NIE-61: CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNIST CONTROL OVER THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT' (REVISED STAFF DRAFT FOR BOARD CONSIDERATION)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000800010019-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 12, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCr
12 June 1952
SUBJECT: W j-61: Consequences of Cczimunist Control over the Indian
subcontinent* (] rued Staff Draft for Board Consideration)
To estimate the strategic consequences to the West and to the
Soviet Bloc of the establislni, of Ccimmtnist control over the Indian
subcontinent without either the Middle East or Southeast Asia having
previously crane under Commurdst contrci. Whether or not the subcontinent
is likely to crane under Coma uair3t control is a question beyond the scope
of this est3mateo
I. POLITICi L AND I SYCI?OL+CQICAL CoI Sh UENCES
1. The establis1 rent of Cfx 1uniet control over the Indian subcontinent
would be a serious b1v a to Welts i prestige throughout the world? would
ggreat3y strengthen- the Ca i monist claim to speak for the non 4 bite peoples
or he Furores of this estimate, the Indian subcontinent will be
taken to include India9 Paki3tsn, .Afghanistan, the border states of
Nepal, Sikkim,, and Bhutan, and Ce7lono
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of Asia and 1frica, and would have a profound shock effect throughout
the Middle and Far East, The loss of the subcontinent, following on the
loss of China, would create the impression that Coeununism was the "wave
of the future" and would soon engulf all Asia and eventually the
entire world.
2, The specific effects of a Communist accession to power in the
sutcontinent would depend on the circumstances under which the Communists
gained control and on the nature of the esterTL reaction thereto.
In general, hoUrever, the following political and psychological con-
sequences could be expected, regardless of the circumstances under which
the Co nunist assumption of power took places
ao Southeast Asia, Mainland Southeast Asia would probab z
soon come under Cnist control, The alreac shaky govern
meet of tBurma, menaced both from without and within, wot1d
probawy succumb to the ComTunists in fairly short order,
wbfl.e Thailand, because of its weakness and exposed position,
would probab3y fool compelled to switch from its present,
pro-Western position to a policy of appeasing its Communist
neighbors. The cost of maintaining Western control in
Indochina and 2 a would greatly increase, and France and
the UK might well decide to abandon their respective ccmznit-
ments there. Although Indonesia would be less directly
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affected than its mainland neighbors, it would also probably'
be drawn into the Cdl,nu xist orbit unless convinced by strong
Western action that its military, political, and econanic
position could be adequately maintained through cooperation
with the :leste
b. Near and Middle Bast. The reaction of Iran, the Arab states,
and Israel would be dependent on their estimate of the
determination and ability of the West to resist further
Communist expansion. Greece and Turkey would probably remain
firm3y a3.lied with the Westo
co The non C uniat Far East, & anto fears for its security,
its sense of isolation from the other major powers of Asia,
and its incentive to trade with the Camaunist bloc would
increase, but it would probably retain its alliance with the
U.S. The government of the Philippines would undergo similar
qualms but, being less capable of acting independently,
would probably concentrate on obtaining additional military
commitments fran the US. lea and New Zealand would
probably increase the pace of their on defense efforts,
concentrating on protection of their own territoriese
South Korea and the Chinese Nationalists would remain
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dependent on Western help and would thus have little
freedom of actione
d. Western Lurot~s. The peoples of Western Europe would became
more concerned about the :Jest' a abctlity to halt the spread
of Communism ax 'whea^ea in the world. The governments of the
UK and France would probably come under strong pressure to
abandon their costly and difficult attempts to hold on to
Indochina and Malaya in order to concentrate on defense of
their metropolitan territory'.
II. Eco!Io?iIC corisi tm :c S
A o Effect on the Economic Position of the Wast*
3o The area of the Indian subcontinent is currently important
to the non-Communist ti orld as a major source of several strategic raw
materials and of a number of wide]y used though less critically important
items- The principal commodities involved are as fofowez
This section is based 1arg4r a an EIC contribution to the fortkacaaning
NIP-S6,, Likelihood of Loss of ortant Economic Rimes in 9elsatted
Foreign Areas.
India also has uneauaileed reserves of monazite sands, from which thorium
(of potential use for atomic euerg ') and rare earths can be obtained,
and also is a source of beryl, of acme strategic importance in beryllium
copper. Although India has thtm far prohibited the export of monazite,
it has entered into negotiation for its males to the US. India restricts
the exportation of beryl and the US has been able to obtain only minor
amounts.
