The Effect of the Past Month's Events on North Vietnamese Military Capabilities

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000300190002-0
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• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 8, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Intelligence Memorandum
The Effect of the Past Month's Events
on North Vietnamese Military Capabilities
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
8 June 1972
THE EFFECT OF THE PAST MONTH'S EVENTS
ON NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY CAPABILITIES
1. This memorandum addresses two related topics: (1) the
capability of the Communists to continue their offensive in
South Vietnam during the next one or two months, and (2) the
impact on Hanoi's capabilities -- both in the short and long
term -- of the US interdiction effort in North Vietnam. The first
section of the memorandum deals mainly with the Communists'
current manpower and logistic situation in South Vietnam and
their prospects for the immediate future. The second section
deals with the longer range implications of the US interdiction
effort, both as it affects the movement of supplies into and
through North Vietnam and its impact on the economy.
2. The current offensive in South Vietnam has cost Hanoi
dearly in military casualties and supplies expended or destroyed.
The drain on North Vietnam's manpower pool has undoubtedly been
heavier than at any time since 1968. Hanoi's greatest manpower
problem is not the simple magnitude of its losses, but the
heavy casualties sustained among the officer and cadre ranks,
losses that cannot quickly be made good by crash training
efforts. Since the end of March this year the North Vietnamese
have expended arms, ammunition, and other military equipment
at rates which at times have exceeded even the high levels
of the 1968 Tet offensive. The enemy already faces serious
replacement problems with some types of ordnance. In addition,
with. the onset of the wet season, his resupply problem in
general will become increasingly difficult in all areas of
South Vietnam other than northern Military Region (MR) 1.
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3. It is still too early to make any comprehensive
judgments about the effects on North Vietnam's longer term
capabilities of the US interdiction program. It is clear
that the volume of supplies moving into North Vietnam is
substantially below the levels being maintained prior to
the mining of Haiphong. There are indications that some
supplies are continuing to move into North Vietnam on the
overland routes from the People's Republic of China (PRC).
It is impossible to determine either the composition or the
volume of these overland movements, but there is evidence
that at least a part of them are the essentials of war --
ordnance and petroleum.
4. Notwithstanding these constraints, if North Vietnam
makes the political decision to do so, it has the ability
to prosecute its offensive in South Vietnam for the next
several months at very high levels of activity in MR 1 and
at substantial levels in other areas. (The timing of successive
waves of attacks and their intensity, of course, may vary
markedly from region to region.) This judgment is based both
on our assessment of the enemy's force in being in South
Vietnam and Cambodia -- its present combat readiness and
recuperability -- and on our assessment of the enemy's continuing
logistical preparations, including stock positioning in
forward base areas. The fact that the enemy continues to
carry out these preparations on a crash basis strongly suggests
that he has already taken the decision to engage in a high
level of combat in coming weeks.
5. The current US mining and bombing campaign has exacted
a heavy toll from North Vietnam in imports foregone and major
disruptions inflicted on its transportation system. There
have also been some disruptions to North Vietnam's economy.
None of these effects, however, has yet impinged in a
significant way on North Vietnam's raw capabilities to continue
the war in the South in the next one or two months. The
military supplies necessary for the current offensive in
this near-term time frame were almost certainly well out of
rear base areas before the US interdiction effort was
started.
6. Total imports into North Vietnam last year were on the
order of 2.5 million tons, about 90% of which came in by sea.
This total -- a daily average of 6,800 tons -- would place
a very great burden on North Vietnam's transport system were
Hanoi to attempt (and its Communist allies agree) to bring
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in this volume of imports largely by overland routes. If
Hanoi introduces a rigorous program of austerity in its
civilian consumption,, by cutting back or even eliminating some
agricultural and industrial imports, the total import require-
ments could be cut by around 50% in terms of tonnage. We es-
timate that this reduced level of imports would be adequate
(psychological factors aside) to meet minimum civilian needs
in the North and to satisfy.. the military requirements for con-
tinuing main force warfare in the South.
7. Whether even such a reduced level of imports could be
achieved in the face of the heavy US bombing program remains to
be seen. Historical experience would suggest that a determined
enemy, by marshalling the manpower to rebuild bridges, lay out
bypasses, and repair roads on a round-the-clock basis, could con-
tinue to move supplies in quantities sufficient to carry on the
war effort. On the other hand, in the 1965-68 period of heavy
bombing, the principal North Vietnamese port of Haiphong remained
open and North Vietnam was fighting a type of war in South Vietnam
that required less heavy equipment and significantly less petroleum.
In addition, the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville was open to the
Communists, and a large portion of Communist military supplies for
the southern half of South Vietnam came through this port. In
that earlier period, North Vietnam also had access to substantial
amounts of Chinese labor, which contributed greatly to the effort
to keep overland routes open. In the past month, only limited
evidence has appeared of efforts by the North Vietnamese themselves
to repair damaged railways and roads, and we have no firm evidence
yet as to the Chinese attitude toward providing manpower assistance
again for this purpose.
8. It will clearly be much more difficult than it was in
the 1965-68 period for Hanoi to meet, over the longer term, the
continued military requirements for the kind of war it is now
fighting. Until we have accumulated evidence for at least
another month or two of what is actually happening in the North
Vietnamese land transport network, however, any judgment con-
cerning the degree to which Hanoi will be able to overcome the
obstacles it now faces is premature. We also need evidence,
which only time will give us, on the scope and type of assistance
that the Soviet Union and the PRC will provide to Hanoi in the
present situation and on the extent of cooperation between these
two powers in providing assistance.
9. Petroleum is probably the most important commodity
in Hanoi's logistical equation. The type of war the North
Vietnamese are now fighting and their entire logistical
apparatus are both tied to petroleum. Military requirements
at the present level of activity probably amount to about
120,000 tons of petroleum annually. As of 8 June 1972, following
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the first month of the current US bombing effort against
petroleum storage facilities, North Vietnam's petroleum
stocks for all purposes were probably sufficient for about
ten weeks. Under a program of strict austerity in the
civilian sector, present stocks might be stretched to last
several weeks longer. There are indications that some
petroleum shipments are being made overland, but it is
doubtful that any major replenishment of stocks has yet
been accomplished. Both the USSR and China have sufficient
petroleum to meet North Vietnam's. needs -- and the movement
of this petroleum through China to the North Vietnam border
would pose no insurmountable logistical burden. The current
construction of a pipeline from the vicinity of Hai Duong,
east of Hanoi, in the direction of China may indicate that
some decisions have been made by the PRC and North Vietnam
to facilitate petroleum shipments. Beyond this, however,
there is no hard evidence of how -- or to what extent -- Hanoi's
allies intend to meet North Vietnam's needs for petroleum or
of how successful Hanoi will be in moving petroleum onward
from the Chinese border.
