AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF STUDIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: December 1, 1974
• Content Type: STUDY

Approved For-Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600036038-1
TOP S-CRET
(When Ann _,~es Detached)
TS 206439-74
Cy-4- 20 Cy s
AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF
STUDIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SS FOR THE
COMMI TIO I ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN
POLICY
December 1974
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
TOP SECRET
 .Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
TOP SECRET T" 206439-74
(When =lnr~e.es Detached)
This report is a review of a number- Of major studies of the
intelligence corr~n:_unity made since the Joint Study Group Report of
1960. This report was selectcl as the startin point, because it had
a major impact on the evclutic.-i of the intelligence community. One
of its more significant resuits was the creation of the decline in the
power and independence of the in "%idual Service intelligence agencies.
Moreover, institutions, relationships and distributions of responsibility
of the pre-1960 period bear little resemblance to those that have evolved
since that time.
The intelligence community is almost continuously under
review or examination. Hardly a year has passed since 1960 without
a major study of some aspect of intelligence activities being undertaken.
Sixteen such reports have been selected for this review as being sub-
stantively significant, or particularly effective in bringing about
improvement or advancing organizational evolution. The observations
and recommendations of these sixteen reports have been assembled
around -a number of recurring topics and concerns. In this regard,
one cautionary note seems appropriate: The cumulative impact of this
review is necessarily more negative than the intelligence community's
record of. achievement would tvarrnt, because the source materials
used naturally tend to address what is wrong rather than what is right
with intelligence activities.
The individual reports themselves have been condensed, but
'with all major points and recommendations preserved, and these are
attached as annexes to this study.
y~hen A e"_es Detached
Approved Fo~ Release 1Ydb3/02/27 : CIA-RDFS86B00269R000600030038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269fi000600030038-1
TOP SECRET TS 206439-74
(when Annexes detached)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Summary i
A. The Direction of the Intelligence Community A-1
The Basic Authority A-i
The Director of Central intelligence as Community
Leader A-3
The Separation of the DCI from CIA A-5
The DCI's Community Staff A-7
The Role of the United States Intelligence Board A-9
The Role of the Executive Committee A-10
B. Selected Intra-Community Relationships B-1
A Single Defense Intelligence Authority B-1
A Single Defense Intelligence Agency B-3
The Authority of .NSA versus the Military B-4
The State Department, the Foreign Service Intelligence
B-6
A Single Photo Interpretation Center B-7
C. Resource Planning and Management C-i
The Authority of the DCI over Resources C-l
A Community Resource ?-Management Body C-2
A Single Defense Resource Manager C-4
Long-Range Planning c-6
Cross-Program Review C-7
Control of R & D C-9
Tactical Intell:L-once Resources C-l0
D. Requirements D-1
E. Collection E-1
Evaluating Collection E-1
Relations with Foreign Services E-2
Expansion of Overt Collection E-3
F. Production
The Information Explosion F-1
Improving the Product F-3
Basic Substantive Research F-5
Strategic Warning and the National Indications Center
F-5
Compartmentation and its Effects F-6
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
TO" SECRET
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B0026912000600030038-1
TOP SECRET TS 206439- 7 4
(when Annexes dctac'r_ed)
Page
C. Consume-- Feedback C-I
H. The Clandestine Services and Covert Action
Coordination and Direction
Military Clandestine Operations
Cover
Counterintelligence
Glossary of Abbreviations
Annexes
- Summaries of Original Source Materials -
A.
The
Joint Study Group Report - December 1960
B.
The
Sprague Report - December 1960
C.
The
Kirkpatrick-Schuyler-Coyne Report - April 1962
D.
The
Cuban Missile Crisis Post iortem - December 1962
E.
The
CIA Long Range Plan - August 1965
F.
The
Cunningham Report - December 1966
G.
The
Shute Report - February 1967
H.
The
Katzenbach Report - .,larch 1967
1.
The
HACIT Report - March 1968
J.
The
Eaton Report - August 1968
K.
The
Lindsay Report - December 1968
L.