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man aneee India currently supplies about 25 percent of
the non-Cc mziniet world's consumption of manganese ores
which is widely used as an a13W for steel, and about
35 percent of that used b3 the US - since the Indian product
is almost all me.rld y superior in grade to that obtainable
elsewhere, its importance is greater than the percentage
figures given hire would indicate-
b. Mica'-India is virtua33y the eoles supplier to the West of Us
more critical classes of block and sheet muscovite ndca, which
is used in manufacture of v cuwn tubes and other cations equipment$ boiler gauges and oxygen breathing
equignento
c. 97-t i rion is r r the only significant non-C~i st
source of high grade amorphous limp graphite,, which is used
in facture of carbon brushes for elactricai equipment*
do Jute and JuteSIndie and Pakistan furnish virtually
all the Jute and Jute products which enter world trade
Jute is the principal material used in bags and bale coverings
for transport and storage of bulk,cuni dities like grain,
fertilizer, cement, and cotton.
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e. Other products'-India is the chief world supplier of premium
quality kyanite, wbiah is a high grade refractory used in
electric furnace 1inin.gs, electrical and chemical pc+rcelala,
and spark plugs; furnishes about 75 percent of the world's
supply of high grade abitlac; and provides about a quarter
of the world's supply of opium for medical purposes.
India and Ceylon together produce close to 85 percent of the
tea entering international trade and about two third' of
the black pepper. Ceylon is a relatively minor source of
rubber for the non-Comwdst world,
Z&Q If the Comunista aalned control of the subcontinent, the prin-
cipal strategic materials listed above would inevitably be unavailable
to the Jest in wartime and might well be denied, under cold war conditions
as well. The Communists would probably continue to export less critical
items like team black peppers and possib3y jute in exchange for food-
stuffs and other products not now subject to Western export controls*
In addition, they might initia13y be willing to continue supplying strategic
materials like manganese, mien, end graphite to the West if the latter
did not apply to the subconti,nent the export controls now in force against
the other Coemtunist countries, since the loss of the petroleum products..
machinery, and other controlled items .bich they subcontinent now obtains
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from the West in exchange for these strategic raw materials wotOA impose
a considerable strain on the econa q of the subcontinent. Barring a major
change in the over-all pattern of East-West trade, however, a gradual
drying up of the subcontinent o s trade with the West would almost
certain3y talce place, because the West would seek to develop alternate
sources of critical materials and the Co mannists in the subcontinent
would attempt to move toward greater self-suffi eienay. Even a teagpoz ary
modus vivendi would be out of the question if the USSR considered the
denial of strategic materials to the West of sufficient importance or
if the US and its allies went ahead with imposition of export controls
5. Denial of the subco~t'a products to the West as a result
of a Ccmunist accession to power would require substantial readjustments
on the part of the US and its all3eso The West would have to spend time
and money in developing generall;Y more expansive and qualitatively less
satisfactory alternate sources, would have to develop substitute materials
in sane cases, and would have to accept some reductions in quaantitg* or
quality of output until these ad3uetmnnta had been madeo
10. The impact on the West of the denial of the subcontinent's
strategic' materials would depend on the extent to vhich stockpiling goals
had been achieved and alternate sources e q anded at the time that the
subcontinent's resources were cut off. Although denial of these resources
would not necessitate any significant reduction in defense and essential
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consumption in the US, the over-all affect, in texms of the magnitude of
the readjustments required, would almost certainly be serious at any time
up through 3,954a The pres4.nt outlook with respect to the principal
strategic commodities named above is as follows
a. Manganese ore--The US could initially maintain its ohm steel
production by drawing on its manganese stockpile, and sig-
nificant reductions in the output of other Western countries,
where little stockpiling has taken place, could also be
averted it US reserves were made available in sufficiently
large quantity. The US stockpile, which was !e5 percent
complete at the end of 1951, is probably sufficient to most
all Western manganese requirements for about two and a
half years. In the long run, adequate supplies of manganese
could be obtained from other sources--.notably Brazil, the
Gold Coast, South, Africa, Belgian Congo, and Angola.
where some expansion of facilities to meet the increasing
demand for manganese is already taking placed However, an
increase in output sufficient to make up completely for the
lose of Indian manse would require several years in view
of manpower and equipment staortagaes, transport and loading
facility bottlenecks grad various other prob1 ep and sme
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curtailment of steel production might be required to prevent
depletion of the stockpile before these other sources had
came into fun production. In air event, lose of fide superior
Indian we would require adjustments in metallurgicia practice,
entailing some loss in rate of productions and higher costa.
b4 ) cap--Lass of the Indian supp3y of block and sheet mica
would require drastic conservation measures in the US,
where stockpiling is only about 20 percent completes, and
even more stringent sorbs on cons mption in the other
Western countries., where stockpiles are virtually nonexistent.