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North Vietnam's Offensive Capabilities Over the
Next Two Months
Manpower
10. Thus far during the enemy's 1972 offensive, manpower
losses have been large and have clearly affected the combat
capability of some units. Nevertheless, Hanoi still has the
capability to engage in large-scale main force offensive
actions and almost certainly intends to do so. For the most
part, lulls in activity so far during the campaign probably
reflect requirements to regenerate battered units and prepare
battlefields with engineering works and logistics. These
activities continue apace.
11. It is difficult to determine the enemy's aggregate
manpower position in the midst of any large campaign, but
many of this season's infiltrees have probably already been
absorbed by logistics, engineering, and other rear service
functions, as well as by combat force requirements. In
addition, the heavy fighting has had adverse effects on many
units. Many seasoned officers and cadre have been killed
during this offensive, and it will be difficult to integrate
green troops into combat units. The enemy's artillery
regiments are taking a heavy pounding, and his armored forces
have been seriously depleted. These problems will reduce the
enemy's offensive punch, but the evidence is fairly clear
that they will not deter him from undertaking new offensive
operations in the near future. So far, the duration of
intensive fighting has not been long for most units, and our
evidence on infiltration indicates that sufficient replacements
are available in most areas to support further action over
at least the next two months or so even with casualty rates
close to those of the April-May period.
Personnel Infiltration
12. Thus far, Hanoi has dispatched at least 120,000 men
to the southern war zones during the current infiltration
cycle (1 September 1971 through early June 1972). This
compares with about 106,000 men from September through the
end of June a year earlier. The number of infiltration starts
detected in April and May 1972 was low, and there have been
no starts detected so far in June. This season's pattern of
infiltration activity is typical of that experienced since
1968, with high rates of infiltration during the period
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September through March, then a tapering off to very low
rates by June. One major difference between personnel movements
this season and those in the previous three years has been
the large-scale deployment of main forces directly across the
DMZ. We cannot estimate the number of infiltrators who have
come across the DMZ outside of organized units, and they
are not included in our figures. It is entirely possible that
personnel could continue to move directly across the DMZ
without being detected in infiltration communications in the
months to come.
13. Infiltration starts during the 1970-71 and 1971-72
infiltration cycles by destination are shown in the tabulation
below:
1970-71
(Sep - Jun)
1971-72
(Sep - Early Jun)
Tri-Thien-Hue
6,000
20,000a
MR 5
14,200
17,000
B-3 Front
14,500
30,000b
MRs 3 and 4 and
Cambodia
COSVN
45,000
38,000
Southern Laos
26,500
14,000
Total
106,200
119,000
a. This figure does not include all troops who moved directly across
the DMZ.
b. The estimate of personnel moving to the B-3 Front has been reduced
from our earlier figures as a result of a re-analysis of enemy
communications.
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14. Our view of the enemy's manpower situation and current
capabilities by military region is developed in the following
paragraphs. Throughout the offensive, our data on personnel
losses have been very soft because of the lack of continuity
in field reporting and the combat circumstances surrounding
the tactical situation. In each military region, however,
we have made a "best judgment" on losses and their probable
effect on combat capabilities. Our definition of losses
includes personnel seriously wounded as well as killed.
Military Region 1
15. In MR 1 and the adjacent areas of Quang Binh Province
in North Vietnam, we estimate that the North Vietnamese have
lost some 20,000 troops this year. Infiltration has probably
not been sufficient to make up all these losses and therefore
some erosion in the strength of combat personnel has occurred
since the offensive commenced.
16. In spite of these losses, we estimate that the North
Vietnamese will be capable of sustaining major attacks throughout
MR 1 and particularly in the Hue area over the next 30 days.
Because of the relatively tight manpower situation, and the
additional casualties that would be incurred in such a major
push, the North Vietnamese would require additional manpower
later in the summer to conduct a second major offensive of
the same magnitude. Moreover, because the dry season in MR 1
continues through September and there are short lines of
communication through the DMZ, the North Vietnamese could
begin a new infiltration cycle at any time.
17. Armored forces will continue to be deployed in MR 1
for the remainder of the dry season and will play a key combat
role in future major offensive activity. However, their
combat effectiveness will be reduced because of the high
losses these units have experienced since the offensive began
and the combination of poorly coordinated combat tactics and
the effective deployment of Allied anti-tank weapons.
18. At present, in the vicinity of Hue the North Vietnamese
have massed forces including infantry, armor, and artillery
regiments of the 325th, 324B, 308th, and 304th NVA Divisions,
as well as units from the B-5/70 Front and the Tri-Thien-Hue
Region. Elements of four divisions are located north and west
of Hue City while the other units are located to the south and
west. Since early May 1972, combat near Hue has been at a
relatively low level, characterized by limited offensive forays
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by Vietnamese Marines behind North Vietnamese defense lines
and one major assault -- which was repulsed -- by North Vietnamese
forces against the South Vietnamese Marines. A large volume of
evidence presently indicates that the North Vietnamese plan to
launch larger scale attacks in the near future.
19. In southern MR 1, the North Vietnamese have the
equivalent of one infantry division operating in the Quang
Nam/Quang Tin Province border area. North Vietnamese strategy
in the southern three provinces of MR 1 -- Quang Nam, Quang
Tin, and Quang Ngai -- has been characterized by the deployment
of main and local forces near district capitals in an attempt
to isolate GVN forces in the towns and permit the Communists
to strengthen their position in the countryside. The success
of the enemy's campaign in southern MR 1, will depend at least
in part on the outcome of the battle for Hue.
Military Region 2
20. During the past two months, Communist forces in MR 2
have sustained heavy casualties in their attempts to drive
government forces from Kontum Province in the western highlands
and to take over Binh Dinh Province along the coast. In Kontum,
the enemy deployed nine infantry regiments (three of the 320th
NVA Division, two of the 2nd NVA Division, and four of the
B-3 Front), two artillery regiments, one armor regiment, and
several local force battalions to overrun several government
outposts and to attack Kontum City, the provincial capital.
