RELEASE OF CIA/RR GM 64-1, CHINA'S BORDER WITH THE USSR SINKIANG, FEBRUARY 1964, SECRET TO FOREIGN GOVERN,EMTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01006A000100360001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 17, 1964
• Content Type: MF

1 1 ` Approved For Release 2000/0'5D1TCIA-RDP79-01006A000100360001-7
CONFlpENrlAL
17 1 areh
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Dissemination Control Branch, DD/CR
FROM o Chief, Publications Staff, ORR
leeae of c" am 64-1, t;4ins' a B er
Wit - _et e 8R. adan I b sere
ore gn 'rem ea s
1. It is requested that the attached copies of subject report be
forwarded as follows:
25X10
20 All ORR responsibilities as defined In the DDI memorandum of
13 August 1952, "Procedures for Dissemination of Finished Intelligence
to Foreign Governments, " as applicable to this report, have been
fulfilled.
.Attachments
CONFIDENTIAL
f:zaR ed !rata uto PI
rCIl
Approved For Release 2000/0 /1
Wn nva dt:s;ias~ifr,aHon
41
DOCUMENT r O.._,_ _ --
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
D DECLASSIWIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C (~
NEXT REVIEW OATS: ~-E
25X
1A
 Approved,;F.prRelease 2000/05/11 CIA-RDP79-01006A000100360001-7
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Copy No.
GEOGRAPHIC
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
CIA/RR GM. 64-I
February 1964
CHINA' S BORDER WITH THE USSR
SINKIANG
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within
the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or
revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
-sEe NET...
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
fRCIODED G R O U P uWMArDC D wncfmxo
DfLUTTICIC~IISN
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 Appr`l~lI~TII" 7 _N~ 7C7SR 6 SF1Va'~CNG01-7
The 1,850-mile boundary between the province* of Sinkiang and the USSR divides the Chinese-ruled
eastern fringe of traditionally Islamic Turkestan from the larger Soviet-controlled portion that
extends as far west as the Caspian Sea. The boundary is based on two sets of documentation. The
portion north of Kizil Jik Dawan. (Wu-tzu-pieh-li Shan-k'ou or "Uz Bel" Pass, 38038'N-73045'E) is
defined by treaties and agreements that were concluded between the Russian and Chinese imperial gov-
ernments during the 19th century in order to establish the China - Russia boundary from Mongolia to
the Khanate of Khokand (Ferghana). This delimitation was complicated and prolonged by the necessity
for Chinese reconquest of the province in 1876-79 after the prolonged Muslim rebellion that began
in 1864.
South of Kizil Jik Dawan the China ?. Russia boundary was delimited by the Anglo-Russian treaty
of 1895 that aligned the Afghan boundaries so as to prevent Russia from having a common frontier
with India. This treaty located the China Russia boundary in the Pamirs along the line of the
Sarikol Range. It also defined the China - Afghanistan boundary, reserving to Afghanistan the open
upper portion of the Wakhan Corridor (sometimes known as the Wakhan Pamir) and reserving to China
the Taghdumbash Pamir. The :Latest available Chinese Communist maps still show the China - USSR
boundary south of Kizil Jik Dawan as indefinite, although the alignment does not differ markedly
from the definite boundary shown.on Soviet maps. The Chinese Communists may be less concerned with
the alignment, however, than with the defective treaty basis for it, which offends national pride
because no Chinese statesman participated in its drafting. The China - USSR boundary is between the
People's Republic of China (PRC) and separate republics of the Soviet Union, although no supporting
territorial or boundary agreements between the :PRC and individual republic governments are known to
exist. The governments of these republics presumably will assent to any territorial changes made on
their behalf by the Moscow government in future boundary agreements with the PRC.
Between 1758 and 1800 the Manchus installed selected groups of Mongols, Manchus, Daghors (Tahurs),
Sibos (Hsi-po), and Soluns (now classed with Sibos) at key places in the Tekes, Ili, Boro Tale, Emel',
and Kobuk River Valleys. Descendants of these settlers have remained in these predominantly Kazakh
areas and have probably been more effective than. inanimate boundary markers in making obvious the
working limits of "original" Chinese sovereignty and thus reaffirming the Chinese position.
