INDIA S POTENTIAL REACTION TO AMERICAN MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200330024-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: November 24, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No. 1471 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Copy No. Olt
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
24 November 1953
INDIA'S POTENTIAL REACTION TO AMERICAN MILITARY AID
TO PAKISTAN
India's reaction to a military aid agreement between Paki-
stan and the United States would be little more than verbal.
There is no important political, economic, or military action
India would be likely to take against either country that would
materially affect American security interests in South Asia or
elsewhere.
Within India itself, signature of the pact would be fol-
lowed immediately by bitter comment from both government offi-
cials and the press. This would be echoed by the Burmese and
Afghan press, which are already critical on the subject. Pres-
sure to take drastic action against Pakistan would be placed
on Prime Minister Nehru by Hindu nationalist groups such as
the Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.
These groups have long agitated for firmness in dealing with
Pakistan and they advocate the eventual reincorporation cat tnat
country with India. They would probably launch demonstrations
similar to those which in late 1952 and early 1953 seriously
embarrassed the Indian government's administration of the Kash-
mir situation. The Communists, with the support of the Moscow
and Peiping radios, would certainly begin a bitter campaign
of propaganda and demonstrations protesting American "imperial-
ism" in South Asia.
These communalist and Communist maneuvers might lead to
some incidents of violence affecting India's 40,000,000 Moslem
population, though for the most part the Indian public has
never displayed any real interest in Indo-Pakistani disputes.
As in the past, however, the net effect of any violence would
be to create a security situation which the present Congress
Party government could not tolerate and which it would take
firm steps to suppress before it got out of hand.
The only concrete move the Indian government might make
internally would be to reinforce its military establishment,
maintaining the same 2-to-1 ratio that presently exists between
tine Indian and Pakistani armies. This would of necessity be a
gradual process, generally parallelin the military buildup Pakistan. There is no indication wh 6pcattYt New Delhi would
even seriously consider war.
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India has several choices of retaliatory action toward
Pakistan, some of which it might take, but none of which
would essentially change the existing situation between the
two nations. India might limit air transport between East
and West Pakistan. It might limit certain items of trade,
though India's imports from Pakistan have ordinarily been
larger than its exports. In Kashmir, however 's of action is limited b , India
y free-
problem. Aside from the question dofacapabilitiestcomplete
cutting off of canal waters from West Pakistan would be so
obviously a retaliatory matter that the IBRD, now mediating
the dispute, would have to blame India for a failure of nego-
tiations. By taking an intransigent or discriminatory atti-
tude on such financial issues as refugee pro ert
would forfeit sums owed to it b p 3', New Delhi
larger than those it owes to Pak
y istan. stan that are considerably
In nearly all instances, unfriendly
would merely prolong a situation already six years old, de-
laying hope of settlements for which there isatpresentlittle
enough hope. The Indian government, despite its probable frame
of mind, is sufficiently aware of the facts to decide against
stringent action on most of these questions.
retaliotardythetenited SStates, India could, and probably would,
These would either have an insignificant eeffect aon Americant.
security interests or would merely accelerate developments
already under way without the provocation of a US-Pakistani
military pact.
These would include denunciation of the present air
agreement with the United States and limitation of American
air traffic in India, steps which New Delhi is already about
to take. Government pressure for the nationalization and In-
dianization of American-owned businesses would increase, forc-
ing the eventual withdrawal of some firms and making others
hesitate to place new investments.
ment in India is small. however, and~newtinvestmentesincev1.947
has been negligible. Pressure probably would not be applied
on the Stanvac, and Caltex oil companies now building oil re-
fineries in Bombay and Visakhapatnam, both of which are vital
to India's long-range interest and whose builders would not
respond readily to dictation. Missionary operations, already
being limited, would be increasingly curtailed.
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In the field. of new endeavors, India would lose much-
needed sources of dollar exchange if it ceased trading with
the United States in manganese and mica. Alternate sources
of supply now available or being developed make the problem
less critical for the United States than in 1947. India
could not withhold its jute products without losing. another
large source of income and without indirectly benefitting
Pakistan's jute industry.. The Indian economic situation is
such and the probable outcry from British and Indian business-
men in these trades would be such that the government could
hardly afford to indulge in economic warfare.
