STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 11, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
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DOS review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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November 11, 1975
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SOVIET UNION ? EASTERN EUROPE
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CONTENTS
November 11, 1975
Soviet-Turkish Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Romania-USSR: Less Warm and Not So
Comradely . 2
Moscow Severs Relations with Uganda. . . . . . . 3
CEMA Summit Next Week. . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Yugoslav Vigilance Campaign. . . .
Eastern Europe: Struggling to Preserve the
Gains.
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Soviet-Turkish Relations
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Moscow is continuing its low-key efforts to ex-
vloit US-Turkish tensions -F`T_
The Soviets evidently have renewed an invitation
to the deputy chief of the Turkish General Staff to
visit Moscow.
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The Soviets have been careful to avoid over-
playing their hand in Turkey since the US arms embargo
was imposed early this year. They recognize that
long-standing Turkish suspicions rule out any dramatic
turnaround in Ankara's position vis-a-vis the USSR
and that the Turks will not replace large amounts of
US hardware with Soviet equipment. Moscow's discreet
overtures, therefore, seem designed only to reassure
the Turks that they have little to fear from the USSR
and to suggest that military ties with the US--in- 25X1
cluding US bases in Turkey--are not as essential to
Turkish security as Ankara once thought.
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Romania-USSR:' ' Les's Warm 'ari'd' 'No't 'So Comradely
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The strains between Bucharest and Moscow were
clearly reflected in President Ceausescu's congrat-
ulatory cable to the Soviet leadership on the October
Revolution anniversary.
Although the protocol aspects of Romania's ob-
servance of the anniversary--the speeches and recep-
tions--were on a par with those of last year, the
telegram was noticeably cooler. In addition to
omitting the key phrase "fraternal greetings," it
downgraded the 1974 formulation of "traditional rela-
tions of fraternal friendship" to a simple "friendly
relations." The message also failed to make the
usual reference to the Soviet Union as the "first
state of workers and peasants," and--in a move un-
doubtedly calculated to annoy the Kremlin--it placed
Romania and the Soviet Union on a equal footing in
their ability to make constructive contributions to
solving contemporary problems and furthering detente:.
agreement, and the Romanians nave indicated that they
intend to fight hard against Soviet initiatives on
economic integration at the coming CEMA summit.
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Meanwhile, more trouble may be brewing. 25X1
Romanian Defense Minister Ion:ta has
just canceled a rir to the Soviet Union. In addition,
Bucharest and Moscow have apparently made little prog-
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Moscow Severs Relations with Uganda
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Moscow's decision to sever relations with Kampala
"temporarily" is an obvious Soviet effort to beat
Ugandan President Amin to the diplomatic punch.
The mercurial Amin had threatened to break re-
lations with the USSR unless a "high-powered emissary"
from General Secretary Brezhnev arrived in Kampala
this morning with a satisfactory explanation for the
pressure the Soviets have put on Uganda to support the
Popular Movement in Angola. Amin had also demanded
the withdrawal of Moscow's ambassador--whom he labeled,
a "criminal"--from Kampala.
By referring to the temporary nature of the dip-
lomatic break, the Soviets have left the door open
for a resumption of relations. The initiative, how-
ever, will almost certainly have to come from Amin-
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CEMAA Summit Next Week
The CEMA summit of party and government leaders
apparently will be held in Moscow during the week of
November 17-21.
According to a Soviet CEMA specialist, the four
major economic themes of the meeting will be raw
materials, machine building, agricultural develop-
ment and cooperation, and transport. In addition,
some administrative changes may be made, especially
in the role ar,d responsibilities of the CEMA secre-
tariat, and the West European Common Market.
The Soviet specialist believes that the CEMA-EC
question is not a major issue and that the Romanians
are "under control." Furthermore, he says that the
East Germans and CzecAoslovaks have been strongly
critical of Bucharest's insistence that each CEMA
country determine its own relationship with the EC
and not cede this responsibility to the CEMA secre-
tariat. For their part, Romanian diplomats assert
that the Soviets have "persistently refused" to make a
"reasonable compromise" despite several high-level
Romanian missions to Moscow over the past month.
Bucharest believes that on this issue it has at least
the tacit support of the Poles and Hungarians.
Although Romanian recalcitrance will spoil the
atmosphere surrounding the ceremonial unveiling of
Moscow's plans for CEMA integration over the next
five years, it probably will not ,??event the Soviets
from going ahead with the event. Most of the major
CEMA policy lines have presumably already been agreed
on and merely await top-level government and party
approval at the Moscow summit.