The Border Area
For most of its length the boundary between Sinkiang and the USSR follows or crosses mountains.
These mountains separate the large interior drainage basins characteristic of Central Asia. Only in
the few areas where the boundary crosses stream valleys at lower elevations are appreciable concen-
trations of population found in the immediate vicinity of the border.
From the trijunction of the China - Afghanistan - USSR boundaries at the end of the Wakhan Cor-
ridor, the boundary between Sinkiang and. the USSR extends northward to the area of Irkeshtam, follow-
ing the Khrebet Sarykol'skiy and connecting watersheds that divide the rugged and deeply dissected
mountains of southwestern Sinkiang from the Pamirs of the USSR. The "pamirs" are treeless, glaciated
valleys at elevations of 12,000 to 14,000 feet, filled with alluvium and detritus and rimmed by
higher snow-crowned peaks. Although these valleys lack timber and cultivation, pasturage is abun-
dant. Snowfall is light, but winds and low temperatures make the region inhospitable in winter.
Transborder movement is restricted. to passes except where the border traverses an area of lakes and
low relief extending eastward. from Kizil Jik Dawan.
Northeastward from Irkeshtam to the lofty mass of peaks and glaciers centered on the peak Khan
Tengri (elevation 22,853 feet)., the border follows the major southern range of the multitiered Tien
Shan. Elevations in most of this sector range from 12,000 to 15,000 feet, and. the border is perma-
nently snow covered for about one-fourth of its length. Rivers in the border region tend to parallel
the border; their valleys sustain.a sparse population of Kirghiz nomads. Several passes and trans-
border stream valleys facilitate movement between the numerous occupied valleys on the USSR side and
the occupied fringes of Kirghiz country in the uplands on the Sinkiang side. Prevailing northwest
winds lose most of their moisture before they cross. the mountains into Sinkiang,. Consequently, the
growth of steppe grasses on the Chinese side of this section of the border is not sufficient to
support a large nomadic population, but summer meltwaters from the high mountains nourish large oases.
Northward from Khan Tengri, -the border crosses the broad interior valleys of the east-flowing
Tekes River (elevation about 5,800 feet at the border) and the west-flowing Ili River (elevation
about 2,130 feet at the border), both of which are sheltered by successive east-west trending ranges
of the Tien Shan. It then turns,gastward along the 130-mile ridge of the-Dzhungarskiy Ala-Tau to
reach the south-draining trench known as the Dzungarian Gate (elevation about 700 feet). The good
water supplies and productive soils of these valleys andof -the valleys of the Kash and Kunges
Ri-ers east of the boundary support extensive agriculture and stockraising. Trransborder movement
is convenient along the foothills of the Tekes and Ili Valleys.
Between -the Dzungarian Gate and the trijunction of the China - Mongolia - USSR boundaries, the
Sinkiang boundary crosses a broad area of mountains, lakes, and deserts. The topography here varies
from high ridges and sharply defined peaks of Alpine appearance to elevated tablelands and low hill
areas. Mountain elevations range from 6,000 to 10,000 feet, and the larger valleys lie at 1,500 to
3,500 feet. The west-flowing Emel' River (elevation about 1,450 feet at the border) and Kara Irtish
River (elevation about 1,475 feet at the border) cross the border in broad valleys that are important
as corridors for movement. Sparse but varied vegetation is found in the mountains and higher hills.
The lower hills and valleys are desertl:ike and unfavorable to agriculture except in such favored
locations as T'a-ch'eng and the sheltered valleys on -the southern flank of the Altai Mountains,
where enough water is available to support shrubs, grasses, and clumps of trees.
* In this memorandum Sinkiang is referred to as a province iin the geographic sense -- a distinct
part of a country. Politically, it is an "autonomous region," a special type of province established
for dealing with minority groups. Sinkiang was incorporated into the Chinese Empire about 1760 and
was made a political province in 1884. Since 1955 it has-been officially called the Sinkiang Uighur
Autonomous Region.
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 ORIENTATION
Karaganda.
Caspian Lake
Balkhash
3 Sea (5Aul
Sea 5
TURKESTAN(Ata
Aliroa Tashkent.
l1 Dushanbe.
