JPRS ID: 9579 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/9579
2 March 1981 -
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tFOUO 12/81)
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26 February 1981
;VOTE FROAi THE DIRECTOR, FBIS:
' Forty years ago, the U.S. Government inaugurated a new
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JPRS L/9579
2 March 1981
,
. WEST EUROPE REPORT
cFOUO ia/si~
CONTENTS
THEATER FORCES
~ FRANCE
'Nuclear Ma,~inat Line' Concept Criticized, Defended
, (Jean-Baptiste Margeric'Q; STRATEGIQUE, No 8, 1980)...........o0 1
- COUNTI~ SECTION
FRANCE
Poss.ible PS-RPR Collaboration in 1981 Election
(Claude Jacquemart; VALEURS ACTLTELLES, 8 Dec 80)...0.......,.. 25
, , .
ITALY
Possible International Connections of Terrorism Analyzed
(IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 22 Jan 81) ..............o.....o....... 29
Investigative Report on PCI's Internal Problems
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, various dates) 42
~
- a - ~III - WE - 150.FOU0]
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~iEATER FORCES FRANCE
'NUCLEAR MAGINOT LINE' COrTCEPT CRITICIZED, DEFENDED
Paris STRATEGIQUE in French ~Oct-Dec~ No 3, 1980 pp 89-122
~Article by Jean-Baptiste Margeride*; passages enclosed in slantlines in italics~
~Excerpts~ In ever increasing numbers since the mid-1970's, Western military
specia~ists have been addressing the grave issue of adequation of 1?ATO defense
plans and means to meet a potential aggression by the Warsaw Pact forces.
These specialists estimate that the unflaggin over-arming effort being deployed
' by the East European nations, in conventional~l~ as t~ell as tactical and thea~er
nuclear weapons, and in chemical warfare weapoms, has�given them an overwhelmirig
superiority. Added to this superiority of forces is their degree of immediate
~ availability, which is constantly being in~creased, thus incr.easing the potential
for a surprise attack.
In th~ face of this constantly growing threat, Western defensive capabilities are,
~ in the view of these specialists, decidedly inf~rior; and as for SVestern plans,
these have hardly changed in 20 years or more and have not been updatec3 in accord-
ance with the many technological changes.~2~
More recently, and to remedy this situation, certain authors, led by American
- Physicist Samuel T. Cohen, have proposed the creation of a kind of "Maginot line"
that, equipped with nuclnar strike and interdiction weapons, would reduce to
impotence the formidablE; war machine being built by the USSR.~3~
:
- The intent of this article is:
--to explain the "nuclear Maginot line" con~ept, and
--to examine the technical criticisms that can be advanced in regard to this
~ concept.
;
I
* The author has already published two articles: "Technical Factors in the
'Counterforces' Strategy" in STRATEGIQUE No 1, and "The Enhanced-Radiation
Weapon" in STRATEGIQUE Nos 3,4,5,6 and 7.
~
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The ~Tuclear I'ortified Line ('The City Walls' )
- We will analyze as simply as possible th~ nuclear Maginot line concept th.at
- S.T. Cohen likens to "the city walis" of long ago, but will endeavor throughout
to respect the intent of its advocates.~9~
The latter argue from the following basic premise: Until the advent of the
nuclear era, the penetration of all fortified lines has been possible because the
attacker could concentrate, on a limited front, a volume of weapons capable of
overwhelming the defenders. This fact of military history has changed radically _
with the advent of the nuclear weapon, because the latter makes it possible to
interdict such concentrations.
R Fortified Zone
They propose therefore the establishment of a fortified zone extendinq the entire
length of the border to be defended--a zone made up of an array of basic strong-
points distributed in length and depth along five successive lines, each line
approximately 5 km (the order of magnitude of ~he range of the future third-
generation antitank missiles) distant from the preceding ~ine. The ~otal depth
of the fortified zone would thus be approximately 20 km.
Along Each line, the basic strongpoints would be spaced approximately 500 meters
(machine-gun range) apart. These strongpoints would be reinforced concrete
bunkers, buried under a thick enouyh layer of earth to shelter the personnel from
the radioactivity released by low-altitude nuclear-warhead bursts,~l~~ including
- those of enhanced-radiation weapons.