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Yucios lav Vigilance' Campaign
Belgrade's campaign against pro-Soviet sub-
versives and other deviationists is now entering its
fourth week with no signs of abating.
Tito himself added new impetus to the drive
over the weekend. During a visit to the Vojvodina--
a conservative stronghold--Tito urged local Commu-
nists-to "clear the ranks" of all who pose an obstacle
to socialism. On Friday, he put the provincial
leaders through a tough grilling on the results of
their political and economic stewardship. He may
not have been satisfied with their answers; the next
day he implied that local Communists are too soft on
advocates of Stalinist programs.
A Montengrin plenum last week heard the re-
public party leader, Veselin Djuranovic, confess to
similar laxity in his organization. Djoranovic ad-
mitted that, in its zeal to crush liberals over the
past few years, the republic regime had left the
door open to pro-Soviets. He claimed that the party
leadership remains--and thus presumably undeserving
of a major shakeup--but he ordered an attack on
factionalism throughout the ranks.
In the meantime,, the propaganda mill in Bel-
grade continues to grind out tantalizing rumors and
tidbits of information calculated to hold the at-
tention of the domestic and foreign press. Leaks
this week from high-level officials are--as in the
past--cautiously skirting the issue of direct Soviet
involvement with the pro-Stalinists.
A Foreign Ministry nficial, however, told the
US embassy that Brezhnev's denials of Soviet support
for the Stalinists--given personally to Tito in
Helsinki last August--were, at best, only partially
credible. The official then qualified his remarks
by saying that the US should not make too much of
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the Soviet connection, implying that if Washington
did, Belgrade might be forced, as a counterweight,
to condemn anti-Titoist emigre activities in the US.
Despite the effort to keep the lid on speculation
about Soviet motives, some influential forces ap-
parently would have it otherwise. The military
journal Narodna Armijaa last week, for example,
dredged up Yugoslavia's past reaction to threats
like the Cyprub crisis and the 1968 Warsaw Pact in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia. The revival of the in-
vasion issue is out of step with the policy of re-
straint and might be the military's way of sharpening
the anti-Soviet edge of the campaign.
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Eastern Europe:,, Struggling
pre'serv'e Vie' Gaj,'ns
'In the aftermath of the Helsinki summit, several
East European regimes have stepped up their efforts
to protect, and if possible to expand, whatever auton-
omy they now enjoy. Their regent actions suggest that
they anticipate renewed Soviet attempts to undercut
their freedom of maneuver.
Indeed, the East Europeans may well have had a
common perception that the Kremlin intended to use
the results of Helsinki to reassert Soviet hegemony
not only in Eastern Europe but throughout the world
Communist movement. Certainly they recognized in the
security talks the implicit endorsement of Moscow's
continued domination of the "buffer zone" it con-
quered in World War II. Furthermore, they saw in
Soviet pressures for a conference of European Commu-
nist parties (ECPC) and for closer economic integra-
tion in CEMA the intent to tie them more closely to
the Kremlin's apron strings.
Moscow originally wanted to hold the ECPC im-
mediately after the security talks, presumably in
order to hand down at once an authoritative inter-
pretation of the document signed in Helsinki. A
timely ECPC could thus have "clarified" such ideo-
logically delicate concepts as sovereignty, independ-
ence, and the renunciation of force as they applied
to relations among Communist countries. It could also
have reasserted the leading role of the Soviet party.
These plans, however, ran afoul of opposition
from the Yugoslav, Romanian, Italian, and Spanish
parties. With the desired linkage thus thwarted,
the East Europeans were prone to see the publication
of Konstantin Zarodov's attack on the soft-line
tactics of Western Communist parties (Pravda, August
6) as another attempt to assert the Soviet party's
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continuing hegemony, and their suspicions were rein-
forced when Brezhnev held a highly unusual and widely
publicized meeting with Zarodov in mid-September.
Even more alarming was the signing on October 7 of a
revised Soviet - East German friendship treaty that
contains the co-called "Brezhnev doctrine" of limited
sovereignty.
Romania
In the wake of these developments, and perhaps
in response to increased Kremlin pressure against his
indepenc.-jnt policies, Romania's Ceausescu went on
something of an anti-Soviet warpath.
During his visit to Portugal in late October,
--He publicly advised the cooperation of
all political parties, including elements
of the bourgeoisie, in solving Portugual's
problems.
Back home last week, he charged Romanian youth
to conduct an unremitting struggle to ensure that
Romania joins the ranks of the free nations so that
the country would "remain unchained forever."
At the same time, one of his top emissaries was
in Washington, telling US officials that Bucharest
was opposing Soviet initiatives at the coming CEMA
summit that would further limit Romanian freedom of
maneuver in economic relations.