Stocks now in the US of these critical classes of erica
represent about a year's sup )3y. Development of now sources
would be very costly and the efforts being made to develop
substitutes cannot be expected to show usable results for
several yearse
c. ar pbitee Since C r]. n is the or ay source of high grade
amorphous lump grcphite, the US would have to draw on its
stockpiles notably for such igaanoue uses as carbon brushes
in high altitude ai oraft, and modify specifications for
other end-items, where inferior grades of graphite might
possibly be used. Although the US stockpile was close to
its goal of 3#356 metric tams at the and of 1951, that level
represented only about a quarter of CeFlonae annual exports.
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d. Jute and Jute products-The loss taoould be serious, involving
far-reaching conservation measures and costly adjustments,
especially for countries like those of Western Europe
where substitutes are less readily available and would
involve foreign exchange problems,
a. other products--Development of synthetic substitutes for
Indian ljranite is man under way, and the loss of the Indian
product should cause no serious difficulties. Loss of Indian
shellac would involve higher costs and widespread inconvenience
since different substitutes would have to be developed for
most of the various uses a shellac. Loss of Indian opium
would inconvenience the UK, which has obtained most of its
supply from the subcontinento
Effect on the Economic. Position of the Soviet Bloc
6. At least in the short run, Gist control of the sub-
continent would provide fear economic benefits to the rest of the Soviet
Bloc and might well prove to be an econaanic lisbilityo The USSR would
probably hasten to exploit India's thorium-bearing monazite for atomic
energy purposes, and the Bloc as a whole could probably use the limited
amounts of rubber, cotton, and cotton textiles available, as wolf as
moderate amounts of mica, graphite, iron and manganese ores, beryl,
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and jute products, Nevertheless, the amount of goods that the Soviet
Bloc could absorb would be relatively small., in terms both of the
subcontinent's present exports and of total Soviet Bloc eonsumptiono
and the dtrategic gain to the Bloc--except possibly with respect to monazite
would be :Limited 0
7. The extent to which aCozrmmnist subcontinent would represent an
economic liability for the rest of the Bloc would depend in the short
run in part on the extent to which the subcontinent to obtain present
imports from the ,-jest, and in part on Communist ability to cope with the
major internal readjustments arising from the transfer of political and
economic power to a Communist regime. The cutting off of major destern
imports would impose a heavy economic strain on the subcontinent which
the USSR would have difficulty in relieving, Just as the subcontinent?s
principal exports are commodities for which the Soviet Bloc has no great
immediate need, so its principal p-esent imports--notably petroleum
products, machinery and other metal manufactures, industrial chemicals,
and foodstuffs--are items which the Communist world cannot easily sparse
The USSR's willingness and ability to make up for the loss of Western
products would be sharply limited by competing demands within the Bloc,
by the grave shortage of shipping facilities, and by the general concept
that it is each Coaranunist regime's responsibility to achieve economic
goals through use of its own resources rather than through grants and
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loans from the USSR. The Soviet Bloc would probably thus be tilling to
supply the subcontinents most urgent import requirements only to the
limited extent that the subcontinent itself contributed goods needed by
the Soviet Bloc. Although a subcontinent Ccwonlst regime could prrobably,
under these circumstances, maintain itself in power by adopting extreme
measures, it would almost certainly exert strong pressure on the USSR
for substantial economic assistance.
8. Action with regard to the subcontinent's food supply would be
particularly urgent. P lthou,h the Soviet Bloc might be able to ship about
one million tons of grain anc Burma might be induced to provide another
million tons, this total would x resent only about half or less of the
grain which the area has imported annual3y in receht year a. Local famines
would probably occur despite ruthless methods of crop collections
If the Conwnmists were sufficiently well entrenched to clash with religious
sentiment, they might be able to save an additional million tons of grain
now consumed by monkeys and cattle.
9, Industrial output would almost certaimnly declined Although the
'USSR and Rumania could theoretically provide much of the six million
> tric tons of petroleum now obtained from the Middle East for internal
consumption lack of tankers would probably permit the shipment of only
insignificant amounts to the subcontinent. Despite possible conversion,
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of oil-burning equipment to coals with is plentiful in the subcontinent,
bottlenecks in production would almost certainy.result. The denial of
the Spare parts and other capital equipment, UKlustrial chMmioa1a, and
miscellaneous metal products prsvious3y obtained from the Weat would
impose further curbs on industrial eettput.