The
Bross Report - January 1969
M.
The
Froehlke Report - July 1969
N.
The
Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel Report - July 1970
0.
The
Schlesinger Report - March 1971
P.
The
President's' Directive - November 1971
Q.
The
Ford Letter - October 1974
H-1
H-1
H-3
11-4
H-4
25X1
(when Annexes detached)
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
 Approved For Relbe a 2 b31d2I 1 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
T, :Q6439-74
The basic authority for the intelligence community is the
NTational Security Act of 1947, which has itself been elaborated upon
seven times since by National Security Council Intelligence Directives
( ;SC1D's). The most comprehensive is \SCiD-1, which delineates tL_e
Director of Central Intelligc:cc's Basic Duties and Responsibilities.
The latest version of NSCID-l, which was revised in accordance with
the President's Directive of 1o-.-emoer 1971, lays the groundwork for
the DCI to assume a greater role as leader of the intelligence com-
munity, a development recommended by all major classified reviews
of the co-,--a unity organization since 1960. These reports are virtually
unanimous in stating that the DCI should not be physically separated
from CI- in performing his community duties. An intelligence com-
munity staff drawn from all the intelligence agencies has been consistently
recommended over the years, but little was done along this line until
it was unequivocally directed by the President in 1971.
The United States Intelligence Board's functions and member-
ship have been commented on frequently and usually not too favorably
in teri'i-is of enchanced-management of the community. USIB's expertise
in substantive matters is effectively recognized in the President's 1971
Directive, which establishes the Board as one of two advisory bodies
to the DCI, with the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC)
being created to assume the responsibility for resource management.
The concentration under the Secretary of Defense of about
80 per cent of all intelligence resources made the establishment of the
DCI's role in resource management for the community rather problematical.
Despite the President's Directive charging the DCI with preparing a
consolidated intelligence program budget for all intelligence activities,
including tactical, he is not yet fully in control of the situation. A
community resource management body was recommended in several
reports, particularly as resources became more limited and hard
choices as to program direction had to be made. A number of proposals
were made over the years and the establishment of IRAC was intended
to give the DCI the ability to carry out his community management
responsibilities.
A single Defense intelligence authority has been sought since
the join'. Study Group Report of 1960. Successive reports have variously
proposed this role for the JCS, DLk and in the late 1960's for a new
Approved For Release O IO /?,7. IA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-t
 `1CCR: ? is
Approved For R ease 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP861300' 991 ODHOb30038-1
official with a close relationship with the Secretary of Defense--first
as a Special Assistant, then as a part-time task for the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Administration, and finally for the Assistant
Secr Lary of Defense for Intelligence. A single Defense intelligence
agency has also been repeatedly proposee., first as a function of the
JCS, then as DIA, and then (after DLL ssemed unable to assume all
intelligence tasks and the Service intelligence agencies regained many
of their prerogatives) as a new and oo% erful Director of Defense
Intelligence or other new institutio~Izl creations. The President's
Directive of 1971, however, retained DIA as the prime Defense
intelligence agency.
Fragmented Defense resource management received frequent
mention and several suggestions aimed at curing the situation were made.
Nevertheless, centralized reviews of Defense resource allocations
did not begin until 1970, and only began to be done effectively when the
office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence was created
in 1972.
Long-range resource planning was advocated repeatedly in
many reports. It is still in the earliest stages of development and
was not singled out as a specific task for the DCI by the President's
Directive of 1971. Cross-program review of resources, also frequently
referred to, has fared somewhat better, but it also is at an early
stage of implementation as far as cost/effectiveness techniques for
cross-program evaluation are concerned. At present, the review
process centers on specific resource issues; true comparative
evaluation across. several programs is yet to be achieved.
Central management and control of tactical intelligence
resources has been hampered by continuing disagreements over criteria
for determining what is tactical intelligence, what is national intelli-
gence and what is force support intelligence, and thus properly organic
to the commands. Tactical intelligence resources have been estimated
at about one-third of the budget of national intelligence resources.