The crew manniiig each strongpoint-~-10-12 men--would operate, by remote control,
an array of weapons mounted on retractable turrets: automatic-loading antitank
rifles; Shillelagh-type missile-launching antitank canon; machine guns and anti-
personnel machine-rifles. The detection, vision, identification and aiming
equipment would be periscopic devices utilizing the diverse frequency spectra--
visible, infrared and millimetric--to provide an equally effective day and night
all-weather surveillance and combat capability, despite:smoke generators, etc.
The terrain would also be sown with conventional obstacles--barbed wire, antitank
~ ditches, mines, etc--designed to delay the enemy's advance and to augment the
time duri.ug which the enemy tanks and foot soldiers would be pinned down by fire
from thE strongpoints and exposed to alarm sensors of all types.
Infantrymen on foot, outside their armored transport vehicles, would be subjected
to fire from 3 or 4 strongpoints if within range of the machine guns, from 6 or 7
if covered by the small-caliber automatic rifles, and from 15 to 20 strongpoints
in the case of the heavy mortars.
.2.
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~
Nuclear Weapons
Should the enemy attack exceed a certain level of power--not in~~i~ted, but the
order of magnitude of which might be one or two tank companies, possibly rein-
forced by armored infantry--the authors of this proposal deem that the defense by
- conventional means should be replaced by enhanced-radiation nuclear-weapons fire.
And, as we know, a 1-kt warhead covers substantially a circle whose radius is
0.85 km, that is, an area of 2 km2, '
The advocates of this defense system estimate at around 5,000, or one weapon per
10 enemy tan~s and 10 VCI's ~Infantry Combat Vehicles~, the number of neutron
warhea3s needed along the Iron Cu~tain front. They wou18 be delivered by limited-
rar~ge--a few tens of kilometers~12~--but highly accurate launchers. Accuracy would =
be obtained thr~agh data furnished by the strongpaints, but perhaps also through
the missile's own texminal guidance system, which would still be dependent upon the
strongpoint for laser illumination of the target's ~~P:~ter of gravity. This,
- it seems, would mean using nuc.lear~~M:s (Precision Guided Munitions) such as
Copperhead warheads or smart bombs , or radar, laser or xnfrared homing
_ missiles.
As has already been indicated, the ~ersonnel manning a strongpoint would be fully
sheltered from the radiation, even if the neutron �-~.rhead exploded directly over
the strongpoint, as the latter would be protected by several meters of concrete
and earth.
Radioactive Obstacles _
To this system of obstacles and fireoower, the authors add an innovative scheme:
The natural and artificial obstacles would be supplemented by zones of intensive
radioactivity that would interdict the advance of foot troops --infantrymen,
~ sappers toward strongpoints, slowly but without excessive risk against the
strongpoint's conventional weapons, by way of approaches defiladed from view and
low-angle fire.
These radioactive zones could be created as needed, usinq the properties of
acrivated sodium~14~. Two methods of 4ctivation can be used simultaneously. ~
- The first consists of a priori peacetime sowing of carefully worked out mandatory
- cr.ossing points and zones with sodium carbonate, and of activating the latter
as the need arises, by means of neutrons released by an enhanced-radiation
weapon. These zones would then become too radioactive for the enemy to consider
sending foot troops through them or stationing armored units in them. If, after
a certain time, the radioactivity of the zone is found to have diminished below
a certain point, the original level can be restored by exploding another neutron
warhead. It will be seen later, however, that in proportion to the quantities of
sodium deployed, the fraction rendered radioactive is infinitesimal.
_ 3
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The second method, which is even more innovative, consists of burying, at rela-
tively great depths not specified by the authors of the proposal, "Dumbos": large
metallic vessels built to withstand tne /internal/ blast of a 0.1-kt(15~ nuclear-
fusion warhead. These vessels would contain sodium carbonate, apparently in
~ aqueous solution. In case of necessity, the nuclear-fusion warhead would be
detonated, the neutrons produoed would activate the sodium, forming radioactive
Na-24. The radioactive water ot this solution wou7.d be.pumped up to and spread _
over the terrain. in the zones that are to be denied to the enemy.
A Conventional Forces Complement
Optimistic though they are about the effectiveness of their fortified line, its
authors nevertheless assume the possibiZity of enemy penetrations, though on a
very limited scale. The need continues, therefore, for conventional fprces to
deal wi~h this eventuality--forces essentially built, it would seem, around tank-
destroyer-type missiles, that is, relatively light, very mobile missiles armed ~
with a powerful antitank warhead.
' The need for g~ound forces is also assumed by them to deal with air- or helicop-
ter-borne attacks deep inside friendly territory.
The entire array--fortified zone, conventional units, rear territorial zone-- must
be covered and supported by sizeable air forces.