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These are Ceausescu's most strident anti-Soviet
utterances in years, and they cannot fail to raise
the Kremlin's hackles. Indeed, at first blush, they
appear to be the behavior of a man who is so fed up
with Soviet pressure that he is willing to take
serious political risks.
At the same time, his uncanny ability to judge
the limits of Soviet tolerance--combined with his
perception of the situation in the Kremlin--suggests
that he is confident Lhat he can get away with his
campaign.
Yugoslavia
The same fundamental preoccupation with sover-
eignty is evident in Yugoslav actions. Belgrade's
stonewalling at the preparatory sessions for the ECPC
does more than highlight Tito's stubborn refusal to
accept any form of Soviet hegemony over Yugoslavia.
It is also designed to thwart the expansion of the
Soviet party's influence beyond the confines of the
Warsaw Pact.
At home, the increasingly bitter campaign against
Cominformists seeks not only to shatter real or
imagined factions that might try to return the coun-
try to the Soviet fold after Tito's passing, it also
serves to warn the nation as a whole to beware of
falling into the trap.
Poland
Polish party boss Gierek took advantage of the
Helsinki summit to achieve an important agreement with
West Germany, and immediately thereafter reportedly
had to fend off strong criticism from Soviet Premier
Kosygin on the Westward drift of Poland's economic
policies. Since then, he has nevertheless installed
a leading "Americanizer" as chief of the State Planning
Corrmission, and continues to move rapidly ahead with
his attempts to conclude major contracts with several
US firms.
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Meantime, he is grappling with the economically
necessary but politically dangerous problem of in-
creasing the prices on basic food items. He is pain-
fully aware that this action, combined with chronic
food shortages, could trigger domestic discord of the
kind that would focus highly unwelcome Soviet attention
on the Polish scene.
Albania
Even the isolated, xenophobic Albanians are show-
ing signs of unease. Recent reporting suggests a
growing belief in Tirana that Moscow might try to
bring the country back into the Soviet alliance system.
Why take the risks?
All the East Europeans, and particularly the
Romanians, are fully aware of the risks involved in
seeking to thwart Moscow's hegemonist impulses. The
more independent among them may believe, however,
that because of the current circumstances in Moscow
the potential benefits outweigh the risks.
--They evidently consider that roscow has
now missed its best opportunity to im-
pose its interpretation of the Helsinki
declaration.
--They have apparently decided that the
current Soviet leadership wants the
ECPC much more than they do.
--They may also believe that Soviet ate
tention to Eastern Europe will decrease
as Moscow becomes increasingly pre-
occupied with preparations for the next
Soviet party congress.
The most important single factor in the calcula-
tions of the East European leaders, however, seems to
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be their perception of he situation within the Soviet
leadership itself. The East Europeans aze hard-headed
political realists who have vtiry close contact with
the Kremlin, and are keenly aware of Soviet power.
They are not likely to take unnecessary chances. Yet
their actions contain an element of haste that sug-
gests a need to shore up their positions and to carve
out additional gains while there is still time. They
may simply perceive a sense of drift in the Soviet
leadership that can be exploited to advantage, but
there have been some reports that they expect a major
shift in Soviet policy or within the Kremlin. in
any event, the more independent-minded East Europeans,
believe that a tougher line against them is very much
within the realm of possibile. They will therefore
continue--at least until the Soviet party con ress--
to attempt to make hay while the sun shines.
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CHRONOLOGY
November 4 President Ford confers with Romanian
Foreign Trade Minister Patan after
the conclusion of the two-day meeting
of the bilateral economic commission
in Washington.
Hungary.
USSR provides the US with photographs
taken by the recent Venus 9 and 10 mis-
sions of the planetary surface.
Hungarian President Losonczi con-
cludes a five-day, state visit to
South Yemen.
USSR and Hungary sign in Budapest a
five-year protocol on cultural coopera-
tion.
Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Yakubov-
sky concludes an official visit to
November 5 GDR-FRG border commission convenes
in Wiesbaden.
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic con-
cludes a three-day, official visit
to West Germany after a meeting with
Chancellor Schmidt.
Three Soviet naval vessels,.inaluding
a Moskva-class helicopter carrier, end
a six-day, official port call at
Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia; three other So-
viet naval vessels end a visit of equal
duration to Lagos, Nigeria.
November 11, 1975
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November 5 Politburo candidate-member Demichev
concludes a four-day visit to Hungary.
November 6 Politburo member Pelshe delivers the
annual speech on the eve of the Bolshe-
vik Revolution anniversary.
of grain to the USSR.
