THE VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP AND INDOCHINA CRISIS OF 1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A001000010001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1979
• Content Type: PAPER

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The Vietnamese Leadership and
The Indochina Crisis of.1979
Secret
PA 7c-10205
May 979
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 Foreign
Assessment
Center
The Vietnamese Leadership and
The Indochina Crisis of 1979
An Intelligence Assessment
Information as of 30 April 1979 has been used
in preparing this report.
The author of this paper isi East
Asia-Pacific Division, Office of Political Analysis.
It has been coordinated with the National Intel-
ligence Officer for East Asia-Pacific. Comments and
queries are welcome and should be addressed to
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Key Judgments
The Vietnamese Leadership and
The Indochina Crisis of 1979
Union-have tested the cohesiveness of the leadership once again.
insurgency in Kampuchea, and an increased dependence on the Soviet
Over the last half century, Vietnamese leaders have displayed a remarkable
ability to absorb reverses, adjust course, and push on toward their goals;
purges at the Politburo level are rare in Vietnam. Although little is known
about the policy preferences of individual leaders, their interpersonal
relations, or how they make decisions, we can surmise that the foreign policy
reverses of the last 18 months-including a war with China, a draining
may still believe it can succeed in both cases.
We have no evidence at present, however, that the Vietnamese leadership
has been fragmented by the latest experience. While there may be some
reordering of influence among individual Politburo members, it is impossi-
ble to say when, or even if, major changes in the leadership will occur. Much
will depend on Hanoi's ability to stick to its present course in Kampuchea
and on defusing its explosive relationship with China. At this point, Hanoi
debate may be continuing.
During the months before Hanoi's invasion of Kampuchea in December
1978 the leadership seemed to share a general consensus on policy toward
Phnom Penh. We have no good evidence that anyone in Hanoi argued for
trimming; foreign policy goals and seeking an accommodation with China.
What debate there has been over foreign policy seems to have turned on
relations with the Soviet Union. There is some evidence to suggest this
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The Vietnamese Leadership and
In the past 18 months the Vietnamese leadership has
made a number of decisions that have produced an
almost unbroken string of foreign policy reverses.
Hanoi is deeply involved in a bitter war in Kampuchea
that has become more costly and protracted than
Vietnam expected. A budding relationship with the
United States has withered. The Vietnamese improved
relations with the Soviet Union only to weaken their
ties with non-Communist aid donors and their South-
east Asian neighbors, who were beginning to feel more
comfortable with Vietnam. Finally, a strained relation-
ship with China has deteriorated into war. Many other
leaderships would be torn apart by such events.
In Vietnam's case, however, we cannot easily predict
such a development; although the Vietnamese Com-
munist Party has been led by essentially the same
group of men for 50 years, we know very little about
them. They are most often discussed as a group, and
individual policy preferences, interpersonal relations,
and the mechanics of decisionmaking are imperfectly
understood. Conventional wisdom-based largely on
repetition and some imaginative tea leaf reading-
divides the leadership into various overlapping groups:
a pro-Soviet faction, a pro-Chinese faction; pragma-
tists, ideologues; northerners and southerners. Al-
though there seem to be elements of truth in such
formulas, none is totally satisfactory.
The Vietnamese leadership is not a total enigma,
however. Certain qualities common in first-generation
revolutionaries have long been associated with it. It has
shown itself to be dedicated to the point of being single
minded, patient, disciplined, resourceful, and inten-
sively nationalistic. Perhaps more than anything else, it
has demonstrated an ability to absorb reverses, adjust
its course, and proceed toward its goal; purges at the
Politburo level are rare in Vietnam.
Individual leaders, however, have seen their influence
wax and wane as a result of wrong decisions. While it is
conceivable that Vietnam's. leadership was united in
making the decisions of the last 18 months-as some
veteran observers in Hanoi claim-it is more likely
that some in the leadership are in a position to ascribe
blame to others and thus reap personal benefit from
the nation's setbacks. It is difficult to make statements
about Vietnamese decisionmaking with confidence,
but it is possible to build a circumstantial case and to
speculate from it. What follows, then, is an effort to
piece together how some of the fateful decisions came
about, how they are related, and to speculate on the
role of the major actors, and the possible effect of that
role on their political standing. 25X1
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Ten men seem to have been most actively involved in
the foreign policy decisions of the last 18 months:
Party Leaders
Le Duan, 72, is Secretary General of the Vietnamese
Communist Party and first among equals. Duan is
generally regarded as more versed in internal affairs,
and has traveled little outside the Communist world.
