YUGOSLAVIA: THE KOSOVO PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A001000060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1979
• Content Type: PAPER

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Foreign
Assessment
Center
Yugoslavia:
The Kosovo- Problem
Confidential
PA 79-10216
May 1979
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Assessment
Center
Yugoslavia:
The Kosov~~ Problem
A Research Paper
Research for this paper was completed
on 21 April 1979.
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Yugoslavia:
The Kosovo Problem
Key Judgments The future; course of Serb-Croat rivalry over the distribution of power in
Yugoslavia is awell-acknowledged key to maintaining the integrity of the
Yugoslav state in a post-Tito period. The evolution of the less publicized
rivalry between Serbs and Albanians within Serbia's Kosovo Province,
however, may have an equally important bearing on Belgrade's manage-
ment of its ethnic minority problems.
Belgrade leas attempted in recent years to win the allegiance of its Albanian
minority primarily by granting qualified political autonomy and contribut-
ing aid intended to reduce the economic gap between Kosovo and the richer
northern republics of the federal Yugoslav state. Albanian nationalism,
however, continues to grow while Kosovo's economic achievement falls short
of Belgrade's promises.
The Hoxh;a regime in neighboring Albania views Kosovo as only temporarily
under Yu?;oslav control. Improved Yugoslav-Albanian state relations-and
Albania's split with its patron, China-have not been accompanied by an
amelioration of the hostility between the two Balkan Communist parties and
their leaders. Each leadership remains wary of the other's long-term
territorial ambition.
While we have no evidence of foreign subversive activity in Kosovo, the
situation there is ready-made for foreign meddling. This is particularly true
because the Albanian minority problem in Yugoslav Macedonia could
unsettle a region against which Bulgaria lays irridentist claims.
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Yugoslavia:
The Kosovo Problem
Kosovo's 1 million Albanians are Yugoslavia's poorest
people. They have the country's highest birth and
illiteracy rates and are the most tied to the land. A
heady brand of Albanian nationalism has developed.
among them, aimed at overcoming the effects of past
Serbian rule and based on unrealistic ext>ectations of
economic gain. Despite substantial federal aid, the
region remains largely underdeveloped; the economic
gap between Kosovo and the richer areas of Yugoslavia
widens each year. The presence of an independent,
Albanian homeland on Kosovo's borders ;adds a foreign
dimension to the problem.
It is against such regional nationalism that Tito has
struggled for 34 years in an uphill fight to forge a
nation out of constituent ethnic groups steeped in
regional prejudices. After Tito has gone, a clash
between Serbs and Albanians could touch off volatile
nationality disputes elsewhere in the federation; any
resurgence of Serbian assertiveness would rekindle
opposition among Croats, Muslim-Slavs, and other
ethnic groups. Moderation of Kosovo's problems thus
could become critical to the Yugoslav federation's
survival.
Historical .Setting
Both the Serbs and Albanians have deep emotional
commitments to Kosovo Province. For the Serbs,
Kosovo is the hallowed ground of "old Sc;rbia." The
first Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate was established at
Pec in 1346, and the province is the site of Serbia's last
stand against the Turks in 1389. The largely Muslim
Albanians claim that, as descendants of the ancient
Illyrians, they are the original inhabitants of the area,
while the Slavs are the interlopers.
Belgrade knows the explosive nature of Albanian
nationalism in Kosovo. In 1944, for example, Tito's
partisans fought an indigenous Albanian Army bent on
establishing control over the region. Albanian hostility,
always just beneath the surface,.erupted again in the
late 1960s in the wake of the fall from power of
Aleksandr Rankovic, a Serb nationalist, confident of
President Tito, and overseer of the secret police.
Rankovic had played a key role in the sometimes
brutal repression of the Albanians, and his departure
raised hopes that the door was now open to political
and social change. Following an unusually candid
debate on the Albanian minority problem at the 6th
Serbian Party Congress, well-organized demonstra-
tions broke out on 27 and 28 November 1968.' The
Albanians' demands-ranging from moderate to far-
reaching-included:
? An end to the "colonization of Kosovo" (an attack on
past Serbian dominance).