Cook Industries of Memphis announces
it has sold another 1.1 million tons
Brezhnev confers with exiled Uru ua .an
communist party chief Arismendi.
November 7 East German soldiers and vehicles ap-
parently participate in the USSR's con-
voy from East Berlin to the Soviets'
war memorial in West Berlin.
Iles and long-range missiles.
notable for its lack of tracked vehi-
Defense Minister Grechko reviews the
troops in Red Square with all in-town
I:remlin leaders except party secretary
Kulakov present; the military parade is
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic re-
turns home from official visits to Nor-
way and West Germany.
GDR party chief Honecker confers with
visiting Polish Foreign Minister
Olszowski. I-- I
November 8 Speaking at a dinner near Belgrade,
Yugoslav President Tito implies there
will be an imminent purge of party
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November 8 members, stating that "we have not et
completely cleaned out our ranks."II 25X1
A Pravda commentary--signed "Observer"
to denote Kremlin approval--.blasts
Chinese and white African intervention
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Visiting Yugoslav party secretary
Dolanc, on return leg of Far East trip,
confers in Moscow with Politburo mem-
ber Kirilenko and party secretary
Katushev.
North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan
begins an official visit to Poland
after leaving the USSR, where he had
spent the past several days resting.
November 9 Polish Foreign Minister Olszowski
concludes a three-day, "working
visit" to East Germany.
Czechoslovak Defense Minister Dzur
leaves Prague for an official visit
D
Ugandan President Amin threatens to
bra-ak relations with the USSR within
48 hours and to expel Soviet citizens
from Uganda if Brezhnev does not ex-
plain, via a high-level official the
Soviets' involvement in Angola.
USSR presents a note to the US calling
for resumption of the Geneva Middle
East Peace Conference.
Brezhnev confers with visiting Argen-
tine Communist arty chief Alvares.
November 11, 1975
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November 9 Yugoslav party secretary Dolanc re-
turns home after an extended tour of
Asian capitals a,nd a stopover in Moscow.
November 10 FRG President Scheel commences a
one-week, state visit to the USSR,
accompanied by Foreign Minister Gen-
scher, a fellow Free Democrat.
East German Foreign Minister Fischer
begins a three-day, official visit
to Sweden.
Romanian-Polish trade talks resume
in Bucharest.
Syrian Prime Minister Ayyubi begins
a four-day, official visit to Romania.
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November 11 Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov
begins a three-day, official visit
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USSR breaks diplomatic relations
porarily" with Uganda.
USSR recognizes MPLA government of
Angola as that nation becomes inde-
pendent.
four-day, official visit to Italy.
Hungarian Premier Lazar commences a
FUTURE EVENTS
November 12 Czechoslovak Premier Strougal to begin
a three-day, official visit to France.
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November 14 Portuguese Foreign Minister Melo An-
tunes to begin an official visit to
Czechoslovakia to he followed by one
to Hungary.
mid-November An "editorial commission" to convene
in East Berlin to try to work out an
agreed text for a European Communist
party conference. F_ I
November 16 Hungarian Defense Minister Czinege
to commence a three-day, official
visit to Austria.
East German Premier Sindermann to ar-
rive in Lan for an official four-day
visit.
November 17 USS Bigelow to begin a six-day, offi-
cial port call at Rijeka, Yugoslavia.
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Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek
to make an official four-day visit to
the Netherlands.
November 20 French Foreign Trade Minister Segard
to begin an official visit to the
USSR for talks on energy matters.
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Romanian Grand National Assembly to
convene.
November 24 Soviet-Norwegian Barents Sea con-
tinental shelf talks to resume.
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November 24
Bulgarian party/state leader Zhivkov
to start a five-day visit to west
Germany. F77 I
November 25 Secretary of Agriculture Butz to be-
gin a four-day, official visit to
late November Italian President Leone to make a
state visit to the USSR.
early Decem-
ber
USSR to launch a satellite containin
US biological experiments.
Turkish Prime Minister Dernirel likely
to make a five-day, official visit
to Bulgaria.
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic to
make an official visit to the Nether-
US-Soviet committee on nuclear energy
cooper tion to convene in Washington.
I I
official v,,sit to the UK.
Foreign Minister Gromyko to make an
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Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah to make
an official visit to the USSR.
Moscow.
USSR Supreme Soviet to convene in
December. 8 Yugor;lav Foreign Minister Minic to
begin a two-day, official visit to
the USSR.
Polish party congress to convene in
December 10 Nobel Peace prize scheduled for award
to Andrey Sakharov in Oslo; Soviet
economist Kantorovich to receive his
Economics prize Stockholm.
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