JPRS ID: 8583 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/8583
23 July 1979
West Europe
Report
(FOUO 43/79)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPRS L/8583
23 July 1979
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 93/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
COUNTRY SECTION
FRANCE
PCF Seen Backing PSF's Rocard To Topple Mitterrand
(Andre Lesueur; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 4 Jun 79) 1
Styles of Weil, Marchais, MitCerrand, Chirac Compared " (Arthur Conte; PARIS MATCH, 1 Jun 79) 4
Ariane ProducCion Projected to Year 2000
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS9 9 Jun 79) 8
Large Ariane Satellite Market Projected
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 9 Jun 79) 23 _
Tactical Air Force J'aguara Evaluated
(Jean de Gblard; AIR & COSMOS, 21 Apr 79) 27
Briafs
Axmored Military Maneuvera 34
Corsican Autonomists Worrying 34
Basque Autonomiats Angered 34
PCF Redeftnes Responsibilities 34
Status of Biological Warfare 34
ITALY
SCammati Interviewed on Foreiga Trade
(Stammati Interview; IL SOLE-24 ORE, 8 Jun 79)........... 35
Director of Energu Sourcea Interviewed on Oil Supply
(Giuseppe Aaanassari interview; IL SOLE-24 ORE, 8 Jun 79). 38
- a - (III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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1--L
,
~
CONTENTS (Continued) PaBQ ~
,
Praspective Energy Conservation Meaeurea Diacuesed
(IL SOLE-24 ORE, 9 Jun 79).~~..~..~ 42
SPAIN
Premier Suarez 3ecoming More and More Isolated
(CAMBTO 16, 17 Jun 79)..,1........................... ..l 44
Decisive Action on Terroriem Aaked of Government
(Editorial, Juan Tomas de Sn1ae;CAMBIO 16, 17 Jun 79)... 48
Gonzalez InCexviewed, Discusaes Party's SiCuation
(Felipe Gonzalez Interview; CAMBIO 16, 24 Jun 79)....... 50
Editoria]. Comments on PSOE'S Ideological Puritiy
(Editorial, Juan Tomas de Salas; CAMBIO 16, 3 Jun 79)... 54
CommenCary Reflects on PSOE Internal Conflict
(Jose Oneto; CAMBIO 16, 3 Jun 79) 56
Military Budget St;udied, Commented Upon
(DEFENSA, Apr 79) 58
. -b-
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COUNTRY SECmION
PCF SEEN BACKING PSF'S IiOCARD TO TOPPLE MITTERRAND
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 4 Jun 79 p 18
[Article by Andre Lesueur: "A'eaxing Down Mitterrand"]
[Text]. The PCF also chooses Rocard against Mitterrand
~ to defeat t:te socialist candidate in 1981 and to become
again the leading party of the left.
FRANCE
Aside from politics, men are now involved in the quarrel between socialists
and communists. On Thursday, in an official comnunique, the executive bu-
reau o� tha PS [Socialist Party] referred clearly to the attitude of Georges
Marchais during the occupation. Mentioning Willy Brandt, the socialiets
noted especially that.he "can learn no lesson from anyone, including the
present leadership of the [French] Communist Party concerning resistance
against the Nazis."
More explicit, Pierre Joxe confided:
"Francois Mitterrand never went into the Obligatory Labor Service."
On 23 May, on Radio-20 Marchais cast doubt on the personal sounc3ness of the
first secretary of the Socialist Party. With an anecdote.
In substance: on 6 May 1974, immediately after the first round of voting
in the presidential eleGtion, Mitterrand and Marchais were said to have met
in the Montparnasse Tower where Mitterrand had set up his headquarters for
the presidential campaign. The communist chief was then said to have con-
soled the only leftist candidate, allegedly distressed by his defeat in the
first round. He stated the following:
~
"He was distraught and I was the one who told him that it was necessary
to fight."
' T,ro days before this statement, the secretary general of the PCF partici-
pated in a meeting with his Italian counterpart, Enrico Berlinguer, in Turin.
He tried to stick on Mitterrand tlxe image of the eternal loser:
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"Francoia Mitterrand represente permanent defeati," he said. "zn 1965, we
made him tihe aingle candidate of the le�t. He �ailed. Yn 1978, victiory was
within reach. At the last moment, Francois Mitterrand abandoned the union
policy."
Thi.s caoe brought up againat Mititerrand is one of the facets of the stra-
tegy that the communiste seem to be tryit,g to deploy between now and the
- 1981 presidentiial election.
Among the possible socialist candidates, Mititierrand ia the one who can most
easily win over communist votera. The 1965 and 1974 electione accuetomed
the PCF voters to vote for him in the first round. And the leftiet poli-
tical line adopted by the socialist leader in the Metz congresa (there, he
allied himself with Ceres) is a denial of the accusationa of a turn to the
right made for over a year by the communists.
Mitterrand has not yet made a decision on his own candidacy. The campaiyn
of discredit launched by the communists is tending to deter him from run-
ning.
The possibility of blackmail is open here. By attacking the aocialist
leader personally, the PCF leads implicitly to the belief that it will
put out the watchword of "six of one, half a dozen of the other" with
which Jacques Duclos dissuaded the communist voters, in 1969, from chooaing
between Georges Pompidou and Alain Poher, with regard to Mitterrand between
the two rounds of the presidential election. This attitude would practi-
cally deprive Mitterrand of any chance of befng elected and perhaps even
of running.
At the same time, Michel Rocard (silent for the last 2 months) is spared
by the communist attacks. That is the second facet of the PCF strategy.
- The deputy from Yvelines ia said to be a better candidate for the PCF than
Mitterrand in the presidential election. Because of his political profile.
The social-democfat image that Rocard has in public opinion hardly enables
him to hope to attract communist voters to him. Therefore, his candidacy
would give Marchais a chance to fill up with his usual voters. And the
"drift to the right" embodied in the PS rightly or wrongly by RQ-
card would justify a refusal to withdraw in favor of the conununist candidate.
The press has its place in this debaL�e. Especfally LE MATIN. Several times,
the daily edited by Claude Perdriel seemed to favor Rocard. He made a
front page headline of the case against Mitterrand. Evidently to defend
to socialist leader.
"But, at the same time, he echoed the incident widely," they are saying
in,Mitterrand's circle of friends.
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It is also being observed there that, the other week, LE MAmiN publiahed
a poll from which it emerged that a majority of eocialiet voters wera hoping
for a rapprochement by their party with the UDF (French Democratic Union).
Thati lent credit to the imaqe of a social-democrat PS. And that would con-
solidate the communist strategy.
COPYRICHT: 1979 "Valoura actuelles"
10,042
C50t 3100

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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
STYLES OF WEIL, MARCHAIS, MITTERRAND, CHIRAC COMPARED
Parie PARIS MATCH in French 1 Jun 79 pp 32, 33, 79
(Article by Arthur ConCe]
[,Text] Simone Weil is conducting what one could call an "exact" campaign.
She is doing strictly what has to be done to fully win such a competiCion. However, she has a certain number of handicaps. For example, she could
liave dreamed of heading a more lively or more popular slate. In the arena,
she does not have Che same "expertise" [metier] as her principal rivals.
Manifestly, this courageous woman is even quite fearful and ia the first
Co feel ahaky in such a grueling debate. But she knows astoniahly well how
to avoid all major mistakes. She unfailingly maintains a remarkable
masCery over herself. She knows how to remain impeccably correct not only
' with respect to the president of the republic but also with respect to the
two prime ministers under whose authority she served. She �ls able, with
sobriety, to maintain such a demeanor and auch broadness of view that she
cannot fail to take votes away from the Gaullists: she is also going to ,
take a lot of votes away from Che socialists and indeed from the connuunists.
Most logically, she should receive a very large number of votes, all the
more so because the people of France unquestionably are going to expresa
Cheir pride at seeing a Frenchwoman in the forefront, with all the riaks,
who is of such -impressive quality and whom all of Europe respects. A aingle
concern for her: the initial public opinion polls are so much to her -
advantage that if she does not take care might well have a very negative `
[demobilisateur] effect upon voter turnout, above all if 10 June is a nice
day. _
George Marchais, too, is in the midst of the fray. It is only wiCh difficulty ;
that we discover faults in his technique and tactics. Of course, proceeding
in this manner, he displays excessive audacity when, during a spectacular ,
joint meeting with the secretary general of the Italian Communist Party,
Enrico Berlinguer, he once again would force us to admit that Eurocommunism '
exists, that the communists of the West are no longer subject to the dis-
ciplines of a vast supranational strategy and that the Stalinists can serve
a free Europe happily. At times he delightedly engages in too primitive
propaganda. But he continues marvelously to play that magic instrument
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which was developed by Lenin persunally: Che hummering (Cechnique]. At
every opportunity, wiCh a terribte percussive force, he indefatignbly
hammera out hia comments abouk multinational companies, monopolietic ggng-
stera, the bourgeois press, traitorous television and above all Curncoae
socialists. More than ever, on the small qcreen, he ia able ta interpret
the class struggle will full effece. tie tina become master nf the arr of
utilizing ridicule and sarcasm, all ttie more so because he has Ueen nmazingly
spared by his opponents who are quite wrong to conaider his gttirudes
simple clowning which ir, Cruth impacC wiCh greaC intensity and in deprh
upon the people.
Georges Marchais: A Stupefying Satanism
With absolute awareneas of his full effect and with n stupefying saCanism,
he porCrays a new "son of the people," with a stubborn brow, dark eyes,
rougti jaw, incisive speech, in the ''ace of a Mitterrand who, on the con-
trary, has never better brought to mind the image of an intellectual poeC,
with tasteftilly refined apeeches and appearance. Everyt}ting considered,
it would not be surprising if on 10 June Georges Marchais obCains a per-
centage of votes larger than most of the prognosticators or pollsters had
credited him with at the outset.
Jacques Chirac continues to be a great fighter. Few gladiators in tlie
public arena will have outshone him in the art of wielding the gladiaCar's
club or the net of the retiaire [gladiator armed with a trident, dagger
and net]. With unquestionable talent, not only is he better able Chan his
opponents to exalt crowds of followers but he exhibited a very studied
"ferocious mildness" in an effort to place Simone Weil in difficulty during
the last four-person televised debate. Thus he knows how skillfully to
wield the smallest dagger equally as well as the heaviest mace. However--
apart from the fact that he presents the image of a man with ajaw too
ready to slash, bite and chew his words which in fact gives him a look of
hardness that he does not posseas--he has committed aC least two serious
tactical mistakes which, moreover, are almost impossible to rectify before
the election. One is a mistake of substance, the other of technique. His
first mistake is having set himself up as the direct opponent of the presi-
dent of the republic as such. Whether Jacques Chirac wished it to be so
or not, that is the most visible result of his actians over the past year.
Quite obviously many men, even among those who personally respect or admire
Jacques Chirac, do not admit that in this manner he is jeopardizing and
endangering the authority of the president, in too critical a period, in
full sarcastic view of the Marxists. Even if Jacques Chirac did not or
does not wish it, the result is as if he had in this way attached the
fundamental balances of the republic. The mayor of Paris would be wise to
rectify such a formidable mistake before it is too laCe. The second mis-
take is inseparable from the nature of the campaign chosen by Che De Gaullist
general staff. It insisted upon conducting a campaign of ineetings, that is,
a campaign for activiats. A capital mistake. For the nature of the
election on the cantrary makes it necessary to broaden the field of fire to
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t}ie mttximum. "The srraregy of cn7.lective assemblies" [rnssemblementi is Co
be recnmmended over a"arrfiregy of exclusion" or a"strntegy of intralsigeance,"
as far ae the election is concerned, With the kind of 1aw which genel'nCes
musses ot votes, one musr rather address the greatest number of Frenchwomen
and rrenchmen as culmly as possible. Meeeinga of activists should be avoided,
meeting which tend too much to conGentraCe the field oE fire and narrow the
argumenCS. During tiis meetings, to sCir up an ovation or to better excite
the enthusiasm of his troops, Jacques Chirac must every evening increasingly
more sharpen his attacks, intensify his accusations, darken tiis criticisms:
at one nnd the same rime he is losing en masse the French who do not recognize
Chemselves in rhis De Gaullism which is too aggreasive or too cloaed. He
should have opted for a calm campaign, wiCh no more than four or five big
meetings. If, on 10 June, he receives a toral voCe count much lower than
ant3cipated, he will owe it principa,lly to such blunders--despite a talent
for debate which continues to be brillianC.
Francois Mitterrand also does not have an ideal alate. How is it poasible
to leave off the slate or in a poor position such men as Michel Rocard and
Alain Savary? How is it possible to relegate to the 21st position a peraon
which the party likes to present as one of iCs princiPal thinkera? It is
not surprising that the socialist campaign is geCting started wiCh a atrange
slowness, as if dragging heaven knows whar weight of remorse or nostalgia.