Location of the Fortified.Zone ~
This question is at best only briefly addressed by the authors of the proposal.
According to t4-iPm, it would be highly desirable that the NATO defense zone be
established in the FRG, along the entire Iron Curtain, a length of about 1,000 km.
International agreementso however, prohibit the FRG from producing and freely
deploying nuclear weapons of any type whatever. S. T.Cohen has suggested in
various articles that, in the alternative, this defense system could be installed -
- by France along its northeastern border, without specifying, however, whether it ~
should be loc~ted exclusively on French territory or whether it should be extended
beyond the Ardennes along the Benelux borders with the FRG.~16)
Critical Analysis
Expropriation of the Fortified Zone
Strictly speaking, and since the "nuclear Maginot line" concept is premised on the
enemy's strategic posture and the peremptory hypothesis of a surprise offensive by
the Warsaw Pact forces, there could be no question of permitting civilian popula-
tians to remain in the fortified zone, since the Allied neutron weapon must be
able to be deployed anywhere within the zones without advance warning and in large
~ numbers, to deal with any surprise attack. This concept therefore presupposes a
civilian "no man's land" some 25 km deep along the entir.e border to be defended.
If, by way of example, we examine the situati~n in the FRG, such a measure would
involve the definitive and permanent evacuation, during peacetime, of numerous
-4~
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localities, indeed of large cities such as Lubeck, Wolfsburg, Salzgitter,
Gottingen, Cobourg, Hof. This praspect being.unaoceptable, the remaining alter-
natives would be either to abandon these densely. pogula~ed.regions to the invader
or to de~end them by other means.
If we examine the situation in France, where consideration has been given to
defense by means of such a system as an adjunct to our strategic deterrent, the
problem posed by the expropriation of a fortified zone is analogous mutatis
mutandis. Moreover, the deterrent effect of a nuclear Maginot line established
- on French soil, against a potential attack by the Eastern European countries on
the FRG, would be oFen to some question: Tn other words, the "tactical deterrent"
value (if indeed these two terms can be so combined) would--at best--be of no
benefit.to any but the country having established it alonq its entire border; and
certainly not to t~ those of its allies wr,ose territory is situated beyond this
border, which, with respect to France, would be the case of the FRG and, possibly
of the Benelux nations, Italy...
Actually, as was demonstrated by the 1940 invasion, the defense of a border by
means of a fortified zone can prove illusory, since the enemy can bypass that zone
by simply qoing through a neutral country. In the case of the FRG, that uncer=
- tainty would require that it extend its defenses along the Austrian border, beyond
the Bohmerwald to the region opposite Salzburg; that is, 200 km and 5,000 km2 more
to be expropriated.
~ In the case of France, the fortified line, beginning at the North Sea, would (in
the event it were not extended across the Benelux nations) have to run along the
entire Swiss border as far as Geneva. Dunkirk, Tourcoing e.t Roubaix, Sedan,
Thionville, Strasbourg, Colmar, :iulhouse, and Pontarlier et Gex, all situated
within the fortified zone, would therefore have to be excluded from the defense
system if they could not be evacuated...
Vulnerabilities of the Fortified 2one
The authors of the plan, assume that this 5ortified system, like any other, can
6e pierced locally. S.T. Cohen estimates that around 150,000 men would suffice to
- seal up any breaks of "limited size and respond to rear-area air- or helicopter-
- borne enem~ actions--even though the USSR currently has 8 airborne divisions.
The reasoning may be summarized as follows:
--the firepower of each strongpoint would be amply sufficient to enable it to
withstand, by its owri means, any loose-formation attacks;
, --any large enemy concentration would be dealt with by enhanced-radiation weapons
, fire;
--any attempts at secret infiltration by foot traops--infantry or sappers--would
be doomed to failure in zones rendered artificially radioactive;
.5. _
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~ --and l.astly, a knockout breach by means of massive nuclear fire is inconceivable,
since, to destroy the buried strongpoints, the enemy would have to resort to
ground bursts that would produce, around the craters, an intensive radoactivity
that would prevent entirely the passage of his armor and, even more so, that of
his foot troops.
But tr.is reasoning, based on the attacker's nuclear capabilities, takes no account
of. his conventional capabilities in the forrn ot highly e��ecti:ve, even though -
not nuclear, conventional missiles in his arsenal. Actually, the stopping power
of the strongpoints depends not only on the nature of their.weapons, but also on
their ability to use them. As has been mentioned above, the deeply buried
p~sition of the strongpaint crews requires, at the surface, means of surveillance,
observation and aiming that must be operational at all times and under all
conditions (day, night, fog, etc) and that must use all imaginable techniques:
visible light, infrared, electromagnetic detection (radars), etc.
