D/INR S LETTER TO ASD(A), DATED 2 NOV 70, RE ALTERNATIVES TO BLUE RIBBON PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000600070002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 6, 1970
• Content Type: MF

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,4 SECRET
6 November 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: D/INR's Letter to ASD(A), dated 2 Nov 70,
re Alternatives to Blue Ribbon Panel
Recommendations
1. I have sent Ray Cline's letter to Froehlke on to Jack Smith
with the suggestion that, when he has had a chance to comment on it,
he forward it to Abbot Smith who also seems to me directly concerned.
2. Ray has made two specific proposals in this letter, one
of which he apparently made to Henry Kissinger on the 15th of Septem-
ber. Both of these, I might say, strike me as a little gratuitous but
I suppose come within Ray's charter, although it would have been a
little more careful on Ray's part to have sent us a copy of his memo-
randum to Kissinger. (Perhaps he did, but I have no record of it. )
3. Ray's first proposal (which is one that he also made to
Kissinger) suggests the creation of an Assessments Panel of USIB
to plan, review, and approve substantive joint studies or reports
of direct relevance to NSC policy papers and decisions.... " This
obviously is a function done, in part at least, by the Board of National
Estimates. It is also an area reviewed by Andy Marshall in his
capacity as a consultant to Kissinger to review the intelligence process
generally and propose ways to make it more helpful and responsive
to the needs of policy makers.
4. The problem of how to relate intelligence estimates and
judgments to policy and planning needs and discussions has never
been wholly solved, in my opinion at least. I believe that the new
format for the national estimates has gone a long way toward improv-
ing our position in this respect and satisfying earlier criticisms
expressed by the NSC staff. I believe Andy Marshall's conclusions
were that the normal estimating process was appropriate and
adequate to fill needs in most instances. His recommendation was to
single out a few topics of priority importance and subject them to a
more detailed and comprehensive analysis than has been the case in
the past. This is about what has happened to the 11-series estimates
as I understand it.
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5. It may be that further improvements are possible in
arrangements under which people preparing intelligence estimates
meet directly with policy makers for the purpose of (a) identifying
subjects for estimates and (b) the substantive implications of the
estimates themselves.
6. Ray Cline's proposal, it seems to me, would have the
effect of removing the Board in, very large measure from this process,
which I do not think would be a good idea.
7. Ray's second proposal relates to the NIRB, which he wants
to reconstitute as a Resources Panel of USIB. The relationship
between the NIRB and USIB has always been a little ambiguous. We
have been proceeding on the assumption that as a practical matter
the Board can already "levy requests for studies and advice directly
on USIB subcommittees" and has been doing so regularly from the
very beginning of the Board. The committee chairman will report to
the DCI and will presumably do what the DCI desires him to do.
8. My own view is that the NIRB is more useful if it is kept
distinct and apart from USIB, with the thought that USIB determines
requirements and priorities for intelligence coverage. The NIRB on
the other hand is the advisory body to the DCI to help him develop a
responsible judgment about the need for resources, particularly those
which cost a lot of money. USIB committees can help this process by
interpreting the requirements and needs for data in particular areas.
If a member of a committee objects to a position which the committee
is taking in response to a request from the NIRB, it can always have
the matter referred to USIB. Otherwise the NIRB is entitled to
presume that a committee position is authoritative insofar as it con-
stitutes a statement of substantive intelligence requirement. This
may be a little complicated but I don't think that integrating the NIRB 25X1
in the USIB would help very much.
JOHN A. BR SS
D/DCI/ NIPE
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luy
n '.K .
ovc..-' er 2 , 19 7
I appreciate very much the tir,ie and effort you tack last week
to acquaint us with the planning presently untderoay on the i ntel l i -.
n'~nce recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. Fro?
personal experience, I know that your task, is a difficult one,
and I am happy to see the beginning to what I hone will be a big
step fort-;ard.
Your invitation for cot^r.ents on the alternatives was also
annreci ate.d. We '. ho are workers in the forei e n nol i cv vineyards
are not only to a very large extent dependent up:;n Dt?
collection svsto s for information but also are deeply and directly
concern;,(! with the political it )l'icationls of the (enloymt:;)t Of these
vste',: abroad. We are. therefore, very conscious of the need for
V7e i Intel l i gence organization which eventually develops fron your
pianning to have a close% and sensitive interface with the national
foreign policy machinery.
In reviewing your alternatives, I find that we lean strongly
toward alternative-, three. It has many merits, and would avoid the
bureaucratic upheaval that would occur if you tried to move irei di-
ately to alternative four--which anpears to be a not unreasonable
long-term goal. The principal reasons for preferring alternative
three are:
1. This alternative would retain a considerable degree
of decentralization in the operational management of
the collection system so that effective technical
liaison can be established at working levels with-
out the need to penetrate too many layers of
,bureaucratic anorovalsy we also believe such
decentralization is more likely to insure respon-
siven,ss to requirements not self-generated, that
is, specifically to political and other foreign
policy requirements.
