(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01048A000100060007-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: SPEECH

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We Robert Amory -refaced his comments on the Sov` t Union and its objec-
tives and policies by . .'erring to the two aspects of h~_ limited war and the
confrontation of atomic power may look from Moscow:
1. to moves today by us to increase our limited war aapabilities and
2. to specific situations in which these enhanced capabilities might
be used.
This estimate of these aspects depends upon this evaluation of the contemporary
U.S.S.R. and its future within the next twenty years. In making such an evalua-
tion, there are two premises; 1) nuclear, general war is unthinkable; the
Soviets are convinced of the appalling destruction which would result and reached
this conclusion more fully and swiftly and 2) thslrpeace -- in the minimum sense
of t1 word as the absence of open warfare -- is to their advantage; they have
about completed the gigantic job o?building their economy.. /after the losses
of the war the last conflict.(World"War II) "cost two five-year plans;" by
mid-1970's their industrial productivity curve vill cross our own; why should
they alter these conditions? They are fully confident. Yet they remain wateh-
ful and suspicious of us and will not, therefore, let their guard down.
The Soviets demonstrated this suspicion when in June, 1953, their troop
deploPments at the time of the Berlin riots were to defensive positions against an
expected allied attack. They were convinced we had pu J.ed the riots off as a
prelude to war. A scemewhat similar situation oeeurred in the Tanking Delta
when we appeared to be sisoiling for a fight. Our attitude towards the offshore
islands also appears to be a prwfocation by us to c
partner.
Ne;rt ? evlievr Ca is -------
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u s. Chair a to: TS
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Soviet military forces appear to be soundly conceived with tremendous chances
taken on untested modelat, this has been particularly apparent in the aircraft they
are producing: a B-52 type comparable to ours was produced in four years; it took
us eight years. IL26 jet light bombers total some six thousand compared with our
few hundreds. Nevertheless we . ich exaggerate the percentage of their effort in
military fields. They did reduce tneir forces by 640,000 and now have some
3,500,000 in forces while we have some 2,900,000. They have i.6 per cent of their
population in forces, we have 1.8 per cent. The idea of Russia being a.nation in arms
held back by the A-Bomb is ridiculous. Tha tr submarine fleet is four times our own;
if we did not win an air war they would dominate the Northern Pacific, But in a
world-wide sense they do not threaten us.
We are overly concerned with an attack upon Europe, as well as with peripheral
aggression. In the last decade Korea was the only. case of overt Soviet aggress;t/
miscalculation on the part of the U.S.S.R.,and they realize that victory would no
come cheaply. Indochina is utterly irrelevant; in early 1954, the highest estimate
of Chinese aid to North Vietnam was only 3,000 tons a month of materiel, the equi-
valent of one liberty ship load every ninety days. On the contrary, the Soviets have
shown extreme wariness -- in-Afghanistan, for example, -- and they could have done
much more with the farther Laos or with East German rearmament than they have. Where
is the likelihood of peripheral aggression? Possibly over the off-shore islands
this spring (twenty-four hours after the Israeli take on the Syrians.); to the
Communists such an operation would be the completion of a revolution, the achieve-
ment of a sovereign right, Such a move would not be regarded as expansion but
restoration.
What would be the Soviet reactiuttif we raised the level of our forces?
It would be a reaction of grave doubts as to the President's sincerity and what
we have been saying about preventive war; the gains for us in raising the levels
would not be worthwhile for the Soviets would.alk why we were raising our forces.
As for their reaction to specific crises -- such as a SAC base in Pakistan -- the
Soviets might make a counter-move and pull a "Prague" in Kabul; if we supported an
exile government and went in militarily their reaction would be sufficient to defeat
us. They would move similarly if a coup should take place in a satellite. If our
objective is to hold wlere we'are, then the situation will remain as it is; if we
try and nibble away then we will meet with a reaction for the Soviets are not
going to be pushed around. The Soviets are concentrating intensively, not extensively,
on the creation of economic power. They do want disarmament. The real problems
are posed by economic development, not by U.S.S.R. bayonets. We have to recognize
the gigantic American economy has a world role responsibility and is not for
us to enjoy alone.