At times the socialists seem to be conducting the campaign as if it were a
chore or forced labor. Fortunately for the first secreCary, European
socialism in spite of the defeat of the laborites in Great Britain continues
to have prestigious influence. The very word socialism retains an exceptional
power of enchantment. Francois Mitrerrand himself still has total control
over his talent and his argumentation. But three serious handicaps hang
heavy upon the activity of our socialists. First, strangely, Francois
Mitterrand unquestionably looks somewhat tired. He seems to be less inciaive
and less feared than during other great campaigns. He has come to the point
of ignoring too many long faces of skepticism, too many stares from a tribunal
which is becoming bored. We might even wonder "if he still believes in
socialism." Moreover, despite his virtuosity, he now is playing a worn out
record, of which the television viewer almost knows the tirades by heart
and can hear all the tremolos coming. To put it bluntly, even if our words
are considered too cruel, what'was needed there was something new, something
brand new. Next, at the naCional level, the socialists are losing the remark-
able advantage they derived from most often having the best candidates at
the local and departmental levels: in a classical election, they owe most
of their victories to the fact of presenting candidates who are dynamic,
respected and well-known in their sector; such will not be the case in an
election of the kind we are discussing. This means, for example, Chat this
same party whose candidates would as a whole receive a total of 28 percent
of the votes in a legislative election could also receive no more than 25
or 26 percent of the votes in a national election in which the advantage of
the best local candidates is of much less importance; finally, the third
importanC handicap: This grand and magnificent party continues to wrap
itself in a strategy which is no longer credible. The blows struck by
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Georges Plarchai;a and hj.s comrades are such Chat the seeking of ttn alLiance
wirla Che communists poses for the socialisCs nor only a prablem of yerious-
ness bur also nne of dignity. How can we say it beteer? Georges Marchuis
is playing the game of the we11-known fable with Francois r[itterrandc
"cuckolcled, beatett up and happy," As For the smAll slntes, a11 Cheir votes
added together shou].d noe e:cceed the figure of 8 percent. If tliis 9hould
prove oCherwise, it caoulcl be an enormoua surprise. Logically, among the
small slates, the ones on which Arlette Laguiller and Michel de Saint-Pierre
appear should rece:Lve the most votes: Is it possible ko imagine that either
of them can rece:tve more Chan 3 percent of the votes cast? No matCer what
the talent of their Principnls may be, they are too handicApped at the
audiovisual propaglnda level lo expect more than thaC.
It is also unimaginab].e Char Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreibet- will be able to
make a bretkthrough. He seems to be too confused., At lenst in appearances,
his positions are contradicCory. He is probably burdened in his campaign
by the facr that, as president of the radical party, he sees important
radicals appearing on almost all the other slates. !{aving drawn up a s1aCe
too precipitantly, in the final analysis will he even be able to muster
1 percent of the votes't Will he by in turn Caking his place among the
_ choir of the anCi-Barre polemists end up by doing hArm, however little, to
Simone Weil's slate, for whom it would be very easy to remind him that it
was not too long ago that he asked to cross over to }ier side? Everything
considered, will he not receive the most votes on the "opposition" slates?
The only serious lesson of his actions is that the radical party is
- definitely doomed. The grand party, which knew so many glorious hours and
seemed so long inseparable from the history of the republic, will doubtless
receive the blows in this election which will put an end to it.
In the coming weeks, obviously many surprises or new developments could
occtir. Our prognostications could also be upset because of the fact that
this is Ctie f irst time a strictly proportional election at the nation2l
level has been held in France: for lack of experience, even the most astute
observers of political life could be thrown off by the manner in which the
country will finally determine its choices through the great masses.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 par Cogedipresse S.A.
8143
CSO: 3100
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C4UNTRY 5ECTION
ARIANE PRODUCTION PROJECTED TO ~.'EAR 2000
FRANCE
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 9 Jun 79 pp 129' 131-133, 135) 137
LTrticle by Pierre Langereux7
ZTex) The Ariane launch vehicle, which will make its first
flight in 6 months, launched from French Gulana, was designed
primarily to place in a geostationary orbit commercial satel-
lites, primarily telecommunications and television trans-
mission satellites. To succeed in this undertaking while stay-
ing within the scheduled time frame and costs, the project's
promoters voluntarily decided to make maximum use of already
known and proven technol.ogies. Still, the design concept does
contain a potent3.a1 for considerable improvementg to meet the
needs of both French and European space ambitions.
To handl.e the users' future needs (heavier and larger payloads)
and to stay in line with the laws of the market, the CNES
LNational Center for Space Studie] which is in charge of
Ariane's development, has since 1W been considering the
evolution of European launch facilities over the coming de-
cades, bearing in mind, of course, the existence of the U.S.
Space Shuttle.
A Conventional Series
From this process of reflection came the idea of an "Ariane
series," based on the present launch vehicle. This follows
- the exa.mpl.e of the series of U.S. rockets: Scoutg Thor Delta,
and Titan, which have been successfully developed for 20 years.
But unlike the United States, which is now concentrating on
1. A circular equatorial orbit at an altitude of 36,000 km.
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a launch vehicle that wlll be recoverable and reusable for
a decadeg the Space Shutitleg the French selection was a series
oE "conventlonal rockets" (usable only once). There were
tihree reasons for tihis, as the CNES explains.
1. Economically, tihe value of the Space Shuttile is far
from beSng prnven even for the number of missions
glanned by the Un~.ted States. So such a system would
e even harder to 3ustiify economiaally for Europe.
2. The hypotiheses used conGerning the misslons do not
show a need to launch very heavy masaes into low orbits.
The combination af multiiple payloads inside a heevy
space vehicle (like the Shuttle) causes some major
operational problems. Moreover, a launch vehicle
capable of placing a human crew in orbit does not seem
to be tihe best way of placing autiomatic satellites
in orbiti.
3. If human flights which are the main justification
for the Shutitl@ were to be made using European
facilSties they would probably be only an additional
factior useA either to provide access to international
orbital stiatiions or to improve the conditions of utili-
zation oF automatic stations (reconfigurations or
repairs). This sort of mission does not require sys-
tems of the Space Shuttl4 type, concluded the CNES.
In order to make tihe initial investment economically feasible,
the CNES did examine the possibilities of improving the Ariane
launch vehicle independently of its missions~ but with the ob-
jective of minimizing new expenditures~ which would of course
be spread oaer a period of time and of reducing to the utmost
uncertainties of a technical ana scheduling nature. This
was also done during the development of the Diamant fatnily
of French rockets.
Three Objectives
The plan to develop the Ariane launch vehicle is thus designed
to satisfy three objectives.
1. To increase performances of the launch vehicle (its
payload placed in geosynchronous orbit and in low
orbits) and the volume (and diameter) of the payloadsg
along with the range of missions possible ever. going
so far as to consider human flights in a iow orbit,
using the I?ermes manned vehicle.
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-nk i4Ttck11. ~,�;t' uNl,l`
' t n f i 1 1 i . . . . ; r� ` ^ t � ~
pro;~ecs s mar..7ed
Ler~cnic ~l:d~:�.
cre-::: -�.ne al ya�;, :ch cost (Frice of t!:e rcc'r.e t
ar;d lau::r!: c~:~r~�e:;) a:;J e specific ex,r,erlses (ar;ount
'ra: cc::':. -e,: in the cost ger kg in
ort;
3rreid out addi tiona' :z 200 kg
outside of solar system
40. Ariane 5/3B: ? 7000 kg in 800 km orbit
41. Hermes manned vehicle
42. Ariane 5H: manned flight in low orbit
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FUk OFFI c: l AL USk: c)Nl,l'
Nose cone of Ariane launch vehicle manufactured in Switzerland
by Contraves AG.
Ariane 57 a Multipurpose Launch Vehicle
In the long term, beyond Ariane 4, a significant development
of performances can not be made without a major change in the
launch vehicle's configuration. The CNES also states that:
"An examination of the users' needs towards the 1990s shows a
growing interest in low and medium orbits (up to 1,000 km) for
observation of the earth7 development of materials, etc., but
also for the assembly of large structures and modular manned
stations, or stations that would be simply visitable (for
bri4ng supplies, maintenance, modifications, etc.)"
For this rea5on, the CNES has proposed for the 1988-1990 period
the development of a multipurpose launch vehicle, Ariane 57
which could be used in at least five different configurations,
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A
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depending on the mission. Genera].ly speaking, the Ariane 5
launch vehicle 3.s derived from the Ariane 4 version by a
complete change of the upper part. The two upper stages used
unt3.l then would be replaced by a single second stage with a
J.arge diameter (4.6 m instead of 2.6 m) with 40 to 45 tona
of cryngenic propellants (H40 or H45 stage) and a new liquid
hydrngen and ].3.qiiid oxygen engine providing 60 t0 80 tons of
thrust (HM60 engine), The work in preparat3on for the develop-
ment of this version should be undertaken now so that the
launcher may be operational at the end of the next decade.
The first stage of the Ariane 5 now proposed would be the same
as that of Ariane 4, but this stage seems to be somewhat
lacking in power for this new rocket, so it might also be
enl.arged (to the same diameter as the rest of the rocket). In
any event, it w3l1, require some redesign in order to upgrade
its reliability to a level compatible with the presence of a
human crew. The guidance and control system would also be im-
proved for the same reason. Moreover, the four Ariane 5
boosters would be larger than the ones used in the preceding
version (at least 8.5 tons of solid propellant instead of 7.2
tons). In all, the Ariane 5 rocket would weigh 308 tons at
liftoff (with a height of 50 meters) and it would develop a
thrust of 550 tons.
The Ariane 5 rocket will have a new nose cone with the same
diameter (4.6 m) and a usable volume half that (170 cubic
meters) of the U.S. Shuttle, which will enable it to launch
very large payloads: 9.5 to 10 tons in a low circular orbit
at an altitude of 200 km, with a 300 inclination. A new
payload adapter will also make it possible to make multiple
launches and to provide some of the same services off ered
by the Space Shuttle. This two-stage with nose cone con-
figuration, optimized for launches in low orbits, is desig-
nated Ariane 5/2. Depending on its mission, Ariane 5 may also be equipped with
an "additional propulsion system" placed under the nose cone.
This will consist of either:
1. A new cryogenic third stage, derived from the present
third stage (with the same HM7 engine with 7 tons of
thrust), to optimize the launch of heavy payloads
(4.75 tons) in an earth-synchronous transfer orbit,
still with the possibility of a double launch.. This
is the Ariane 5/3A configuration.
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2. A new third stage with storable prope7.lants equipped
, with the propul.sion system of the Hermes vehicle for
1.aunches to med3.um orbits (for examp].e, 7 tons in
a he].iosynchronouc circular orbit at an a1.titude of
800 km). This is the Ar3.ane 5/3B configuration.
,
�
\
I ,
,
3. Or a combination of the two complementary stages
under a nose cone (cryogenic third stage and a fourth
stage with storabl.e propellants) for a four-stage
rocket. This is the Ariane 5/4 conf.iguration to be used
for earthsynchronous launches and for sending planetar
probes (2.5 tons toward Venus or 600 kg toward Jupiter~
or beyond the solar system (200 kg), possibly to
remove radioactive nuclear wastes, such as actinides:
:

Aerial view of the Ariane launch complex at Kourou with the
propellants model of the rocket erected on the launch pad.
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Ariane 5/H and Hermes
The Ariane 51I1 version of the rocket wi11 be used to launeh
the manned vehicle, Hermes, into alow circular orbit at an
altitude of 200 km, with a 300 or 1.ess inclination, in order to
assemb].e and service orbital stations (see AIR & COSMOS, no
767, pages 66-67).
Hermes is a hypersonic delta-wing glider project with a total
mass of 10 tonsy or two times 1.arger than an Apo1].o capsule
and even larger than a Soyuz vessel. It could carry at most
five astronauts or only two passengers and 1.5 ton of freight
and it could rema3.n in orbit for a week. It would be launchea
from Kaurou by the Ariane 5/H rocket (without a nose cone) and
recovered, like the Shuttle, on a landing strip where the
glider wi11 touch down. The guidance and control of this
aerospace vehicle will be entirely automated. It will be re-
usable for a certain number of missions.
These projects the Ariane 5 multipurpose launch vehicle and
Hermes, the manned hypersonic glider are still in the phase
of prel3.minary studies. The CNES believes it will be ready
to present more detailed proposals to its European partners
in about a year and a half after an in-depth study. The
feasibility of some important technological points still re-
mains to be determined, particularly for the development of
the fIermes hypersonic glider. The most critical points are
the reusable thermal protection and the electric power suppiy
by fuel cells.
Also to be determined is the cost of these development, which
would be spread over 7 to 8 years. The development of Ariane
5 could be estimated from 5 to 10 billion franes (depending
on which first stage is used). The cost of development of the
Hermes project is estimated at about 10 billion franes.
Six Months Before the First Ariane Launch
Now when the real scale model of the European rocket Ariane
is being displayed in public for the first time at the Le
Bourget 79 Salon, we are 3ust 6 months away from the first
flight test shot of the new launch vehicle. This first launch
was set for 3 November 1979; it is still scheduled for Novem-
ber, but a few days later.
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roR oYrictnI, USE qNLY~ ~
~ i
~
At the present tiimet the integratiori of thi,s firs4; rocket :ts
being compl.eted at the SIL LLauncher Integration Site7 at Les
riureaux. Aerospat3.alet the industrial archi"ect foi the launch
vehicl.e, along with the other main contractora (SEP LEuropean
Propellant Company]~ MATRA etc.) is making the f;lnal. overa~.l
checkout o� the rocket; this wi1.l be completed in m3.d-June.