In Binh Dinh the Communists used two regiments of the 3rd NVA
Division to take control of the three northern districts in the
province and used the remaining regiment in an attempt to cut
east-west Route 19 at An Khe Pass. With the exception of the
battles in northern Binh Dinh and at Tan Canh and Dak To in
Kontum, the ARVN, extensively supported by US air power, has
fought hard against the enemy thrusts. The heavy fighting in
MR 2 thus far has probably cost the enemy about 10,000 men
in losses, as well as a substantial number of his tanks in
this region.
21. Almost all of this season's infiltrators who have arrived
in MR 2 have already been absorbed by the major expansion of the
combat and rear services order of battle and by losses early in
the campaigning season. There appear to be about 5,000 replacements
now arriving in MR 2. These personnel should be enough to
replace only about half of the enemy's recent losses, leaving
a net reduction of about 5,000 men in his combat strength.
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Even with-this reduction, however, the Communists will still
pose a powerful threat to ARVN in coming weeks. After a period
for rest and refitting, the enemy forces should again be
capable of serious attacks against Pleiku or Kontum, of
cutting ARVN lines of communication in additional places, and
of attacking some additional areas in the coastal lowlands.
Major enemy combat operations in MR 2 may be curtailed, however,
by increasingly poor operating conditions during the wet season.
Heavy rains will limit his ability to move men and materiel
and especially limit his use of tanks and heavy artillery.
Military Region 3
22. The Communists have had limited success in achieving
their objectives in MR 3 thus far and have suffered heavy
casualties. Inflexible battle plans and an underestimation of
the fighting capabilities of ARVN ground forces supported by
air power have disrupted and slowed the Communists' military
timetable. Evidence is now emerging that the Communists have
been forced to modify their battle plans and give up some of
their objectives Ce?g?,a swift seizure of An Loc). The
events of recent weeks plus the impact of changing weather
will almost certainly alter the type of enemy offensive
activity possible over the next two months or so. Offensive
operations of some form will nonetheless continue as current
enemy unit shifts indicate.
23. Three long-established enemy divisions and one newly
formed divisional entity operating in MR 3 have suffered heavy
casualties in combat around An Loc and elsewhere in MR 3.
Enemy losses in the region as a whole are probably on the order
of 10,0.00 men. Field reports point to the devastating effects
of B-52 strikes and other Allied air strikes on massed troop
formations as being responsible for a large proportion of these
losses. It is likely that the Communists have had sufficient
numbers of infiltrators on hand to replace losses thus far
during the offensive; but they may now be reaching the limit
or replacement capability. Prisoner interrogations give a
picture of newly arrived infiltrators from the north being pushed
into battle while still weak from the infiltration journey.
24. Recent moves of enemy units suggest that the Communists
have had to alter their offensive plans and seek less ambitious
objectives. The 9th Division pulled back from An Loc for
reorganization and refitting, though elements may now be
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returning to combat. The 5th Division a4lsQ pulled out of
the An Loc area into Cambodia. These elements have now moved
into the Parrot's Beak and will likely be targeted in the near
future against Tay Ninh ant Hau Nghia Provinces. Other units
appear to have been pulled back to the Cambodia-Kien Phong-Kien
Tuong Province border area. The 7th Division, though in a
weakened condition, is still blocking Route 13 and has been
ordered to prevent Allied forces from relieving An Loc.
Military Region 4
25. During the first two months of the current offensive
in MR 4, enemy main force activity has been limited. The
estimated loss of 3,000 troops is far smaller than the enemy's
replacement capability from infiltration. Furthermore, unit
redeployments from Cambodia have resulted in a large increase
in combat forces in the region. As a result, the enemy is in
a favorable position to initiate heavier combat during the
next two to three months than thus far has been the case.
26. To date, however, Communist achievements in the delta
have been fairly modest and the GVN's performance fairly
impressive, particularly in light of the deployment to other
regions of the equivalent of close to two ARVN divisions.
Although sketchy reporting makes impossible a confident
assessment of the security situation in many delta districts,
in general the government still seems to have the upper hand
in the most heavily populated parts of the region.
27. During the next month or so, the Communists will
probably attempt to deploy deeper into the Delta in order
to threaten ARVN lines of communications and try to gain control
of some populated areas. This strategy, if successful, would
have the effect of reducing Saigon's rice supply and isolating
parts of the Delta from the rest of the country.
Logistics
Recent Developments
28. Since the start of the enemy's current military offensive,
the Communist logistic commands in the DMZ area, the Laotian
Panhandle, and Cambodia have been engaged in a major and
continuing effort to move large quantities of supplies to the
battle areas in South Vietnam. To accommodate this effort,
the North Vietnamese extended their "General Transportation
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Offensive" through May, made a number of organizational
adjustments, and increased road construction and maintenance
work. In recent weeks the large-scale logistic drive has been
tempered by heavy rains in the Laotian Panhandle which forced
a sharp curtailment of resupply activity. However, heavy
logistic activity has continued on the routes through the
DMZ area, which will enjoy continued dry weather for the
next several months, and in Cambodia, where the rains have
not as yet seriously affected activity.
29. During April, the "highpoint" month of the "General
Transportation Offensive," the Communists probably moved more
supplies to units in South Vietnam than in any other month
of the 1971/72 dry season. Aerial observers 25X1D
indicated very heavy use of the roads through the DMZ into
northern MR 1. In the Laotian Panhandle, sensor detections
reached peak levels, and vehicles, moving day and night,
made longer truck hauls than ever before to reduce cargo-handling
time. In Cambodia the picture was the same. A 30 April intercept
ordered the unprecedented direct dispatch of 190 vehicles
carrying 600 tons of ordnance from southern Laos to COSVN.
An early May intercept revealed that the "Transportation
Offensive" had been extended through the month to continue
the resupply of the "battlefronts." The magnitude of the
May effort was indicated by an intercept which stated that
one logistical authority in Laos was scheduled to ship 4,000
tons of cargo to northern MR 1 during May.