Mr. Kennan described this analysis se very realistic and penetrative. It is
important to underscore the remark of Mr. Amory that the Russians emphasize the
development of their own country and they take great pride in their accomplish-
ments. With respect to such areas as Indochina we must acknowledge the Soviets
are not responsible for everything; they are not supporting subversive elements
there. With respect to the periphery, there is the source of tension and the remarksof
Khrushchev are important. The assumption that Communist parties may now come into
power by parliamentary means seems an acquiesoen(oto "Titoism" in advance to a kind
of ,eft-wing power which is anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist) wary of the United
States and not ''eally fully under Moscow's dictation. Stalin would never have
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accepted this, he thought in terms of general power. So if the regime has changed,
with respect to the periphery, the Soviets will be content to settle for anti-
-'m?ricanism or the elimination of American influence; complete Soviet domina-
tion is not needed. The Soviets would, 06r example, like to see this in South
Asia.
Mr. Kennan and Mr. Amory agreed further that the Soviets are being even
more subtle: saying, in effect, "get all the aid you can get from both sides" --
they are not saying you have to be for us or against us; no political or military
alliances and not too much encouragement in coups by Communist parties, "go
ahead and fight your own problems in parliamentary battles; we don't insist
you remain a conspiratorial subversive group." This policy lessens the degree
of making them puppets and also increases the danger of localCommunist Parties
being successful. This will be important to us if we cling to a strongly
military posture; that war is the only outcome -- if we do so our prestige is
going to plummet. We have to settle for something "fuzzy."
Mr. Altschul asked if this is the policy and program, what does it portend
for us in the world conflict; what lines of policy should we adopt?
Mr. Amory replied we still have some chips on our side. No area of the
world has opted voluntarily for Communism. If we are willing to stand up and
be counted on the humanitarian front as we have on the military, we can beat
+hem hands down. Ultimately, we can look forward to a merger between the two
systems. There is a great difference in attitude of-=any in the U.S.S.R. --
(development of a managerial group, etc.); we have to keep their system from
taking over through our default and thereby isolating ourselves. Does the
Soviet system "contain the seeds of its own destruction"? It will modify itself
into more benign channels -- a welfare state is not at all impossible. Mr.
Kennan said he was referring in his article to Stalin's policies and that
1F r"'.Yshchev and Co. are aware of Stalin.
Mr. Johnson said he knew these points had to be stated but that he had a
real fear concerning our nuclear situation if the American people were to
believe Mr. Amory and Mr. Kennan were right; their reaction to our military
defenses would be catastrophic. We may run the danger of a unilateral disarm-
ament scheme -- and it is essential we maintain our nuclear capabilities.
Concerning economic assistance, Mr. Johnson expressed the fear that when we do
participate in development programs we are charged with economic imperialism.
How can we launch a non-military campaign and do it so we don't look imperialist?
Mr. Franklin asked to what extent we could give other states the greater ini-
tiative in seeking the aid and setting their requirements.
Mr. Amory thought greater use of multi-national groups would help -- giving
through the Colombo plan, for example, would help remove the curse. Now can
the Russians afford a large program? They are not making gifts but postponing
payments and accepting "soft" credits. They are also accepting the idea of a
rational division of labor -- if someone else can produce rice cheaper, well
and good. They can give us a real challenge here; we have to do something about
preserving our over-all national interests and stop California frcre...growing rice.
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Mr. Kis&inger suggested that whatever might happen eventually about the
two systems at the present moment they must act according to their best lights;
with reference to aid, our problem has been one of political legitimacy. The
Soviets have gained much from the promise of aid , we have gained little from
its actuality; we have not developed a political legitimacy or framework in
which aid might fit; in the Middle East, for example, the initial impact of
economic aid will be unsettling. On the military side, the very fact the
Soviets have a certain missile capability has an impact on the periphery even
if that capability is never used. Mr. Amory thought the Soviets would resist
coups in the satellite areas; Mr. Kissinger asked what our position would be,
if there were a coup in Iran?