IIefore sending the rocket to Guiana, the CNES and the indus-
tries involved must sti11 carry out two important procedures:
putting down the third stage in order to integrate the last
modifications tested by bench testing, and a creckout of th!,
turbopump bearings of the Viking engine of the first and sF-cond
stages (after finding a defect in the lubricat3.on of 6he bearinga
during the bench testing). '
The first Ariane rocket (L01 ) wi11 leave for Guiana on1.y at
the end of August, slightly later than originally planned. The
launch test program will begin during the first week of Septem-
ber; it wi11 last 2 and a half months.
Several inspections of 3.ts flight aptitude will be made before
the launch, one during the last week in June and the other in
September, primarily to incorporate the results of the second
qual.ification shot of the first stage (planned in August) and
of the shots of the third stage propulsion system, which will
resume in June (the first qualification shot of the third
stage propulsion system is schedul.ed for mid-November 1979,
after the L01 shot). A third qualification shot for the
second stage is scheduled in September, but in principle$
this stage is already qualified.
SYLDA, the Double Launch System for Ariane .
Ariane's SYLDA system is designed to enable the European rocket
in its present version and in future versions to launch two
satellites at the same time. These would be satel.lites of the
Thor Delta class (800 to 1,020 kg each. The SYLDA is shaped
like an egg-cup which is separated in two parts along a!
horizontal plane. One of the satellites is placed inside
the container and the other is on top, outside (but still in-
side the launch vehicle's nose cone). The upper satellite is
released firstg then the upper half-shell of the SYLDA is
e3ected to release the inside satellite, which is then re-
leased in turn.
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The SYLDA is being developed under a contract (19 million
francs) from the European Space Agency by Aerospatiale (France)
with the participat3.on of SAAB-Scania (Sweden) for the three
separation subsystems. It weighs 165 kg, but it does replace
the adaptor (44 kg) to be used for single launches. This
means it represents an additional mass of only 120 kg for the
launch vehicle. The SYLDA's structure is a sandwich of high
modulus carbon fibers mounted on a honeycomb web. In the
original design, the unit measures 4 meters in height and 2.8
meters in diameter. A longer version (+0.5 m) is planned for
. launching satellites of the STS/FAM class.
The SYLDA is now scheduled to be used for the first t3me in
April 1981 to place in a geostationary orbit the European
satellite Sirio 2 along with the maritime telecommunications
satell.ite, MARECS B, of the ESA.
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos, Paris,1979
7679
Cso: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTInN PRANCE
I
LAItCE AItIANE SATELLITE MARKET PItOJECTEn
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 9 Jun 79 pp 139p 141
[Arricie by Pierre Langereux: "The 'Ariane' Satellites: A Market of 6
to 11 billion F"I
[Textj "Average" all-inclusive prices (with insurance) for operational
launchings towards the end of 1982 and the beginning of 1983 of rockets
of the second lot in the seriee are as follows (mid-1978 price):
- Launchings into geoatgtioaary orbit of the "Ariane" claes eatellites
(fuii capaciry):
' . 175 million F, EuropFan price.
!
. 140 million, exportation price.
- Launchings of "De1Ca" claes eatellites:
. 95 million F, European price, double firing.
. 75 million F, exportaCion price, double firing.
. 150 million F, EuropQan price, single firing.
The first four trial flight launchings of the European "Ariane" rocket--
firings L01-L04, scheduled for 1979 aad 1980--will put five Europeaa and
foreign satellites into orbit, as well as the four "Ariaae" technological
capeules (CAT).
The firat roclcet (LO1), which will be lauached in November 1979 from
Kourou, Prench Guiaea, will be equipped with only a 150 kg "CAT" capsule
and ballaet. The total load thus thruet iato a 200-369000 km geosynchronous
transfereace orbit, inclined at 17.5�, will be 1,600 kg.
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The seeond roeket (1.02), td be launched in Mgreh 1980, wiii put ehree
satellteeg inro the sane geogynchronous tranaference orbit: thg 150 kg
"CAT"; the amaeeur-radio setel7.ite, the "AMSAT-08car 9" ,.,2 kg); end the
Certeen scient3fic satelltee, ehe "Firewheel" (1,080 kg). 'Che two 18eter
satellires will be equipped with a perigee engine whieh wili make it
possible ea pue ehem dn eheir dafinieive orbits. "Ograr 9" will revolve
nn an nrbie of 900 to 1,500 km perigee and en apogee of 35,000 kmg while
the "Firewhee1" wili be nn an orbit of 227-54,500 1m.
The third rocket (1,03), which wi11 be launched in June 1980, wi11 aleo put
three satellites inCO g 900-36,000 km transference orbit, ieclined at 10.5�:
a"CAT," with ballaet (315 kg); India's telecommunicationg gatelliteg
"Apple" (630 kg); and rhe European meteorological eatelliCe, "Meteosat 2"
(670 kg). Tb.e 1atCer two satellites will be equipped with an apoggee
engine. They wi11 be ehe firet geogtationary satelliteg launched by
"Ariane."
The fourth rocket (1.04), scheduled to be launched in OcCober 1980, i;ill
put Che following into a 200-36,000 lcm transference orbit, inclined aC 8�:
a"CAT" capaule and rhe European maritime telecommunications satellite,
"MARECS A" (960 kg, including 444 kg for the "Mage 1 S" apogee engine),
which will then be placed on a geostationary orbit. During the flight,
this eatellite will be equipped with an "Ariane" (DIVA) device to eliminate
vibrationa.
Construction and launching costs of theae four test rockets and for the
manufacture of the "CAT" capsules (utilized during only six revolutione)
ere part of the developmental program of the "Ariane" launcher.
A first lot of a seriea of six rockets is already in conatruction. One
lot of five rockets waa ordered in December 1978, to which another launcher
was added in April 1979 for the Intelsat organization, which gave a
confirmed order, and one on option, for a rocket Co ESA.
One of these aix rockets is a reserve one for a possible launching; the
other five are scheduled to put six satellitea--two of them as double
f.irings--into orbit in 1981 and 1982. They are the European sientific tele-
- communications eatellite, "MARECS-B" (Intelsat), and "Telecom lA" (France),
the latter in place of the French reconnaiasance satellite, "Spot,"
scheduled to be launched later (tYtarch 1984).
A second lot of five rockeCa, "Ariane" series (one in reaerve), is to be
ordered in Jaauary 1980, in order to launch the European communications
eatellites, "MARECS C" (to be decided) a.nd "ECS 2" (decided in December 1978
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Foa dFFicTnI. usE oNt,Y
by ehe ESA wieh "EC3 3" and "4")9 ae we11 Ao oeh8r �atallites in planning
- for Burope or for fdreign countries.
The firse "Ar3ane" operationei launchings, ahich vi7.1 take place on orbite
of 185-36,000 km geoeynchroeous tranaference, inclined at 8.75� or 9.5�0 arQ
preaently seheduled for the foilowing daeest
- Aprii 1981 (LS) for the "3irio 2" and "MARECS 8" eaeailita8, with the
firse utliization of the doubie iaunching ayseemp "SYLDA."
- July 1981 (L6) for the "Inteleat 5" eatellitg.
- November 1981 (L7) for the Exoeat" eatellite.
--February 1982 (L8) for the "ECS 1" eatellite.
These launchinge of confirmed projecte are echeduled in principia for firm
dates. The launching of tihe "Inteleat S" eatellite may be advanced to
April 1981, at the requeet of IntelsaC. But the QdEB [Nationai Center for
5pace Studies] hea eatimated that the firet "Ariane" operatiional firing may
be mede in February 1981 (instead of April).
The following operational lauachings have been scheduied for the uaual
firing crenels of the Kourou firing raege:
- April 1982 (0) for the "MARECS C" satellite.
- June 1982 (L10) for another "Inteleat S" eatellite.
- October 1982 (L11) for the "ECS 2" satellite and another ae yet uade-
termined satellite. This aill be the firat flight of the ne`+ "Arikme 3"
rocket.
- December 1982 (L12) for the French satellite, "Telecom 1 A."
In 10 yeare, from 1981 to 1990, the "Ariane" rocket could lauach from 27
to�45 satellites, according to epeculationa (pessimistic or optimistic) on
" a Worid market of 220 eatellites. The average European launcher markat ia
about 36 launchinga, 6 in 1981-1982 and 30 during the 1983 to A1990 pariod.
These satellites include about 10 eatellitea of the 500 kg claes and about
20 of the 900 kg class. In this regard one notes the importaace of the
heavy satellites for direct TV, ahich would probably utilize a platform
that would be adapted to "Ariane," aad this, from 1973 on. Well, the -
realization of this "Ariaae" platform has not yet been settled in Europe.
It is the only e2emeat lacking in the "Ariane" panoplq, but it is aav the
0
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FOR tlFFfCtAL USh OtdLY
mose eritica1. But the CNES hopes ehae a panieive d@eisian aili be made
soon eone@rning the p1an for a Fren.h dir@ee TV sateilite--posnibly eo be
developed in eaoppration wieh Cermany--Whieh wili make ie possibie then eo
heve a heavy plaeform. For iea part, the 89A hgs prepar@d a new p1an for
a direee 'PV sateilit@, named "t,-SAT," whish Wili be ineroduced at the
beginning of Juiy ta the ma.mber staces. This plan ia aleo dea3gned for a
nea Eurdpean heavy plaefdrm Eor "Ariano."
A11 together, the "Ariane" pramoeera hgpe co eapCure 14 to 23 percent
oE the aorld commercial sateli3te market during the n@xe 10 yQare, Which
aould represene a merker of 6-11 billion francsl
COPYRiGHT: Air 6 Coamos, Paris, 1979
8255
CSO: 3100
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FoR oFFIctnt. usE at.Y vt
~
~
~
1
cotNTRY sEcTiorr
,
TACTtCAL AIR FORCE JA(itfAR3 EVALUATED
Peris AIR ST COSMOS in French 21 Apr 79 pp 23-25, 27
FRAxcE
(Article by Jean de Galard: "The Jaguare ln the Tactical Air Force")
(Text) The followieg articie vaa aritten on the bneie of an interviea
t+hich air corpe Generai Michei Forget, appointed cammander of the Tactical
Air Force in ehe Firet Air Region ae of 24 February 1979, Wge kind enough
to grant ua. .
in the 27 months preceding his appointment to head thie large command,
Ceneral Forget aerved ae aecond in command of the Taceical Air Force for
the First Air Region. In other aorde he ie very familiar with the Taceical
Air Force. He a18o knoWa the Jaguars and their functional characterietical
becauae in the courae of the past tao years, among other dutiee, he hae
been responsibia, outeide the hexagon and at the request of the countriee
to which France is linked by defenee and cooperatinn agreement8, to see to �
rhe use of thie racricai eupport aircraft.
Ceneral Forget is equaily familiar aith gir defense, because he aerved in +
turn as commander of the north air defenae zone and commander of the east
air defense zone, serving for 13 months between these tao poete ae head of
the military ataff of the minieter of defenee.
Ceneral Forget, who has logged more than 6,000 houre of flight time to date,
aae particulariy weli qualified to draft What We aould call an aseessment
of the Jaguar in operation, �or the information of our readere 18 monthe
fbllowing the publication of our igaue number 690 ("The Jaguar in Setvice
in Seven Tacticel Air Force Squadrona"). He explains among other things
ahy this asaessment can be judged very eatiafactory on all points.
120 Jaguars in Service ;-Pigced with eight units (three With the Seventh Squadrons based in�
Saint-Ditier, one with Che Thitid Squedron, based in Naacyp and four vith
the lYth Squadron, based in Toul, although the fourth unit within it,
eatablished on 1 January 1979, is based in Bordeaux), 121 Jaguars will be
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tn us@ by 30 June 1979. Of ehese 114 wer~ already in aerviee nn of
iS Aprii, a w@ek agd, hdving logged 900000 houra of �lighe eimeo At the
present rare df unie aceiviey, it is probable that the 100,000-flight-hour
mark wiii bp passed this coming summer, i.e. leee than rwo years after the
50,000-hour mark was passed (see AiR ET C03M03, No 690, p 21).
in the ceuree of the paee 18 montha, Genaral Forget axplained, four major
developmenrs have character3zed the activiey of the Jaguars wirhi� the
Tact#.cal Air Force.
1. The eommisaioning of the Ardenneg 3/3 unit on the operational level in
the apring of 1978, where the execut3on of ite main miseion wae concerned:
ateack force eupport using the MarCel A3-37 anti.-radar miesile. in �act
sincp May 1978, an had been planned, the 18 pilots in thie unit w3th 15
Jaguars, including a modpl L two-geatier, are able to carry out, on the eame
baeie as the pilots of the twa other units in the T1iird Squadrong equipped
for their part with Mirage IIIE aircraft, borh thie main mieaion and the
secondary one, which may range from low-altitude cover to claseic attack.
2. The establishment of the 4/11 uniC in Bordeaux: although the unit was
officially established last January, the preparationa neceseary for its
creation occupied the whole of the year 1978 in fact, in the course of which
the two training formation was responsible for providing ground instruction
for a11 of the mechanics and aome of the pilota in the unit. All of this
preparatory and installation activity culminated durittg the last quarter of
the year. At present, the commander of the Tactical Air Force explained,
the 4/11 has 12 pilota for 8 planes, and will in turn be entirely operational,
with 18 pilota for 15 planea, this coming 30 June, after which date it can
fully carry out its main mission, which will be, as is the case for units
1 and 3 of the llth Squadron, conventional attack and overseas action.