30. Evidence of heavy logistic activity was also evident
within MR 1, where the Communists built several new roads
and built up their logistical organization. In an unprecedented
move, a logistical authority located southwest of the Mu Gia
Pass was ordered on 6 May to the Hue area of South Vietnam.
A second logistical authority, believed to have operated in
the northern part of the Laotian Panhandle, was moved south
to reinforce the logistical organization just west of the DMZ,
adjacent to MR 1.
31. In Cambodia, heavy logistic activity continued throughout
May. Aerial observers reported continued large-scale vehicular
movements through the Siem Pang-Stung Treng area as well as
on the major roads leading to the B-3 Front. In anticipation
of the wet season, the senior logistic authority in the
area has ordered engineers not only to maintain the roads
but also to "develop and maintain the river route," which
will undoubtedly be used extensively as the rains progressively
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25X1 D3a
restrict motorized transport. Farther south, aerial observers
have similarly reported a high level of supply activity on
routes leading from Kratie and Chup to MR 3 and the Parrot's
Beak area. For example, on 28 May, 50 trucks in a convoy were
observed moving east on Route 155 near the South Vietnamese
border.
32. As the wet season progresses, the Communists' capability
to move supplies by truck will continue to be progressively
restricted, except in northern MR 1. Judging from preparations
being made and stockpiles already in place, however, the
enemy will not shut down the Laotian Panhandle system this
summer, as has occurred in some years in the past. To keep
supplies moving through, the Communists could, for example,
use their new "central corridor" in the Laotian Panhandle --
a series of roads built or improved this dry season. It is
a heavily canopied route, difficult to interdict, and not
highly susceptible to landslides caused by rain.
Outlook for the Rainy Season
33. Despite the enemy's effort to maintain his logistical
momentum in the Laotian Panhandle, heavy rains during the latter
part of May have forced a reduction in logistic activity as
weather typical of the annual southwest monsoon prevailed
over the Panhandle. Several intercepted enemy messages
indicate that the North Vietnamese have reduced the average
tonnage carried by vehicles in order to facilitate transport
on slippery and muddy roads.
34. Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese are making strenuous
efforts to counter the effects of the rains by graveling
roads, by rapid repair, and by continued resupply efforts.
most major roads in
the Panhandle were in good condition and sustaining a
moderate level of traffic. The enemy apparently intends to
continue vehicle activity for as long as is possible, but
it is clear that the period of large-scale vehicle activity
has ended. The enemy has access to an extensive river supply
system for moving supplies both into and out of Cambodia, but
one fact is clear: the amount shipped will be much lower than
dry season levels, with the actual volume of supplies moved
this summer hinging on the severity of the monsoon rains, the
interdiction effort, and the tactical situation in South Vietnam.
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Logistic Capabilities, By Region
35. The current enemy offensive in South Vietnam has resulted
in a sharp increase in expenditures of all types of supplies,
but to date there has been little evidence of shortages. The
diminishing level of surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft
artillery firings in North Vietnam quite clearly indicate a
Communist decision to conserve these munitions and may reflect
developing real shortages, but within South Vietnam we have
detected no shortages which could be related to the US interdiction
campaign in the North. We judge enemy logistic prospects,
by Military Region, to be as follows.
36. Military Region l: The Communists are logistically
capable of supporting major operations in MR 1 throughout the
summer. The monsoon rains which are already beginning to affect
other areas of South Vietnam will not influence Communist
operations in MR 1. Because of their proximity to major supply
lines in Laos and the DMZ, Communist forces in MR 1 operate from
a close and more secure logistics base. They have received
substantially greater supply flows this year and with increased
local procurement of supplies are in a much stronger supply
position than they were a year ago. The Communists have roads
extending through the DMZ as well as a petroleum pipeline system
into the DMZ. Because of these and other logistic assets, the
North Vietnamese should experience few logistic constraints in
MR 1 over the next few months.
37. During the period October 1971 through May 1972, at
least 4,600 tons of supplies were delivered into MR 1 through
southern Laos. To sustain the offensive in MR 1 the Communists
require about 900 tons monthly, including food, weapons, and
ammunition. While this is substantially above the average dry
season flow from Laos, several considerations indicate that
the enemy should experience little difficulty meeting projected
requirements. First and most important, the 4,600-ton estimate
includes only deliveries through Laos; additional, very large
amounts of supplies have been transported straight across the
DMZ since early April. Second, prior to the enemy's offensive,
the Communists unquestionably stockpiled large quantities of
ordnance for the offensive. Third, our food estimate may be
overstated in view of the ready access the Communists have had
to foodstocks in northern South Vietnam as a result of their
successes in Quang Tri and elsewhere in MR 1.
38. Military Region 2: Weather will restrict enemy logistical
operations in MR 2 this summer, but the substantial supply
13
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deliveries this past dry season probably give the enemy an
adequate reserve. COMINT reflected heavy shipments of ordnance
into the area this spring, substantially more than has yet
appeared in combat. Concurrently, the enemy transported large
volumes of foodstuffs from Cambodia and the coastal lowlands
of north South Vietnam to forces deployed in the B-3 Front.
The amount of stocks already available in supply areas near
the combat zones and the ability of the Communists to deliver
some additional supplies into the area during the wet season
provide the requisite supply base from which to continue
operations. The main problem, one which is already evident,
is that of moving supplies to forward positions in a timely
manner. Weather and air strikes have already produced some food
distribution problems. Recently captured documents, for example,
have revealed food shortages among elements of the 320th
Division. Other supplies are apparently available in sufficient
quantities, however, and few ammunition shortages have been
detected.
39. An estimated 7,400 to 9,400 tons of supplies were
delivered from southern Laos to the B-3 Front during the period
October 1971 - May 1972. Weapons, ammunition, and equipment
constituted a little more than half of this total (4,300 to
5,500 tons). The current estimate of the weapons, ammunition,
and equipment required to sustain offensive operations in this
area is about 270 tons monthly, considerably below average
monthly deliveries from southern Laos. Thus, detected shipments
of ordnance to the B-3 Front area should be adequate for current
military operations and providing reserves for stockpiles for
the wet season.