All of these systems have in common their fragility. The enemy could thus breach
the fortified zone by means of nan-nuclear bombardments designed to destroy these
sensors. Blinded, the defensive strongpoints would be depriv~ed of their combat
capability, hence neutralized.
The sensors could be destroyed in several ways.
In fact, the use of explosive aerosol cloud missiles by the enemy against inher-
ently fragilA targets cannot be ~xcluded from consider ation.~l~~
It appears, therefore, that the attacker, provided he commits weapons in sufEi-
cient number and suited to the breaching of fortified zones, could create large
gaps in it without having to resort to nuclear weapons.~18~ -
These breaches accomplished, the invader could then commit his armored units in
, accordance with nuclear dispersion levels. The disappearance of the local
ground observation system would render much more difficult for the defender the
use of his neutron weagons against the attacking units (with spy satellites
destroyed or blinded and the defender's manifest air inferiority leaving the
latter hopelessly deprived of ineans of reconnaissance... Iz any case, the time
delays involved in analysis of the data furnished by orbiting or airborne systems
appear hardly compatible with the zccuracy demanded, in terms of time and space,
by the effective range of enhanced-radiation weapons~.
At this point, according to S.T. Cohen's plan, the defender could resort to his
tank-destroyer units to try to stem the enemy advance. The evaluation of the
number of units required to stop the thousands of enemy tanks and VCI's that would
exploit the breach seems very low, however, considering that the total strength
of this conventi~nal component, charged also with figh ting against potential air-
borne rear-area operations, would not exceed around 150,000 men.~l9)
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Artificial Radioactive Zones
This brings us to the most innovative of the plan's concepts, that of infil-
tration zones interdicted by the presence of activated sodium irradiated with
neutron warheads. We must confess from the outset that this idea leaves us some-
what perplexed, since elementary calculations seem to indicate that this system of
defense can be but very limitedly effective.
We must assume, of course, that the sodium carbona~.e will :,ave been put in place
during peacetime, since the basis of the fortified zon~ concept is the response to .
a surprise attack. The presence of sodium-23 is in~ended to substantially enhance _
the activation of the ground's component substances under irradiation by the
neutrons released by nuclear explosions. Thi~ effect is labeled under the acronym
NIGA (Neutron Induced Ground Activation)~20) by the Anglo-Saxons.
Very roughly speaking, two methods of activation may be used:
--either a low-altitude burst, at around 100-150 .i, to produce strong irradiation
intensities at ground zero and its immediate vicinity,
--or raise the altitude and "power" of the explosion--for example, to some `
300-400 m--to obtain an activation whose decay would be less rapid with increasing
distance from ground zero, but which at ground zero itself would be :~~eaker than
in the first alterna~ive unless a xelatively more pawer�ul warhead is used.
Which are we to chc~ose? We know that the fast neutron flux diminishes with dis-
tance in accordance With a law in terms o� 1/R2 x exp(�-R/235). If, all other
thinqs being equal, we compare the activations produced at ground zero by a war-
head exploding at an altitude of 100 m with those by an explosion at 300 m, we
find that the ratio of possible activations at ground zero is 21 to 1 in favor of
the low-altitude explosion, The issue thus appears settled in favor of inedium-
altitude 10Q-150m bursts, since the energy o� the neutron wazhead would have
to be increased considerably to obtain effects analogous to those of high-altitude
300-400 m bursts. (21)
Figure 5 refers to a warhead burst at a height of 100 m. The activation is
plotted as a function of distance, /in terms of rel~tive values/ with respect to
its value at ground zero, since its absolute values would depend on the composi-
tion of the terrain: various natural terrains or terrains doped by irrigation
with sodium carbonate.
We note that activation drops to 1/10 of ~round zero width at 140 m f.rom ground
zero, and to 1/100 at around 310 m.
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i~~lr.nsilb rclative
~ d'activ~tion ~
~ -~~1~ .
U~J ~
' ~ Key :
~ o~~ - 1. Relative imtensity of
e,os activation.
2. Ground-zero width.
o,oz
3. Distance from ground
zero
o,oo:;
o,ooz
0,001 '
- 0 100 200 300 di^tance
L..PJ. au P.Z.
~2~ Fig.S ~3~
A first objection to the concept seems to arise immediately. Sodium carbonate is
a water-solubl.e substance.~22~ One might think, therefore, that if put in place
during peacetime, it would be diluted rapidly by rain. In fact, if the quantity
distributed is sufficient and if the t~rrain is not extremely impermeable, a sub-
stantial fraction of the carbonate dissolved by rainwater will settle into the
upper layers of the surface soil. The chances are, however, that little by little
~ it will be further diluted and carried down to such depth as will require new -
distributions, the periodicity of which, to be determined by soil analys~s, must
be evaluated in terms of months at least, and more probably in terms of years.
We note, nevertheless, that the solubility of sodium carbonate constitutes a
factor in its �avor for the proposed purpose. Actually, the cross section of
Na-23 is 0.56 barn for thermal nputrons, that is, neutrons slowed to an energy
level corresponding to the ambient temperature. But, for 14-MeV fusion-neutrons,
this cross section is less than 0.001 barn. Consequently, if ::he Na2C03 remains
at the surface, each sodium atom would have but an infinitesimally low probability
of being activated: The neutrons would pass through the carbonate layer practi-
cally without producing activata.on. (We will encounter this problem again with
regard to the Dumbos). The soi~.'s water~content thermalizes the neutrons, thus
tending to augment the cross section and to favor the process sought by the
advocates of the defense system.
Let us now examine the quantity of. radioactive so~ium that could be produced.
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We ~now that a 1-kt ~usion reaction releases 1.42 x 1024 neutrons. I� each o�
these neutrons were to activate one atom of Na-23, the mass of Na-24 produced
would be
24 x 1.42 x 1024 ~~6.6 grams ~2~~ .
6.02 x 1023
This quantity might seem sm~24f but it repsesents an initial radioactivity of
close to 50Q,000,000 curies . Actually, the quantity of P~a-24 created is much -
less, for the following reasons:
: --It may be assumed that the warhead includea a neutron reflector that directs the
neutrons earthwards. We know that no perfect reflector exists. Nevertheless, if
one can obtain that 70 or 80 percent of the neutrons bP well directed earthwards,
this cause of loss of yield may be considered negligible in proportion to the
others;
--During their transit between the point of explosion and earth, a suwstantial
number of neutrons is captured by the air (exp d/235 law), with emission of 6-MeV
gamma rays that will not take part in the activation. This phenomenon was taken _
into acoount in plotting the curve of Figure 5.
= Lastly, and abflve a11, the aodium is "diluted" among the ground's constituent
substances. Generally speaking, it wi~l capture�only a very small propoxtion o�
the neutrons: The vast majority of the latter will be absorbed by these natural
components of the terrain, gince they are present in vastly greater proportion
than the carbonate. ~
By way of example, let us suppose that sufficient sodium carbonate has been spread
to ensure a concentration of 100 grams per m2 thro~~ghout the first 30 cm of soil
(that is, 100 tons per kmz). �
_ These 100 g of Na2C03 correspond to 43 g of sodium-23 (sole stable isotope). Now,
- these same 30 cm of depth per m2, a volume of 0.3 m3 represent ~ mass of the order
of 450 kg of earth, which is approximately 10,000 times the weight of sodium.
Let us assume a clayey-type terrain (of the kaolin type). Its chemical formula
will be very close to Si2A1205 (OH)4 (pure kaolinite). A simple calculation shows
that this soil contains some 2,000 atoms o~ silicon and the same amount again of
aluminum for each atom of sodium.
It should now be taken into account that natural silicon is composed of several
isotopes of which only one, Si-30, whose isotopic abundance is 3.1 percent, pro-
duces a radioactive isotape, Si-3I, through neutronic irradiation.
Based on the common-capture cxoss sections of the proportionate amounts of the
different substances, it is clear that far each atom oE sodium Na-24 activated,
750 of A1-28 and 12 of Si-31 will also be activated. Moreover, 380 atoms of Si-28
and 6i-29 will absorb one neutron, but witk?out producing an activated subs-:
stance.~25~ The question then arises: Will the activated aluminum and silicon
add significant effects to those of the soc7ium? _
~9
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The period of activated aluminum (A1-28) is only 2.3 minutes, meaning it drops
to 1/1,000 of its initial value in 23 minutes and to 1/1,000,000 in 46 minutes;
it is therefore negligible. At each disintegration, A1-28 emits one 2.86-I4eV
beta ray and one 1.78-MeV gamma ray.