When questioned about the possible undesirability for the Tactical Air
Force command of the geographic diatance of this squadron from the other
units in the canmand, General Forget said that the distance posea no problem,
on the contrary fu11y illustrating the major trump provided the command by
its great mobility, which is essential since it muat be capable of action
where a threat occurs, and that it representa the expresaion in any case
of a general milttary policy designed to ensure greater flexibiliCy for
action to clear any area toward the aoutheast and the southwest of the
hexagon. In practice, as would be the case with a clasaic redeployment
operation, the Tactical Air Force relies solely on the Fourth Unit on the
operational level, with the Third Air Region providing all the support
necessary in this connection.
All in all, the situation of the 4/11 unit in Bordeaux is comparable to
that of a Strategic Air Porce unit at a base where units of other major
commands are located. At the most, the result for the commander of the
llth Squadron might be the "inconvenience" of having to make some shifts
from Toul to Bordeaux in order to better control and follow up the training
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The Jaguar, General FargeC cammented, ie precisely the plane required to
provide the kind of demonseraeions which were requeeeed last year gnd those of
a,peacefu1 naCure provided on an average of twice a year by the Jaguare of
the tiactiical air cnmmand at the request of friendly countries. This was the
case in Fet+ruary 1978 during a m3sgion eo the Ivory Coaer, and also in
December, with en opergt3on carried out i,n Togo (Mangrove exerciae) jointly
with the Togolese air force.
The foreign miasione cgrried out in 1977 and 1978 revealed the epeed with
which the Jaguare can reach the sitea where their action wae required, ae
we11 ae their functional efficiency. The plan0s nav3gation ayaCem a].so
received high marks. Currently the Tactical Air Force ie maintaining two
ema11 detachmente with a11 their Jaguar equipment in Africa.
Resulte in Exercieea and Maneuvers
The various miRgions carried out last year oueside French Cerritory by the
Jaguars of the Tactical Air Force in no way hindered the development of the
planned annual maneuvers, whether Carget practice carried out in Cazeux or
more specif ic maneuvera of the Coupe Centaure type in which, in addition
Co the Jaguars, the Mirage IIIE aircraft of other tactical nuclear aquadrona
in the Tacticgl Air Force also parCicipaCed.
Where the reaults obtained in the courae of air-to-air Carget pracCice
were concerned, General Forget termed them remarkable, and noted with
satisfaction that the Jaguar piloCa achieved good resulCa very speedily on
an average in the course of these practice sesaiona. Each unit has 15 days
a year for air-to-air Carget practice in Cazaux, and unit 3/11, for example,
is there now.
During the teat in the Coupe Centaure, which was carried out in September
of 1978 as a canpeCition between two nuclear aquadrona of.Mirage IIIE air-
craft from the Luxeuil base and two nuclear squadrons of Jaguars from the
base in Saint-Dizier, two pilots in the 1/1 unit placed second and fourth,
respectively, in the individual ranking. The Coupe Centaure made clear
the advantage the radar equipment on board provides to the pilots of the
Mirage IIIEs, and for the Jaguar pilots, the precision of the navigation
systems with which the planes are equipped, not to mention their greater
flight range.
The Tactical Air Force Jaguars also participated actively, boCh in 1978
and 1979, in the Datex maneuvers, and next week they will participate in
Exentia 79 (see page 32 in this connection). A detachmenC o� 12 Jaguars
from the 2/11 unit will be temporarily based in Saint-Nazaire, and 8 from
the Seventh Squadron and unit 313 will be dep-loyed in Cazaux.
180 Hours of Flight and Special Assignments
General Forget made a point of stressing that deapite the missions to which
the Jaguar pilots of the llth Squadron were assigned outside the hexagon last
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year, Che requiremenC of 180 flight houre per pi7,ot per year wge meC, with
nn equitable distribuCinn of flight houre among a11 the uniee. What ie at
lGUsr ae impnrtant to rhe operational abiliry oP combae p1ane pilotd, he
be].leves, iy thar thie Plight be regular. Thie requiree good planning end
a new efforC.
The apeci811zation o� tihe Tgctical Air Force unita tg being mainCained.
Let us recgll ehae where the Jaguar squgdrons are concerned, it ia as follows:
t,nits 1/7 end 3/7 havQ nuclear penetration ae rheir principal misgion, and
as their secondary mission, classic assaule; the principal miseion of unit
2/7 3e rhe training of Jgguar pilots and periodic checking of their in-
structiion, while its secondary mieaion is tacCical eupporC in claseical
weaponry; unit 3/3 has as iCs principal miasion atCack assietance (ueing
the AS-37 miesile), as is the case for unit 2/1I, which is eapecially
equipped for eleatronic war�are (offenaive jamming equipment), and the
secondary mission of these Cwo uniCs is Cactical support; the principal
miagion of units 1/11, 3/11 and 4/11 ia clasaical tactical eupport, but
where units 3/11 and more recently 4/11 are concerned, their uae for overaeae
operaCion is a cerCainty.
The specific assignment of unit 2/11 is offensive electronic warfare with
the main goal of scrnmbling and neutralizing enemy defense equipmenic. The
apecific apparaCus planned requirea a great deal of electrical energy for
use and ia generally bulky. Within a period of three yeara, unit 2/11 will
" be very active in this aector. For the time belng, it is pursuing varioua
experimenta joinCly with the CEAM [Military Air-Experimentation Center]. At
a later date it will have the Cask of training all of the Tactical Air Force
pilots and mechanics, and ita duties will include eaCablishing the rules
covering the condiCions for the uae and funcCioning of thia specific
apparaCus.
Attrition and Improvement
The comnander of the Tactical Air Force described the attrition rate for
the Jaguars in the first five years of their commissioning for service,
between 1973 and 1977, as low. The year 1978, on the other hand, was a
bad year, in terms of the number of planea lost, but General Forget hastened
to correct this impression. On the one hand, he remains persuaded that
since the plane is a good one and boCh pilots and mechanics are highly
motivated where flight safety is concerned, the attrition rate for the
Jaguars will quickly return to what iC was in 1975 and 1976--very low. On
the other hand, he stressed that four out of five of the accidents which
occurred outside of France last year could equally well have occurred in
metropolitan France, and were not in any case due to the impact of military
attack.
Quite the contrary, the Jaguar is perfectly equipped to defend itself
despite the multiplicity and diversity af the enemy ground-air system.
On the one hand it has the triple advantage of its weaponry (air-to-air and
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BCflCUB of thege piloee. Ir goes withour sgying that the seructure nf the
air force ig such Chae it can egsi].y effecti sunh deployment gcCion.
36 The capncity provided the Jaguar for reconnaissance, which hae proved
very beneficial. General Forget explained in this connection that recon-
naissance ia a permanent aseignment for every combat pilot. "One mueC go
and see." To this end, the majority of the Jaguar A eingle-seat models for
unirs 1 nnd 3 of the llth Squadron were equipped with Omerg 40 panoramic
cameras 1agC year. The aircraft of unit 4I11 are also awaiting installaCion
o� this equipment. PreeenC plans do not ca11 for equipping other units
than these ehree in the llth Squadron with the capacity for reconnaiesance,
by way of an auxiliary secondary miseion, which proved particularly Naluable
during the activities carried out in 1978 outside the hexagon. The use of
this phoCographic equipment requires rather general Craining for pilots
which is provided for them by the 33rd Reconnaissance Squadroii in Straebourg.
Naturally, this capacity servea to supplemenC that of the Mirage IIIR and
III1tD aircra�t of the 33rd Squadron, for which reaonnaissance ia the taain
mission.
4. The sum of the experience acquired in connection with the military
activities carried out aC the request of client countriea. In Chis con-
nection, the Jaguar has indeed given proof of its operational capacity,
and the pilots have demonstrated all of the benefits they can extract from
the excellent aircraft available to ehem.
About 100 Percent Performance
The commander of the Tactical Air Force sumcnarized the comnents which
could be made about the functioning of the Jaguars during miasiona outside
the hexagon for which they were used last year in a few meaning�ul atate-
ments. These missions made it possible to test the reliability of the
fueling in-flight system and the weapona system, as well as the qualiCy
of the weaponry, parCicularly in the case of the misaions involving target
practice. ,
The overall performance of the Jaguars in this connection was near 100
percent, which is remarkable. The majority of the glanes employed�, after
refueling in-flight, carried out missions involving targets located some-
times more than 1,500 kilometers from their poinC of departure.
The fact that the plane has twin engines won praise. The engines functioned
very well on this occasion, despite trying weaCher conditions, in terms of
heat. The refueling in-flight operations, in the course of which the use
of the modulated PC proved especially useful and effective and provided
satisfaction beyond expectations, became routine operations or at least
regular activities for the pilots of the 11th Squadron last year.
Today, more than half the Jaguar pilots are trained to carry out missions
involving one or several refuelings in-flight.
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nir-to-ground), iCg gpeed (it can carry 3.8 Cons of wegponry at 500 knoeg
f.lying low, whi.l.e the 8-17 foreregy used in 1943--1944 could noti carry gs
much gr 10,000 feer), and its mgneuverability, and, since ira career is
Just beginning, it is subject eo constant improvemant. Some have to do
with pilor aids, and othera wirh weaponry (see the ar.Ciclea on pages 29 and
31 in rhia connection). General ForgeC, for his pare, noCed the two areas
in which weapnnry effdreg wi].1 be focuged: on the one hand the 1ow-altiCude
relense of fragmenCation bombs, and on the other very high-preciaion firing,
making possible the desrruction of heavily defended apecific targete
fnllowing evasive ncCion to escape enemy anti-aircraft defense ef�orCe.
Meanwhile, the mounting of a laser range-finder, beginning with Jaguar
number 81, has greatly �ac3.litated the task of the pilot in firing pasaes,
since the Assessment of distances is always difficult, except at firing -
ranges where there are generally very useful viaual reference points.
In the repair and mainCenance sector, iC is still too soon Co assess how
the equipment ages, because the "oldest" air force Jaguars have only JusC
exceeded 1,200 flight houre. The modular concept of the engine, in any
case, has yielded happy results on the levels of economy (fewer replacemenC
flywheels and less indusCrial work) and performance.
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ruK ukrtUltiL ubIS UNLY
Under this photo of the Jaguar No 117, one of the last taken by the 4/11
unit in Bordeaux, the aperture of the telemetric laser can be seen.
The mounting of a panorama camera Omera 40 in the nose of the fuselage of
a Jaguar A of the 4/11 unit in Bordeaux.
COPYRIGHT: Air eC Cosmos, Paris, 1979
5157
CSO: 3100 33
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COUNTItY SCC'I'ION FRANCE
B1tIEFS
A12MOI2CU MZLITARY MANEUVEItS--In October [1979), Preaident Giacard wi11
nfficiaCe eC the mose exCensive armored unit maneuverg to rake place
[in France] since WarLd Wer II. 7'he maneuvere w,t11 be held in the Saone
and boubg Uepurrments. [Texr] [Parig PARIS MATC'H in F'rench 22 Jun 79
P 511
COItSICAN AUTONOMISTS WORRYING--The pollce have become aware o� an in-
creasing nervousnesa amung the autonomiste on Corsica ae the "Crial of
the 21" proceedg in the National Security Court. There ie fear that the
Corsicgn exCremigts may imiCaCe the meChods of the ICalian leftiats who
maim their victims by firing bullete inGo their lege. (Text] (Parie
VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 25 Jun 79 p 171
BASQUE AUTONOMISTS ANGERED--The Basque autonomiate have wriCten to VALEURS
ACmUELLES to reproach it for having revealed (on 21 May) their intention
to kidnap Jacques Chaban--Delmas. For Chat reaeon, they have been forced
to "puC off the operation and rethink Cheir palne for action." Group RP 259
(the French section of the revolutionary organization Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna,
or LTA) has announced: "We can now tell you that thia acCion will take
place before the end o.f the year and as a reault great progrese will be
made on the path to freeing the Basque people." [Text] [Paris VALEURS
ACTUELLES in French 25 Jun 79 n 171
PCF REDEFINES RESPONSIBILITIES--The new responsibilitiea of the I'CF
secretariat are to be redefined by the central committee on 21 June. Pierre
Juquin will probably become PCF spokesman and put in charge of the [PCF]
weekly FRANCE NOWELLE. Jean-Francois Gau, one of Georgea Marrhais'
secretaries, will probably fill editorialist Francette Lazard;s 3ob with
L'HUMANITE; she is said to be going to work with Guy Hermier dealing with
"inte3.lecCual" matters. [Text] [Paria LE POINT in French 18 Jun 79 p 45]
STATUS OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE--The author reviews the possibility of the uae
of biological arms. After analysing the different pathogenic agenta and
more specifically military problems poaed by the use of such arms, the role
of military health services is envisaged at various levels: alert, detec-
tion, immediaCe protection, identification, prophylaxis and treatment. The
principles of inedical defence against biological attack are identical to those
used in the treatment of natural infection. Finally, the suthor emphaeisea
the real threat represented by biological arma, forbidden by international
conventions and whoae effects are difficult to predict. [TexC] [Paria
MEDECINE ET ARMEES in EngJ.ish Vol 7 No 4 1979 p 3481
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COUNTItY SECTZON
STAMMATI INTERVIEWED ON FOREIGN TRADE
Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in ICalian 8 Jun 79 p 9
[Interview with SenaCOr and former Miniater of Treasury SCammati]
iTALY
[TexC] [Question] Senator Stammatii, the brie� inCerval of "national
solidariCy" has produced some positive economic reaults, though within a
political �ramework that has been breaking up gradually. Do you feel thaC
these resulCs have contributed subsCantially to a change in the international
market's assessment of the Italian "market-place?" In other words, hae
the flow of investments .aad--more generally speaking--international trade
reflected, positively and Cangibly, a mitigation of the "Italy risk?"