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Truong Chinh, 71, is the second-ranking Politburo
member and one of the party's leading theoreticians.
Chinh, doctrinaire and inflexible, is thought to be anti-
Western and anti-Soviet. Chinh has often been charac-
terized as pro-Chinese, but it is more accurate to 25X1
regard him as a devotee of Maoist ideology than as an
advocate of a political alliance with Beijing. Like all
Vietnamese leaders, he is intensely nationalistic.
Pharr Van Dong, 73, is Premier and a member of the
Politburo. Dong, who has had extensive contacts with
foreigners, is regarded as Chinh's opposite-flexible
and pragmatic.
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Pharr Hung, 67, Politburo member and an economic
and agrarian specialist, may have helped organize
Hanoi's puppet regime in Kampuchea--a role similar
to the one he had in South Vietnam during the war.
Le Due Tho, 69, is a Politburo member and head of the
party's Organization Department. Tho also allegedly
played a major role in setting up the puppet regime in
Phnom Penh, and may head a Vietnamese committee
that oversees assistance to Kampuchea.
Military Leaders
Vo Nguyen Giap, 67, is a Politburo member and holds
the positions of Minister of National Defense and Vice
Premier. Giap is thought to be an opponent of Truong
Chinh. General Giap has been described as very anti-
Western. Despite his defense portfolio, he no longer
seems to be the power he once was in either the party or
Van Tien Dung, 62, is a Politburo member and Chief
of Staff. Dung, who planned the final offensive against
South Vietnam, may be the most influential military
Foreign Policy Technicians
Nguyen Duy Trinh, 67, is a Politburo member and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Trinh is regarded by.some
as having little influence and being nearly senile.
Nguyen Co Thach, 58, is a Central Committee
member and a Vice Foreign Minister. One of Viet-
nam's most capable diplomats, Thach is regarded by
some as the real power in the Ministry of Foreign
Phan Hien, 60, is a Vice Foreign Minister. I-Iien seems
to have responsibility in the Ministry for managing
relations with China, Kampuchea, and non-Commu-
nist Southeast Asia. He apparently sought to negotiate
a settlement with the Pol Pot government in Phnom
Penh before Vietnam's massive invasion, and also led
Vietnam's delegation to the border talks with China.
I
Circumstantial evidence suggests there may have been
a general consensus in the leadership on Kampuchean
policy, at least through the initial stage of the
December 1978 offensive. Certainly the policy seems
to have evolved slowly and in increments. Before
making the decision in midsummer 1978 to launch a
major offensive in Kampuchea, Hanoi had tried to
resolve its border problems with Phnom Penh through
private talks. When that failed it sought Chinese
assistance, which was either refused or ineffective.
Hanoi then launched a punitive strike in December
1977 in a final effort to bring Phnom Penh to its senses.
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December 1978 whatever misgivings may have existed
about using greater force against Kampuchea seem to
have centered on potential world reaction, not on the
necessity of the military operation or its likelihood of
success. the Foreign Ministry as 25X1
being particularly concerned about potential reaction
abroad. Vice Foreign Minister Thach reportedly fret-
ted over the effect on Western sources of aid, while
some midlevel Foreign Ministry officials agonized over
the reaction in non-Communist Southeast Asia. Any-
one who doubted the wisdom of the military action
itself probably was not in a position to protest too
vigorously. After all, alternate solutions
given a chance and they had failed.
The initial disposition of Hanoi's forces, comments by
a senior Soviet official, and Hanoi's failure to prepare a
Khmer front group sufficiently large to administer the
entire country all suggest that the decision to push the
offensive across the Mekong and to go for a knockout
blow in Kampuchea was not made until about a week
after the invasion was launched.
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fThe lack of
resistance encountered by Vietnamese orces in the
first days of the invasion may have encouraged Hanoi
to go all out. It may have drawn an erroneous parallel
to the Easter offensive of 1975, which precipitated the
collapse of the South Vietnamese Government after
beginning as a major but limited campaign.
opening to the West at the possible expense of better
relations with Moscow. Relations with China had
begun to deteriorate even before the war ended; with
its termination, competing regional interests that had
been submerged came to the forefront, most notably in
Kampuchea. Although we can surmise that the entire
Vietnamese leadership probably felt it was in the
country's best interests to keep relations from deterio-
rating further, we have no real evidence that anyone in
Hanoi was arguing for trimming Vietnam's ambitions
and accommodating Beijing. Indeed, the Chinese
themselves apparently believed that Vietnamese lead-
ers who had once been sympathetic, including Dong,
Dung, and economic experts and Politburo members
Le Thanh Nghi and Do Muoi, turned cold after 1975.
Certainly China-torn by its own internal political
problems at that time---had less to offer of what
Vietnam needed most, massive reconstruction aid,
than either the Soviet Union or the West. The latter
two also had the advantage in Vietnam's view of
having less at stake in the region and of being farther
away than China, thus probably being less willing and
We have almost no information on how the top
leadership lined up on thedecision to go all out in
Kampuchea; it is conceivable the Politburo was united.
There is some reason to believe, however, that at least
the leaders immediately below the top were divided on
the issue. The Foreign Ministry, which was concerned
about the consequences of a limited invasion, may well
have had strong reservations about the wisdom of
crossing the Mekong. The Ministry of Defense,
had favored strong action all along, and under the
circumstances-an apparent collapse of Pol Pot's
forces-it seems likely it would have pushed for an all-
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The actual architect of the drive may have been Chief
of Staff Van Tien Dung. He reportedly made regular
visits to the Vietnamese-Kampuchean border area in
the weeks before the invasion and would seem to be the
logical choice for overall command in view of his
paramount role in planning the final campaign against
South Vietnam. Dung-perhaps envisaging a repeti-
tion of his earlier success-may have argued for going
all the way. Dung's execution of the campaign may
leave him vulnerable to criticism, i egardless of where
he lined up on the issue of an all-out offensive, if Hanoi
becomes bogged down in a war in Kampuchea it
cannot win.
Unlike the policy for relations with Kampuchea, how
best to maneuver within the Sino-Soviet-US triangle
has been a contentious issue for some time. It seems,
however, that since the end of the Vietnam war in 1975
the issue has been not whether to tilt toward Mosow or
Beijing, but rather how vigorously to pursue an
able to pressure Hanoi.
Premier Pham Van Dung seems to have had a great
deal of personal prestige invested in overtures to the
West. His trip to Europe in April 1977 to raise aid may
not have had the full support of the Politburo.
Circumstantial evidence suggests both Le Duan and
Truong Chinh had reservations about it, and the Soviet
Union apparently lobbied against it. Perhaps unfortu-
nately for Dong, the trip seems to have produced less
aid than the Vietnamese had hoped. Dong also may
have suffered when efforts to improve relations with
the United States came to nought last fall even after
Hanoi had reversed its earlier position and dropped all
preconditions for normalization, principally US aid.
Dong favored greater flexibility on this issue,
while uan and Chinh were hardliners on the aid
Perhaps not surprisingly then, rumors of Dong's
political eclipse were widespread in Hanoi during
1978. Most versions held he would be moved up to a
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largely ceremonial post to coincide with the promulga-
tion of a new constitution, an event that is yet to occur.
According to some accounts, Dong would then be
replaced as Premier by Giap, widely believed to be a
rival of Dong. While such stories may not be entirely
accurate, they may reflect a loss of prestige and
influence.
Dong's personal influence aside, by early 1978 veteran
observers in Hanoi and some Vietnamese officials
abroad believed Duan, Giap, and Le Due Tho, the
advocates of a harder line toward the West and the
figures most inclined to see the Soviet Union as
Vietnam's logical partner, had increased their influ-
ence. The cause-and-effect relationship is unclear, but
their ascendancy coincided with a rapid deterioration
in relations with China and a narrowing of the options
available to Hanoi other than closer relations with
Moscow. It was presumably under the direction of
these men that ties with Moscow expanded rapidly
during the summer and fall. Vietnam became a full-
fledged member of CEMA (Council for Economic
Assistance) in July, and in November Le Duan signed
a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in Moscow that
linked the signatories as never before.
There is some evidence that Dong and Trinh, in
particular, continued to have reservations about the
wisdom of moving so close to the Soviet Union. Dong
reportedly was upset, too, by the timing; of the treaty
signing. It came right on the heels of his swing through
non-Communist Southeast Asia, during which he
seems to have had some marginal success in allaying
the suspicions of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) that Hanoi was Moscow's cat's-
paw, as Beijing had been charging. Much of the good
will created by Dong's trip dissipated with the treaty.
Trinh was concerned that the pact would have a
negative impact on non-Communist aid donors, and
indeed, several announced they would review their
assistance programs in light of the treaty. Truong
Chinh, too, may have been less than enthusiastic about
the new relationship with the Soviet Union. He
reportedly had been unhappy with the drift toward the
Soviets since 1976.
Although the external threat probably has the immedi-
ate effect of drawing the leadership closer together, the
Chinese invasion almost certainly exacerbated what-
ever undercurrents of discord may be present as well. It
is impossible to gauge with any certainty how wide-
spread or significant such resentment may be, and
indeed, the very lack of other attractive options
probably serves as a check on polarization. Still,
muttering about the wisdom of a foreign policy that
leads to such unpleasant consequences seems now more
evident. Some middle-level Vietnamese officials seem
disillusioned that the treaty with Moscow did not
prevent the Chinese strike. Others are upset that the
Soviet Union did not use force along the Sino-Soviet
border to demonstrate its support for Hanoi. Both
Moscow and Hanoi seem aware of these feelings, and
both have attempted to defend Soviet actions during
the crisis. Hanoi media have also made an effort to sell
the xenophobic Vietnamese man in the street on the
value of the relationship with the Soviets. More 25X1
sophisticated audiences are getting similar treatment.
Nonetheless, the situation does not seem to be at a
point as yet where there will be another shift in
influence on the Politburo and an accompanying
adjustment in policy. Indeed, the foreign policy line set
last year seems to be hardening. The relationship with
Moscow is certainly as close if not closer than before
the Chinese invasion. Hanoi's decision in early April to
drop its preconditions for border talks with Beijing
cannot be taken as a sign Vietnam is ready to
capitulate to China or even to begin serious discussion
of their differences. The Vietnamese have in the past
used talks as a propaganda forum and as a means of
buying time while they upgrade their defenses.
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Perhaps most importantly, it is not yet certain whether
Vietnam's policy in Kampuchea has come a cropper.
While things clearly are not going as Hanoi planned,
Vietnam still feels it is in a position to win and is
vigorously pushing its effort there. Any fundamental
reversal in policy and power relationships among
individual leaders will probably require an assessment
in Hanoi that its situation in Kampuchea is hopeless.
It is impossible to predict how soon changes in the
leadership might occur or even if they will. Over the
years Vietnamese leaders have shown a remarkable
ability to adjust policy, close ranks, and push on even
after the bitterest disputes. The fortunes of individuals
have waxed and waned but there have not been
wholesale purges at the top. Even major blunders have
not ended careers as they would have in other
Communist countries. Truong Chinh is the classic
example. He was the author of an agrarian reform
program in the early 1950s that was so ill-conceived
that it sparked a revolt in Ho Chin Minh's home
province; yet, Chinh survived and after a period in
decline rose again to his present number-two position
in the leadership. Given the advanced age and ill health
of the Vietnamese leadership, it may well be that time
will have a bigger role in remaking the Politburo than
any in-house political wars.
Nonetheless, some subtle reordering of influence
among individual Politburo members may be begin-
ning. The best evidence, as usual, is tenuous and
negative-namely, the apparent drop off in rumors
about Dong's decline. Given Vietnam's difficult eco-
nomic and military position as a result of the policies of
the past year, it is possible to speculate that if the war
in Kampuchea drags on and the relationship with the
Soviet Union results in more frequent and less palat-
able demands on Hanoi by Moscow, the Vietnamese
leadership might eventually conclude it is in its best
interest to reach a modus vivendi with Beijing. It is
possible that men like Duan, Giap, Tho, and Dung will
become less influential as a result, while Dong, Trinh,
Hien, Trach, and Chinh will be in a position to benefit.
There is an additional complicating factor, however,
namely that Dong and the others are themselves open
to criticism on other counts.
The Vietnamese are very good at masking debate
within the leadership, and we are unlikely to see many
signs of disagreement or maneuvering. Our best
evidence that the political balance in the Politburo has
changed is most likely to come after the fact-with
signposts such as evidence of a cooling in relations with
the Soviet Union, a retrenchment in Kampuchea, a
relaxation in the military posture along the Chinese
border, or a clear shift away from the strident anti-
Beijing propaganda signaling a new line of march in
Hanoi.l
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