STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400090042-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: July 28, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
1E
July 28, 1975
No. 0749/75
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europa Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligonco, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence, Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
July 28, 1975
Soviet Views on Schlesinger. . .
Belgrade Hopes To Avert Effort To
Oust Israel from the UN . . . .
Private Soviet Comment on India. . . . . . . . . 5
Romania: Soviet-Albanian Intermediary . . . . . 7
Budapest Wants the Crown Returned. . . . . . . . 9
Yugoslav-US Pet' ocl-cmical Joint Venture. . . . . 10
Czechoslovakia: Bilak Is Not Going to
Helsinki. 11
More EE Delegations to CSCE. . . . . . . . . . . 12
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sPiCIO "l,
Soviet Views Oil Schlesinc cr
Moscow has resumed it`d press campai.cjn against
t econt public s tat(nicnL., on nuclear strategy by U- -
fense Secretary Schlesinger. The new attack, prob-
ably intended in part to offset too rosy an i.-nage
of the US created by the extravagantly 17avorab1c
coverage of Apollo-Soyuz, appeared in Lhe weekly
news magazine Noo i'r:r,-cu. Although this mass cir-
culation periodical does not carry the weight: of
other party and government organs, the author,
Georgiy Arbatov, is one of Brezhnev's most prominent
advisers on US affairs. Arbatov's Institute of the
USA and Canada has long been critical of Pentagon
nuclear policy.
The article by Arbatov broke no new ground in
cataloging Soviet objections to the Secretary's r_- -
marks. The author reiterated Soviet complaints that
the Secretary is attempting to ensure US superiority
over the USSR in contravention of bilateral acireo-
ments on the right of each side to equal securi.tl".
Arbatov also took the Secretary to task for his "bar-
gaining chip" tactics regarding new weapons, and his
"advocacy" of limited nuclear war.
Arbatov replayed the standard rejoinder that
Washington cannot prescribe the rules of nuclear war-
fare and cautioned that even a "limited" strike could
result in a launch-on-warning response. He derided
the notion that a policy of "selective response' is
more likely to deter a "limited attack" than one of
massive retaliation.
As have other Soviet conunentators, Arbatov tied
the Secretary's statements to anti-detente maneuver-
ings in the US. In a more authoritative conunentary
earlier this month, Prae:;:r accused the Secretary of
July 28, 1975
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being a spokesman .Lot: those hewing to "militarist
dogmas of the past" :-aand added that his remarks were
also aimed at winni?ig approval of the US military
budget.
Moscow's cont::.nuing attention to the Secretary's
comments suggests that Brezhnev may raise the issue
with the President in Helsinki. Although detente
considerations an,1 diplomatic courtesy dictate that
the Soviets concotitrate their attacks on the Secre-
tary of Defense, vhcy almost certainly read his state-
ments as those c,l the administration. 13rezhnev may
argue at Helsinki that such statements undercut his
efforts in the 1,7:?;Srt to sell now arms limitation ac roe--
ments with the 13. 25X1
July 28, 1975
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Bulgy. ade ]Hopei To Avert Effort To
oust Israel. from the UN
Boigr.ade will apparently attempt to steer next
month's nunaliciried foreign m,, n:i.stors' meeting in Lima
away from efforts to sue), Israel's ouster or suspen-
sion from the UN.
Recent remarks by high-level Yugoslavs indicate 25X1
that Belgrade is sampling intcr.nat-~lonal opinion to 25X1
determine whether the time is ripe to push for a
more balanced line in the nonaligned moyemenf- _
Premier Eijedic last Thursday expressed the
same thought in more general terms to the US ambas-
sador. Bijc.aic contended that moderates constitute
a majority ire the nonaligned movement, and they want a
dialogue, not a confrontation, with the developed
countries. Bii=dic nonetheless indicated impatience
with Israeli inflexibility and argued for a nonaligned
role in arranging a Middle East settlement.
.Yugoslav impatience with radicals in the non-
aligned leadership--especially Algeria--has been
steadily growing since the Algiers nonaligned summit
in 1973. Although still an advocate of "'active non-
alignme:lt," Belgrade disagrees with the radicals'
Trill; .ss to endanger such common interests as
pr:=? 1g the effectiveness of the UN for short
term ns. The danger of offending the Arabs and
the risk of dividing the nonaligned movement has,
however, muted Yugoslav complaints.
July 28, 1975
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SE, CItE1.
The Yugoslav comments in part reflect the fact
that thn itfnn!41 ,v ocz.,.omy is now seriously affected
by the world-wide recession. As a result, Belgrade
is even more impatient with radical posturing on
negotiations affecting the prices of oil and other
raw materials. With the Israeli-UN issue coming to
the forefront, Belgrade and. the other nonaligned
moderates are torn between desires for unity in the
movement and the need for good relations with the 25X1
developed countries.
