SE-36: SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US THROUGH MID-1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 3, 1953
• Content Type: MF

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S.cwitv Inforrnafion
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Mlitiator Attaak on the US
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SECURITI INFORMATION
11,6900800050010-6
owsE-36
Subjects Soviet Capabilities for an Attack on
the United States before Mid-1955
Board Members Associated:
IAC directs
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Requested by ICIS
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sled personnel and subjeCt The w o e enter-
. prise to vely gat security hazards.
28. A variety of forms of clandestine delivery
suggest themselves. Atomic weapons could
be delivered by disguised TU-4 type aircraft,
could be detonated in the hold of a merchant
ship or sown as underwater mines. Either
components or assembled weapons could be
smuggled in under diplomatic immunity,
put ashore by submarines, smuggled across
land borders, introduced through normal im-
port channels, or even introduced as bonded
merchandise awaiting transshipment. The
selection of the method of introduction, and of
methods of assembly and transport to point of
detonation, presumably would be made ac-
cording to the objective desired and the risk
of detection which the Soviets were willing to
assume. It is not considered possible that the
(USSR could surmount the security and tech-
nical problems involved in delivering a large
number of atomic weapons against the US by
clandestine means. We have no evidence to
indicate whether or not the USSR has taken 1
steps toward planning any methods of clan-
destine delivery.
29. Biological Weapons: Some BW agents are
peculiarly adaptable to clandestine introduc-
tion. The introduction of small amounts of
7
BW agents would be difficult to detect or iden-
tify as to source, but Soviet operatives would
be required for their dissemination. A large
number of people would be required for ex-
tensive dissemination of BW agents, and So-
viet security considerations would be a limit-
ing factor in the scale and timing of such an
attack.
30. Chemical Weapons: CW agents are not
easily adaptable to clandestine use. In addi-
tion to the limitations noted above as ap-
plicable to BW attack, CW agents are easily
identifiable by their immediate effects and it
probably would not be feasible to build up
sufficient supplies or to procure the means
clandestinely for their dissemination against
large population centers. The most prac-
ticable use would be against personnel in key
installations, but even this would be difficult.
We have no evidence to indicate whether or
not the USSR is developing the means for the
clandestine delivery of chemical weapons.
ATTACK ON THE US WITH CONVENTIONAL
NAVAL AND AIRBORNE FORCES
Conventional Naval Attack
31. Soviet capabilities for attacking the US
with naval forces employing conventional
armament are low. The Soviet surface fleet
is geographically divided, lacks advance bases,
has limited operational experience, and does
not possess a shipborne air arm. Its minor
combatant vessels, including amphibious
types, are entirely unsuited for transoceanic
attack. The Soviet merchant marine, which
would be called upon to provide the lift, could
not be developed into an efficient auxiliary
element to amphibious operations on any sig-
nificant scale. The only substantial naval
threat to the US which the USSR could mus-
ter would be that of its submarine force. In
addition to its potential in connection with
the delivery of mass destruction weapons, the
submarine force could, at least in the initial
phases of a conflict, inflict serious damage on
US overseas communications and carry out
offensive mining in the shipping approaches
to principal US harbors. It is expected that
during the period of this estimate the sub-
marine force will be enlarged and improved by
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the introduction of additional numbers of im-
proved ocean patrol types, by the progressive
modernization of existing types, and by the
possible adaptation of submarines to missile
launching.
Airborne Attack
32. Soviet capabilities for airborne attack
upon the continental US (except Alaska) are
also very limited. TU-4's could be adapted
for troop-carrying service and operate within
the same limits and under the same conditions
as the TU-4 bomber. We have no evidence
to indicate whether or not the USSR has made
any plans for the dropping of airborne forces
in the US, but the USSR could, if it chose,
drop specially trained assault and sabotage
forces for attack upon important but difficult
bombing targets.
PART II
CERTAIN FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OF
THE FOREGOING CAPABILITIES ASSUMING A SOVIET
DECISION TO ATTACK THE U.S.
33. The Soviet rulers would expect a direct
attack on the United States to precipitate
general war. In such a war the Soviet rulers
would expect to have an initial preponderance
of military power on the Eurasian continent,
but in their attack upon the continental US
would be concerned to prevent: (a) US re-
taliatory air attack on the Soviet Union with
weapons of mass destruction; (b) mobilization
of the superior war potential of the Western
allies, particularly that of the United States;
and (c) US reinforcement of anti-Soviet forces
in Eurasia.
34, The Soviet rulers have demonstrated their
sensitivity to the danger of US air attack with
weapons of mass destruction by the high pri-
ority which they have given to the develop-
ment of defenses against such an attack.
Despite the substantial progress already
achieved in building up their defenses, it is un-
likely that they would regard their defensive
capabilities as adequate to prevent substantial
numbers of attacking aircraft from reaching
strategic targets in the USSR. It is likely,
therefore, that in initiating atomic warfare
the USSR would be concerned: (a) swiftly to
destroy or cripple US capabilities for retalia-
tion in kind, with particular reference to SAC
continental and overseas bases; (b) to deliver
such an attack on industrial and psychological
targets in the United States as would prevent,
or at least hinder, the mobilization of the US
war potential; and (c) to retain the means to
counter any US reinforcement of Eurasia.
35. As among the available forces and weap-
ons for attacking the continental US, the
USSR's highest capability lies in open mili-
tary attack with atomic bombs delivered by
TU-4 type aircraft, for the following reasons:
a. The low capabilities of conventional
naval forces and airborne forces.
b. The security and technical difficulties in-
herent in the delivery of large numbers of
atomic weapons by clandestine means, par-
ticularly in inland areas.
c. Other methods of delivery of atomic
weapons are insufficiently developed for large-
scale use.
d. Other mass destruction weapons are in-
sufficiently developed or subject to other hand-
icaps in their large-scale use.
36. The Soviet rulers might, however, employ
other methods of attacking the US concur-
rently with or immediately following an open
and direct atomic attack. In the cases of
guided missiles, airborne attack, submarine
bombardment, and biological warfare, Soviet
capabilities at best appear to be severely
limited. They have a greater capability for
chemical attack in connection with, or sub-
sequent to, atomic bombing.
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37. Large-scale clandestine attack, because of
the security difficulties inherent in such action
and because of the obstacles to coordinating
its timing with that of overt attack from the
outside, is unlikely to be used immediately
preceding or concurrent with an overt attack.
Clandestine attack on a small scale, in the
form of sabotage or biological warfare, might
occur at any time, and even without an overt
attack ever being launched. Subsequent to
an overt attack, clandestine attack in any
form could be expected to the maximum prac-
ticable extent.
38. We believe that the considerations affect-
ing Soviet employment of their capabilities
will remain throughout this period essentially
the same as those outlined above.
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