VEGETATION - ECONOMIC RESOURCES
0 Sparse vegetation `~ :. ' }.,';j:;?'.G{:
desert or mountain
Grassland
Cultivated or oasis
Kazakh
? Kirghiz
Uighur
Tadzhik
Mongol
? Uzbek
RURAL DENSITY
per square kilometer
over 50
m10to50
1to10 t
under 1
and uninhabited
Imo: V
ii
Forest
ETHNIC GROUPS
POPULATION
Lake
Irkutsk Baikal
Oilfield
it Oil refinery
Coal mine
Pipelines.
South
China
Sea
U Han Chinese
T- TatarH- Hui (Chinese Muslim)
S- Sibo D . Oaghor
SELECTED ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
L Oblast'or chou
Hsien
(boundary approximate or
---conjectural)
Gorno-Aitayskaya
Avtonomnaya Oblast'f'
Hi Kazakh~
Autonomous C ou
Gorno-Badakhshanskaya
Avtonomnaya
Oblast'
U. S. S. R.
Chapchal SI o
Autonomous
Hsien
Kl~ISu'
p KlrghV ..C.
75
Kurghan
utonomous
Hsien
Ka~am
^.-.C)MunicJi~y
BorkTalu; iI
Mongol A.C.
Bayan Gol
Mongo A:C: -
Chang=chf
Hui
A.C.
URBAN POPULATION
O over 300,000
D. 100,000 to 300,000
? 30,000 to 100,000
CIA-RDP79- 1'W S O . BOR D E
- ??- International boundary
fix- International boundary, indefinite +-
- Internal administrative boundary
r-u; i-e Internal administrative center 0
14301 Spot height (in feet)
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OZE
/ss YK
532
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stn
AA K i...
Ozera
Sasgkka?'
tZEXO
AYSAN
BaQa
Nsar
Railroad
Railroad under construction
Road
airfield
*ass
Demarcated border
Chinese Nationalist claim
Chinese Communist claim
dropped in December 1953
atlas
Approved For R
BORDER ALIGNMENT
"Definite" on Chinese Communist
and Soviet maps, based on: 1860
Treaty of Peking, 1864 Treaty of
Tarbagatai (Chuguchak), and 1881
Treaty of St. Petersburg ("Treaty of
Ili")
Territories transferred by 1881 Treaty of St. Petersburg
Yielded by China
Yielded by China for resettlement of voluntary emigrants
BORDER ALIGNMENT
"Indefinite" on Chinese Communist maps
"Definite" on Soviet maps; based on 1895
Anglo-Russian treaty
C] "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic,"
194649 Soviet-oriented area of dissi-
dence (from 1944) and separatism
5/11 : CIA-RDP7 00A 16 6 I -
Altai dissident area (1944-50)
not fully controlled by "East
Turkestan" separatists
 Approved For Release 2QQ0/0 11 Cl Rnp79-010n?pn n n nl-7
a religiously motivated anti-Soviet East I~ukestan RepuT7ic wzth'a331~s~'tQ~St at Kashgar,
which existed between November 1933 and June 1934. A 1944 uprising in the Kuldja area, under the
leadership of revolutionaries trained and inspired by the USSR, led to the creation in 1946 of an
anti-Chinese "East Turkestan Autonomous Republic," which dominated the Kuldja, and Chuguchak areas
until it was finally eliminated in 1949 at the time of the Chinese Communist takeover. Although Sin-
kiang's non-Chinese peoples lack the political cohesiveness to capitalize on their Muslim religious
and Turkic linguistic ties without outside assistance, these ties help to sustain an inclination to
sinophobia with which the Peking, regime must cope.
Prospects
Several factors contribute to the inherently adverse Chinese strategic position in Sinkiang.