10. Under these circumstances, the prospects of a Cost sub-
continent's becoming a major center of Cammudet economic power appear
exceedin.3r remote. Although the subcontinent has lmge manpower reserves,
the basic raw materials receded in heavy industry, and an extensive existing
productive plant, large-scale exploitation of these resources would require
considerable time and termendous capital iuvestimento on the basis of
the Japanese experieix e, an industrial .ccnplex of the order of that
existing in Japan and Manchuria at the start of the World Warn might
theoretically be achieved in 1$ to 20 years. waver, such a rate of
developments which would require the importation of capital equipment
of the order of half a billion dollars annually, would clearly be beyond
the capabilities of a Comma ist regime in the subcontinent, which would
probob3y be cut off from the major Western sources of capital equipment,
could expect only limited assistance from the USSR, and would probably
be confronted with serious problems of internal economic adjustment as
wellAlthough it is probable that an improvcmant in agricutlrual output
and an expansion of certain critical industrial facilities would eventually
be achieved, the general pace of economic development would almost certainly
be extremely elev.
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III. ni ITARY CONSM(U LACES
A. exist Forces ..Facilities
11, The nations of the subcontinent possess forces in
being of arproxiately 650,000, some 1,500,000 trained
reservists, and a vast reservoir of manpower. The
armies of India and Pakistan, ccxiprising more than
90 percent of present active strength., are well-trained
and well-disciplined forces of good fighting quality.
Both countries have stna11 air forces designed primarily
for support of ground operations and a few light naval
surface vossel8.*
12. The subcontinent's other m:=litary assets include:
a. A large number of excellent airbasoe and air-
base sites (notably in West Pakistan) trithin
medium and heavy bomber range of major industrial
and governmental centers in Soviet Central Asia
and the interior of Camr.uriist China. Corimunica.
tions and other facilities are adequate for main-
tenance of large-scale operations from these bases.
b,. I:ajor ports, airbases, and other facilities
which could be used: (1) for maintenance of cam
rninications between Western Europe and the Far East
# See Anne; A for further details on subcontinent military forces.,
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and for log stical. support of possible military
operations in the t:ic c,le or Far East or (2) for
the support of air and naval action against these
co sunicatiom,
Cp Limited facilities for production of arms
and equip cent, Alti oug h these facilities can
supply si a ficant amounts of sail arms and
nrn-,1 tion, the subcontinent is dependor t on out-
side sources for most other major items of rmaterield
B. Effect on Western 11il.ita Capabilities
13 a Bst? b1 shnout of Cos unist control over the Indian
subcontinent would have little effect on the present
rail:itavy stren z of the US and its alliae o The Western
powers might be oc poUed to undertake sme shifts in
military supply routes and possibly some redeployment
of forces to talco account of the changed military
situation in the subcontinent, while the loss of N opal
would provont .f , er British resting of Gurkha
troops and possibly weaken the morale of the 6,000-odd
Gurkhas now serving with the BBritish in t? layas Except
in those relatively minor ways, however, the military
strength now available against tho Soviet Bloc would
bo vir yuolly unchanged. Thos forges and militarj
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installations of India and Pakistan,.. the only two
militarily sii ni.f leant powers of the area, are not now
available to the [Jest as a result of the .non. involvement
policies being pursued by the two governments. L1ore.
over, these forces, though large In. acnparison to those
of their non-Con. mmist neighbors, are far weaker than
those of Comunist China and the USSR and, in any event,
are currently tied down because of the Kashmir dispute,
Fran a purply military standpoint, they thus do not
constitute a significant deterrent to Communist military
expaans ions, in the neighboring areas of Southeast Asia
or the Addle East.
14. Ccaunist accession to power in the subcontinent
would, however, be of same significance in denying a
potential source of additional Western military strength.
Pakistan has repeatedly suggestod that it might be
willing to participate in Western defense arrangements
if the Kashmir dispute were settled satisfactorily, and
it is possible that even India might eventually be
induced to participate in Western defense arrangements.