July 28, 1975
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Private Soviet Comment on India
Moscow seems worried that the US may mount a
discreet effort in support of Prime Minister Gandhi's
opponents in India but at the same time is disap-
pointed that the present crisis has not done more to
damage 1ndo-US relations. These at least were the
messages conveyed when US officials met recently with
two of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's South Asian ex-
perts in Moscow. These officials repeated the USSR's
public line that Gandhi was forced to act as she did
because India's rightists were intent on fomenting
domestic disorder. They noted that there had been
little effective opposition to her moves in India, but
nevertheless warned against outside interference in
India's internal affairs. The Soviets seemed to be
saying in effect that Washington would fail should it
attempt any move against Mrs. Gandhi.
There was a trace of disappointment that the US
had not stumbled into a stronger anti-Gandhi policy.
The Soviets attempted to elicit the likely US response
should India move even further in an authoritarian di-
rection and, when the US officials were noncommittal,
seemed to draw some satisfaction from the fact that the
US press is decidedly anti-Gandhi. The Soviets have
been worried about the recent improvement in US-Indian
relations because they are not sure how far it will go
and because they fear it might eventually facilitate
a Sino-Indian rapprochemnnt-
The Soviets maintained that their relations with
India are still close, in fact "without a cloud in the
sky." Moscow does enjoy better relations with India
than any other major power, but its claim is somewhat
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overdrawn. Prime Minister Gandhi welcomed Soviet sup-
port for her recent moves but would have preferred
that it was offered more discreetly.
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The Soviets were also overly sanguine about the
effects of the Indian domestic crisis on Pakistan.
They may not have been aware that Pakistani Prime Min-
ister Bhutto is planning to write to a number of 25X1
25X1 chiefs of state to express concern that if Mrs. Gandhi's
domestic reforms fail, she may be tempted to attack
Pakistan as a diversionary tactic.
July 28, 1975
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s1. c:R I I,7.'
Romania: Soviet-Albanian lntermediaEZ
The Soviets have reportedly sought Romania's
July 28, 1975
od offices in their efforts to normalize rela-
Lions with Albania.
Moscow has from time to time shown interest in
restoring relations with Tirana, and the Kremlin's
latest initiative probably reflects its awareness
that pro-Soviet sentiments could have played a part
in the recent challenge to Albanian party leader
Enver Hoxha. Moscow thus may have been probing
Tirana for any hint of a change in its anti-Soviet:
position as well as signaling Soviet sympathizers
in Albania of the Kremlin's desire to improve rela-
tions. These efforts, like those in the past, how-
ever, have failed.
Bucharest enjoys playing the role of intermediary,
particularly when it puts Moscow in Romania's debt.
The Romanians apparently see little, if any, hope
for success however, in this project.
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Budapest Wants the Crown Returned
Hungarian Premier Lazar has of"icially requested
that the US return the Crown of St. Stephen. The
crown, a traditional symbol of political legitimacy
for the Hungarians, has been in US hands since 1945.
This is the first time that Budapest has directly
raised the matter at this level.
During Ambassador McAuliffe's introductory call
on July 16, Lazar gave a lengthy rationale why the
crown should be returned, pointing mainly to improved
bilateral relations and to the current atmosphere of
detente. He explicitly asked that his oral, but
official, request be relayed to senior US authorities.
Lazar said that the granting of most-favored-
nati.on status would remove the second major impediment
to normal US-Hungarian relations. He hoped that the
recently enacted US trade law would be rewritten, and
rejected any linkage between bilateral trade and
Hungarian emigration policies. Lazar said his gov-
ernment will not change its law virtually prohibiting
emigration, nor will it yield to pressure on the way
it administers the law. He said Budapest is willing,
however, to consider the "humanitarian needs" of in-
dividual cases, but without publicity.
July 28, 1975
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Yugoslav-Us Pe trochamical Joint Ventura
Dow Chemical Company and Industria Nafte of
Zagreb signed an agreement in January for con-
struction of a $600 million petrochemical complex
at Rijeka whore the Yugoslavian company has a
refinery, Details of the project have just boon
released by Yugoslavia.
The complu,c will be near the deep water port
under, construction at Omisalj and c.djacent to a
scheduled crude oil terminal. The terminal is
being built in conjunction with the projected
Yugoslav pipeline that will supply Yugoslavia,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia with oil from the Middle
East and Africa.
The petrochemical facilities, to be built in
three stages, will include:
Units for vinyl chloride, polypropylene
and high-density polyethylene scheduled
to go on stream in 1979.