40. Military Regions 3 and 4: The Communists have enough
stocks in place to support continuous heavy action in the provinces
contiguous to the Cambodia border. The enemy's massive expenditure
of mortar, rocket, and artillery ammunition against An Loc
provides tangible evidence of large supply stores on hand in
support of border province operations. Communist forces currently
need about 600 tons of weapons, equipment, and ammunition
supplies per month to prosecute the war in MRs 3 and 4 and to
support present operations in Cambodia. Supplies consigned to
Cambodia and COSVN from Laos during the past dry season amounted
to 6,500 to 8,400 tons, an amount well in excess of enemy
requirements before the offensive and above their current
needs. These deliveries plus additional amounts moved by road
and waterways during the summer would allow the Communists to
initiate substantial offensive operations over the next few
months. Manpower will be more of a limiting factor than supplies.
TT p F 14
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41. There will be problems, however, associated with moving
supplies to the interior. For example, Long An Subregion
communications have indicated shortages of ammunition and
explosive devices among some district units, and low-level
source reporting has revealed that logistic problems in the
lower Delta as a result of a lack of extensive Viet Cong control
have made large-scale attacks difficult to initiate. Ammunition
shortages have been reported in Viet Cong Ben Tre Province,
south of Saigon; and, in the upper Delta, enemy units in Dinh
Tuong Province reportedly were unable to intensify attacks in
mid-May because of ammunition shortages. Finally, armor and
artillery losses by the Communists over the past two months
may not be replaceable during the rainy season.
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North Vietnam's Offensive Capabilities in
Relation to the US Interdiction Effort
42. It seems clear from the foregoing discussion that the
Communists have sufficient military stocks in place to continue
offensive activity in South Vietnam for the next two months
or so at the least. There is no evidence that the current
mining and bombing program has yet impinged directly on
front-line capabilities in the short term. Whether or not
it will do so later on depends on such factors as the
ability of the North Vietnamese to circumvent the interdiction
program and the willingness of the Communist allies to pour
supplies into North Vietnam in sufficient quantities to
offset bombing losses.
Import Requirements
43. One way of gaining perspective on the potential impact
of the current mining and air interdiction effort is to
determine the "minimum" amount of imports which North Vietnam
must have to sustain its economy and continue the war. Total
imports in 1971 -- about 2.5 million tons -- enabled Hanoi
to continue its war effort in Indochina and prepare for
the current offensive while continuing to rebuild its industry
and at least sustain the existing standard of living for its
people. Many of these imports are essential for
North Vietnam's continued economic and military viability;
some are not essential. As a rough estimate, we judge that if
during the next twelve months, about 1 million tons of
aid arrive in North Vietnam from Communist countries --
less than 50% of 1971 deliveries -- Hanoi could continue a high
level of combat in the South and meet essential civilian
needs at home.(1)
44. North Vietnam is wholly dependent upon imports for
petroleum, which for the past four years have averaged close
to 400,000 tons annually. If Hanoi strictly rationed its
civilian petroleum consumers, consumption might be reduced
by some 50,000 tons. North Vietnam also probably has enough
domestic food supplies to feed its people until the next
harvest in October/November of this year, although some
1. The imposition of extreme austerity by the regime could, of
course, mean even lower import requirements. It is always risky
to predict what a relatively underdeveloped country may or may
not find to be essential under crisis conditions.
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belt-tightening would be necessary. Once the next harvest
is reached, food supplies should be adequate into the first
months of 1973. No additional fertilizer imports this year
will be necessary to ensure adequate food supplies in North
Vietnam throughout 1972. North Vietnam undoubtedly can
reduce imports of a wide range of other items normally used
in the economy, but in so doing will have to forego economic
development and accept a decline in production. General and
miscellaneous imports by sea during 1971 totaled 350,000 tons.
By maintaining imports of only essential commodities, much
of this category of imports could probably be eliminated.
Evidence of Overland Movements from the PRC
45. The evidence on overland movement of supplies between
the PRC and North Vietnam by rail.is not sufficient to support
firm estimates.(2) During May, identified rail shipments
totaling at least 3,900 tons were dispatched to North Vietnam
from the USSR, China, and Eastern Europe. Added to this were the
goods already en route which during the month were delivered
to P'ing-hsiang, China, the classification and transloading
yard near the border where the cargoes are accepted for
further delivery into North Vietnam.
Between 18 and 21 May, the PRC dispatched more
than 1,500 tons of steel, and between 19 and
21 May, sent some 525 tons of foodstuffs by
rail to P'ing-hsiang, and possibly into North
Vietnam. (On 4 May, Hanoi had requested immediate
delivery of more than 9,000 tons of steel from
the USSR, 1,750 tons of the total by express
train. At mid-month, COMINT reflected a backlog
of 1,650 tons of steel awaiting acceptance at
the border by the North Vietnamese.)
On 25 and 31 May, Soviet foreign trade
representatives confirmed shipment by rail from
North Vietnam to Moscow of carpets and other
items.
-- On 2 June, US aircraft reportedly destroyed a
seven-car train on the Lao Cai-Hanoi line 55 miles
from the China border. On the same day, a drone
photographic mission over the Dong Dang-Hanoi
line south of Kep showed a flanged-wheel truck
pulling two small rail cars, indicating that
some shuttling is under way on the line.
There is as yet no information on the use of roads or the
Red River entering North Vietnam from China.
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46. Rail traffic appears to have been at or near normal
levels on at least some sections of both the Dong Dang-Hanoi
and Lao Cai-Hanoi lines, and there are some signs that trafficc5X1D3a
is moving in and out of the border yards of both lines. E
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Seaborne Resupply
48. No foreign merchant ships have transited the minefields
since their activation on 12 May. At that time, 23 ships
were en route to North Vietnam with nearly 160,000 tons of
cargo. Of this number, 19 subsequently were diverted and five
(including a Soviet ship that left Gdynia after the mines
were activated) are still en route. These ships almost
certainly will be diverted as they near North Vietnamese
waters. As of 8 June, 29 ships were in North Vietnamese
ports: 26 at Haiphong, one at Cam Pha, one at Hon Nieu
anchorage serving Vinh, and one at Hon La Island, 60 miles
south of Vinh.
49. China has permitted three East European ships to
offload cargo bound for North Vietnam at Huang-pu (near Canton
and Hong Kong); a fourth is en route, and permission for it
and others apparently will be given. Although no Soviet dry
cargo ship has been permitted to enter a Chinese port as
yet, two Soviet dry cargo ships have requested Chinese
permission to unload at Huang-pu. (Their requests have so
far gone unanswered.) The Soviet tanker Pevek arrived at
Huang-pu on 24 May for bunkering and repairs to damage
sustained during a US air strike on Haiphong and departed
on 6 June. Its cargo of petroleum was apparently not offloaded.