[Answer] Regarding the question of the "ICaly ri.ek," I have personal
recollections of very difficulC times back in the period when I wae minister
of Creasury in Andreotti's third government. The 12 months between October
1976 and October 1977 represent to some extent the synthesis, in a manner
of speaking the "pulse," of the change in internaCional opinion about us.
I am taking the liberCy of this brief step backwards in time in order to
explain that the "Italy risk," a phenomenon whose scope was clearly per-
ceptible in October 1976 at the International Monetary Fund meeting in
Manila, was already considerably at an end 1 year later at the meeting
in Washington.
That iC was a forgotten matter was demonstrated by the American bankers
who in large numbers sought me out on thaC occasion to negatiate loans for
our country. That was a political Cime of great importance for our economy
because Che solidarity of the warious forces that supported the Andreotti
government by Cheir abstentinn permitted an incisive and unambiguous acCion
that constituted the basis of the renewal process we are now experiencing.
[Question] One of the major criticisms leveled against the government by
the sectors of production has been the lack of a basic "political" aupport
for the penetration of foreign markets. Fortunately, this governmental
attitude has been rectified by the activity of former Minister [of Foreign
Trade] Ossola, and in these past few weeks by the activiCy that you have
initiated. But a certain governmenCal passiveness remains. In your opinion,
has enough been done? Do the difficulties of international trade require
an intensification of the efforts being made, and perhaps new initiatives?
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[Answer] IC is easentially true Chat the eo-called "ICalinn economic mire-
c1e" has resuleed more from A spontaneous "germinaeion" than from coordinated
acrion. The resulCs were noted during ehe economic and energy crisee from
1973 on, Yet it is also erue rhat in recent years, that ie, within the
framework of the policy of "national aolldariCy," say from 1976 on, much
has been done to give a common impulse--I woulil sgy a cooperative impulse--
to Italian penetration of foreign markeCs.
[QuesCion] Minisrer StammaCi, do you believe our foreign policy should be
somewhar modified, pareicularly with regard to relaeions with the countries
of ttie so-called merging areas: the socialiat, OPEC and Third World
countries? ~
[Answer] Relations with the so-called emerging nationa should be intenai-
fied; this is a traditional part of our economic policy, and, ae I said,
should be intensified, especially in terma of the spectacular improvemenC
o� our �oreign Crade balance.
The Ital3an economy is one of eransformation that bases its posaibiliCies
for expansion, and therefore its aurvival, on the existing differencea
between the imported raw and semiraw product and the finiahed exporC
product.
The greater the value added, the higher the profit of our enterpriaes ancl
the greater their abiliCy to reinvest and create new employment.
Therefore, the goal of our process of industrial reconversion is to expand
the areas of production with high added value in relation to the influx
of imported products.
Thus, wi.zh regard Co the countries producing raw materials, there is the
dual need Co be able to depend on secure supplies from them and at the
same time to increase the flow of exporCs of goods and services as to
generate anavailability of foreign currency to offseC the increasing
burdens that oil imports impose on the balance of trade.
A separate poinC can be made for the Third World. Here we are concerned
with countries whose growing industrialization can count on extremaly low
labor costs, with their products consequently being highly competitive.
In order for the Italian presence to penetrate and increase in those
markets, it is therefore necessary to aim at quality products and at the
rationalization of production processes with investments for expansion
in the advanced sectors. Unfortunately, the domestic economic crisis has
reduced such investments.
[Question] Minister Stammati, in your opinion, do the new serious problems
presented by the oil crisis require substantial changes in the relations
of trade and cooperation with the [other] producing nations?
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Foa oFFiciaL usE ocn.Y
[Mswer) As Iaaid bpfore, dependence on aaingip energy source rrpaeea
the dual nped for security of oupply and for covert.ng the burdene deriving
from that dependence. Wtiat it involves in astrategic couree of ection to
be followed on rhe bagis of a eetiies of bilaCarai agreempnte entailing the
exchange of oil for our goods and servicea. It in u Cnurge df aceion thet
involvee the overall policy of the governmenC) and as euch cannot be
implemented by the minieter of foreign trade aloae.
On the other hand, it cen be implemented within an international eoneext
Chat ie awre adjuetable and stabie; to implement it, it ie npcessgry to
be careful to avoid a future repetition of kinds of the times caused by
the Yom Kippur War and by the iranian itetirutional criaig.
[Question) Senator Stammati, in resent months ItnliAn expor.ta hava seen
parCl.cularly good timee. Nowever, thp internatioaal indicators give reason
to fear a slowdown in international demand in the near future. Do you think
that the "magicai moment" of our exporCe is about to paeg4
(Answer) We are faced with a certain resumption of the inflationary trend,
nd the future eituation presents aome uncertainty becauep of the considerable
increase in the cost of oil aad other ra.w maeeriale, the effects of which
are still not clear. Our economy is one that is being draw nlong cather
than doieg the leading, and as such it is bound and conditioned by the
capacity for development of the syetem of vhich it for;.,a a part.
However, the preceding statemente are eomewhat positive, becauea even if a
certain alowdown in the groath of the American economy ig expected in the
eecond half of this year, the pace of forpign demand in 6urope appears to
be favorable. However, the dangez of inflationary tensions still remaina,
due to the rise in the price of raw materials.
Such a possibility vould heve a negative effect on the grorth of the GNP
of the Luropean countries, ahich this year is expected to be 3.6 percent,
compared to 2.8 percent in'1978. But it must etill be said that even though
the Italian ecoaomy is influenced by poeitive indications, it contiaues
to be charac;terized by serioue etructural deficiencies that must be overcome
by meane of a policy of qualifying public expenditure and of increased
investment.
COPYRICHT: 1979 Editrice 11 Sole-24 Ore s.r.l.
5346
CSO: 3104
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COtT1nRY 3ECTZON
bIRECTOR OF ENERGY SOURGES INTERVTEWEU ON OIL SUPPLY
Milan IL 30tE - 24 ORE in Italian 8 Jun 79 pp 1, 2
ITALY
~
(lnterviev With Energy Sources Director Giuseppe Ammaseari by Claudio Alo:
"Government and Companies in Italy Vying for 'Foreign' Refinery Products")
(Text) Rome. The arm wreeCling.ie on. The etakee are an adequare level
of perroleum auppiies for Italy, a resuit, to tell the truth, which the two
contenders say they aant to attain. On oae eide of the table ve have the
petroleum companiee Which for some time have beeu proteeting against the
inadequacies of the Italian price-fixing syatem and which resent the
decision, adopted on 28 May by the Ministry of Induetr.y, to block in Italy
35 percent of the producee derived from the proceseing of the crude of
foreign clienta in Italian refineries.
"This ia a deciaion," say the private petroleum companies quite harehly,
"ahich is useless, damaging, and contrary to the national iaterest."
On the other side of the table, with equal determination, wL, have a
government in general or, more apecifically, the Miniatry ~)f Industry
and, further dowm, Giuseppe Anmoaseari, the Director Generai of Energy .
Sources, who responds to the argumeuts of the petroleum companies. According
to statistics available to the Minietry--Ammassari maintains in fact--the oil
companies enormously stepped up their proceaeing for foreign ordere, 1aeCead
reduciiig final processing here. They therefore do not have auq confideace in
the official commitments undertakea with regard to suppliee for Italq while
products are begianing to become scarce.
A new round began yeaterday in this long arm wrestling contest which has noW
been going on for several months. Ammassari as a matter of fact auaomoned
- the represeatatives of the petroleum companies, both public and private,
Which operate in italy, to the Ministry. The meeting topic was triis: Oa the
one hand, a check on the status of supply program implementation and, on the :
other hand, the famous provision of 28 May which caused very atiff protests
from the petroleum companiea.
~ .
The confrontation seems to have been very bitter, aith a subatantial rigidi-
f~cation on both sides; Ammassari rejected their challenges aad the companies
~
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reppaeed the1r argumente. The meeeing--vhich ended wieh grim faces and
a pledge Co meet again nexe Thursday--waa sucemarized by representativee of
peeroleum compantee as "interlocutory."
The Uirector-Cenerai of Energy Sourc@s on ghe oeher hend aas lers Cight-
lipped in Che eourse of an inrerview ahich he gave ue gt the end of a
meeting.
Here, in eunimary, is what he Cold ue,
[Queetion] Now, Profeesor Ammassari, is thie really an arm wreetling conteat?
[Answer) Let us say, ae one of the oil company repreeenrativee eaid, that
we are on a coliigton couree,
lRupsti.oa) Why?
[Answer] Because crude ie aiready lacking ahen it comes to the decieione
of the producer countries and ve cannot eccept a eituBCion ahere other die-
torting elemente are added, elemente ahich aill further reduce the oil
available to Ttaly. The ehortage during the firet helf of the year vae
made up wtth uneold stocks but nov there are no longer any uneold stocke.
We must be very careful and on the alert.
(Question] Are We then going to have a gasoline ehortage this auamer?
(Anawer] No, in the light of the checke which ve made--providing, of coureeo
consumpCion doee not go up further--we ought to have enough gasoline for
ourselves and for the anticipated tour3et inPlux. But the thing that worries
us aeriously is the gas-oil and fuel oil aituation. For these products, the
situation is grave especially fo17.oW3ng the price establiahed in the Uaited
States for these supplies. We asked the oil companiee for further clarifi-
cation.
(Queationj And thia is what you called them in for?
[Mswer] More or less. I summoned the repreaentativea of the nine oil
companies operating on our market by direction of the minieter aad I explained
to them the supply situation on the basis of a check on the 1971 plan re-
garding the second half.
[Question] And you did not talk about the etep taken Co block 35 percent of
the procesaing volume for foreiga orders in Italy?
[Mswer] That, too. As for the reat, protests have reached the Ministxy
in recent days, I might almost say threats, in connection with thie step
which became necessary in order to guarantee sufficient quantities of
products for Italy, pending verificatioa of the supply plan and also taking
' iato account a vast effort on the international petroleum bypraducts pur-
chasing market which sprang from a decision by the United States Government.
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(Queseion] The decision eo subsidize the import of diesei fuel aith $S p@r
barrel? `
(AneaeY) Not juat ehat. I am taiking here Fitiat of all gbout the decision
ehae no longer prevents the pareieipaeion af ehe Ametiicen companies in ea8h
transactionA on ehe r+orid crude market, This decision conflicted aith What
the United Staties repreeentatives asserted afterwaxd Co ehe Ineerngeionai
Cnorgy Agency during the 21 and 22 May meet3ng. Afteti eheC came
another Amerirgn deciaion, the decision to eubaidize dieeel fuel importa. Thia
ia precrice meant that the Unieed States vag prepared to pay 30 lire more per
kilogram of dieeei fuel then the internetional price at the moment. Md,
as everybody knowe, theae ewo etepe caueed tho Ministry of industiry in
PAria eo adopt a formal posirion.
[Question] Profeseorg 1et us get back for a moment to today'e meeeing. What
staei.etice did you Bhow the companips?
CAnewrer] The data S illuetrated this morning unequivocally point to a reduc- j
tion in the shipmente of crude during the eecond half of 1979 to supply the
domestic market and, on the other hands they also paint to a further increaee
in processing for foreign ardere. Ie the light of these data, the minietry ;
couid only t.zke the steps it took, and the decision vae painful enough.
(Queation) Can you give me those data?
(Aneaer] No, but I preeented them very ciearly to the oil companiae ti+hich
pgrhape vere not too familiar aith them. The decision that Wae made how-
ever is aimed at Choae operators who expect to reduce the final proceseiag
volume by doubiing or tripling the volume proceesed for the foreign client.
- (Queation] But the companiea say that this decision will damage Italy,
diverting abroad certain processing that can be done in Italy.
[Mswer] This morning I recalled that the minietry knovs very i+ell that
Italy has twice the refining capacity it needs for domeatic consumptioe and
tbat there is no *intention noC to run the refinerie8 and cause unemployment.
In November 1978, vhen the supply plan waa draWn up, after aseuring the
coverage of our complete dnmeatic needs, ae allowed the operatore to double
the procesaing volume oP last year for Poreign cuatomers, incYeasing the
figure to 22 million tons.
[Question] And aow Chings have changed?
[MsWer] Noa, regarding the second half of the year, compared to a final
procesaing volume of 45.5 million tons and a gap of 8 million tone when it
comes to meettng domeatic needa completely, We would be increasing the
foreign client account to 16 million tons. This means that the Italian
refineriea ti+ould allocate 25 percent of the volume processed for exports
without Pirst haviug taken care of the domestic need.