? The fulfillment of autonomous rights promised
during the war.
? The right of self-determination.
? The right to a separate constitution for Kosovo.
? The creation of an Albanian republic within the
Yugoslav federal structure.
? The creation of an Albanian university not domi-
nated by Serbs.
? The right to fly the Albanian flag.
The Kosovo demonstrations triggered similar Alba-
niandisturbances in the neighboring Macedonian town
of~ Tetovo on 23 December 1968. Demonstrators called
for an end to anti-Albanian prejudice and union with
Kosovo.
In 1971, this time buoyed by a resurgent Croatian
nationalism, Albanians agitated once again for full
republic status for Kosovo. In December 1974, dis-
orders again broke out, centering at Pristina Univer-
sity. Hundreds of arrests were reportedly made, and
many persons were jailed for crimes ranging from the
distribution of Albanian nationalist leaflets to painting
nationalist slogans on university buildings; some slo-
gans called fora "Greater Albania." In the ensuing
years, there have been several bloody prison riots
among Albanians protesting alleged mistreatment by
their Serbian wardens.
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Yugoslav National Da ? in 1968 the latter date marked Yugoslavia's
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Belgrade's Policies and Consequences
Belgrade's response to manifestations of Albanian
nationalism has generally been to meet moderate
demands and to pour large amounts of development
funds into the province. Belgrade has al:;o, however,
tended to deal harshly with nationalist agitators,
handing out stiff jail sentences to those convicted of
voicing extreme programs.
The effort to defuse the Kosovo problems has met with
only limited success. Investments in the province
stimulated large-scale migration of unskilled workers
into the cities and towns where the pron'cise of
employment has been largely unfulfilledl. The decision
to expand Pristina University, sever its tries to Belgrade
University, and lower entrance requirements has
produced a pool of semieducated, unemployed malcon-
tents. Crowded living conditions and limited recreation
facilities add to discontent at the university, where
students have demonstrated a particularly strong
penchant for nationalist extremism. Because many
militant Serb nationalists lost power and left Kosovo,
the sensitivity of those remaining has increased with
the growth of their perception of a fundamental threat
to their historically dominant position in. that province.
While addressing Albanian demands, both federal
officials in Belgrade and local Albanian officials in
Kosovo have also kept an eye on Serb nationalism on a
national scale. Serb sensitivities stem in part from the
role the Serbian Republic played in creating modern
Yugoslavia. The Serbs tend to view themselves as
champions and guardians of the state, and they point
with pride to the fact that it was Serbia which provided
the nucleus for the first Yugoslav state iin 1918.
Many Serbs view moves toward greater Kosovo
autonomy as attempts to weaken terminally Serbian
power and influence in the Yugoslav federation. The
problem of containing Serbian chauvinism has been
openly debated within the Serbian party, but little has
been done to close the deep rift between the Serbs and
Albanians. To the contrary, in 1976 Serb nationalists
tried unsuccessfully to take away Kosovo's ri ht to
represent itself in the federal government.
The largely Albanian leadership in the Kosovo is
acutely aware of Serb sensitivities. Fadil Hodza, the
province's representative on the Yugoslav party presid-
ium and state presidency, has repeatedly denounced
the more extreme excesses of Albanian nationalism,
such as advocating union with Albania. He has
stressed that Kosovo Albanians have opted for Tito's
Yugoslav federation-in principle a community of
equal nations and nationalities. At the local level,
however, Kosovo's Albanian leaders are frank and
assertive in airing the province's economic grievances
and keeping alive hopes of attaining full republic
status.
The Muslim Factor
Given the international resurgence of the Muslim faith
and its recent impact on events in Iran, the Yugoslav
leadership has a new element to ponder. Belgrade's
reactions to periodic foreign allegations about repres-
sion of its 3.8 million Muslims suggest a potential
problem of at least modest proportions.
