BLOODSHED MAY BE INEVITABLE AT PANMUNJOM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200090005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 8, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 8 January 1954
BLOODSHED MAY BE INEVITABLE
AT PANMUNJOM
I. Disorders involving bloodshed at
Panmunjom on or about 23 January
are beginning to look inevitable,
regardless of whether India releases
the prisoners. r
7W K -1 %0 ~.GLr
II. The 22,000 anti-Communist prisoners
are well-organized for any eventuality.
25X1X7
A. each
compound is thoroughly organized
down to four and five-man cells.
B. They are receiving instruc-
tions by radio code from
South Korea's General Won 4 btc&,;
who engineered the prisoner
release last'June.
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C. They are armed with home-made
weapons, have their own
security patrols operating
around the clock which are
25X1X7ruthless.
III. If prisoners are not released on
schedule, they are almost certain
to riot and attempt a mass break-
out, If Indians attempt to hold
them back, slaughter of hundreds
appears likely.
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IV. If prisoners are not released on
schedule, Rhee would feel impelled
to take some action to effect their
release.
He is emotional over detention
of Korean nationals by a
foreign power.
B. His conviction that India is
pro-Communist was newly
reinforced by the unfavorable
NNRC interim POW report and
the Indian "headcount."
C. He has already publicly threatened
to use force against the Indians
if the POW's are not automatically
released on 23 January.
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V. Any attempt by Rhee, probably effected
by police troops under Gen. Won,
would, by the truce terms, have
to be counteracted by UNC action.
A. While Rhee would be reluctant
to risk a UN-South Korean
clash, he might gamble that
the US would choose not to
uphold the truce rather than to
shoot down South Koreans.
B. The fact that he would be
violating the truce would not
deter Rhee since his agreement
not to obstruct the truce
expires a few days after
23 January.
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VI. The continued detention of POW's
might become, for Rhee, justification
for initiating unilateral military
action against the Communists.
A. His recent statements, however,
have emphasized the "right"
rather than the "intention"
to attack northward.
B. There are no indications that
he is preparing to renew the
war.
VII. If the prisoners are not released,
the Communists would likely respond
with heavy propaganda exploitation
of what they would term acceptance
of their position, meanwhile standing
by to exploit any possible incidents
between South Korean, and Indian
or US forces.
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VIII. Even if the prisoners are released,
as now seems probable, there is a
likelihood of bloodshed.
A. Possibly anti-Communist leaders
in the southern camp will
dictate death on the night of
22 January for any prisoners
who have wavered in their
determination not to go home
or who may be suspected agents.
B. These leaders might attempt
a massacre of the 350 pro-
Communist (including 21 Americans)
in the northern camp.
C. There might be a mass breakout
prior to 22 January by
prisoners who fear retaliation
from the anti-Communist leaders.
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D. Although more remote, Rhee's
emotionalism over India might
cause him to order a breakout
25X6Din advance of 22 January.
IX. If the prisoners are released on
schedule, the Communists are certain
to exploit the situation for propaganda
stressing the illegality of the
release and the "forcible retention"
of the prisoners.
A. They are likely by subversion to
create maximum disorder and
bloodshed during the release, in
much the same way they did on
Koje Island while under UNC
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B. Less probable is that they
would commit one of the North
Korean divisions opposite
Panmunjom to forcibly seize
the POW's. We don't think
this issue is important
enough to them to risk a
renewal of the war, however.
C. They would be more likely to
exercise this capability if
South Korean forces moved first,
thus making Communist retalia-
tion appear as an act of self-
defense.
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X. India has indicated that it agrees
with the UN Command that its troops
cannot legally hold the POW's
beyond 22 January.
A. Nehru is under pressure
from Peiping and pro-Communist
advisers in the foreign
ministry to delay the release.
B. India is planning to have
the UN General Assembly
reconvened on 9 February, and
a decision to hold the
prisoners until that date,
while not expected, is
possible.
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XI In reply to Thimayya's letter of
2 January the Communists have just
reaffirmed their position that dis-
cussion in the political conference
must precede the prisoners' release.
A. The UNC previously informed
Thimayya that explanations are
over and the POW's must be
released at midnight on 22
January.
B. ThimayyA's next step will be to
ask both commands to take back
custody of the POW's. The
Communists undoubtedly will
reject this.
C. Thimayya then plans to "liberate"
the prisoners on 23 January
without formally turning them
over to the original detaining
sides, provided New Delhi agrees.
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XIi. Tension among the Indians and the
prisoners at Panmunjom being built
up largely because of New Delhi's
indecision and South Korean threats.
XIII. The US is sufficiently involved so
that if disorders break out we will
suffer international embarrassment
as well as defeat on the propaganda
front.
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