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[Quegtion] Profpssor Annnaaaari, i,n eh4s noC a btC of confuel,on due to e
qupation of inadequaCe fu11 priceg?
[Anewer] It may a1so be that the Curreer sysrem that hae been agreed upon,
with the same companies, might wrork we11 in a eituation of calm 3nternational
prices Whereae in a gyseem that i8 3n morion, auch as the presenr one aad
fuilowing the American deciaions, the compantee are forced to eell on
markets uhere the beat prices can 6e goteen,
(Quegtion) in ather wordd, the actiun of the companies is justified, at
leaet Prom the strictiy economic viewpotn0
[Angwer] It 3e clear rhat, the more money they make, the better for them,
But tihig is not 3ust a queation of profiteZ there are aieo some specific
respons#b3lities involved here.
They derive from the refining licensee Whtch impose certain suppiy obliga-
tiona and which mean that one must comply wiCh commitmente undertaken,
i want to aay again that the moet eCartling thing in ail Chis is that the
crude, that is subjected to final processing, keepa going down, whtle there
te an enormous increaee in the proceaeing for foreign clients. Thie is
something which a miniatry that ia concerned wl.th energy sourcea cannot
put up with.
(Question] In summnary, you are determined to hold faet in this arm
wrestiing conteat?
(Ansver] We will see what happens next Thuraday after the companies have
more carefully atudied the data I brought to their attention.
COPYRICHT: 1979 Editrice 11 Sole - 24 Ore e4r.l.
5058
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I
;
~
COUNTRY 9ECmION ITALY '
r I
PROSPECTIVv. ENERGY CONSERVATION MEASURES DISCU3SED
Milan TL SOLE - 24 ORE in ital3an 9 Jun 79 pp 1, 2
[Articie by C.A.= "The Coming AccounCing for Enargy 3avings"]
[Text] Rome. Amid the big hullabaloo that broke out in connecCion with ;
tRe "suspense novel" represented by petroleum eupplies, the famoua .
"Nicolazzi Pian" for energy eavings elowing drifted into the background ,
as wa8 perhape euggested (to the poltticiane) by the upcoming elections%
Next 3unday, we vote fo�r Europe and on Monday the country will again find ~
itaelf fac3ng ite own real problems.
, It may therefore be usefult on the basis of precise information obtained .j
from the Mintatry of Tndustry, to take a look at a group of ineaeures ~
ahich, in the longer or ehorter run, Will have to be paesed. ' I
These stepa can be divided into Cwo separate categoriea, In the firsC :i
category we have the more unpleaeant and unpopular ones although they will
probably be more decisive. They include the reviaion of petroleum product
prices and electric power rates. The CIPE [Inter Miniaterial Committee for
Economic Planntng] or the new parliament will have to expresa itself and
we can therefore anticipate a relatively long interval of Cime.
In the second category, for which we have more precise iaformation, we on
the other hand have adequate administrative provisions and the procedurea
therefore are simpler. Here ts what ae can look forWard to.
Coal, The replacement of growing quantities of fuel oil w3th coal is the �
measure in Which the Mtnistry of Industry ia presently placiag its greatest
hopes when it comes to achieving a considerably savings by the end of the
Year,
,
Moati of thia operatic+a naturally is handled by ENEL jNational Electric Power
Agency] whtch is already converting some electric power plants. But the
electric poWer agency and the Ministry oP Tadustry are not completely in ,
on the quantity as such. ENEL enperts maintain that they can almost
cextatnly increase the total coal consumption from 2 million tons iu 1978
to 2.8-3 million tons in 1979 atth a eaving of about 700,000 toas of 42
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petroleum produces. The Ministry of Induetry on the oeher hand maintaina
that iti had committed Che ENEL to 3.ncrease itis coal consumption to 3.5
million tons during 1979.
Speed 1imiCs. Right aPter Easter, MiniaCe: Compagna approved a proviaion
(the oniy one introduced ao far) to limit ehe apeed of truck-trailer com-
binaCi4ns to 80 kilomeeers per hour. The Minister o� Public Works noted
that this step wae noti Caken to reduce conaumpeion "buC to reduce highway
deaths."
In addition to this by no means negligible resulto it would aleo be poseible,
according to the Min3sCry of Industryt to achieve a eaving of abour 100,000
litera oE gasoline, Concerning epeed limita on the other hand, we do not
know anytihing as yeC.
Supply of gasoline at border. This proviaion (no more than half a Cank for
outgoing truck-erailer combinatione) is aleo adminiatrative in naCure and
is inCanded to reduce the now Widespread habit of foreign truckers to fill
up their tanks in ICaly (where gasoline is considerably cheaper) before
crossing the border, According to Ministry sourcea, this measure could
be approved by next week, resulting in a saving of about 60,000 tona.
Parking ban in historical areas. This atep will certainly be a difficult
one since--after the CIPE fias issued the necessary directive--the local
admittistrations will have to deliberate on it.
Extension of summertime. This measure hae been approved and, starting in
1980 summertime will be extended to six montha (saving of 60,OOQ tona).
COPYRIGHT; 1179 Editrice 11 Sole - 24 Ore s.r..l.
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COUNTRY SECTION
PREMIER SUAREZ BECOMING MORE AND MORE ISOLATED
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 17 Jun 79 pp 304 31
[Text] Silence of Suarez
SPAIN
The silence of Suarez has much to clo with a style of governing, whose roots
go deep down into the furrow of the most recent pastj with a manner and a
profession that the government, pnliticians, the press and the whole coun-
try are learninq day by day: to live in democracy and with a certain, hid-
den inclination toward perpetuity in office that, according to sources in
the UCD [Democratic Center Union] itself, is imparting a stronq character
to the prime minister.
Nevertheless, that silence brought this mud. The recent terrorist assaults,
the feeling of inactivity and paralysis given to the country by the gov+ern-
ment of Prime Minister Suarez, the problem of autonomy and the already very
much discussed economic crisis have succeeded in casting doubt on what
seemed to be unquestionable: the figure of Adol�o Suarez itself, of "Uncle
Adolfo" as he is known in UCD circles.
Is Suarez irreplaceable? Is he capable of tackling the three great pro-
blems confronting the country namely, terrorism'and law and order, auto-
nomies and constitutional development and economic crisis with reasonable
capability of solving them?
Jose Luis Gutierrez conducted research in the areas of the qovernment and
the center party and wrote the history.
"This is going to the'dogs. It is intolerable." This comment, halfway be-
tween irritation and pessimism, was made by a well-known UCD member of Par-
liament, after the Perez Llorca storm.
And the discouragement of this deputy can be detected in broad areas of the
government party. The country's situation, described recently as "serious"
by the minister of Interior, is described, within the UCD, as "grave, tend-
ing to become worse." And everyone is looking,toward "Uncle Adolfo."
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"Ever since Suarez has been in of�ice," an 3mportant UCD member of Parliament
pointed out to this periodical, " ha has al.ways gi.ven priority to urgent mat-
ters over important matiters, perhaps obliged in part but the march o� eventa.
But i believe that long-range planning is necessary and thnt ia what Suarez
haa noti done. Government has been conductedin a way very similar to Franco's
way, with the same tricks, and the ministers have been and are mere depart-
ment heads but with large of�ices. They are not aware o� what is happening,
when they should be jofntly responsible for an earnest, well-constructed gnv-
ernment policy. Cabinet meetings are nothing more than a mere authentication
of what is approved in the committee of unfler secretaries."
According to all the sources, the progressive isolation o� Suarez to a con-
stantly smaller circle of trusted men began in tihe leaks from cabinet meet-
ings in the first Suarez government.
The prime minister is especially sensitive to two topics that he handlea
with much tact: relations with the mi.litary and criticisms of his admin-
istration. "Leaks," the UCD member of Parliament stated, "make him ex-
tremely nervous and he no longer trusts anyone. His manner of governing
the country is constantly more autocratic and personal, without relying on
anyone.11 In this respect, the commentators recall the appointment by desiq-
nation of the new national secretariat of UCD by Adolfo Suarez, at the end
of May this year, in strong contrast with the democratic debates of the
28th congress of the PSOE [Spanish Socilist Workers Party], held at the
same time.
Too Many Problems
In view of the events piling up, this question arises bothersomely: What
is;Suarez doing? Does the "Suarez paralysis" really exist?
Broad areas of the center party agree in stating that "the suit is too big
for Suarez," problems are too much for him.
In�those circles, his extreme skill in piloting the transition is pointed
out, but also "his indecision when the time came to govern really, when
strong measures have to be taken."
"Undoubtedly," a high UCD figure stated, "Suarez has glued himself to his
chair in the prime minister's office and everything he does is for the pur-
pose of staying there. But the present moment is sufficiently grave and,
therefore, a statesman is needed at the head of the country. Let us hope
that the prime minister will react. He has a great reaction capability
and it increases when faced with difficult situations, and this one cer-
tainly is difficult."
What if he does not react? Last week, several opinions mentioning the prime
minister's "stability" appeared in some Madrid newspapers.
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According to these judgments, Suarez wi11 be around awhi]:e. Sn his speech
in the congress on 30 May, tihe prime minister himsel� leaked a dazzling
megsage in a veiled manner in his speach: Either Suarez or chaos.
The prime minister's inconstancy {n identiEying his figure with the democra-
,tia order is systematically tiaken aparti by a nmber of repreaentativea of
the center party who stiate thati a replaaement of the prime. minister should
come from the party itself.
"it is neither real nor well to trot out the ghost of a mil3tary coup in
the most crucial moments," a well-known UCD member of Parliament stated tio
this periodical. "The party, the system would take charge of producing a
substitiute, in case Suarez fails. Otherwise, the party or the syatem would
be replaced."
Thus, the possible replacement o� Suarez, a rumor that began to spread some
weeks ago in very limited circles and always in whispers, leaped openly to
the pages o� newspapers and to political commentaries. On the party
level, very timidly, meetings, suppers and in�ormai dinners are taking
place with groups in which "nothing important is talked about," always ac-
cording to the participants.
Nevertheless, the names of possible replacements have already appeared in
print and even with photographs. Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo whose maximum
endorsement for being selected for the post is safd, according to some
sources, to be the fact that he does not belong to any of the three treh8s
is one of those most mentioned, like Rodolfo Martin Villa, Ordonez, or
Landelino Lavilla himself.
But it seems that the phase of replacement of Suarez is, for the present,
only a dream by many or wishful thinking confusing desires with reali-
ties by others.
- "It is impossible to do without Suarez," a well-known representative of the
social-democrat wing pointed out. Aside from the fact that legally it is
very difficult to do (a vote of censure would have to occur and the PSOE and
Democratic Coalition would have to come to an agreement, together with the
Comnunist Party, or the whole parliamentary group of UCD would-have to de-
cide it in full) which seems still less possible) politically it would be
a catastrophe, because the UCD would break up into seven pieces. Suarez
is irreplaceable at this time. That is one thing and what is done with
this strong government is something else. Giving a new reading to pro-
blems, stirring up the enthusiasm and solidarity of every sector in the
country, something that is not happening now. Coming out of the leadership
crisis being undergone by UCD and the government."
In addition, center sources indicated another impossibility for replacing
Suarez: there are no candidates. "Suarez," a representative of the Christ-
ian democratic sector of UCD stated, "has been very careful that there is
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nn one who can cast a ahadow on him. Thus, the partiy hae no 'number tiwo,'
or even a'number three,' because he hae eliminatied the �igurea of etature
who might have bean these numbers. On1y 'number fourg' are 1eft."
The cantier politiciang added: "Z'he figure df Garrigues is among tihe possibl.e
replacements, but his delicate health does not make thiB adviaable. Calvo
Sotielo seema to me entirely unpresentiable. He has done nothing ae a minister.
Ne hae no politiical pasti and when he prepared the firet UCD tickets for the
15 June election, he had the strange skill of confrontiing everyone."
Fernande z Ordonez is being regarded, nevertheless, as a more certain.value,
alrhough he raises the disadvantiage of the rejection caused by his figure
3n certain sectors of tihe righti in thie country. However, as some party
sources point out, "iti would have been worse for the PSOE to have won the
election, and if they had won, they would be governing." ,
Etodolfo Martin Villa does not appear to be a firm candidate, because of his
abraded image as ministier o� Interior, and Lande]ino Lavilla seems to be
completely witihdrawn from the most turbulent centera.
Protecting Suarez
Every UCD sector agrees, however, on stating that "there is no other solution
than to protect Suarez, to oblige him to govern and to govern in a more
collegial manner."
There are disagreements, howeve r, on how to govern. Thus, some party sec-
tors show an inclination to support a strengthening of the government based
on strengthening the party, "which practically does not exist now," with
a secretary general who will be one in fact. "It is not wise," one of the spokesmen of this sector added, "to make a
change in government at present, a few months after its appointment. The
government must be strengthened on the basis of a strong party."
The supporters of this point of view are considering Rodolfo Martin Villa
as secretary general of UCD and the establishment of a standing comanittee
of the Executive Comanittee, consisting of eight or ten persons on who;n the
highest political responsibilities will be incumbent for the party leader-
shi;p and the government line. ~
~
- Nevertheless, the possibility that the situation may deteriorate and that
things may even become aggravated and worse make the replacement of Suarez
continue there,in a chrysalis state, in broad sectors of the center party.