The physical orientation of Sinkiang and its isolation from China Proper tend to weaken the ties of
the province with Communist China. The polyglot population, traditionally vulnerable to subversion,
is unsettled. Economic and social aspirations in the western region of Sinkiang are difficult to
keep dissociated from those in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakh SSR. A large proportion of the popu-
lation, agricultural and pastoral resources, and most of the petroleum industry of Sinkiang are con-
centrated inconveniently close to the boundary with the USSR. Completion of the Soviet portion of
the Aktogay-Lanchow Railroad has increased the strategic advantage of the USSR because the railroad
now terminates at a point on the border where it outflanks adjacent parts of the frontier; Soviet
military forces would be capable of rapidly isolating the various regions of the province from each
other and from the rest of Communist China. The 36,000 regular Chinese Communist troops estimated
to be stationed in Sinkiang (1.4 percent of the total ground forces in Communist China) are able to
control the border in critical sectors, keep internal order, and provide guidance and support for
the Public Security forces and the SPCAG. They are, however, obviously too few for defense.
Recent history does not suggest that the USSR covets Sinkiang as real estate. Soviet interest
in this hard-to-govern province has been expressed historically through economic penetration of the
province and through political measures designed to keep the semi-colonial Soviet domains in Central
Asia and Kazakh SSR insulated from outside influences. The Chinese Communists, nonetheless, are
steadfast in their efforts to control and sinicize the province, whatever the degree of Soviet sen-
sitivity regarding such activities near the border. The outcome of the possible territorial nego-
tiations with the USSR recently forecast by Chou En-lai may have an unanticipated depressant effect.
The prospect, however, is for Sinkiang's continued involvement in the basic hostilities between the
two powers.
N
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s
The established transborder transportation routes are limited all-wea her, grave
cross the border at Chi-mu-nai, Bakhty, Khorgos (Ho-ch'eng), Turug Art Dawan, and Irkeshtam. The
Kuldja area has convenient highway and river connections with Alma-Ata, in the USSR, but is rela-
tively isolated from the rest of Sinkiang. Its only convenient outlet to Dzungaria and eastward is
by a mountain road near the boundary, which can easily be blocked. A limited all-weather route from
Kuldja to A-k'o-su (Aksu) via the Muz Art Dawan (elevation 11,840 feet) is still incomplete, and the
alternate route via Kucha apparently is still in use. A system of roads extending northward from
Wu-su serves the remote towns, administrative centers, and state farms of western Dzungaria and the
Altai Mountains region. In the Pamirs to the south a motorable road connects Tash Kurghan (P'u-li)
with the highway junction point of Murgab in the Oksu (Aq Su) River Valley of the USSR. Autumn and
winter are the best times for surface movement on plains and in valleys, although roads across high
passes may be closed by winter snows. Floods of meltwater also may close highways in mountains and
in marshy areas during the spring and early summer.
Truck transportation is supplemented by seasonal waterborne transportation on the Ili River
below San-tao-ho-tzu, a border transshipment point, and on the Kara Irtish River below Pu-erh-citing.
The extensive system of airfields and surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites in Soviet Central Asia
is not matched in Sinkiang. Domestic civil air service connects Urumchi with the border area towns
of Sharasume (A-lo-t'ai), Karamai, Chuguchak, Kuldja, Kucha, A-k'o-su, and Kashgar. There is no
international air service. Scheduled flights from Urumchi and Kuldja to Alma-Ata have been dis-
continued.
Population Factors
Composition and Distribution
About three-fifths of the population of Sinkiang lives within 150 miles of the China - USSR
boundary. The ethnic composition of this zone is comparable to that of the province as a whole
except for the virtual absence of Hui and a lower proportion of Han Chinese. The population of Sin-
kiang and of Soviet Central Asia and Kazakh SSR in 1958 and 1959, respectively, by principal census
groups, is tabulated below. Turkmen (981,000 in the USSR in 1959) and certain other peoples not in
Sinkiang are omitted from the tabulation.
Uighur (Turki)
Han Chinese
Kazakh
Hui (Chinese Muslims)
Mongol
Kirghiz (Kirgiz)
Tadzhik
Uzbek
Sibo (Hsi-po)
Russian
Tatar (Tartar)
Manchu
Daghor (Tahur)
Unidentified
Soviet Central Asia
Sinkiang a and Kazakh SSR
195 1959
4,000,000 93,000
610,000 1 3,000
500,000 3,232,000
140,000 21,000
60,000
50,000 to 68,000 ? 962,000
15,000 1,3
13,000 5,973,000
11,000 0
8,000 7,376,000
3,350 780,000
1,000 0
2,000 0
120,000 ?
a. The population of Sinkiang presumably was 7 million in October 1962,
6,480,000 in 1960, and 5,550,000 in 1958. These figures may be projec-
tions from the 1953 census figures of 4,873,000.
b. Possibly does not include the 200,000 to 300,000 members of the Sin-
kiang Production and Construction Army Group (SPCAG) and their families.
c. Includes Ukrainian and Byelorussian.