The ship appeared to be riding low in the water on departure.
50. On about 30 May, two Chinese freighters carrying an
estimated 6,000 tons of unidentified cargo moved into southern
North Vietnamese waters from the Chinese port of Huang-pu.
One ship joined two other Chinese ships, which had been at
the Hon Nieu anchorage since mid-April.(3) The other moved
to Hon La Island some 60 miles to the south of Vinh and just
3. These ships -- the Hung Chi 152 and 160 -- left the anchorage
on or about 6 June, apparently heading for a port in China.
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north of Quang Khe. all four vessels
have been engaged in lg tering operations, and some lighters
have been destroyed by US air strikes as they moved toward
the coast. At Hon La Island, for example, two were destroyed 25X1D3a
and secondary explosions were noted.
a possible supply point/bivouac
area about one mile north of the mouth of the river leading
to Vinh. There is no way of estimating how much of the cargo
will successfully be brought to shore.
Scale of US Air Operations
51. With the initiation of Operation LINEBACKER,
US air units began a systematic campaign against the major
logistic and military targets in North Vietnam. By 7 June, about
6,000 attack sorties (205 per day) had been flown throughout
North Vietnam. (The current campaign, however, falls short of
the highest countrywide daily average achieved during ROLLING
THUNDER. During August 1967, a total of 11,846 attack sorties --
382 per day -- were flown.) In addition, over 47,000 rounds of
naval gunfire have been directed against targets in North Vietnam
since 5 April.
52. US air operations have been concentrated in three principal
areas. In northern North Vietnam, the attacks have focused on
the Hanoi-Lao Cai railroad in the northwest, the Hanoi-Dong Dang
railroad in the northeast, and the Hanoi-Haiphong railroad in
the east. Bridges, tunnels, track, and rolling stock have been
the targets most frequently attacked by pilots. In addition,
petroleum and other storage areas surrounding Hanoi and Haiphong
have been struck in the north. The second major area of strikes
has occurred in central North Vietnam between Thanh Hoa and
Vinh. Again, the rail line and associated targets, including
petroleum storage areas between these points, bore the brunt
of the attacks. Finally, US attacks in southern North Vietnam
have concentrated on an area just north of the DMZ. Unlike the
other sorties, these strikes have been targeted largely against
the movement of men and supplies supporting the current offensive.
Trucks, artillery pieces, roads, and storage areas have been
the targets most frequently struck in this area. In addition,
North Vietnam's air defenses, including surface-to-air missile
equipment, radar, and antiaircraft artillery, have come under
heavy fire in all three areas.
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NORTH VIETNAM-PANHANDLE AREA
Selected Transportation
and Logistics Facilities
PQL storage facility
(over .0?0 ton A Rail bridge
capacity) Rail/Road bridge
Airfield Railyard
J, Port
Route package boundary
Road ---- POL pipeline
- Trail Railroad
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.Effects of US Air operations on the North Vietnamese
Transportation System
General
53. Operations to date have significantly disrupted and
delayed traffic movements especially on the railroads -- but as
indicated above the bombing has not stopped all
traffic. Part of the campaign's immediate achievements can be
attributed to the use of "smart" bombs and part to the overall
lack of any concerted countermeasure efforts by the North
Vietnamese during the first two weeks of the bombing. However,
since then quick repairs and countermeasures at some key rail
interdictions -- particularly on the Hanoi-Dong Dang line to
China -- have been increasingly evident. The effects of LINEBACKER
on roads and waterways to date is harder to judge, but high levels
of highway traffic continue in the Panhandle where LINEBACKER
attacks on highways have so far been concentrated. Repair
activity is evident along several key roads and there is some
evidence of mine sweeping operations in southern inland waterways.
Railroad System
54. The railroad network -- particularly the main routes
through Dong Dang and Lao Cai into China -- has been a primary
target of US aerial bombardment. Several railroad yards and
bridges along four of the country's seven rail lines have been
destroyed or damaged, disrupting operations and restricting
through rail service. Rail targets on two of the remaining
three lines -- the Hanoi-Thai Nguyen and Kep-Thai Nguyen routes --
have not yet been attacked. On the Hon Gay-Kep line, the only
targets hit have been the railroad yard and bridge at Uong Bi 25X1D3a
near the thermal powerplant. During the initial phases of
LINEBACKER,
5ucn inact1v1ty25X1D3a
suggests that the intensity of the bombing was a surprise to
the North Vietnamese, and time was needed to gear up their
repair effort. Since late May, however, there has been an
increasing number of repairs and bypass construction at key
targets.
Hanoi-Dong Dang Line
55. Of the 20 major bridges and 10 main railroad yards on
this major overland import route, six bridges have been destroyed
and one yard heavily damaged, periodically interrupting through
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rail traffic from China. To date, however, quick repairs and
bypass construction have been noted at interdictions on this
line -- much more so than on the other rail lines -- suggesting
the North Vietnamese are concentrating their repair efforts on
this, their most important rail import route.
56. Of the six bridges destroyed to date, the railroad/highway
bridge at Cao Nung, 65 miles northeast of Hanoi, was repaired
in at least 11 days and the railroad bridge at Vu Chua --
re orted destroyed on 23 May -- was serviceable on 29 May
Both of these crossings are north of Kep, and with
these repairs, through rail service from China to Yen Vien,
seven miles north of Hanoi, was possible via the Kep-Thai
Nguyen-Yen Vien alternate to the west for at least several days
since mid-month. These bridges were reported destroyed again
on 2 June and through rail service was again interrupted.(4)
However, highway traffic can shuttle goods around the crossings.
South of Kep, the Bac Giang railroad/highway bridge has been
interdicted since 23 May, but several highway bypasses are
available and a rail ferry and rail bridge are under construction,
assuring the continuation of some shuttle service.
57. The key mile-long Hanoi railroad/highway bridge -- the
Doumer Bridge -- which serves rail traffic from all northern
rail lines to points south of Hanoi was destroyed on 10 May.