The Honorable
Robert F. Froehike,
Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Room 3E822, The Pentagon.
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?. It would i r nr h n :'~' 'G.??1 i n of 4' rlirecter of
tU 4 h e
;i;r to trsc.
needs to f u I f i i 1 his re zs on':s es or resi arch ,
analysis and rc-~crti e^ , r. of only i i ~cfcnse , but in
the as a t,.-,hole.
3. This strengt?iening of the position of ^IA would also
help to place the producer-collector relationship in
proper balance! production of finished intelligence
in support of the needs of the national policy maker
should drive col iectican,, and this is not so easy if
analytical and resea.rchi elements seem junior and
subordinate to the collection system.
4. Finally, this alternative would provide the ',SD (I)
with a staff large enough to enable him not only to
make intelligence policy, but also to monitor the
process of its is ipl enentati on and even perhaps to
undertake program evaluation studies, which probably
can be dealt with meaningfully only at this level.
The ASP (I) concept paper is, in my estimation, excellent. I
believe if this concept can be followed and your alternative three
placed into effect, you will have provided Defense with an organiza-
tion that will have cone a lone way toward meeting the intent of the
suggestions made by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel-.'
only reservations about the reorganization: you are considering
1
relate to the interface between Defense intelligence components and the
rest of the Intelligence Co:~Y urii ty. I realize this problem cannot be
dealt with unilaterally by Defense, but I think State, CIA and Defense
should. address themselves to interface arrangements very promptly.
Briefly, my suggestions for critical elements to be considered are
as fol l o:wws :
1. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB),what-
ever else might happen in the light of the Defense
reorganization, should be restructured in the two
following important respects:
a) An Assessments Panel, or Steering Cor=ittee
of USIB, should be established to plan,
review, and approve substantive Joint studies
or reports of direct. relevance to USC policy
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pn:in xrs 1'1 disci sior;s (Ct. attpc' Cc r'.:70 to
t` is Sl1~^ns".iOr1)'.
sp:2llino out
it t'ould cG ist of senior analytical (Fs dis-
tinct ron operational) intelligence officers
of S, E:^, . " :nse and UP,, with other nembers
of US1 s,:rvinn as observers or participants
,n invit.tion accordinc' to subject matter,
Ond i L should deal directly with !;SC Committees
insofar as possible.
b) The National Intelligence Pesources Board (,IRB)
should be reconstituted as a '..csourccs Panel, or
Steering Corlmi ttce of 4iSIB, .,.i th e^nropri ate
State. Defense and CIA re- rship (as now con-
stitutod, I should t';ink) ar,:i L;% authorized to
l evyy requ.,3s is for studies and advice directly
On USI sub C-;-'1i hoes which have functional ,
i?2.tii.^er 1:4 Or i i;ntor resnonsibi i i ties as t:,wel l
as on i n e l l i gence program directors in the
whole Covruni 4y.
2. State (I; R) and AS7 (I) should at. an early date ex-
chann 411 oh i ev l l i a f soli officers who would ;fork
with our resp:=ctive front-offici, staffs to insure
that essential in;ar ration, about on-going projects
and activities is provided in tiriely fashion from
each agency to the other; special emphasis should
be put on arranging working-level contacts on an
informal basis at the earliest possible point in
the development of important joint studies.
'.!y suggcs ti ons are all designer: to knit the intelligence elements
of State, !le';ease and CIA closer together and enable them to deal
effectively with the nol i cy-ma! i nq el events of our Government both at
the Departmental and !SC levels. Only by this joint approach can we,
in ;y view, achieve the better interface with intelligence users which
your reorganization is partially intended to facilitate.
I wish you much, success in this important and difficult task, and
want to thank you for the opportunity to cement on matters in which
w;e have a deep, corrrion interest..
Sincerely,
Attachment:
Ray S. Cline
Cline7Kissinger Memorandum,
September 15, 1970 (SECRET)
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CONFIDENiIA[
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
During the past few weeks the comments of the Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel on intelligence have been under study. Mel and Dave
have asked me to develop several alternative plans. Prior to any
decision on intelligence reorganization, they would like to get your
individual views.
Accordingly, a briefing and discussion have been scheduled for
1000 Tuesday, 20 October in Room 3C200 to present these alternatives
to you. I certainly hope you or your representative can come. Sub-
sequently I would appreciate receiving your written comments on
the alternatives by close of business 2 November. I will pass them
on to Mel and Dave along with my recommendation.
You will, of course, be kept informed as to what I recommend.
Please inform the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Intelligence) (OX 71024) if you or your representative will
attend.
Mr. Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20305
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