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According to the Yugoslav Muslim Supreme Body of
Elders, about 1.3 million Albanian and Turkish
Kosovars (about 85 percent of Kosovo's population)
"live in the texture of Muslim culture and
civilization." Another 350,000 Albanian Muslims live
in the neighboring Republic of Macedonia. There are
1.7 million more Muslim-Slavs living in the Republic
of Bosnia-Hercegovina, but they are divided by geog-
raphy, race, and a less tenacious attachment to a
feudal Muslim culture than their Albanian and
Turkish co-believers. For example, blood feuds and
bride-selling are still fairly common in Kosovo, but
have long ago disappeared among the more modern-
ized Muslim-Slavs. While religious attitudes are an 25X1
important factor in the attitude of Albanian Muslims
in Kosovo toward neighboring Albania, which con-
ducts avirulent atheist policy, Kosovo's Albanian
youth appear less attracted than their elders to the
religious aspects of the Muslim heritage. This may
account for the recent stronger "greater Albania"
proclivity among Albanian students in the province.
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(n any future Albanian nationalistic surge in Kosovo,
there probably would be two fringe factions with
opposite orientations. One would probably gravitate
toward such leading Muslim states as Libya, Iraq, and
Kuwait, where most Yugoslav Muslim clergy go for
training. The other group, primarily university stu-
dents would resumably look to Tirane for inspiration.
Poverty, Ineptitude, and Impatience
Belgrade will clearly have to devise a new approach to
Kosovo's economic problems if the province is to be
kept quiet and made loyal to the Yugoslav federal
concept. Historically, the region's economic ills have in
turn been ignored and then actively-often unwisely-
addressed. Until 1956 the local economy was left to its
devices, and Belgrade maintained political order
through unsympathetic, and often brutal, police meas-
ures.
In the 1957-61 period Kosovo began to receive special
economic aid such as that granted to other less
developed Yugoslav regions since 1947, but the flow
was inadequate to meet Kosovo's needs. Following the
purge of Rankovic in 1966, and in keeping with the
subsequent acceleration of economic reforms and
political decentralization throughout Yugoslavia, Bel-
grade tried to tackle Kosovo's economic problems
head-on. The economic keystone of the new approach
was a development program-formalized in 1971-for
all the underdeveloped regions-with special emphasis
on Kosovo. Development funds and social service
subsidies for the program came from taxes levied on
Population Growth Trends
Percent (1947-77)
Yugoslavia ~
~-
Yugoslav Republics and Provinces
the profits of the northern republics at the rate of about Vojvodina
3 percent of their total income. The stated goal was to
help the southern underdeveloped regions catch up
with the northern part of the country. In Kosovo's case,
the program actually delivered $1.5 billion-one-third 25X1:.
of the total supplementary aid package for the south- 5~92~ 5.~9
in the 1970s and substantially raised local expecta-
tions.
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Economic Aid From Northern to
Southern Regions, 1971-75
Percent
Total 2.15 Billion US $
The program has not made progress toward its
ultimate goal of helping Kosovo reach parity with the
developed regions, however. In fact, the province is
falling behind; its per capita GNP in 1947 was 49
percent of the national average, but only 30 percent in
197$. Since 1975, annual economic growth has
averaged only 3 percent in Kosovo-half the rate of the
other less developed regions.
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Responsibility for the failure must be shared by both
Belgrade and Kosovo. The federal investments made in
the province, mainly capital-intensive industrial
projects, were ill-designed to help combat the main
long-range problem-unemployment. Worse, the ini-
tial investment surge ignored the region's inadequate
economic base, for example, roads and communica-
tions, with the result that subsequent investments have
had to be diverted to these necessary, but low return,
projects.
The Kosovars themselves have demonstrated an inabil-
ity to bring new projects on line on schedule or within
estimated costs. Shortages of trained technicians and
managers as well as general educational shortcomings,
exemplified in a 30 percent illiteracy rate, contribute
to this inefficiency. Debts in the province are thus very
high, and one-third of the industrial work force
reportedly is employed by unprofitable enterprises.