The President's Directive clearly charges the DCI with responsibility
to include these resources in his consolidated intelligence budget,
but the means to do so are yet to be worked out.
The contest between the National Security Agency (NSA) on
one hand and the JCS bolstered by tactical forces on the other for con-
trol of certain Sigint resources, primarily in the electronic intelligence
field, attracted attention of several review groups, particularly during
the Vietnam War. Most of the reports recommended that NSA retain
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
 Approved For FIjlCag6'2MfO2i27--r-'CIA-RDP86BOO269ROO0600030038-1
TS 139-74
control over such Sigint resources and that i such resources here
needed by tactical coIT manders, they be budgeted for as part of the
tactical force budget, but nevertheless not be denied to national
intelligence users.
Intelligence activities of the Department of State have
figured relatively little in the reports reviewed. Concern over the
need for a national photo-intelligence center, found in reports in the
early l9 O s, has disaa_ ar , itl t? establishment of _N PIC. Worry
then turned to NPICs ability to handle the workload as imagery
satellites b--carne more of ec.i.-e and the "take" increasingly abundant.
The disarray of community intelligence requirements is
mentioned a number of times, notably in the Cunningham Report of
1966. In the absence of consumer guidance as to the most important
matters, analysts tend to cover all bets by issuing requirements
for much more information than was likely to be needed, or in fact
could ever be used. The President's Directive gave the DCI, as
one of his four major responsibilities, that of reconciling require-
ments and priorities within budgetary coctraints and charged the
USIB to advise him in this regard.
Relatively little space in this report is devoted to collection
questions. Reviews and inquiries into various collection systems
have been numerous', but are generally too specialized and narrow
in scope to qualify for consideration by the Commission. The
important matter of evaluating the effectiveness of collection as a
whole is noted, but the difficulty of tying good information to the
sources that produced it has apparently made any systematic approach
to this process uncertain and imperfect.
Many reports, particularly in the mid-19601s, referred to
the information explosion as a major problem. Technical collection
advances were creating floods of information with no proportional
increase in the analytical capacity to exploit it. The Schlesinger
Report in 1971 pointed to the great increase in information collected
by technical means, but noted that there had been little progress in
developing human sources with.access to foreign intentions, doctrines
or political processes. Improvement of the analytical functions and
the overall relevancy of the int igence product was likewise of
considerable concern, and many reports addressed it. The President's
Directive described the need for product improvement as urgent and
established the NSC intelligence Community (NiSCIC) as a consumer
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
 iv
Approved For RelIM;- 2DA3102121 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
lu 206439-74
forum to give direction o.nd guidance on production and to evaluate
the usefulness of intelligence rep orts. Both this directive and
President Ford's letter of October l;'7 placed specific responsibility
on the D CI to a s sure that national i:` ~ elligence is of the highest quality nationto support foreign policy a-d mi tar;' operations.
Few topics received as ch attention in the reports as the
need for consu?r er guidance to inc_ `ase the pertinence and effective-
ness of community activities. Several reports pointed to the fact
that, in the absence of this guidance, the community was talking to
itself, producing against its own requirements and operating with
scant reference to what policy makers really needed. Both the
Schlesinger Report and the President's Directive called for better
consumer representation in community deliberations, and the NSCIC
was set up to bring this about.
As to the Clandestine Services and covert action, the general
finding of the reports that dealt with these subjects was that existing
control and supervision over covert operations was adequate and that
the imposition of further outside review authorities only carried the
additional risk of disclosure without adding any important safeguards.
The reports were also strongly opposed to separating the Clandestine
Services from CIA or to spliting off the covert action function.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
 Approved For-Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
..3 ~~ 206;39-71
n of ' T `, '.==-geac CJT Linity
A. T! :e D; rec" or1 O~ 1.1 C' n
1. T1_e sic Authority
Tire organic iav cf the intelligence community is co.z-
tained in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
Section 101 established the National Security Council to advise
the President with respect to the integration of domestic,
foreign and militar policies 1 elating to t e nation_ securiLy.