Facilities for styrene and low-density
polyethylene to be completed in 1981.
A 400,000 ton-per-year ethylene plant
and facilities for propylene, benzene uriLi
ethylbenzene to be completed in 1982.
Dow will hold a 49 percent interest in the project
and the Yugoslav company, 51 percent. Petroleum feed-
stock will come from three Yugoslav refineries; Dow
technology will be used.
The petrochemical joint venture--Dow's second
in Yugoslavia--will enable Dow not only to enter
the Yugoslav market, but also to market its products
in other East European countries. Dow will be able
to repatriate one-third of the foreign exchange
Proceeds resultin from exported products.
July 28, 1975
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C ',,achora.lovak.i a : 1i:..1 X11. "[:.
NoL` c;_n.,i_Tr~i-c;l~ti
Vasil 13i.lak' :1 ab:1ence from the C::ec;hc.~:;.I c~vik clc lc?
(lclti.on neleeLed to attend the C:,C1': :;unllui.L utuc_:I..in~a i.n
Ilel ninki "ugcle:tl::.t that he in at ]eie;t' ii Leinjiorn 17 Vic,..
time 0. politi.cal infighting in the party
The absence of' Billik, W110 ill; the,
for international affair!,, .i.:, can:;lri.c:uc~ur bucritlre lli.s
counterparts, in the Ilulclar. ian, c;urmnn , Po]..i ::h ,
and Romanian parties are attund.inc.l the datllrrin'l in
Helsinki. I3ilak c'.oes not, howev(;r., enjoy the elcoccc
rolationshi.p with party chief 11u:;a1; that: hi:, counter-
parts have with their respective i>arLy lcader-u.
Indeed, Ilu. al:, the leader of the dr~.lc.:c~aLion, may
have engineered l3ilak's exclusion. The two mien ha.vice
a history of political and per:;ona1 d.iff:erenccis.
Bilak has also reportedly differed with I'orciq.in
Minister Chnoupek over the formulation oC f:arc .i yin pol-
:;ul } cc~n1 .clr i;f
icy. Chnoupek is an aclgressivu and
foreign policy executor, who has excu].lent contacts
with the Soviets. in clddit:i.on, there rare rumor:; in
Prague that Chnoupek Wi.l.1 be promoI:ed to the 1pa1rL';
presidium (politburo) before or at the party conore:;s
next April. Bilak's absence from the lle].sinki. dele-
gation thus could al-.-,o be at least a tactical victory
for Chnoupek--with liu:iak's blessing and support.
If Bilak's position is slipping there will al-
most certainly be further evidence as the Czecho:;loviik 25X1
party prepares for its 1976 congress.
July 28, 1975
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More 11?. 1)u' 1 J~nt:ionr; l:o (';CE
ilua.c aria
Prcn.i.crcnt/1'tlrty C;h i.ot Todor: "I'll tvk()v
(clelc(i;rl:.icn hr,r.1cl)
i'oreic.ln M.i.nit;ter. 11cittir t1.1.t,denc)v
i'ar.ty :3etcratary for Into- Kant;tail ti II T(A.Ieilov
na Lional. Iii .a t? ions; and
1'orci.cjn hl:falrt;
Deputy Chairman of. Ni.kolay Cc:orgiev
National A .;r;ernbI y
Permanent 12cl.,1 ;entalive it ti};() Ilikc'r1ov
to UN
C echo nlovakia
1'reuident/Party Chid
(clc~l_c~'i~rticin h?~. ~l)
I'romier Lulu ,m.i.r Lrc~tr1;1.1.
1?'orc.i.cln Minister I3c7)ru:;1,iv c.:irnoupc_k
Ambassador to Vinland ulclr.ich Pav.ic.)vr:',:y
East Germany
Party Chief Erich 1IOncckc1,
(dclccl'rtion hc_ad)
1'orcign Minister nr;kcir 1'it;cher
Party Secretary for Inter- Iicrrr,:rnn ,\xen
national Itclati.onra
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Emit (;l rmin (c_ont:' 1)
stead or l'or-ebin Minir;try
Policy and t'.i inninfJ De-
t)aL ttrient
Ifeacl of Foro1gn M.inir;tr.y
Nor thorn ISuropean
Depni- imon t
Ambassador to Vinland
Potilanin
1'renicIont/Party Clsief
foreic_in Mini.nt:er
Party Secretary ifor
Foreign At fair. u
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Peter Steci.lich
11vi.n2 do].zner.
Nicolne Ceausescu
(delecjati.on head)
("vorcje tthcovet;cu
Valentin Lil)atti
July 28, 1975
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