The international political arena is a potentially more
important region where India might conceivably affect Indo-
American relations and American strategic interests in Asia.
On the spot and in the United Nations, India could adopt an
apparently pro-Communist attitude toward such questions as
peace in Korea. It could intensify its efforts to obtain Com-
munist China's admission to the United Nations. In Southeast
Asia it could increasingly criticize American support of the
French in Indo-China. It could inspire the Burmese govern-
ment to embarrass the United States on the question of Chinese
Nationalist troops. In the Near East, Indian anti-Americanism
could take the form of agitation against American "meddling"
in Tunis, Morocco, Egypt, and Iran.
Indian adoption of a consistent pro-Communist or openly
anti-American line inside and outside the United Nations, how-
ever, would mean abandoning two of Prime Minister Nehru's most
basic positions. Constant favoring the Communist side would
soon destroy any impression of Indian neutrality, the keystone
of Nehru's foreign policy. It would also end any Indian hope
of becoming the leading nation of Asia and an important power
in world affairs. Any suggestion that New Delhi was becoming
a satellite of Moscow would immediately lessen Indian influ-
ence among both Asian and Western nations, which sometimes
follow India's lead or take advantage of its potential useful-
ness as a mediator between the Eastern and Western power blocs.
Southeast Asian nations, except possibly Burma and Indonesia,
would be even less inclined to take India's advice than they
now are. Near Eastern Moslem countries, which already look
to Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan for leadership rather than to
India, would continue to act independently on Tunis, Morocco,
Israel, and the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.
Furthermore, New Delhi is fully aware of the hazards
posed by Chinese possession of Tibet and of the food and secu-
rity problems which would be created if Southeast Asia fell
into Communist hands. Thus, Prime Minister Nehru seems un-
likely to retreat from his present stand of non-involvement
and to initiate a rapprochement with the Communist bloc.
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Possibly the most dangerous action India could take,
from the United States' point of view, would be to make itself
ineligible for continued American financial and technical aid,
either voluntarily or otherwise. India, in pique, could loosen
its administrative restrictions on the shipment of strategic
materials to the Orbit and by contravening the terms of the
Battle'Act force the United States to withdraw all assistance.
Alternatively, Indian press propaganda and diplomatic action
on the world front might so antagonize the American government
that aid would be withdrawn without specific provocation.
In either case, India would be faced with an essentially
unfavorable situation. American aid is now being offered at
the rate of about $90,000,000, annually, a sum not decisive in
guaranteeing Indian economic well-being but one of considerable
magnitude nonetheless. With its cessation
the experience and knowledge of American technical experts,
whose value is much greater than either their numbers or the
financial outlay involved in their salaries. Failure of India's
much-touted Five Year Plan would also be ensured. This, in
addition to the probable burden of increased military expendi-
tures, would lead to growing dissatisfaction with the ruling Con-
gress Party, to more extensive unemployment, and to unrest of
a nature far outweighing the small advantage to be gained by
any demonstration of India's independence of the West in thought
and deed. Nehru and the conservative leaders who hold the
purse-strings of the Congress Party fully recognize that the
party cannot afford a major setback to its prestige prior to
the national elections of 1956-57.
tentionally to create a situation more ifavorabledtohCommunistn'
exploitation than the present one, since Nehru and others have
spoken out forthrightly against the Communists.
Furthermore, the Orbit does not require large quantities
of Indian goods. Neither has it in the past demonstrated the
sincere desire or ability to supply India with the capital
goods it most urgently needs. It has confined most of its
large-scale shipments to food. Even su _
ness to make available a large number ofptechniccians,wNNewiDelhi
recognizes the dangers of accepting them.
ternatives to American aid, Nehru would In ly also eking oonsr er-
the possible unwillingness of Colombo Planocountriestoincrease
the amount of their assistance in the face of an American with-
drawal. It appears, therefore,that Nehru would hesitate to
jeopardize his dream of making India a
by taking any step which showed every indicationuofrdoingaso.
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As a final, and possibly most convincing point to con-
sider, Nehru and his government would have little reason to
believe that any action taken by them, most of which would be
deleterious to their country's political and economic positions,
would cause the United States to denounce its new agreement
with Pakistan and end American military aid. Without holding
a winning hand, India's leaders are unlikely to take major
risks.
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