Section 102 established the Central intelligence Agency
under the National Sec?_trity Council (CSC) to be headed by the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), with a Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence to act for the DCI in his absence or
disability.
Section 102 further stipulates that it shall be the duty of
the A-7~ (the Central Intelligence Agency), for the purpose
of of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several depart-
ments and agencies and under the direction of the `:SC, to:
--advise the NSC concerning such intelligence
activities as relate to national security;
--make recommendations to the NSC for the
coordination of such intelligence activities;
--correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to
the national security and provide for the
dissemination within the government, provided
that the departments and other agencies shall
continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and
disserninate departmental intelligence, and
provided that the DCI shall be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure;
--perform for existing intelligence agencies such
additional services of common concern as the
NSC determines can be more efficiently accom-
plished centrally.
To the extent recommended by the NSC and approved by
the President, intelligence of the departments and agencies
shall be open to inspection by the DCI and shall be made avail-
able to the DCI for correlation, evaluation and dissemination.
~ . ] ] ' ~ ? . I.Y- 7 )rr'-
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
 Approved For Rele. _ 9se.29Q31b2/17 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
i a,zI_I TS J6439-74
The _,!cognition Section 1UZ(d)(3) of the Act of depart-
mental intelli-ence as continuing to be provided by the several
existing departments and a_encies has had lasting ircnpact on the
role of the DCI in coordinating the intelligence activities of the
government. At the ver least, the acknowledged responsibility
for departmental intelligence has permitted the various intelli-
gence services and agencies to continue to operate collection,
processing and production systems for their own needs, leading
to duplication, contrasting views on situations, and a continuing
resistance to any central authority.
The provision that the DCI may inspect intelligence of
the departments and agencies, though limited by implication
to substantive matters, has tended over the years to be extended
beyond substance to management and lately to resource matters,
and in effect constitutes the basis for the DCI's survey power.
The National Security Council, in order to regulate and
direct the intelligence activities of the Government, has issued
National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's)
establishing basic policy for certain classes of intelligence
activities. The number of NSCID's and their provisions have
changed from time to time, but the present list of them is as
follows:
NSCID -1 Basic Duties and Responsibilities
NSCID-2 Coordination of Overt Collection Activities
NSCID-3 Coordination of Intelligence Production
NSCID-^ The Defector Program
NSCID-5 U. S. Espionage and Counter Intelligence
Activities Abroad
NSCID-6 Signals Intelligence
NSCID-7 Critical Intelligence Communications
NSCID - 8 Photographic Interpretation
The N'SCID's are further particularized and interpreted in
a series of Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID's),
related by number to the '~SCID's from which they derive, which
form the basic documentary means of coordinating the intelligence
community, covering as they do in aggregate the greater part of
the community's varied activities. Most of the current NSCID's
and DCID's were last revised in 1972, so they are relevant to
present-day organizations and functions. Efforts are under way
to develop a single omnibus NSCID to incorporate the provisions
of existing directives.