Wartime access to the subcontinent's airbase and port
facilities could add significantly to Western capabil.
ities for air operations against the USSiI and for other
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military operations in the Middle or Far East. Western
military planners have alreaar manifested an interest
in obtaining Pakistani assistance in the defense of the
.dd1e East. Although most of the remaining forces in
being would probably have to be loft in defensive positions
at hone in the event of Indian and Pakistani participa-
tion in a war on the side of the West, they might to a
limited extent tie down Cormunist troops in the Central
Asian aroa, The subcontirssntfs nanpower reserves,
trained and untrained, would be useful to the West to
the extent that manpower rather than equipment sat the
significant factor limiting the expansion of Western
ril.itiary strength.
C. Effect on Soviet Bloc tylitarv Canab ilities
15. Communist control of the subcontinent would increase
the size of the military forces available to the Soviet
Bloc and would provide it with an additions base of
operations strategic fly located with respect to the
T?Ziddle East and Southeast Asia and to the main line of
coo nr unications bet -awn Western Europe and the For East.
It is unlikely' however, that the Soviet Bloats military,
capabilities would be significantly increased, at least
for marry years to come.
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16. The ; irriediate effect on Soviet Bloc military capa.>
bilitios would almost certainly be small. The particular
circumstances under which the Coammists achieved power
might well entail Leavy troop requirements for internal
security duty, reluctance to fight for the Coarrmunists
on the part of m=- of the present troops, and combat
losses of men and equipment. Even if these adverse
effects were largely avoided and sizeable forces in being
were thus made available for possible aggressive oper-
ation: against Southeast Asia and the Middle East, the
usefu'rass of these forces, except possibly on political
grounds, would be limited. The Chinese Communists and
the USSR respectively can already muster a preponderance
of force for operations in. these two areas. Moreover,
C runist use of subcontinent force: against these
areas would be subject to serious operational limitations,
inasmuch as: (a) the land routes available for such
operations traverse extremoly difficult mountainous
terrain and would involve major logistical problems; and
(b) shipping for use in amphibious or other seaborne
operations would be difficult to assemble and highly
vulnerable to Western naval attack. While control of
the subcontinontes air and naval bases would put the
SECMIET
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Ccmmtimists in a position to attack: essential Western
communications tlcrc h the Indian Ocean, as well as
possible air and naval targets in Southeast Asia and
the Middle East, present subcontinent air and naval
forces would be almost completely inadequate for
such a purpose and could be readily neutralized by
Western forces.
17. Even in the la W run, the maces that a Communist
subcontinent would:cantribute significantly to over-
all Soviet Bloc military capabilities are small.
Althourrh the USSR Iou1d have an opportunity to exploit
the subcontinent's military potential much as it has
that of Conn u ist China, the Soviets would probably be
deterred from doing so by the following considerations:
a. A larsge-scale buildup of subcontinent military
forces and installationhwould require a heavy
investment in technical and material assistance,
either through direct supply of military end-items
or through development of the subcontinent's now
limited war industry. This investment could be
made only at the expense of military and economic
requirements elsewhere in the Bloc which are likely
to remain pressing for many years to come.
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b. Difficulties of access and control would make
a Soviet investment in subcontinent military
power a risky one. Unlike Cormaunist China, the
subcontinent has no major overland communications
with the rest of the Soviet Bloc and would there-
fore have to be supplied almost entirely by sea.
In the event of w&c, the subcontinent military
ostablishment's supply lines would thus be gravely
vulnerable to Western naval interdiction.
C. Any larga-acale buildup of the subcontinent
military establishment., especially one which less-
ened the subcontinent's dependence on vulnerable
supply lines, would weaken the control which the
USSR itself could exercise over the subcontinent.
d. Such a buildup would offer little strategic
gain to the Soviets. As indicated above? difficulties
of terrain and the availability of adequate alter-
native forces would matte it inexpediont--except
possibly on political grounds-to use large con-
tingents from the subcontinent in either Southeast
Asia or the Addle East,, the only areas in which
they could ba employed at all. without a marked
change in the world balance of naval power,
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18. In view of these factors, the Soviet contribution
to subcontinent military strength would probably be
limited. The USSR could be expected to provide some
assistance in building up the subcontinent's armed
forces and war industries, but only to the extent of
internal security and defense requirements. The USSR
would probably underwrite some limited expansion of
subcontinent air and nail forces, possibly providing
some interceptor and ground attack aircraft, as well
as patrol craft, coastal submarines, and other light
naval equipment simi3a to that it has supplied to
Coarraunist China and North Korea. The Soviets, however,
would probably not wish to build up subcontinent air
strength significantly, particularly in the absence of
uninterrupted supplies of POL, and would almost
certainly be unwilling to ccznmit major naval units to
the Indian Ocean area,.
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