COPYRIGHT 1979. INFORMACION Y PUBLICACIONES, S.A. 10;042
CSO: 3110
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DECISIVE ACTION ON TEF2RORISM ASKED OF GOVERNMENT
Madrid CAMBZO 16 in Spanish 17 Jun 79 p 3
(Editorial by Juan Tomas de 5alas: "Consensua or Nonsense")
sPArN
(Text] Perhaps Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez is not under a table worried
over the number and size of the problems that must be solved by his gov-
ernment, but an increasing part of the political class and of the country's
informed opinion feels that this is so. An increasing outcry is sprirging
up for Suarez to govern, for him to establish de�inite objectives in the
country's three great problems and for him to indicate time limits and ways
for achieving them.
If Adolfo Suarez resorts exclusively to his unqueationable tactical ability,
erosion of the government will ensue very rapidly. During the first years
of the transition, the strategic objective achievement of a constitution
accepted by the immense majority was so clear that the tactical capability
of Adolfo Suarez sufficed and was more than enough to keep the country's
confiderice in spite of the destabilizing campaign that fell down on us and
the economic crisis that acted independently. But when the Constitution
was approved, the medium-term strategic objective disappeared and there is
no tactical preciosity that will free the country of its anxities. Without
telling us clearly where we are going in these four years lying ahead of us,
each assassination, each act of savagery, each strike and each business
failure make the counti-y quiver down to the marrow.
A magic panacea is beginning to appear in these days: let us return to con-
sensus with the left. With a lack of government, it seems that we return
to consensus.
Unfortunately, _gentlemen-, the course of consensus with the left is not the
right course for the country. Perhaps no other remedy is left, but first of
all an attempt must be made to govern in accordance with the mandate re-
ceived from the voters on 1 March, firmly and fearlessly. And only later,
only if it is demonstrated that a center party governing firmly is not ca-
pable of compl-eting the strengthening of the new regime, or~ly in that case
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would the country understand that we should again sing ambiguous songs all
together, in union, in order not to have to sign by force the heroic b1,ue
anthems already on the decline.
It is an admission in advance that the government doea not want to govern,
i� the phantom o� consensus is resuacitated now. The argument that the
Suarez Administration doQS not have an absolute majority in Parliament is
not valid. The problem is how to achieve tihat majority. Yt may be achieved
"unnaturally" by making a pact with the 1eft, but it may also be achieved,
with much greatier consistency, by rapidly establishing the autonom; sta-
tutes without pettiness and then by coming to an agreement with the Cata-
lonians and the Basques on a moderate program of government that will have
almost 200 deputies in the Chamber. 7'his alternative is as possible as
consensus with the left, but much more consiatent and better for the coun-
try.
That kind of government, with Basques and Catalon3ans represented in it,
would be capable of settling the economic crisis from an overall liberal
point of view and it would be capable of undertaking, day by day, blow
by blow, the very great task of building the new state. Moreover, the
Socialist Party, placed as opposition to this government, would come out
of its ambiguity and its Marxist madness to prepare, also day by day, blow
by blow, its own concrete government alternative. Thus, in 1983, Spaniards
could choose between two concrete, complete government programs. Z'hat is
the course. That is the strategy.
COPYRIGHT 1979. INFORMACION Y PUBLICACIONES~ S.A.
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COIJNTRY SECTION
GONZALEZ INTERVIEWED, DISCU5SES PARTY'S SITUATION
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 24 Jun 79 pp 39-41 LD
SPAYN
[Interview with former 5panish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) Secretary
General Felipe Gonzalez by Lortnza de Azcarraga, first publiehed by
Mexican magazine EXCELSIOR: "Felipe Spealcs"--date and place not
specified] -
[Text] A few weeks after the 28th PSOE Congress sp1iC the country's oldeat
party inCo two opposed wings, the new democracy`s foremost socialist leader
agreed to an in-depth inCerview with ajournalist,
This magar.ine has secured exclusive publish3ng rights in Spain for the
interview between Felipe Gonzalez and Lorenza de Azcarraga for the Mexican
magazine EXCELSIOR.
Question: You resigned for ethical reasons, but a large proportion of
the party believes that it was an irresponsible move. What would you say
to me about that charge?
Answer: Well, I have not carried ouC any opinton polls to f3nd out whether
a large proportion of the country believes that my resignation was incon-
sistent, but I am still subject to a popular tribunal, so that when the
next elections come we will see if indeed there lias been a negaCive or a
positive reactiion.
Question: Did the debate for and against Marxism serve to hide the grass
roots' irritation with the leadership?
Answer: Well, I believe that there is always a degree o� aggressiveness
on the part of the party grass roots toward tfie leadershtp; there has always
been some throughout the party's history at all the congzesses and during
this period also, and it has been increased, if you like, by a party grass
roots which has grown tpn~-.fold during my period in office and which we
have managed to integrate into active participation in political decisions.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that this means that the debate on Marxfsm
was used in any way to bring this aggressiveness to the surfaae [hacer
aflorar esa agresividad, possible misprint for hacer aflojar.,.to weaken]
3n any case the issue of Marxism was fundamental to the congress.
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Questiion: Do you be].ieve rhat your party ia sufficiane].y responsibie to
take chargp of this countiry'a future after the eontradiceione of ehe
cdngress?
Anower: Obviousiy 2 do believe so end I believe it after the congreee juet
as much es I did before, becnuee it has bpen the only party capable of
pubiiely discussing ite internal differenceg end discuesing them quite
freely. Vsua11y a political party's reeponeibility is confueed with ite
ability to conceai itie 3.nternal problems. I eti1L believe rhat of all the
partiies in the country it ie the one leaet unfit Co take charge ofthe
country's future.
Quearion: it ia also gaid that the party elipped from your hande. Do you
beliave that you 8re sufficiently capable to lead a country of 36 mYliion
people, with it8 economic crisie, terroriem...Z
Anawer: Well, I must not be the judge of myself, but in any case even the
opinion ehat the party elipped from my haeds depende on one's viea of
politicaL action. Of course, if one regards it ae rigid control activity
aver a party's progreas and dynamics, then in fact it did not siip from my
hande; the facti ie Chat I never tried eo control it. The party hae iCs own
life and mugt do so increasingly.
if ehp implication ia that I did not have eufficient support from the
congress, i do not believe that in trues the executive received the votes
of almost 70 percent of the membere, with only 10 percent ageinet and
30 percent abataining [as published]. Therefore, there was only 10 percent
real opposition to the party leaderahip and Co me pereonally, if you Went
to make it peraonal, then Chere wae no voting to appoint a c8ndidete, but
it seems that some of the comxades who formed the oppesition nucleus have
stated publicly that they were aware that 90 percent Would have elected
me secretary general. "
Question: Who will win at the next congresa? Could there be an under-
standing between the hard line and the moderate? I
Mswer: We11, if I represent the hard line and the rest represent the
moderdte line, I hope that Chere is an underatanding, but I believe that
ig not the point: a cliche has been coined which does not in any way
correspond to the facts nf the matter. I believe that the party could;
and should, be more radical in its socioeconomic approach to aocioeconomic
and cultural transformations and more vigoroua in its ideological and
theoretical pronouncements so that what it says may be brought moYe into
line with what it does, so that there fs no violent discrepancy between
what it says it wante and what it is prepared to do in the couatry. I
believe thaC more progress must be made along the path of social trans-
formations and that there should be less shouting. This has alwayB been
my stance.
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Question: Could there be anotiher secretary general?
Answer; Obviously, ehere couid be another. Somebody eaid rightiy that this
party lived 100 years withouti Felipe Gonzalez and can live another 100 years
wiChaur I1im, fortunaeely for ehe party and for the country.
Questiion: Who could it be2
Ansaer: I do noti yeC have any candidate.
QuesCion: 2'his is what Tierno Galvan (PSOE honorary chairman) toid me.
Ie ie erue thar Tierno Galvan supported you uncondieionally during the
laCest criets?
Answer: Well. The only poinC I would make ie that on the Sunday morning,
when I have alreedy dectded not to aeand, Tierno offered to support me.
Queation: What was the content of your latest conversation with [Prime
Miniseer] Suarez and what kind of relations do you have with him?
Answer: Relations are not as good as they were bafore, As far as T am
cnncerned, Che question of wheeher relations between the prime miniater
and our party, as an opposition parCy, are good or bad immediately places
an assessment of personal relations on a subordinate level, when the
country has to deal with the grave problems which it can experience from
time to time. Therefore, irrespective of how good or bad relations are,
I will always be willing to diacuas the country's grave probleme. And as
for the content, I muat be diacreet. The prees has said certain things
that are not true: in order to reestablish the truth I muet say that it
was at the government's initiative and that I Rad the adminisCraCive
committee's authorization to meet with the prime minister and that the
basic content was the damestic political situation and certain aspects
of foreign policy: I can say no more.
Question: Do you believe Chat the PSOE Would be in a better position
to end terrorism than the government?
Answer: This is a terribly difficult question to answer. I do not
believe--and I have said this in the Cortes--that anybody should be as .
demagogic as to stand up in the congress of deputtes and guarantee that -
he will put an end to terrorism within a specified time limit. As long
as there is an assassin in the street prepared to kiil anyone wearfng A
uniform, then that assassin is difffcult to control. But I do believe
that the atruggle against.terrorism is sometimes vtewed from different
philosophical standpoints,
Nevertheless, there is x precondition, and th$t fs efficiency, technicotl
preparation. The availability of large resources and in some caaes a
series of political neasures--as could happen fn the caae of the terrorism
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in the 9asque cnunery--the ETA tierroriem, in other worda. IC is not eaoy
to cnmbine rhis sertes of preconditions, eepecially when tihere ie no hQri-
tage of adequaCe preparaeion for dealing with theee aepecra from a dema-�
cratic etandpoint.
puegtion: Do you belteve that the present goverrnnent wi11 last the i
expected 4 years, because many people are eaying that it wili noC laet, or '
ig there likely to be a coalition government with the PBOE before 1983? '
Answer: We11, i would say that gfCpr the elections the firet indication
I gave was that i believed thar the government should last, because
democracy is weakened when electiona are brought forward.
I now have the impreseion that the guvernment will experience great diffi-
culties in lasring the course. I eay "wtll experience"; and Z also have
the pereonal impreseion Chat it will be difficulC to eetablieh a coalitioe
government of any kind.
Frnm a personal viewpoint, I would eay that only if the democratic
institueions were in danger would I personally advise any kind of ineaeure,
including government parCicipation. But naCurally it ie the party that
musC gsseee the danger, not in any way the inCerlocutor on the oCtier side.
Queation: What conditions wbuld the PSOE set on a coalition, if ane were
to be formed?
Answer: I believe it is premature to make any assessment of this kind.
In the evene of a coalition being auggested, it would be becauae there
wae a serious inatitutional danger and if there ie a serioua institutional
danger, conditions become of secondary importance, because What Would be
at stake would be to save democracy, rhough probably and logically there
would be conditions: they would, however, become subordinate.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Informacion y Publicaciones, S.A. ~
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EDITORIAL COM!lENTS ON P80E'8 IDEOLOQICAI. PURITY
Madrid CAMS=0 16 in Spaniah 3 Jun 79 p 3
(Editorial by Juar 4bmas de Salas: "P80g or P81J8?111
SPAIN
(Text) A minoritiy of iiludinati, tacitiy joinad.by aiaicoatenentie of every
kind in the party, has attemptied thus, naithar more nor lasa tio
uAUrp the aili of the 5 miilion Spaniarde who voted, 3 nanths ago, for
a eoaialieti aitarnatiive in this country, as was presantad popularly by
Felipe Gonzsiez. MarxiBtie and younq peroone of every color sat tihemseivea
up as an oppoaitiion borderinq on psychiatric an8 thay threaten to tear to..
ehre8a t.hati great hope raiaed scarcely 2 years aqo by 3paniah soaialism.
Dotim witt Felipe, because without Felipe we shali lo8e bettier.
Tha lacti ie that without Felipe, without thati imaqe of nwclarn aoaialism
that he has been able to offer the country, the pure and hard PSOC (Spaniah
Socialist Workera party) cati be eure that it wili not evan wia over Carrillo
in elactiono. For better or for worse, whether or not they lika it, the
pure idoology ayatoilahs in this country aill find acant echo. Falipe, or
the imaqe qivsn by Felipe, is worth miliions of votars. Tha Marxiats, or
the imaqe that the opponente have qiven to Felips, make no coparison with
Carrilio.
pBllE (3paniah Vnitied Socialiat Party) or PSOE, that ia the quaetion. The
lelt Ning ot the axialist party is tryinq to fiqht aqainat Carrillo on hia
qround by passinq him on the left, by winniiiq the heaven of the prophet Marx.
It is possible tio ain heaven with that stratiegy. What is cartain is that
every election will be lost, one after the other. And what ia lfkely is
that the battle against the very clever conamuniat Santiaqo Carrillo aili
be lost. 3pain:s recent history is full of puritan, Marxist and Leainist
qroupa by the basketful r+ho almoat alwaya wound up by confaesinq their
�ina~and modestly antarinq the Mecca of the Ccmuniat Pas-ty that cleanses
all minde and en+allowa up its children aho have qone astray. Either that,
or the solitsry, happy puritianism of the four cate purer thaa anyane and
mors lonely t.haa anyone.