Approved For iRgse X003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
 Approved For Release'2003/02127 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
TS .j6439-74
The most fir reac?~ig of the :~SClD's is VISCID-I, Basic
Rut E S and iiesponsi;h__1t:'es. he current version, dated Feb-
ru~_; 17, 197, directs the DC_ o coordinate the foreign ir_telli-
cence activities of the Uiiite:i J ateS; E Sta,._J11SC2eS the National
Security Council Intelligence Committee to give direction to
national substantive intelligence and provide consumer evalua-
tion of the )rod ucts: and directs _^e DCI to plan, review,v and
evaluate all intelligence activities and the allocation of all
intelligence resources, to nrodace national intelligence, to
chair advisory boards and committees, and to establish and
reconcile requirements and priorities within budgetary con-
straints. The DCI is also charged to prepare and submit a
consolidated intelligence program; budget, to issue DGID's as
appropriate, to formulate policy on arrangements 1;,,ith foreign
governments on intelligence matters, to review security stan-
dards and practices, and to make such surveys of departmental
intelligence activities as he may deem necessary to his responsi-
bilities to the DISC. The directive goes on to establish the
Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC) to advise
the DCI on the intelligence budget and the allocation of resources;
to restructure the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and define
more explicitly than before its responsibilities to the DCI; to
define national, departmental and interdepartmental intelligence;
to stipulate roles in the protection of intelligence sources and
methods; and, for the first time,. to define the community respon-
sibilities of the DCI.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence as Community Leader
As a result of the President's Directive of November 1971
and under the revised NSCID-1 of February 1972, the DCI is
charged to seek the attainment of the following objectives as
essential to the efficient and effective functioning of the intelli-
gence community:
--continuing review of the responsiveness of the
U. S. intelligence effort to national requirements;
--assurance of authoritative and responsible leader-
ship of the community;
--achievement of more efficient use of intelligence
resources;
--review and revision of intelligence functions and
elimination of inefficient or outmoded activities;
--improvernent in the quality, scope and timeliness
of the community product;
--enhancement of U. S. policy through the provision
and use of national intelligence
Approved Fors F 'e13e s_ 26O-M2/27: CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
 Approved For Release 2003%0 127 : CIA-RDP86B00269RO60600030038-1
TS 6439-74
:NSC1DI -1 a s 7) ^e S. i.?. i _.nen _S a m a.;or C ::f-) _ lion and
definition of tr_ role TIC= s community leader. A number
of reviews of t e ;: =e'1 n ? CO iZr;_"_Lnii",?` have addresses: the
lcadershi-) role of the DC,1 over the - ears.
The Joint Study Group Report of 1960 observed that there
was no common understanding of '.ow to achieve coordination,
that the role the DC= and of C- !A i.. -oordination lacked clarity,
and that there was considerable con n_sion as to how the DC1 was
to operate. The report noted that coDrd'_ination could be construed
as either command or '7?rSLTCSiOn and that it could be carried out
through leader ship in r_ew intelligence programs, identification
of new problem areas, investigation of problems under the
right to survey intelligence activities, and the solution of prob-
lems by agreed cooperation under the leadership of the coordinator.
Even in 1960 the Join;. Study Group was urging a stronger man-
agement role on the DCI and recd mended that he act to achieve
more effective community coordination through "command
channels. " This recommendation was approved by the 1%SC.
In 1968 the Eaton Report urged the DCI to make authorita-
tive and consistent determinations as to t He validity of require-
ments in relation to the costs of meeting them and the effective-
ness of resources in satisfying intelligence needs. The broad
guidance needed from the DCI could be in the form of a proposed
National Intelligence Plan setting forth objectives, targets and
priorities for the Secretary of Defense, the community and
program managers so that resources would be available to
respond to present and foreseeable requirements.
In 1969 the Bross Report, addressing the community role
of the DCI, observed that both President Kennedy (January 16,
1962) and President Johnson (September 24, 1965) had characterized
the DCI as the "principal intellige ce officer of the government"
and had directed the DCI to act as the leader of the intelligence
community as his primary task.
The Schlesinger Report in March 1971 proposed three
options for the creation of a leader of the comsnunity who would
control intelli'epee resources, manage most resources, and
coordinate resources appropriated elsewhere. The first option
was a Director of National Into lligence who would control all
major intelligence resources, leaving the Defense Department
only the tactical. The second option was a Director of Central
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
" . ..,. TS c,, _1439-7 4
Tntalli_ence .--_o wo_tl_' pre~.._ he roles and mission:. of the
DCI a. t at im ., ce L fei :-esponsibility for cones ,1ida -
intellioence -,Dro`rar -i and third option proposed a
Coordinator of ;rational ir.te1 i ~: c as an NISC or White :d3use
overseer with emphasis on resource management, consumer
needs and output evaluation.
President _ ixonr s Dii c ? i . of November 5, 1971, was
based on the second Schlesinger option and stated: "I am
directing the Director of Cent al Intelligence to assume leader-
ship of the community in planning, reviewing, coordinating and
evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the
production of intelligence. I shall look to him to improve the
performance of the community, to provide his judgments on the
efficiency and effectiveness of all intelligence programs and
activities (including tactical intelligence), and to recommend
the appropriate allocation of resources to be devoted to intelli-
gence. " NSCID-1 of February 1972 was written to implement
the President's Directive.