Mr. Amory agreed no charitable "egg-head" program is useful. But relative-
ly small Mounts of aid behind a government such as India would be of significant
help and avoid an extremist situation; $200,000,000 a year might do it -- we have
$175,000,000 in military equipment in Matsu and Quemoy. Libya is holding us
up to the tune of $5,000,000 a year to keep its internal air line from the
'Soviets; on a per capita basis, this would be the equivalent of $5,000,000,000
to India. Also long-range planning is essential: $20,000,000 spread over
10 years may be far more useful than $40,000,000 this year and may be nothing
next year. Mr. Amory agreed that until we get proper safeguards, armaments
must be matched. As for what would happen in Italy (sic) if Communistatook over?
We cannot let it go and it won't happen without a legitimate government in
exile. We cannot attack a "popular front" and Italy might drift away through
such a device.
Mr. Kennan, referring back to Mr. Johnson's question, said the American
people must be given the whole story; if they won't support an arms program
when the reasons for it are true, then what further course lies ahead? We
should make an effort to persuade people we are keeping the weapons reluctantly.
The weapons must not creep into our public posture. Concerning Mr. Amor~Os
suggestion, we would do well to recompense every manufacturer "suffering"
from our tariff policies and encourage trade through a governmental trading
corporation with substantial capital and leeway. We should use our best brains
in the process; lay off areas where blackmail is offered -- when that has come
up, you have already lost.
Mr. Altschul noted the earlier comments that the Soviet Union has no
intention of going to war and id full of confidence for the future; also that
their system is being modified and may yet approach our own. If these remarks
are true, why should we care about n;king an effort at all? Yet aren't there
some basic values involved? Such as the relationship of the state to the
individual'? Do we want a world dominated by the Soviet system? How can we
prevent this from taking place? Isn't there something else involved, something
more fundamental than that implied in a race between two economic systems?
We cannot ignore the fundamental, human values; there are these greater values
at stake. We must look with misgivings on any further expansion.
Do we have to change our state of mind? Unless the challenge of values
is recognized we are not going to respond in the economic domain. If we move from
a military challenge and decide there is a challenge in human values and in
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national values we shall have to reorganize our thinking and our methods -- a
monumental task of self-criticism which we have not yet accepted.
Mr. Amory replied it is not just a race between Magnitogorsk and Gary;
moral values are innate; each has had a great cultural past. The development
Mr. Amory envisaged is one in which these things which were suppressed in the
cult of~;hatred will reappear. If we can get through the iron curtain and not
try to win everything at once, Mr. Amory was convinced the two systems will
move together on a more fundamental level than the economic. More arguments in
the Central Committee will lead to something like our House of Representatives
and lead eventually to free elections. The breakdown of the Iron Curtain is
not a disaster to America. If Harvard students live in Russia and Russian
students live in Harvard, you would have the eventual prospect of two societies
living together. Also, it is well to remember that our values are not found
among all our associates.
Mr. Johnson supported Mr. Altschul's concern. If the trends are in that
direction, as described by Mr. Amory, what is the point of an all-out effort on
our part for the next fifty years? Mr. Amory replied it may not be necessary
if we go at it in the right way. Unless another mad Czar --a Stalin or another
great miscalculation occurs, it may not be necessary. We have to sell the
American people on adequate military preparedness but this does not mean we have
to have unlimited superiority over Russian efforts. We could live with a mixture
of the Bulganin-Eisenhower proposals for inspection. Mr. Smyth added that some-
thing in this line is better than nothing.
Mr. Kissinger reverted to his question of Iran. There are some areas we
can't let go Communist. If the Tudeh Party takes over, we should have to react.
Unless we are willing to do so we shall lose continuously -- the question is still
relevant -- how far do we react? Mr. Franklin added we are very much less likely
to have war when there is a real danger of both sides being wiped out. If we
reduce power, particularly nuclear power, by half, then half, as Mr. Amory
suggested, we would be returning to an earlier situation when the possible gains
from war would not be ruled out by the possibility of national suicide.
Mr. Altschul asked if there were no place where vital American interests
would be at stake and we would be obliged to go to war? Mr. Amory suggested
any NATO country including West Germany. Mr. Altschul asked about the Middle
East. Mr. Amory replied that the possibility of overt aggression is remote but
that in such an event, a vital American interest would be at stake. But our
response to an attack upon Syria, Iran or Turkey should be in limited war with
every effort to contain it.
Melvin Conant
Rapporteur
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