About one-fourth of the inhabitants of the 150-mile-deep border area live within and north of
the Tien Shan. The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou -- in the Tien Shan, western Dzungaria, and the Altai
Mountains -- has a population of more than 1 million, an increase of about 30 percent since 1955.
Within the Autonomous Chou, the Ili region has about twice the population of the Chuguchak (T'a-ch'eng)
and A-to-t'ai (Altai) regions combined. About one-third of the people in the north are city or town
dwellers engaged in mining, transportation, construction, and other occupations; another one-third
are settled rural inhabitants engaged in agriculture, grazing, mixed farming, and stockraising; the
remainder are nomads or ex-nomads.
South of the Tien Shan, on the desert fringes of the Takla Makan Desert, the population consists
almost entirely of oasis-dwelling Uighur farmers, augmented by a small but growing percentage of
Chinese colonists on state farms in reclamation areas. Only about 10 percent of the inhabitants are
town dwellers, but 40 or 50 percent live in intensively cultivated, irrigated oases, close to towns
and bazaars where-rumors and news originate. The Yarkand, Kashgar, and A-k'o-su oases have the prin-
cipal concentrations of population. In parts of the surrounding mountains, smaller communities of
Kirghiz and Tadzhiks practice mixed farming and stockraising.
The largest city in the border area is Kuldja, which may have grown somewhat since 1959 when it
had a population of 160,000. None of the cities and towns in the border area are as large as Urum-
chi, the capital and largest city of Sinkiang, with a population of about 400,000 in 1963. The com-
bined population of the 10 or 12 principal cities and towns in the border area probably exceeds
500,000, about one-sixth of the total population there. Most of the remaining five-sixths live near
principal trade routes, where they have been exposed to outside influences. This rural population
can be cc n e1uedi 0rO5II I : C' eI '6P79 01to the 006A000100360001-7vents.
 MovemeiApproved For Release 2000/05/11: CIA-RDP79-01006A000100360001-7
A westward movement of Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Uighurs, Tatars, and Russians from Sinkiang
into the USSR has been taking place since 1953; illegal crossing began to become important after
1958. Border controls, although inherently stringent, are relatively easy to circumvent because
the physical character and great length of the border make enforcement difficult and because move-
ments of tribesmen with livestock are hard to control. Estimates of the numbers of the non-Chinese
in Sinkiang who have migrated to the USSR in the past 3 years range from 25,000 to 100,000. Large-
scale border crossings by Kazakhs and Uighurs occurred in the Chuguchak and Kuldja areas in 1962;
60,000 or more Kazakhs reportedly crossed in mid-1962, but some may have returned. Press reports
also cite movements during 1963 of substantial. numbers of Kirghiz and Tadzhiks from areas near
.A-k'o-su and Kashgar and on the fringes of the Pamirs. The exodus probably included more than
6,000 ethnic Russians. By now virtually all Russians who entered the province from the USSR since
1917 have again departed.
The movement of Chinese settlers into Sinkiang is an official government program. The Peking
regime selects skilled and semiskilled workers, ex-students, and surplus farm and city residents to
augment the already large number of ex-military colonists who have been resettled in Sinkiang. The
present Han Chinese population is probably between 800,000 and 2 million. Proportionally it con-
stituted some 15 to 30 percent of the total provincial population in 1962 as compared with some 11
to 18 percent in 1958. The number of Chinese immigrants who can be accommodated in Sinkiang is
limited by the pace at which productive land for resettlement can be reclaimed or vacated and by the
amount of surplus foodstuffs available for nonagricultural labor.