President Ford, in his October 9, 1974, letter. reaffirmed
the responsibilities charged to the DCI as "leader of the intelli-
gence community. "
3. The Separation 'of the DCI from CIA
From time to time proposals have been made to separate
the DCI from the agency which he heads, usually on the grounds
that to do so would enable him to play a more active role in
managing or directing the community. Such an idea appears in
the Joint Study Group Report of 1960, the Bross Report in 1969
and the Schlesinger Report of 1971, but is by no means confined
to these references. The studies covered in this revie-%z have
come out against such a move, but the idea -reappears almost
every time the scope of DCI powers are under discussion.
The Joint Study Group of 1960 observed that it was possible
to separate the DCI from CIA with a small community staff or
with a larger group to carry on the estimating of current intelligence
and planning functions as well. It was noted that such a move
would require a change in existing legislation and, moreover,
would deny the President one man to look to for substance as
well as covert action and could lead to the formation of a large
DCI staff duplicating much of ghat CIA could provide. The
Defense member of the Study Group, contending that DCI coordina-
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP8'QBOQ269R(3QO6OO030038-1
til was w0_k_ngS:i~`?c `-_ `-1 i221P r iate separation. The
it dea_ of a co_nm-_:_lity staff
i:-~,- ~ r~ i
other r,-ie^-ioers L~referrzd th
for the DCI drawn from all community agencies to handle
coordination ~)r. oblems before so stir a step was to -en. Such
a staff was not formed, however, and the idea of separating the
DCI from the Agency for more freedom to coordinate the corn-
mur_ity persisted.
During the staff discussions in the preparation of the Eaton
Report of 1968, the idea reappeared i7 the novel suggestion that
the DGI be separated from CLA. so that he could exercise cen-
tralized authority over both CIA and NSA, effectively insulating
the latter from encroachments it was then experiencing from
the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This suggestion
did not surface in the final Eaton Report.
The Bross Report in 1969 referred to the proposals to
separate the DCI from the Agency and establish him as over-all
coordinator in the Executive Office Building and observed that
any such move would create a substantial legal problem in view
of the National Security Act of 1947, clearly establishing the
DCI as the head of CIA_ Moreover, Mr. Bross said such a
move would mean the dismemberment of elaborate arrangements
in CIA to support the DCI in the production of national intelligence.
In addition, to function as coordinator, the DCI would need a
substantial staff for support of national functions which would
clearly be too large to fit in the Executive Office Building.
Without such back-up, it would be impossible for the DCI , as
the "principal intelligence officer," to "authenticate the signifi-
cance of substantive developments or the value of resource
programs and activities. "
The third option in the Schlesinger Report in 1971 for a
leader of the community posed a Coordinator of National Intelli-
gence in the NSC or White House staff structure. Schlesinger
noted that such a position would not require legislative action,
but could lead to unproductive competition between the Coordinator
and the White Louse staff and would be less likely than the other
options to accomplish the improvements in product and resource
economies the President was seeking.
The President's Directive in November 1971 in selecting
Schlesinger's second option--a DCI with much the same as his
existing authorities--implicitly rejects the separation of the DCI
from CIA_ The Directive states that the DCI must delegate
Approved Fcr Iaiease 2483102/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP86f~0O2f9Mg960PV30038-1
direct a .. thor==y to the De -__ty Director (a s far as is bl e
``ze as prograrrLs and day-to-day
'~'.1tnOLi~ _e~ISl?_t20nj 102 ~.
Ope_atia n= of CL\ and i`_a1 3 t as.~um Over' it leadership of the
com_-= _-Ly. Much the same enjoinder was made by Presidents
T
Kenne T j and ,, ohr_son.