For silicon, the period of Si-31 is 2.7 hours. It emi*s a 1.48-MeV beta ray and
a 1.26-MeV gamma ray, but, for the latter, only in the proportion of 0.07 per-
cen t(7/ ~0,000) of the disintegrations. Now, emitted /in the soil/, the beta rays
are absorbed by it, and only the ~~ery scarcely emi,tted gamma rays need ~be taken
into account for the calculation of the irradiation o� troops crossing the acti-
vated zone. Of course, the beta rays emitted by the sodium must also be disre-
garded for this purpose.
Thus, and a~ter some tens o� minutes, the dangerous radiations are the only
gammas being emitted, in their relative initial r~tios of
--2 for the sodium (2 gamm3s per disintegration)
--and 12 x 0.07 _ 0.0084 for the silicon,
100
oc 240 times less for the silicon. Moreover, the periods of these two substances
being respectively 15 houcs (Na-24) and 2.7 hours (Si-31), the very weak concen-
tration of the latter diminishes rapidly.
In sum, the irradiation of combatants crossing the zone unaer consideration will
be owing essentially to the sodium-24 coming from its isotope 23 activated by the _
neu tzons. The values indicated above show that this would still be the case ii `
the quan tity of carbonate distributed over the terrain had been 100 times less
than the one we assumed, that is, if it had been only 1 g per m2 (1 ton per km2).
Kao lin-type clay is, however, far from being the only kind of terrain one is
lik ely to encounter. One might well question whether the foregoing conclusions
would still hold regardless of type of soil.
Actually, rather than seek to examinE what the combiriation of sodium carbonate -
with all the other imaginable types of terrain would produce--which would be a
_ prodigious effort of painstaking scholarship--it is simpler to examine what the
neu tronic bombardment of the principal components of the various soils would
give.
This examinatiAn is summarized in the tabulation that follows, in which:
--we have.eliminated th~~:elements that: appear only rarely and solely in the foxm
of traces--gold, titanium, tellurium, etc--which eLiminates the vast majority of
the 92 natural elements, inso�ar as conGerns the soils found in Europe;
--for each of the ~lements studied, we have included only the natural isotopes -
which, by neutronic irradiation, produce a radioactive isotope;
_ lp .
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--tihe indicated cross section is that relative to the thermal neutrons (0.025
eV~ (26) ~
--We have not includad elements such as hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, and carbon,
either because their cross section is extremely small (0-16), or because their
gamma emissiori is immediate (N-14), ~r because the isotope formed is not
radioactive.
( ) ~ ( ' (4 ( I 6 nriies ~~�i�a
~S~'l~Cf7': i ~'i~ C72~3 j i~''.C~~fl ~ ~~lUl~' I ~CI'IO~~o I( ) ~
n;~:~irol clf:mrnt ; c�t!ir,aco ~~sotope du radio- I Enerc~io ~ �/o p.if
~ naturcl d~ ! form~3 isUtopo (h1ev.) d~:-inlb-
' I c~~turo i ~ (7) ~ yr~tion
~ i(barns} ; ~ I ~ (8)
t
2~{ I i a_~ i 1.a~ ~ 1r.o
t~~ I 100 �/o i 0,.`.6 ~ ~ia 14,~J5 h ?,7.�i ~ 1(10
11 ~ ~ i 11 ! ( j
~ -i -
-26 ----~-----I--- ' 27 t I
12PAg 11,~ �/o i 0,05 I 1?.FAg 9,45 mn I~,015 I 3U
--I----' -i -
27 ~ ' 'j %4
AI , 100 ~ i 0,?_ 1 ! AI I?,3 mn 1,78 ~ 100
13 j I I 13 ~ i
~ 3
J j ~ 31 - - ~
i ~
r:;i ~ 3.12 �io ~ 0.11 I Si I 7_,GS h i 12G ~ 0,07
1~. ~ ~ I 14 ~
--A~-----~-------i----- I---I----
f: i G,`.? �/n I 1 ' K ' 17.~i7 h ~ 1,51 i 1~
i`+ ~ ; ~ 1`~ ~ ~ i
- i ~ - -
- -j
-q~ ~ I 4D ~ j 3.10 ~ Fl~
Ca i 0,1~35�r'n I 1,1 i Ga I 8,J mn i ^.~7'> I 1a
~p i 20 ~ ~ ~t.~r- !
SR i----- --I ~G i- ~---~,1~ i 7.,8
FO 0..~.1 �;o ( 0,9 j Pn 45j I i,i0 ~ 57
7.~, I ~ i?.6 ~ 1.2J I ~3
Key : ~ ~
l. Na+:ural isotope.
2. Percent in natural element.
3. Cross section (barns).
4. Radioisotape formed.
5. Period of radioisotope.
6. Gamma rays.
7. Energy (MeV),
8. Percent per disintegration.
The above table easily explains why the induced activity is par~icularly higher
in terrains that contain sodium, present either as a natural component o~ its
rock~27~, or purposely. distributed, for example in the form ot carbonate as
propcsed by the authors of the syster.i:
ii
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--magnesium has very little effect, owing to its low percentage o� isotope 2C~,
its small cross section and short peri~d;
-~~luminum has a very short period;
--silicon-30 is present only in the proportion of 3 percent and produces a gamma
ray only in 7 disintegrations per 1.0,000.
--potassium-41 is present only in the praportion ~f 6.9 percent; less than 1 dis-
integration in 5 produces a gamma ray;
--isotope 48 of calcium is present anly to the extent of less than 0.2 percent
and the period of the Ca-49 formed is very brief;
--lastly, isotope 58 of iron represents only 0.3 percent of the element present
and its period is relatively very long (radioactivity persistent, but weak).
Gf course, there are elements in existence that, for this purpose, would yield an
induced activity far superior to that obtainable trom sodium. Unfortunately, they
are very rare substances in nature, whose prices are such as to preclude any
. thought of using them. Gold, for example, would be far more "viable" than sodium.
Its natural isotope, Au-197, is unique (100 percent isotopic abundance); its cross
section is 100 barns; and it forms Au-198, whose period is 2.7 days, and which
emits a 0.41-MeV gamma ray at every disinteqration.
Although the choice of sodium carbonate thus seems justified, a question of
~ capi~al importance now arises: Ta what irradiation would troops crossing a zone in
which this induced activity of sodium had been produced be subjected? The res-
ponse to this ques~ion must enable an assessment of the /military value/ of the
system being proposed by S.T.Cohen. With this in mind,. we return to the case of
a terrain containing in its upper layers 100 g of sodium carbonate per m2, subjec-
ted to the effects of a 1-kt fusion-neutron warhead exploded at a height of 100 m.
We have assumed this warhead to be equipped with a re�lector and that the absorp-
tion by the materials comprising the warhead is low, the overall assembly permit-
ting SO percent of the neutrons formed to be directed to earth.
Figure 6-- which is merely a transposition of Figure 5-- gives the initial dosage
yield as a function of distance from ground zero.
It will be noted that dosage yields are large in the immediate vicinity of ground
zero, but over a very limited area. Calculation easily shows that personnel cir-
culating on foot, at a speed of 4.5 km/hr and passing directly over ground zero,
would receive a dosage of onZy 4.8 rads. In tanks, with a protection coefficient
of 5 and at a speed of ~20 km/hr, the dosage received drops to less than 0.2 rads.
These figures are valid immediately ~ollowing the activating explosion, but, let
= us recall, they diminish by half 15 hours after the explosion, by three quarters
30 hours ~fter, etc.
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i
;
;
;
` ' ~:~.i~~,,~
~o~ ; ~1~. Key:
1. Initial yield in rads/hr .
~ . 2. Ground zero.
jn .
' 3. Distance from ground
' _ zero
~ o -
, ~
-
~ \
1 ~ .
O,J '
0,2
I-- r"
100 ^r,p 300 rn dis~;:ncr
, (f'.7_.) ,ttt ('.7_.
(2) ~3~
~ /The dosages involved would thus be to low to interdict attacking forces, even on
; foot, from crossiny the activated zones/. A substantially higher level of radio-
activity could be obtained, however, in two ways, since this radioactivity is
' practically proportional :
i
, --to the quantity of sodium present per m2;
~
i --to the energy of the neutron warhead used to produce the activation.
Theoretically, the first way ia easy: We have p~esupposed a minimum net
distribution within the soil ot 100 g o� sodium carbonate per m2, which, allowinq
for the quantity washed away by rain, could represent an initial distribution of
around 500 g per m2. A tenfold increase in the activity we have thus assumed could
be obtained by an initial distribution of around 5 kg of carbonate per m2. But
this would represent 5,000 tons per km2, meaning that if only 1/100 of the 25,000
, km2 of forti�ied zone must be activatable, 1,250,000 tons of sodium carbonate must
! be used; this represents works and expenditures on a considerable scale, and, as
~ we have said above, would have to be renewec~ periodically. A m~nimum net concen-
~ tration of some 100 g of carbonate per m2 theretore seems a reasonable value; It
; would require the distribution of 500,000 tons to prepare for the artificial
i activation of 1/50 of the �orti�ied zone.
