THE SHATT AL 'ARAB DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00825R000100370001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 7, 1960
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2001/08/07 :CIA-RDP84-008258000100370001-5
CONFIDENTIAL
Copy No.
GEOGRAPHIC
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
CIA/RR GM 60-I
7 January 1960
TI-IL' SHA TT AL ARAB DISPUTE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within
the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or
revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CONFIDENTIAL
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The underlying factor in the current dispute between Iran and Iraq is a
series of treaties that have the effect of requiring Iranian shipping to pass
through Iraqi territorial waters. Between the Persian Gulf and a point a few
miles north of Khorramshahr the Iraq-Iran border runs along the low water
mark on the Iranian shore of the Shatt al Arab except for two short stretches
opposite the Iranian orts o:P Khorramshahr and Abadan, where it follows the
main channel (thalweg~, leaving these ports in Iranian waters. The boundary
is based on the Fszerum Treaty of 1847 and on the results of a 1914 Boundary
Protocol, which placed 'the line at low water on the Iranian shore. The results
denied the thalweg principal, for which Tran argues, in favor of the-stand that
Iraq possesses no access to the sea other than the Shatt, whereas Iran has a
long coastline. Controversy over the 1914 decision continued until ~+ July 1937,
when an agreement was reached granting Iran a strip of water that lies between
the Iranian bank and the thalweg opposite Abadan and extends ~+ miles downstream
from Abadan. The short sector of the boundary that in similar fashion follows
the thalweg opposite Khorramshahr was established by the Treaty of 1$47. The
Treaty of 1937 authorized merchant ships of all countries to use the Shatt on
equal terms and declared it open to both Iraqi and Iranian warships. The
treaty also provided for the conclusion of a Convention agreement) concerning
all questions relating to navigation on the Shatt. The Convention has never
been concluded, primarily because of Iraq's unwillingness to reach an agreement.
Until such time as the Convention is concluded, Iraq claims control over all
matters pertaining to the use of the river with which the Convention is to deal.
In effect, Iraq legally controls the 5hatt al Arab, a function exercised through
the Basra Port Authority.
Regulations of the Basra Port Authority (BPA), which govern traffic on the
Shatt, require that pilots of all seagoing vessels operating in Iraqi waters
be licensed by BPA. It has been customary for vessels to fly the Iraqi flag
when in Iraqi waters and to replace it with the Iranian flag when entering
Iranian waters, but on occasion ships bound for Iranian ports have flown the
Iranian flag throughout their passage of the Shatt. In practice, Iraqi author-
ities have maintained the navigational aids and collected fees from ships using
Iraqi services. Until the fall of 1958, there was little controversy over
practical procedures and little apparent concern over the flag issue. Much of
the heat of the present contention has been generated by Iraqi revocation of
many pilot licenses, Iran`s-order that vessels using Iranian ports should fly
the Iranian flag at all times, and Iran's defiance of BPA regulations in sending
ships under Iranian flag down the Shatt without licensed pilots. An additional
issue involves Iran's use of the port of Khosrowabad, whose jetties extend
beyond-low water into waters under Iraqi jurisdiction.
So long as the two countries cooperated in Bagdad Pact matters and the
residual British influence imparted stability to Iraq,~Iran was not too unhappy
with the arrangement. However, the picture changed abruptly when Iraq became
highly volatile following the revolution of July 1958. Beneath the recent
claims, accusations, incidents, and troop movements lies Iran's fear of the
strangle hold that Iraq could exert on its commerce. Approximately 40 percent
of Iran~s dry-cargo trade passes through the port of Khorramshahr, and all of
her refined-petroleum exports pass down the Shatt al Arab from Abadan. Further-
more, Iran considers that the presence of Bloc technicians at Basra constitutes
a potential threat. Coming in addition to diplomatic pressures from USSR, the
total impact of the Shatt al Arab issue has sorely wounded Iranian national
pride. On the Iraqi side, Q,assim found this issue a convenient one with which
to divert public attention from domestic turmoil and to .improve his position
as a champion of Iraq.
Iran wants a voice in the control of the Shatt and has used the flag. issue,
and other relatively insignificant controversies, to bring pressure for a new
convention on the Shatt. Iran has .insisted upon the right to require vessels
proceding to Iranian ports to fly the Iranian flag, the right to use the port
of Khosrowabad, and the freedom for small craft to navigate the Shatt without
search. In addition, Iran demands a joint port authority and an equal division
of fees collected in the Shatt. Iran has called for resumption of arbitration
of the boundary settlements, which. it maintains were concluded "under duress,"
and accuses Iraq of failing to honor a 1957 agreement to negotiate joint control
of the Shatt through the medium of a Swedish arbitrator. Iraq retorts that Iran
has, in violation of international law, consistently exceeded the rights granted
to it in 1937 and is, in fact, responsible for the current situation.
Resolution of the present controversy rests upon the acceptance by Iran
and Iraq of arbitration by experts in international law. A lasting solution
must guarantee the rights of users beyond transitory good intentions and
beyond the formal provisions contained in the 1937 treaty.
Approved For Release~0'~?/08IU`~`-CI7~TRD'P~84-008258000100370001-5
 Approved For Release 200~~1'~~~i~~0825R000100370001-5
Khorramshahr
Jetty
No. 1
SHUTAIT
ISLAND
BASE: USFIO Chart 3639 1:350,000
2nd edition, March 31, 1958
ABADAN ISLAND\\
(JAZIREH-YE ABADAN)
Existing boundary based
on treaty of 1937
I~ Poinf two miles
downsEream From Fao
WARBAH
U W A I T
BUBIYAN ISLAND
(JAZIRAT BUBIYAN)
Fa o"~
(AI Fdw)
PERSIAN' GULF
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Ap
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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
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,SIGNATURE
Remarks
This GM on the Shatt al Arab was
done in response to your query of last
week. 1 ~-
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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
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I A R 55 237 Replaces Form 30-4
whpeL may be used.
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6 January 1960
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Approved For Release.2001:/08/07 CIA-RDP84-0082580001003700:01-5
 Ap
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NCI,ASSIFIED x ~~bNFIDENTIAL
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
INITIALS
DATE
1
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2
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PREPARE REPLY
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DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
F NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
:~R 206 wilding 11 x 3791
6 Jan 60
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
I A R 55 237 Replaces Form 3U-4
which may be used.
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