During ROLLING THUNDER there were 22 different bypasses
at this bridge -- highway and rail ferries and pontoon bridges
which together provided more transport capacity than the original
addition, a railroad ferry.
bridge. To date, there are two highway
pontoon bridges in operation s owing heavy use. There is, in
because of either impediments or danger of travel on the Dong
4. Since mid-May, some East European and Soviet technicians 25X1D1a
have departed North Vietnam by vehicle and aircraft probably
Danq line.
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Hanoi-Lao Cai Line
58. To date, 12 of the nearly 40 main bridges on this
secondary overland import route have been attacked and 10
have been reported destroyed, including the line's longest
bridge -- at Viet Tri about 30 miles northwest of Hanoi.
some of these bridges remain
interdicted with no bypasses currently available, but with
others under repair only a week after being damaged. The main
bottleneck to through-service is at Viet Tri because most of
the other bridges are small and easily repaired. Through
rail service is not possible between Hanoi and China on this
line, but some shuttling is possible.
Hanoi-Haiphong Line
59. This main import line for seaborne cargoes which arrived
at Haiphong before the mining is currently interdicted at
Haiphong and at Hai Duong, about midway between Hanoi and
Haiphong. The Haiphong railroad/highway bridge, the Haiphong
rail yards, and the two railroad/highway bridges at Hai Duong
have been attacked and are currently unserviceable. Currently
no repair efforts to the main
bridges to date, however, and through rail service between
Hanoi and Haiphong is not possible. Road traffic can continue
out of Haiphong, however, via serviceable highway bypasses
and could provide a shuttle service for the rail system.
Highway bypasses are also available at Hai Duong.
Hanoi-Vinh Line
60. By far the heaviest concentration of air strikes in
North Vietnam has been south of Hanoi, where the primary
targets have included rail yards and sidings and numerous
rail bridges. The reported bomb damage to date has reflected
this emphasis: around 300 pieces of rolling stock have been
reported destroyed or damaged. The damage to bridges and
rail yards has effectively stopped the through movement of
trains from Hanoi into the Panhandle of North Vietnam,
although shuttling is possible.
61. The North Vietnamese retain some ability to move supplies
by rail relatively unimpeded from Hanoi to Ninh Binh. However,
the capability rapidly deteriorates south of this point where
the rail facilities have borne the full brunt of the present 25X1D3a
interdiction effort.
in addition to the damage or destruction ot almost
every major rail bridge from Ninh Binh to Vinh, several
rail yards and sidings have been effectively damaged, thereby
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blocking the rail line with derelict railcars, ripped-up track,
and craters. very few if
any attempts to repair or bypass the interdicted yards.
However, some rail and highway countermeasures are beginning
to be evident at selected bridges on the northernmost segment
of the line, such as Ninh Binh, Dong Phong Thuong, and Thanh
Hoa. Further south, between Thanh Hoa and Vinh, rail movement
will probably continue to be difficult because of the larger
number of interdictions and the apparent lack of bypass
efforts. South of Vinh on the light-capacity tramway,
LINEBACKER has effectively closed the line to through rail
service. A message from a military logistical organization
at Vinh on 29 May stated that the disruption of the rail line
was causing distribution problems in the area.
Highways
62. The interruptions to through rail traffic have not yet
sparked a visible shift from railroad to alternative truck
mode of transport in the northern half of the country.
Repeated photographic reconnaissance over the north has shown
no significant change in either the volume or pattern of truck
activity along the major highways radiating from the Hanoi-Haiphong
region or along the China border. (It should be noted,
however, that during Rolling Thunder, photography did not
show a major shift from rail to truck transport in this area.)
63. During the initial three weeks of LINEBACKER, attacks
against major highway chokepoints in northern North Vietnam
have met with some success. By the end of May, many key highway
bridge crossings ringing the Hanoi-Haiphong areas and those
on National Route 1A, which leads south of the capital into
the Panhandle, had been severed. Relatively few countermeasures
have been noted except for the addition of a pontoon
bridge adjacent to a ferry crossing 7 miles east of Hanoi.
Existing ferry and pontoon bridge facilities are being used
in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas to shuttle vehicle traffic in
and out of these areas and appear adequate to the task despite
some congestion observed at the immediate crossing points.
64. In the Panhandle, although most significant highway
bridges have been destroyed or damaged, pilots continue to
report a significant volume of truck traffic moving. This road
system is difficult to interdict because of its redundancy
and the myriad bypass options open to the enemy. In many cases,
bridges are not an absolute necessity to maintain the flow of
traffic as many crossings are fordable, and pontoon bridge
sections stored in the area can be assembled quickly at the
unfordable crossings.
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65. COMINT generally confirms that truck traffic is moving
on the southern road system with continuing shuttling activity.
In addition to the southward movement of supplies, substantial
numbers of vehicles have also been noted moving west toward
Laos.
66. The communists are, however, obviously facing substantial
problems in the Panhandle. One recently intercepted message has
indicated that they are having difficulty in meeting some
resupply commitments, and their transportation problems have
evidently been compounded by a shortage of experienced vehicle
drivers. The virtual closure of the rail lines south of Vinh
places a greater burden on the roads and imposes a greater
requirement for experienced drivers.
Waterways
67. Since LINEBACKER began there has been very little
movement noted on the inland waterways in the Panhandle. What
movement has occurred has been attacked and, in most cases,
reportedly damaged or destroyed. This inactivity may be ending,
however, as the enemy organizes himself to meet the challenge
of the interdiction effort. In this respect, in early June,
the number of watercraft reported sighted by aerial observers
far exceeded the numbers reported in earlier weeks. On 1 June a
pilot reported a large number of vessels in the mouth of the
Song Giang River at Quang Khe, an area which has been mined.
In addition, similar activity was noted on 4 June at or near
a mine field on the Song Ca River near Vinh. These observations
seem to indicate that these waterways may have been cleared
of mines and that some river traffic and transshipping
operations are taking place.
Impact on Economic and Related Targets
Petroleum Storage Capacity
68. The bombing of petroleum storage facilities has
reduced storage capacity in North Vietnam by an estimated
42,000 tons, or about 17% from the total estimated to have
existed on 31 March 1972 as shown in the following tabulation:
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31 Mar
1972
3 Jun
1972
Principal terminals
67,930
37,000
Dispersed storage
Tanks
90,000
84,000
Drums
85,000
80,000
Civil, industrial,
5,000
5,000
and military sites
Total
247,930
206,000
Almost 31,000 tons of this loss was inflicted on the two
principal storage terminals at Haiphong and Hanoi. An estimated
total of 37,000 tons of storage capacity (including about
6,900 tons at Haiphong and 3,400 tons at Hanoi) is considered
to remain at the eight principal terminals.
