LAOS GENERAL PHOUMI NASOVAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R004100150021-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: June 29, 1961
• Content Type: LETTER

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June Z9, 1961
Participants: United States
The Secretary
Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Glenn (Interpreter)
The Secretary said that the Gener al would certainly like to
know what kinds of attitudes and what kinds of action might be expected
from the United States during the weeks and the months to come. The
Secretary expressed his intention to speak with frankness to which
friendship authorizes him. The substance of what he was going to say,
after his earlier conversation with the President, will be communicated
to Ambassador Brown and repeated by the latter to the General and the
King of Laos. After apologizing for the apparent discourtesy of such a
reminder, the Secretary cautioned the General to be most careful to
preserve the secrecy of the meeting, since common enemies of the two
countries would be most happy to learn what was said in these conver-
sations.
The Secretary said that he would begin by outlining two main
reasons which make it difficult for the United States to take direct
military action in Laos.
The first of these is that when President Kennedy took office in
January, he found that the United States had been committed by the
previous Administration to seek a solution of the Laotian problem
through negotiations. Such a commitment is extremely important, not
because a new President could not change a position taken by the earlier
Administration, but because it had created a climate of opinion in the
world at large and in the public opinion of the United States in respect to
Laos. Moreover, it involved the question of solidarity among the allies
and it had repercussions in all those areas of ambiguity which accompany
all negotiations.
State Department review completed
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4L o'it1.
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The second difficulty is even more serious. This is that the
United States is in a confrontation throughout the world with the Sino-
Soviet Bloc. Thus the question of Laos is not only the question of Laos
as such but also that of this world-wide confrontation. When the United
States thinks of a military action, it must do so after taking into con-
sideration the responsibilities which it and it alone has in respect to
itself and to the entire world. In consequence, a decision in regard to
Laos might well mean a decision in regard to World War III. The
Secretary said this not to show a fear or a particular concern on the
part of the United States in regard to World War III, but simply to show
that a decision taken in Washington is by its very nature differei t from
a decision which might be taken in Vientiane, and this because a decision
taken in Washington or in Moscow might be such as to reduce all of Laos
to ashes. This is for the United States a question of conscience and of moral
principle, and of what the United States feels it owes to the two million
Laotians. It is possible that a decision might involve only the lives of a
few thousand or a few tens of thousands of soldiers. It is possible also
that such a decision might involve the lives of hundreds or millions of people.
It is the tragedy of the peaceful Laotian people that they are involved
in the confrontation between the great powers, in which they should not be
involved at all. The U. S. is, nevertheless, fully conscious of having
undertaken to do its utmost in order to prevent a Communist takeover of
Laos. This undertaking has three reasons. The first one is the Laotian
people themselves. The second one is Southeast Asia; and the third one is
the position and the prestige of the U. S. in the world. Actions of the past
have proved that the U. S. is in earnest in regard to Laos. For example,
if only the efforts of the foreign nations were considered, it would be clear
that the actions in the defense of Laotian independence of countries other
than the U. S. were very puny indeed.
There are circumstances under which the U. S. would find it
necessary to send its own armed forces to defend Laotian independence.
The Secretary expressed his feeling that under such circumstances the
principal allies of the U. S. would also find it necessary to participate in
the struggle. If, however, the Secretary is to speak frankly and as a
friend, he finds it impossible for the U. S. to state precisely and in
advance what might be the circumstances under which the U. S. would find
it necessary to intervene militarily. This is because to state such cir-
cumstances in advance would amount to delegating to the Government of
Laos the responsibility for the decisions and the policy of the U. S. The
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Secretary therefore cannot state what set of circumstances would
automatically bring about military action as a response of the U. S.
A better way, however, is to call for mutual trust and openness
between the Laotian Government and ourselves.
To give an example, the Secretary then recalled the events of
these recent weeks. At the beginning of the Geneva Conference the
Secretary sent a message to the General, in which he called upon the
Royal Laotian Government to avoid making premature concessions to
Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao. fAt that time his colleagues,
the Foreign Ministers of France and/t`.e U. K., transmitted similar
messages to the Laotian Government. Although the Secretary did not
see the texts of those messages, he was assured that they were indeed
transmitted by the two Governments mentioned.
The Secretary indicated he wished to renew at this moment the
same advice and the same appeal against premature concessions to the
enemy. He said he gave this advice with the full realization of the
responsibility of his office and of the responsibility of the U. S. as a
great power. The Secretary reiterated that he did not believe that the
General, the King of Laos, and Prince Boun Oum should consider the
situation as calling for surrender. This is the advice which the Secretary
felt he had to give as a friend. The Secretary furthermore said that the
General should not advise the King to enter on the path of premature con-
cessions leading to the formation of a coalition Government which would
be in fact dominated by the Communists. The question arises how a
feeling of uncertainty. The only answer which can be given to this question
is to suggest that -- should the Government and the King be willing --
daily contacts be maintained between the Laotian and the U. S. Government,
so as to transmit from one to the other a full and frank expression of its
thoughts and intentions. The Secretary assured the General that the
President of the U. S. will not deceive the latter, and that if the two
Governments remain in close liaison and act in a concerted manner in the
future, at the very least each will know the thoughts of the other. The
U. S. is committed to the defense of freedom in the entire world, which
means also in Laos. Looking at the situation from Vientiane, it is possible
to think that there is a certain indifference in American attitude. This,
however, is not the case.
The Secretary stated that he had to add a highly important comment.
He is doing so not to be critical but only to be frank. If the U. S. is to call
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on its young men to go and fight to defend the freedom of another country,
it must be quite certain of the desire of that country for freedom. This
is a question of practical necessity. Therefore, it is of the highest
importance to make certain that the will to defend freedom not only exists
in Laos but also is made obvious to the entire world, and complete
solidarity and readiness to accept sacrifice on the part of the Laotian
people becomes more apparent. American soldiers are not mercenaries
who can be used to defend the causes of other people. The Secretary can
say this with the utmost frankness because he knows of the great gallantry
with which the General has defended the cause of freedom.
The Secretary appealed for close contacts between the General, the
King and the Laotian Government on the one hand, and Ambassador Brown
and the U. S. Government on the other, in order to obtain concerted
efforts on both sides to determine the manner in which the defense of Laos
can be best assured. The Secretary repeated that it is not possible to
bring more precision to the description of the American position, as any
attempt at such a clarification would amount to deception. The Secretary
said that he had spoken with a frankness which went beyond traditional
diplomatic practice. His concern in doing so was to clarify the situation.
It is not necessary to think of an intervention in Laos in terms of risk to
the lives of a few thousands or a few tens of thousands of soldiers, but
rather in the terms of the danger of a direct clash between the two greatest
powers. If a certain caution could be felt in the actions of the U. S.
Government, it was not so much due to the undertaking entered into by the
previous administration to seek a solution through negotiations, or to the
concern about possible consequences, as due primarily to a deep sense
of responsibility on the part of the U. S. The responsibility of the U. S.
is, among other things, that of preserving Laotian independence and not
making Laos into a cemetery. The question is a very complex one, and the
only answer is close liaision between the two Governments and concerted
action by them. The simplest answers may sometimes be also the worst
answers. What is sought is the independence of Laos and not the crushing
of Laos between the millstones of the two great powers.
If the United States has taken a position for the neutrality of Laos,
it is certainly not because of a lack of appreciation for what the General
and men like him have done. The Secretary asked the General to believe
that one of the motivations of the United States is a reluctance to involve
the Laotian people in a tragedy. The United States has no national
ambitions in Laos. It does not seek any military bases in Laos and neither
does it seek a military ally in Laos. The extent of its ambitions in regard
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to Laos is to safeguard the latter's freedom and independence, and
this is also the ambition of the Laotians themselves. The Secretary
repeated his apologies for having been more frank than is traditional
in diplomacy; he was frank in order to show the necessity for a close
and complete liaison between the two Governments.
In conclusion, the Secretary said that the Laotians should not feel
that they must surrender; neither should they feel that they must accept
Communist domination nor, again should they feel that they lack support.
The Secretary added, after apologizing for an indiscretion of such a
remark, that the United States Government feels that the historical
moment has come for His Majesty the King to exercise a greater degree
of direct influence. The Secretary understands the King's reluctance
at playing an active part in politics. However, if his ;understanding of
the situation is correct, the Laotian people have a great respect for the
institution of monarchy. There are times when such respect can be
safeguarded only by taking appropriate decisions. It is clear that in a
Communist Laos there would be no place for a King, and that the moment
has come for the King to assert his leadership. It is possible that the
King may be reluctant to take actions which might create a risk for the
institution of the monarchy. However, if the Secretary is to consider
risking the life of his son in the defense of Laos, the King should also
consider taking risks for the crown.
General Phoumi Nosavan thanked the Secretary for the latter's
frankness and for the expression of his opinion. The General shares many
of those opinions; in particular in regard to actions which would be
desirable on the part of the King.
There is, however, something which makes difficult action on the
part of the King and also on the part of the General. This is a lack of
clarity as to the United States position. Such a lack of clarity makes it
difficult to take decisions. Therefore, one of the things which the General
would greatly like to understand better is what actions the United States
contemplates in the near future from the political, diplomatic and
military points of view.
The Geneva conference was convened, in fact, against the wishes
of the Royal Laotian Government. The General believes that the United
States has already committed itself in Geneva to a certain objective. He
would appreciate it if more precision could be given to him as to the nature
of that objective. This is of the highest importance to determine the future
actions of the Laotian Government.
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The Secretary said that the United States seeks the neutrality
and the independence of Laos. In Geneva, the United States delegation
has supported all the proposals which could lead to a maximum of
international assistance to genuine independence and neutrality of Laos.
The United States is in favor of an effective international machinery,
without a Soviet veto, which would prevent infiltration into Laos of arms
or men, and the development of any situation which would endanger
Laotian independence. In consequence, the United States is for a strong
international commission without a Soviet veto.
The question of the Geneva conference, however, is secondary at
the present moment as compared to that of the establishment of a
coalition government in Laos. Should there be established a coalition
government which would in fact be dominated by the Communists, the
United States would lose all interest in Laos. The United States does not
intend to subscribe to a fiction. Not one dollar would be spent on either
military or economic aid for a Laos which would not be genuinely inde-
pendent. The United States will have no part in any decision or any action
which would make Laos Communist.
From the American point of view, the so-called neutralists in Laos
are in fact the allies of the Communists. If a possibility existed for those
neutralists to be drawn away from the Communists, so as to become
allied with the Royal Laotian Government, that would greatly improve the
prospects for the future. At the present moment, however, the United
States Government is sceptical as to the possibility of a coalition govern-
ment based on the idea of the three forces and of an apportionment of
portofolios, which would, in fact, be dominated by the Communists. If
the neutralists can be drawn away from the Pathet Lao and toward the
Government, the situation might be different.
The General said that if he understood correctly, the United States
has decided to approve the objectives of the Geneva conference.
The Secretary said that this was not exactly the case, although the
United States would view with favor such objectives if the situation
permitted that they be genuinely reached. The Geneva conference,
however, is of a secondary importance at the present moment, as he
noted earlier. The Secretary mentioned as an example the early days
of the Geneva conference when he was isolated in Geneva. He was
insisting at the time that it was absurd to seat the Souvanna Phouma
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and the Pathet Lao delegations on a footing of equality with the delegation
of the Royal Laotian Government. Yet at that very moment at Van Namone,
the three delegations were gathering on a footing of equality and amidst a
great display of friendly relations, including champagne luncheons. To be
fair, it must be said that the United States Government suggested to the
Royal Laotian Government that the latter participate in the Van Namone
talks; the question is, however, of the spirit and the atmosphere which
surrounded these talks. If the United States Government is to take a firm
position at major international conferences, it must be sure that its friends
will not pull the rug from under it. In consequence, the Secretary renewed
his appeal for close contacts between the two Governments, so as to avoid
any situation in which any one of them would be in the dark concerning the
thoughts of the other one, in order both to avoid any actions other than those
agreed upon jointly, and to avoid any premature concessions to the enemy.
The Secretary expressed the hope that the King might assert his influence,
for example by making the three Princes come to him in Luang Prabang.
The Secretary said that the General might wish to continue this
conversation the next day at the reception to be offered by the Charge de
Affaires in honor of the General.
The General said that he did not wish to take advantage of the
Secretary's kindness and take up too much of his time. He recognized that
there was not enough liaison between the two Governments and in fact such
actions as those leading to the Geneva conference, the Van Namone meetings
and the meetings of the three Princes In Zurich were taken without much
consultation.
The Secretary remarked that direct consultation and close contacts
are much better than any formal definition of positions, especially in regard
to hypothetical situations concerning a future which no one can foresee. The
Secretary indicated that the United States is interested not only in Laos but
in all of Southeast Asia and that events in Laos can not fail to have an
influence on Thailand, Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. In turn, events in
Southeast Asia cannot fail to influence the world situation. Thus the involve-
ment of the United States in world affairs does not mean that the United States
may have appeared negligent in regard to Laos, rather on the contrary. The
Secretary said that if he had spoken to General with a somewhat brutal frankness,
it is because he had not always been a diplomat. He also used to be a soldier
and had fought in Southeast Asia and in particular in the North part of Burma
where he had seen action along side with the Karins and the Kachins who
reminded him very much of the Khas and the Meos of Laos.
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