? The Dt.I`s Community Staff
ylternatiti e to separating the DCI from CL's, the
~s zn )CI
Joi:a ~`udy o:~p in 1?60 re:commendtd t'_.` formation of a
, Gr
star cr_,v.T~ fr0_~- the entire community. T'_e Study Group tco'.:
account that the then Coordination Staff of three, headed by
Genera' Lucien K. Truscott and charged to coordinate the
and
cor11ITr--lity through revising NSCID's an_ DCID's, was regarded
elsewhere as part of CIA and did not meet the need for a manage-
ment u::--It to support the DCI in coordination apart from the help
of the Office of National Estimates and the CIA Directorates. The
-Group Report recommended a full-time staff of professionals,
loyal to the community at large and solely responsible to the DCI
to assist him through use of the survey oo%vers provided in NSCID-1.
rn 1962 the Kirkpatrick-Schuyler -Coyne Report noted the
then current plan to abolish the DCI's Assistant for Coordination
(held by General Truscott) and to replace it with a post designated
as the Assistant for Coordination and Community Guidance. The
Report recommended this office be responsible for representing
the DCI. in contact with senior intelligence officials, developing
Signit policy, reviewing community efforts in support of national
policy, and reviewing CIA efforts as they related tocthecommunity's
efforts. The Report further recommended that the g lp
with senior professionals since problems hitherto defying solution
would need to be confronted.
The position of Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
Programs Evaluation (NIPE) was established in 1963 under John
Bross with a staff larger than General Truscott's and with similar
responsibilities. Personnel were entirely from CIA, so .a com-
munity character for the staff was not established, although it
began to move outside CIA into community problems.
The Eaton Report in 1968 urged the DCI to consider not
only broadening the functional scope, but also strengthening the
representation of the military and civilian intelligence community
on the staff (NIPE) which assists him in discharging his national
Approved For ReIe se'200 /O f2 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1
 AS
Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP86BT0269ROQ(6Q0~30038-1
T
planning and proaran. guidance it roocomn_1ie?.aed
the inclusion for ext tided tours of senior military officers,
I' oreigu Ser:=~. Officer = -_: '~ G~:'_?r itn appropriate expertise,
and noted that such a staff structure would contribute to more
objective planning and evaluation; ensure the needs of the military
would not be overlooked; and raise confidence in the proposed
NaLionai Ir.` eel; c_'c~ Plan and Shcrt-terra program guidance.
The Bross R^pJt o that 1;aG~? : :CO~i?'_=^,r=f1C~::? at .. the --'IPE
staff be expanded and its mission clarified. The staff should
have the authority to deal with all components in the CIA, support
the newly created National Intelligence Resources Board (NLRB)
(set up to adverse the DCI on resource issues), hold custody of the
Target Oriented Display (developed to relate costs of resources
to their substantive targets), represent the DCI in Defense pro-
gram reviews, .produce long-range intelligence plans, provide
systems anal, sis support to the DCI and maintain relations with
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).
Bross also asked that the chairmen of USIB resource-related
committees be placed on the NIPE staff. In the next three years,
the NIPE staff grew slowly, but still drawing its people from
CIA, except for a National Security Agency (NSA) representative
added in 1972.
In 1971 the Schlesinger Report observed that, although
the DCI had established a NIPE staff and the NIRB, efforts at
management through these institutions were being resisted and
their contribution to the DCI's authority was small. Schlesinger
believed the DCI's staff should at least have program and budget
authority over resources; control over allocated resources;
supervision of R&D; inspection of program operations; and the
review, if not the original production, of national intelligence
estimates and net assessments.
The President's Directive of November 1971 instructed in
unequivocal terms the formation of an increased and restructered
personal staff for the DCI to assist him in carrying out his responsi-
bilities as ccordinator and in playing a major role in the resolution
of major issues.
When 2611r. Schlesinger became the DCI in February 1973,
one of his first actions was to transform the NIPE staff into the
Intelligence Community staff and to man it with a much larger
proportion of officers assigned from Defense, notably from DIA,
and from outside the community.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030038-1 -
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP86B00 69RQp~0?OSQQ39938-1
?. 1 'le 5t _ i.i_ _ d 1 : n. t. c: