LETTER TO HONORABLE TEODORO MOSCOSO FROM(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002900220017-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: January 18, 1962
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R002900220017-1
ER: 62-377/a
STAT
LoxMosooso4fAss1e
r ftiFIttnAaeriut
yartment [mate
Agency far International Devalopsent
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Mr, Moaeoso
Mcecsie has asked 11le tO acknow and theuak you
letter cif 16 *Tamers aneln3tb
you by raterials
lIce4me hits "Ward wee of our specialists haw
to st&y these proposals and h* will be in further touch
vith nzard.tng this subject
afrieer
0/DCl/I 18 Jan 62
Distribution:
orig & 1 - addressee
I - JSE loOmimic
1 - DD/P wicy of basic and enclosures
ER
I -FMC
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STAT
STAT
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ER 61-9864/
t7-
Mr. HowardjrnaaJ
Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary
for Atomic Energy and Outer Space
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Mr. Turnas:
STAT
Attached are this Agency's comirtents on the draft of a proposed
approach to the problem of dealing with Soviet anti-missile taps
.-
Witty claims which you referred to us on 22 December 1961.
t.6A6ELL
(;? P. Cabell
General, USAF
3eputy Oirector
Attaclunent
Distribution:
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Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R002900220017-1
GENERAL COMMENTS
As the paper implies, it is noteworthy that the soviet Union has not yet
developed a stronger propaganda campaign on the subject of anti-missile
capabilities. There may be certain definite considerations restraining
the Soviets from making false claims. If the Soviet Union should claim to
be invulnerable, there would be great pressure from Peiping and other
quarters for a more aggressive policy. If the Soviet claim were actually
false, Moscow might be forced either to back down or go through with a
nuclear war. Moscow may also hesitate to make false claims out of
respect for our monitoring system. Further, there might just possibly be a
belief that loud claims of an approaching Soviet invulnerability that would
make Western leaders, especielly military, behave irrationally and launch
a preventive war in a last futile effort to postpone the death of capitalism.
We might point out that, although the first American reaction to any Soviet
claim to prowess is usually disbelief, serious, explicit Soviet claims in
such fields as rockets and nuclear weapons have generally proved to have
some foundation. Thus a major Soviet campaign on anti-missile capability
may well, when it comes, betoken a genuine capability of considerable
dimensions, although not necessarily adequate to offset a U.S. attack.
As matters stand, Malinovskyls statement (as you have noted) implies
a potential, not current capability. General Kasakov (see FEIS RS. 49, p. 16)
speaks vaguely of land, sea, and air targets. Khrushchev, who is notoriously
bullish and who is sometimes unguarded in his statements, appears to
have been jumping the gun in his talk with Speak; his reply to Sulzberger's
question was evasive, and claimed only satisfaction 'with the work going
on. General Kuleshov's embroidery on Malinarsky (RS. 49. p. 16) is
most ominous, though it offers no evidence.
Despite the foregoing, a false campaign on anti-missile strength is
definitely a possibility (perhaps at the next intensification of the Berlin
crisis). Rather than make an immediate assertion of a general
capability, the Soviet government will probably publish a cumulative
series of Khrushchevian assertions, reports of successes, and rumors
of startling accompLishments. And there is also an eventual reel
capability to reckon with. The latter would of course have immense
psychological significance, for it would not only encourage warlike
Soviet policies, but also?more than false claims, which we could more
or less readily contest?tend to divide NATO and to weaken the American
will to resist. We think your draft paper offers a sound program for
dealing with the over-all problem. but we offer the specific comments
which follow.
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SPECIFIC COMMENTS
Page 4. para. I: V e agree that the treatment of Soviet capabilities
should be in a low key, and in fact we feel that there may be a danger.
after as well as before the Soviet campaign begins, of "protesting too
much" on our ability to outmatch Soviet defenses, thus drawing attention
to Soviet claims. But we should seize the opportunity. before the Soviet
campaign begins, to stress our own anti-missile program, and the U.S.
offensive capability, including a wide range of weapons, thus creating
publie awareness before our information campaign appears a mere
response to Soviet claims. We can also draw en some Soviet statements.
(see RS. 49. p. 15).
Page 5, para. 3a: We must expect the Soviets also to produce photographs,
as well as "eye-witness reports." damaged missiles which have been
"shot down," and so forth. Again, it would be desirable to get our
evidence fully in the public eye before the Soviets begin presenting theirs.
Pages 6 and 7. zara. 4a: Supersonic aircraft, aircraft with air-to-
surface missiles, and Polaris underwater-launched missiles would seem
to be the most convincing weapons to stress.
Page 7, para. 4b: Historical precedents appear only slightly convincing
under the projected conditions. Moreover. in World War I. defense had
the advantage. Instead, we might argue that, in the nuclear age, the
offensive has an unprecedented advantage over the defense.
Page 7. para. 4d, last sentence: Once these developments have
reached a point where the United States can present a convincing claim
to capability, security hesitations should be reviewed in the light of (a)
probable Soviet knowledge, and (b) the extreme importance of assuring
free world publics that we have an effective deterrent. In other words,
while avoiding needless disclosures, and revelations which will assist
the Soviets in developing counter-measures, we should remember
that the policy aim of maintaining a convincing deterrent has priority
over security for security's sake. This comment also applies to the
first paragraph of p.8.
Paje 9, pares. 3 and 4: We would be prepared to try to identify
types of demonstrations the Soviet Union might give. Then we would
also be ready to call attention to doubtful aspects of Soviet claims.
Pages 9 and 10, para. Sc: This would be very good, if we were confident
of success. Failure would be so serious that this action seems ruled out.
Page 10, para. 6: Agree.
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Attachment: FBIS research series. As. ifis. J.pcvsztoner
ADDRESS OFFICIAL CAMAIL.I,NLCAATIONS.T
IP a V
THE SECRETA . Mor Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80601676R062900220017-1
WASHINGTON 23, D. C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Dear General Cabell:
WASHINGTON
December 22, 1961
Attached is a draft of a proposed approach to
the problem of dealing with Soviet anti-missile
capability claims. Will you please send me any
comments or suggested revisions you may have,
especially in the light of the technical briefing
we received the other day in the meeting with Mt.
It is my feeling that we should not nonqattempt
to outline detailed steps for use in case of Soviet
actions, but that we should agree on a statement of
basic principles to govern activities which individual
agencies will need to undertake. The agencies should,
of course, begin as soon as possible to prepare for
measures in their respective fields, and an agreed
contingency plan will provide the necessary guidance
for such preparations.
When I have received your comments and suggestions,
we can consider the question of the next meeting of the
group.
Sincerely yours,
Howard Furnas
Deputy
Attachment.
General Charles P. Cabell,
Deputy Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.
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' Ifiymerafialotylraoptownet 1.pr :Dtlilea?sttwteoomuustc4.1y.oidige
of 12/22/61 to DDCI from Mr. Howard Furnas,
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transmitting for comment draft of anti-missile
capability.
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