69. There were about 220 small tank sites dispersed
throughout North Vietnam just prior to the US air operation.
Dispersed at random and well-concealed, these tanks are
relatively invulnerable to attack. Small tank capacity is
estimated to have been reduced from 90,000 tons on 31 March
1972 to about 84,000 tons on 2 June. Storage capacity of
55-gallon drums and other small containers represented about
85,000 tons on 31 March, and not more than about 5,000 tons of
this capacity (equivalent to about 30,000 55-gallon drums)
have been destroyed.
70. There is no information on the operational status
of the pipeline system -- which itself represents petroleum
"storage" -- although the system has been damaged in places
and some pumping stations reportedly have been hit. Because
replacement pumps and line pipe almost certainly are available
in North Vietnam, they could be repaired or replaced in a
matter of hours.
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Petroleum Stock Levels
71. There is no evidence of shortages of petroleum nor
of anxiety on the part of Hanoi about near-term supplies.
Consumption of petroleum by both military and civil sectors
during the early part of 1972 was estimated to have been
about 1,200 tons per day. Following the mining of the harbors
and the intensified bombing, some conservation measures
probably were imposed and the activity of petroleum consuming
equipment reduced. Thus, consumption of petroleum may have
declined to about 1,000 tons per day since the bombing began.
72. Under these conditions, North Vietnamese stocks of
petroleum may have been about 70,000 tons to 93,000 tons,
representing 70 to 93 days of supply on 2 June 1972 at
the 1,000 tons per day consumption level. Not all of
these stocks can be considered as usable: small quantities
of petroleum in each of the thousands of small storage tanks
(tank bottoms) and drums probably could not be removed
completely.
Overland Imports of Petroleum
73. There is nothing as yet to indicate that petroleum
in quantity is being moved into North Vietnam overland,
although some tank cars have been sighted at the P'ing-hsiang
border crossing recently. Petroleum in quantities sufficient
to meet minimum essential needs in North Vietnam could be
imported by rail through China from the USSR. Seaborne imports
of petroleum could be delivered to bulk storage facilities at
Fort Bayard or Canton/Whampoa in south China and be transshipped
by rail to North Vietnam. Furthermore, there are three
"strategic storage" sites in south China near the border with
North Vietnam. One of these with an estimated capacity of
about 33,000 tons is located at Kai-yuan about 140 miles
from Lao Cai; two others with a total capacity of about 53,000
tons are located at Nan-ping, about 140 miles from Dong Dang.
These three sites are served by rail, and shipment to the
North Vietnamese border would be relatively simple.
74. Imports of petroleum from the China border by truck,
however, would be extremely difficult. If imported in drums,
the daily requirement (both military and civilian) of
1,000 tons would involve the movement of about 500 truckloads
southbound daily. If imported in bulk, the equivalent of
about 330 tank trucks would be required southbound daily.
27
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Recent evidence of construction of a pipeline system north
from the vicinity of Hai Duong in the direction of Kep
suggests that the North Vietnamese may plan to extend
the system to the China border. Such a facility would, of
course, simplify the overland imports of petroleum from the
China border. Given sufficient line pipe and pumps on hand,
this line could be completed to the vicinity of Dong Dang
by the end of June.
Industrial Facilities
75. Air strikes against industrial targets have been
concentrated on electric power facilities. Of the estimated
260,000 kilowatts (KW) of generating capacity available at
the beginning of the interdiction campaign, some 90,000 KW
(35%) currently may be out of service.(5) Damage appears
sufficient to prevent even partial operation of most plants
for periods ranging from two to six months. The damaged Ben
Thuy and Thanh Hoa powerplants, each serving small areas
in the vicinity, probably can be offset to some extent by
use of mobile diesel generating equipment. Six powerplants
in the Hanoi-Haiphong power network have been struck. Power
supply remains generally adequate, however, although temporary
outages undoubtedly have occurred. Since the end of 1971,
North Vietnam's reconstruction effort had brought total
generating capacity up to about 170,000 KW, and by May 1972
another 90,000 KW was put into service. Most of the new
additions came from completion of the Thac Ba Hydroelectric
Powerplant. Based on the end-year situation, therefore,
North Vietnam's reserve cushion at the start of the current
bombing campaign was on the order of 100,000 KW.
76. In other branches of industry, three significant
targets have been struck. The Haiphong Cement Plant, the
country's only large producer of cement, has been out of
operation for about six weeks. Damage here is relatively
moderate and could be repaired quickly if parts are available.
At the Nam Dinh Textile Plant, about one-third of the main
production buildings have received moderate to heavy damage.
The textile plant represents roughly 40% of weaving and spinning
capacity in North Vietnam. Damage to the Hon Gay Coal Processing
Plant, the second largest such facility in the country, will
curtail sorting and grading of coal but will have little
5. Losses amount to 68,000 KW (26%).
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TCS-2677/72
effect on mining capabilities. Of these three industrial
facilities, shutdown of the cement plant probably will produce
the most serious problems.
77. The most immediate effect of bombing on the economy
would appear to be a cutback in nonessential construction
activity. Several groups of Polish technicians have been noted
leaving the country, and at least 96 Soviet technicians working
on various industrial projects have been flown out. An
additional 40 Soviet powerplant technicians are scheduled
to be flown out on 8 June. The exodus of technicians probably
is an indication that work on these economic aid projects
will be suspended, at least in areas where the risk of further
bombing is high. Because of North Vietnam's heavy dependence
on foreign technicians, there is also a possibility that repair
of bomb damage to industry may be postponed or limited to a
small select segment.
78. Beyond the confirmed physical damage and cutback
in construction, there are no hard signs of economic dislocation
caused by the interdiction effort. no 25X1D3a
general curtailment of economic activity as of 31 May.
Substantial disruption has reportedly resulted from the
evacuation of large numbers of people from urban centers,
involving chiefly the elderly and young, as well as handicraft
enterprises. As yet, however, no evacuation of larger industrial
installations has been reported.
29
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