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Here, amonq uo, if ei@ctions were to be hold innnedl.atiely and Buetielop Solana
and Gaatellano weYe to head the P80C ticket, if no ons elsa ontierad the
racos, the UCD (Democratiic Center Union) would achieve a bold majority o�
the popular votie and an overwhelming majoritiy in the legiglatiive chambers.
Pure, pure, eolitiary Like hermits, Eitihar solitiu8e or be abeorbed by
Carriilo in a new and glorious Spanish UnifieQ Socialiet Party (PStiE).
Sometihing sounded hollow in that brilliant eocialiati party of Felipe tihet,
tihere�ore, never was equal tio the occasion, either in the Canary =slandsi
or in the Basque Countiry, or in the real country. There was brilliance
on tiop and much demagogy or much diseatiiafactiion below. And now it hag
been eeen why. 8ecause a very profound cr3ais between the iiluminati and
the politiciane was eating away the very marrow of the new qreati party thet
wae reborn 2 yeara aqo. And now the momenti of truth has arrived. The cri-
sis opened by Felipe Gonzalaz makee it posaible tio diacuas tihoroughly whati
is desirecl tio do with the traditional Spaniah socialist party. Eitiher iti
becomea a minority party on the tail of the PCE, or iti becomes a great par-
ty capable of looking at the 20th centiury in the face and, if you presa me,
even the 21st century. it is not clear which o� the tiwo options is goinq
to win out. What does appear safe is that the crisis has become public
and an end is being put to an ambiguous situation thati manipulated objec-
tively voters of good faitih who would never have voted for the Marxiat-like
radical ideas that had the majoritiy in the socialist congress. The two
wings Felipe on the one hand and the puriatis on the other deceived
the country objectively and it is well for tihem to come to an aqreement with
each other or to separate once and for all. There is a qreat 6-month battle
and we shall know who won only at the end.
COPYRIGHT 1979, INFORMACION Y PUBLICACIONESO S.A.
10,042
CSO: 3110
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COMMENTARY REFLECTS ON PSOE INTERNAL CONFLYCT
Madrid CAMSiO 16 in Spanish 3 Jun 79 p 21
[Article by Jose Oneto: "Felipe (Gonzalez)"]
3PAIN
(Text) Among tihe tiears of the men on the Executiive Board who aucceeded in
making of tha PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workera Party] a real alternative in
government autihority, in a dramatic silAnce that all Spain was able to per-
ceive by means of the direct broadaasti by Radio Nacional, with �ear visible
on the faces of those wh.o had brouqht about the "greati tragedy," Felipe
Gonzalez Marquez announced, last week, that he could nat run for reelection
'as secretary general of the party, because it was runninq countier to his own
ethics.
Felfpe Gonzalez, who is not a Marxist, who does not believe tihat Marxism
is his party's alternative, who has personally had the courage to state
publicly that he prefers to die knifed in New York's Harlem thar to live
miserably in the Soviet Union, has believed that thz definition that emerged
from the 28th conqress of the PSOE (a Marxist, clas,sist) mass and federal
party) is inconsistent with a model of a modern socialist society (hie
concept of society) and he has decided to resiqn as secretary qeneral of
the party. Gonzalez, without whose collaboration the political tranaition
that occurred in this country in 3 dramatic years would noti have been pos-
- sible, has given a proof of honesty and ethics that caused surprise even
outside Spain.
His party, a party that was about to come into office on 1 March and that
succeeded in defeating UCD (Democratic Center Union) in the April munici-
pal elections owing to the activity of Gonzalez and the resigning Executive
Board, has, nevertheless, demonstrated so much immaturity, revolutionary
infantilism, and function as a unfversity assembly under Franco that re-
covery of credibility is going to cost much.
In the PSOE conqress, a congress governed by freedom and open doors like
none of the conqresses held in Spain, serious proposals were made, but the
serious proposals were flooded by pseudorevolutionary verbosity.and by an
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inEanti].ism that should serve as as example tio the leaders of tihe p rty of
Pablo igleaias. mhere were tihose who advocated the "phyeical annih ltation
of tihe bourgeoisie." There were those who proposed that ETA (BasquelFather-
land and Liberty Group] be recognized as a national liberation movementi.
'I'here were those who advocated transferring the United Nations to ibiza.
There were, in the PSOE congress, vexy wortihy groups of delegatea with an
irreproachable democraric trajectory, but there also were many delegates
who sang "Cara al Sol" up to 4 years ago, who wore the blue shirt, who re-
ceived pol3.tical patronage �rom the Franco regime and who now are �arther
to the left than anyone. '
With tihese political proposals, with this mixture of a party that has grown
exceasively and that has been uaed as baptism for crossing the Jordan of
democracy, with tihe large number of persons infiltrated in the PSOE, with
the tensions caused in every province by the makeup of the tiicketa for the
general and-municipal elections, with the radicalism of some of the bases
used, the result o� the congress could not be any different. '
Felipe Gonzalez, who had a historic opportunity, 3 years ago in the first
general elections, to make a party that would meet the demand of 5 mfllion
voters, as Francois Mitterrand recommended to him, chose, at that time, the
easy road of a spirit of victory. Now, with a historic decision that shows
his stature as a man with ethics and as a statesman, he has not wanted to
play the game of those who want to make revolution right in the middle of
industrial civilization and in southern Europe.
Felipe and the Executive Board that has resigned will try to continue to
guide the party from the soaialist parliamentary group, while an emergency
management committee will handle matters of procedure and administration.
Gonzalez and the Seville group will try, in a few months, to take over con-
trol again of the apparatus of a party that will declare itself neither
Marxist or classist in the next special congress. But it is aertain that,
if the attempt fails, Felipe Gonzalez and he has already demonstrated
it will go back home for the tragedy of Spanish socialism. +
The,outgoing secretary general of the PSOE has little time for this bpera-
tion. With a country constantly more disillusioned that sees the spectacle
of a government that does not govern, a chairman of the executive commi.ttee
that seems to be paralyzed, a socialist opposition that wants to make re-
volution and not come into office and even where prominent gentlemen fiqht
violently for the bars of a banner that does not exist up to now, time is
running out.
Therefore, the special congress must be held as soon as possible, not only
for the good of the PSOE, but also for the good of the country
COPYRIGHT 1979, INFORMACION Y PUBLICACIONES, S.A.
10,042
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Madrid DEFF21SA in 5panish Apr 79 pp 54-55
[Text] A prominent peraor., who for tihe tiime being has
not yet siqned any article in DEFENSA but who, we hope,
will do so in the near future, describes this analyais
on the Spanish defense budget as "disquiBitions at the
averaqe citizen level." We belfeve.that it will be of
interest to our readers.
3PAIN
Last November, Fernandez Ordonez submitted the qeneral budget of the state
for 1979 to Parliament and subsequently to the preas and public opinion.
The minister stressed the first attempt by State Administration to prepare
a budget "by proqrams." This placed us, he said, on a par with the most
advanced European countries in this matter. Perhapa ft would have been
desirable to make a concrete reference to the departments that initiated
this new administratit-e method.
The daily press, in turn, has been giving in detail several sunnnaries of
the budget for certain departments, wliich, li:ke Education and Science and
Defense, represent substantial items in tr^ totgl public expendi.ture and
are attracting the attention, at present, a broad aector of the country.
I�am sure that'the summary by items appeal.& ..y in the press and�copied be-
low sugqests not a few questions to the man tn the street at the-present
time.
The section on "obligations to be paid off" is clear in meaninq and has a
precise correlation in the three brancheg ^F th e Armed Forces.
The Army reports the staff unilaterally, while this body exists in the three
branches of the Armed Forces. .
The Army refers to General Services, assigning them to the orqanization
responsible for their adninistration (Directorate General). The Navy makes
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refexenre exclugively to General Services, while these expendi.turas dre noti
reported in any way in the Air Force. in the Air Force, on the other hand,
there are expenditiurea reported ae "economic maitters," certainly paradoxical
in buclgets in which everything is "economic."
The olear itiem of "personnel expenditures" showe up conBidered by the Army
and the Air Force, while the Navy handles it unaer the heading of "Peraonnel
Departiment." This leads to the belief tihati included under this heading
are both "peraonnel expenditures" and expenditiuree for organization (De-
partment). This interpretation would enable us to correlate the total �i-
gure with the figure resultiing from adding the itiems for "Office of Chief
of Personnel" and "Personnel Command," respectively, to the "personnel ex-
penditures" item in the Army and the Air Force.
The Army ligts a final item of "Office of the Chief of Loqistiic Support" that
is expressedin the same way in the Navy and that the Air Force doea not men-
tion. With regard tio the remaining items for the Navy and the Air Force,
it can be suapected that the Army has lunped the expenditure tiogether (ati
least in the form presented by the press), while the Navy gives qzeater de-
tail (Bureau of Naval Constructiion, Supply and mransportation and Rssearch
and Development) and the Air Force reports the Materiel Cocnnand and Air
Infrastructure.
Finally, in the Navy, there is a singular, broad heading of "General Supply
Bureau," possibly correlated either with the personnel item or-the logistics
item, because of some of their special components.
In mentioning specifically for the Navy three organizatiiona participating
in logistics like Naval Construction, Supply and Transportation and Research
and Development, while the Air Force speaks of Materiel and of Air Infra-
structure and no subordinate boc"�R are reported in the Army, it is not
possible to go beyond some possible questions like whether only the Navy
engages in research and development, ox whether the Army does not consider
infrastructure at the chief's office (or bureau) level.
Z'he aimple, brief remarks made above raise, nevertheless, serious doubts on
the rationality, arrangement and proper paralielism of this budget, which
is certainly "traditional" in its forn and not very suftable for a clear,
transparent analysis by each~ of the groups concerned in the country. ' As-
pects like designations themselves, levels of orqans and structures, should
be considered with closer and similar criteria, by eliminatinq past stages
of excessive compartimentation and particularism.
Aside from the foregoinq qeneral remarks and elfminating the structural
shortcomings of the budget, another kind of remarks can be make by means
of which the average "little Spaniard" might guess the deqree of partici-
pation by each branch of the Armed Forces in the overall outlay, a topic
that is being aired and commented on more and more in variovs sectors of
the country.
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zn tihis connectiion, the overall expenditure figurea by Armed Forces branch
are a first, important detail. 'Mtese figures are (atill in accordance with
tihe gummary below) approximately 130,000 tnillion �or the Army, 54,000 mi.1-
lion tnr th.; Navy and 49,000 million for the Air Force. Zn other words,
the percentages are 55.7 percent, 23.1 percent and 21.0 percent, respectively.
c)f these figures, the peraonnel expenditures, by their double headinq
"Personnel Expenditures" and "Organization Expenditures," are 57.4, 37.9
and 49.0 percent, respectively. 7'his brings out clearly tha differences
in contributfon to the overall expenditure for this item in the Army, Navy
and Air F'orce. Undoubtedly, the "quantiitatiive" factor prevails in this
initial correl.ation of expenditures.
WitY regard to the otiher large block of expenditures, Logistics expenc3ituros,
grouped in the same way as indicated above, yield percentages of participa-
tion in the overall expenditures o� each Armed Forces branch of 30.5 percent
for the Army, 60.0 percent for tihe Navy and 93.0 percent for the Air Force.
These f3gures are aga3n significant, not only because of their size, but
also with regard to the complexity and scarcity of support activities in
each branch of the Armed Forces. zn this connection, the Navy is close to
normal values of expenditure distribution, between Personnel (40 percent)
and Materiel (60 percent). The Army is far �rom this distribution and in
the Air Force the separation has a negative sign.
The average citizen can ascertain, from this simple analysis, even disre-
garding the "contingency funds" allocated to each Armed Forces branch, a
clear "separation" of the Air Force in the present amount flf the joint.
outlay, without necessarily implying a judgment on the value of Spain's
present strategy, although it certainly reflects treatment different from
other European countries and in clear disagreement with the role assigned
at present to the Air Force in foreseeable future conflicts and in the de-
velopment of a"deterrent" capability, of fast, effective reply.
[Table on next page]
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Swnmary of Expenditiureg
DeEense
Ministiry, Subsecretariat and General Services 1,009,445,000
Higher DeFense Data Centier 579,5250000
Tota1 1,58809704000
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Army
Obligations to be paid off 11,254,597,000
Army Staff 30119,6020000
Directorate General of General Services 972,160,000
Office of Chief of Personnel 1,943,475,000
Office o� Chief of Logistic Support 40,3420932,000
Peraonnel Expenditures 720704,9800000
Total 1300337,746,000
Navy
Obligations to be paid off
2580773,000
General Services
33106,000
Personnel Department
20,492,824,000
Of�ice of Chief of Logistic Support
4704000,000
Bureau of Naval Military Construction
2302530300,000
Supply and Transportation
8,7000331,000
Reeearch and development
17,0000000
General Supply Bureau
855,948,000
Total
54,046,2820000
Air Force
'
Obligations to be paid off
435,887,000
Air'Force Economic Matters
30413,104,000
Personnel ExpenditurPs
22,9430072,000
Personnel Conanand
10159,230,000
Materiel Conanand
10,1201565,000
Air infrastructure
1,022,252,000
Total
49,0941110,000
,
COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Defensa, S.A., Madrid, 1978
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