Many newcomers, some of whom are apparently unprepared for the rigors of their new life, are
resettled by the Sinkiang Production and Construction Army Group (SPCAG), a quasi-military agency
comprised of old combat units grouped in military colonies. The SPCAG, which operates independently
of local governments, has relocated in reclamation areas and on scores of state farms (now 149 in the
entire province, including 1.4 agricultural and 4 stockbreeding farms in the Ili River Basin alone)
the veterans of the Chinese Nationalist Sinkiang Garrison Forces and the Chinese Communist forces
that were in Sinkiang in 1950 and. later arrivals. These garrison-type units follow a military sys-
tem of administration, discipline, and. guidance, although their members are disarmed and no longer
have a combat potential except as militia. Selected units may possibly be participating now in the
reported buildup of the numerical strength of the Public Security forces in the border area. The
indigenous people have greeted SPCAG activities, and the movement of Chinese settlers in general,
with less than enthusiasm. The many Chinese who participate in local government, however, are the
primary targets of resentment.
Economic Factors
The natural resources of northwestern Sinkiang, although relatively limited, make the border area
potentially self-sufficient and provide useful surpluses for export. Coal deposits are fairly broad-
ly distributed and are exploited for local use. Petroleum reserves at Karamal, Wu-erh.-ho, and
Tu-shan-tzu are small. One of the few iron ore deposits in Sinkiang is in the Kunges Valley; the
magnetitic ore from this deposit is smelted at :Elsin-Yuan. Metallic ores found in the border area
contain lithium, beryllium, niobium, uranium, tungsten, molybdenum, copper, lead, zinc, gold, and
possibly tin and silver. Of the many probable occurrences of uranium-bearing minerals in Sinkiang,
four of the five most important are close to the northwestern boundary of Sinkiang -- at Fu-yun, in
the Ya-tzu-k'ou (Ulugh Chat) - A.-t'u-shih (Artush) area, in the A-k'o-su - Kucha area, and in the
Kunges Valley. Present efforts to increase and improve the use of available agricultural and grazing
land (including that which can be reclaimed) could, if successful, support a provincial. population
estimated conservatively to be about 10 million -- an increase of about one-third over the present
population. The livestock industry, however, requires large-scale production of fodder crops to
replace the loss of grazing lands to agriculture, and the reclamation of marginal lands is slow and
laborious.
Sino-Soviet collaboration in Sinkiang was active in the period between the mid-1930's and 1960
and contributed tangibly to the economic development of the province. It facilitated the export to
the USSR of a wide variety of animal and agricultural products, as well as mineral concentrates.
This export is apparently still continuing, although probably at a reduced level. In 1955-56, for
example, two-thirds of the grain exports of the Kuldja and Chuguchak areas went to the Soviet Union,
but proportionately more grain probably is now going eastward to the developing Urumchi area, the
principal food-deficit region in Sinkiang.
Construction of the Turkestan-Siberian Railroad, which kinks Soviet Central Asia with the Trans-
Siberian Railroad, has had an adverse effect on Chinese interests in Sinkiang. Completion of the
railroad in 1930 caused the external trade of Sinkiang to tend to flow toward the USSR to avoid the
slow and costly overland freight service to the Chinese railhead at Pao-t'ou, about 1,100 miles east
of Urumchi. On the Chinese side of the border the final 298?-mile section of the Aktogay-Lanchow
Railroad, between Urumchi and the completed Soviet railhead at the Dzungarian Gate (A-la Shan-k'ou),
remains unbuilt. In view of the deterioration of Sino-Soviet; relations, completion of the line seems
unlikely at present.
Political Factors
The USSR and the People's Republic of China are ideologically. competitive in the border area of
:northwestern Sinkiang. National self-determination, which is professed as a constitutional right in
the USSR and expressed in a federal state organization, is rejected by Communist China, which
stresses a unitary state organization as its basic constitutional principle. In practice, therefore,
the Soviet territorial system of federated SSR's organized by nationalities is less offensive to
ethnic loyalties than the Chinese system of self-administration ("autonomy") for subject minorities,
with emphasis on cultural fusion through "national union." In 1957-58 the alleged preference of
Uighur and Kazakh spokesmen in Sinkiang for the Soviet system drew blunt Chinese rejection of its
applicability to Sinkiang, as expressed in a purge of certain non-Chinese political leaders in 1958.
Separatism is a longstanding political factor in Sinkiang that has taken both religious and anti-
Chinese nationalistic forms. Muslim disorders in 1931-35, for example, included the establishment of
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