assume that these constraints will
necessarily be decisive to Chinese leaders, who feel
that they are morally and legally in the right on the
Taiwan issue and that they have broad support
around the world. They are suspicious that the United
States, despite its promise to respect Chinese sover-
eignty, is in fact disregarding it in its desire to keep
Taiwan separate from China and they believe that the
arms supply relationship encourages the Taiwan au-
thorities to reject negotiations with Beijing. It is a
frustrating situation, because they know that it is
impractical to use force against Taiwan. The emotion-
al content of the issue and its effectiveness as a
weapon in Chinese domestic politics can add to
pressures to retaliate against the United States de-
spite the cost to Chinese interests. The Chinese broke
with the Soviet Union in 1960 over offenses to their
national pride, despite the severe damage it did to
their economic development and military moderniza-
tion and in the face of a dangerous level of confronta-
tion with the United States.
Taiwan's Policies. A crisis over Taiwan might arise
without being provoked by Beijing's pressures if a
political struggle in Taiwan over the succession took a
turn in which large numbers of Taiwanese demanded
a declaration of independence. The principal leaders
in Taiwan today, both mainlander and Taiwanese, are
sensitive to that danger and probably will succeed in
averting it, but it cannot be ruled out altogether.
The danger of a crisis over Taiwan between the
United States and China will be lessened if the island
remains politically stable through the period of transi-
tion from mainlander leaders to native Taiwanese,
which probably will be only partially complete within
the coming eight years. Whether or not the United
States makes further concessions on arms sales during
the period, the authorities on Taiwan are unlikely to
be willing to negotiate directly with Beijing on the
unification issue. Increases in trade and other forms
of intercourse between Taiwan and the mainland that
seemed to the Beijing leaders to demonstrate firm
adherence to the one-China position and held open the
possibility of eventual unification would diminish the
risk that Beijing would take strong actions against the
United States on the Taiwan issue or shift from
conciliatory to coercive policies toward Taiwan itself.
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