This inefficiency feeds the natural resistance of the
northern regions to contribute to the development
fund.
to the majority of Kosovars.
A paucity of comprehensive data makes it difficult to
document the human costs of Kosovo's economic
plight; no gross unemployment figures, for example,
are published. But it is generally conceded that
Kosovo's problem in this critical area is the worst in the
country and is not improving. According to a Yugoslav
journal, only one in 10 Kosovars is employed. Large
families-averaging eight members-limited job op-
portunities, and primitive living conditions contribute
substantially to restiveness. Health programs are far
below the national average, with only one doctor per
2,000 residents and a scarcity of adequate hospital
facilities. As a result, according to the Belgrade daily
Borba even basic social services-such as unemploy-
mentpay, guaranteed health care-cannot be provided
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Southern Regions: Dependence on
Special Development Funds, 1977
(Expressed in percent of total
local investments made)
Bosnia- Montenegro Macedonia Kosovo
Hercegovina
Kosovo's legacy of underdevelopment probably tends
to soften the impact of resentment over unrealized
expectations, particularly among older residents. The
province's population, however, has doubled since the
war; the average age now is in the early 20s. This
youthful majority came of age in an era of great
expectations, which are now perceived as exaggerated.
I'he outlook is bleak; the continuing population boom
leads to doubts that job opportunities will ever expand
fast enough for the unemployment situation to im-
prove. Moreover, it is doubtful that the Kosovars will
ever be able to join the Yugoslav economic main-
stream.
External Factors
Given its problems, Kosovo is clearly ripe for foreign
meddling; this adds yet another dimension to
Yugoslavia's problem in holding on to the area and
better integrating its people into a largely Slavic
society.
Albanian Attitudes. Privately viewing Kosovo as a part
of Albania only temporarily under Yugoslav control,
the Albanian regime's public stand is one of quiet
watching and waiting. Disclaiming any intention of
interfering in Yugoslav internal affairs, Enver Hoxha's
leadership, nonetheless, openly asserts its right to
watch over the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia.
Tirane expresses particular concern about the
Since the late 1960s--specifically since the 196$
Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia led to a
moderation of Albania's most rabid anti-Yugoslav
policies-Tirane has developed numerous cultural and
economic contacts with Kosovo. The effectiveness of
these exchanges, designed to encourage Albanian
nationalism and to improve Albania's image in the
province, is tempered by Albania's economic back-
wardness, even compared with Kosovo. Ina surpris-
inglycandid conversation with a Western diplomat last
December, Albanian- foreign Minister Nesti Nase
suggested that Albania's "natural and permanent"
aim is to reunite all Albanians into one state. Nose's
comments may be a good indication that Tirane hopes
to take advantage of the post-Tito era-should the
Yugoslav federation begin to come apart-to achieve a
greater Albania. The receptivity of some Kosovars to
this line stems not only from common nationality, but
also from an expectation that, no matter how back-
ward they may be in Yugoslav terms, they would be
considered. advanced in a greater Albania.
Soviet Attitudes. There are also opportunities for
Soviet meddling in Ke}sovo. A number of those arrested
by Yugoslav officials in the April 1974 pro-Soviet
party conspiracy were: Serbs from Kosovo. Since that
time, provincial party leaders have been vocal in
warning against the activities of unspecified foreign
intelligence services. Their comments clearly imply
concern over Albanian and Soviet activity.
The indictment against cominformist leader Vladimir
Dapcevic-arrested iai 1976-accused him of planning
to detach parts of Kosovo and Macedonia from
Yugoslavia and give them to Albania. Earlier Soviet
support for Dapcevic and his followers after they had
originally fled Yugoslavia in 1958-initially to Alba-
nia and from there eventually to the USSR-is well
documented. Now, in the wake of the Sino-Albanian
rift, Moscow has renewed overtures toward Tirane. No
matter how remote rapprochement between the two
may be, Belgrade sees a renewed threat of Soviet-
Albanian collusion to be at Yugoslavia's expense.
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