The second way seems to offer greater possibilities upon tirst analysis. Actually,
if instead o~ a 1-kt fusion wathead we had assumed warheads of 2, 5 or 10 kt, the
, activations would have been twice, five times, or 10 times greater, respectively.
Let us note, however, that explosion at a rigorously exact height ot 100 m cannot
i
I
j 13
~
I
I
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be taken tor granted--�ar from itl And in the event that a malfunction in the
detonation system were to set off the explosion at ground level or too closp to
it, the phenomenon of nuclear fallout would be inevitable. Now, we know (cf.
STRATEGIQUE No 4) that 1 kt of fusion energy involves blast energy corresponding
to that of a 0.5-kt fission warhead--ignition by fission plus the blast energy of
fusion. Thus, the fallout from a 1-kt �usion warhead, in a sheltered area,
corresponds to that from a 0.5-kt fission bomb, and that from 2-, 5- and 10-kt
fusion warheads to that �rom 1-, 2.5- and 5-kt ~ission bombs, levels that are far
from being negligible.~28~
We will assume that it would not be reasonable to use activation warheads of
tusio~x energy exceeding 5 kt at low altitudes of 100 m.~a9) _
Under these conditions, the ordinates of the curve of Figure 6 must be multiplied
by 5, as well as the dosages we have calculated. These wauld become:
--24 rads for foot troops;
--1 rad for tank crews.
These are still small dosages that are not likely to involve physiological ~rob-
lems that would prevent these troops from accomplishing their mission.
/In conclusion, the artificial activation of terrain by prior placement of sodium
carbonate and the explosion of a neutron warhead at the opportune time appears to
us to o�fer very little of military value/, and we feel we can say that it would
be far more viable to use those c~arheads.against targets, that is, directly on
concentrations of forces.
- The Dumbo Me~hod
As we have said, the system calls for irradiating sodium carbonate by means of a
very-low-energy (0.1-kt fusion) fusion warhead, the whole being placed inside a
reservoir whose dimensions and ability to withstand overpressures would ensure its
tightness. The irradiated carbonate in water solution is then pumped up and ~
distributed over the surface of the zones to be interdicted.
Its authors provide no detailed description of the proposed system. It is
possible, however, on the basis of simple reasoning, to arrive at a rough approxi- -
mation of its make-up.
The first fact to be noted is that the probable /direct/ action of the fusion
neutrons on the sodium would }~e very mild (a cross section of less than 1 milli-
barn for neutrons at 14 MeV).~30~ I'rom a practical standpoint, it would appear
necessary to surround the fusion warhead with a light vessel containing the sodium
carbanate in a"comman" (light water) aqueous solution that would serve as a
moderator to reduce the neutron energy level to the proper value. Th~ cross
section then becomes 0.56 barn for the sodium; it remains small for the other
subs~tances present: oxygen, hydrogen, carbon.
~ -14
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Calculation--based on ~rnne simp2ifying assumptions--gives us, for the proportion
of neutrons absorbed, as a function o~ the thickness of the sodium carbonate
(saturatEd solution)~ the results shown in Figure 7.
The curve reaches a maximum of a little over 60 percent at theoretically infinite
thickness, but a practical maxim~n is reached at a thickness of the order of ]..5 m.
�/o neulrons
~ absorb6s par Na 23 , Ke~:
i00 ~1~
l. Percent neutrons absorbed
by the Na-23.
2. Thickness of Na2C03 in
50 � s~% solution.
o
0 10 20 30 ~10 ,0 GO 70 a0 90 100 crn
(2) dpaisse~ir CO,NA, en solution
The Dumbo system could then take a form somewhat like the one diaqramed in Figure
S, in which, for the sake of clarity, components are not drawn to scale.
_
- ,
, ,
j~.~~, ; ;~rr~l~i' , . . � ~ ,i'., ,
' , ~
~ : . . . . , . , . ,,..i., < ~
, ~
~
I I
. I~ i)tJi~A[iQ
I - ( ~pii~re aci^r)
~ i.~ _
~ ~ ~
, ~I , ~ Solution ca~i,nn,~~e ~la Key:
' ~ r~~~ '~(4~.Enc~in o,t I