North Vietnamese Capabilities and Intentions Through the Rainy Season and Beyond

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000400270002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 12, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
Top Secret
No Foreign Dissern
North Vietnamese Capabilities and Intentions
Through the Rainy Season and Beyond
NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.
Handle via
Top Secret
1 15
Talent-Keyhole- Comint
12 May 1973
Channels Jointly
TCS No. 3263/73
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national security of the.
United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18,
Sections 793, 794 and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the reve-
lation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as
its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United
States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the
United States. It is to he seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels.
Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining
to the TALE NT-KEYIIOLE and Communications Intelligence Controls.
No action is to be taken on any communications intelligence which may
he contained herein, regardless of the advantage to be gained, if sneh action'
might have the effect of revealing the existence and nature of the source,
unless such action is first approved by the appropriate authority.
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence
Sources and Methods Involved
Cl..dfl.d by 014522
E..mpt from p.nuo. a.no..dicotion uh.d?
l. f E. O. 11672, )). m Ilan col.poryt
3 Se 1UZ lmmm~wllyC+d (14c fl.a en r.>
Dap lmpo.nbi. fo Daomin.r m
Cool... Imp..dbl., Corsi dal. or .vml)
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved For Rya"2gln(nM C1*"f0T t( 400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
12 May 197
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
NORTH VIETNAMESE CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
THROUGH THE RAINY SEASON AND BEYOND
1. This memorandum assesses in detail North
Vietnamese military capabilities and intentions
through the rainy season now beginning (i.e. from
now to mid-October 1973), and examines more briefly
Hanoi's intentions beyond that date. The memorandum
takes a current look at the military strength of
both the Communists and the GVN, and assesses the
impact of Indochina's monsoonal climate on the cap-
abilities of both sides over the next five months.
There is general agreement within the Central Intel-
ligence Agency with all of the judgments presented
below on these subjects. On the more complicated
question of Hanoi's intentions, there are differences
of opinion among the various components of the Agency
which work on the Vietnam problem. This memorandum
presents the two main schools of thought which exist
within the CIA, and makes no effort to submerge the
differences in homogenized mush.
1. THE MILITARY BALANCE IN INDOCHINA*-
2. Overall Balance. During the 1972-73 dry
season,. both the Communists and the South Vietnamese
have moved to rebuild and strengthen their military
positions in South Vietnam. In terms of military
See Annex A for a more detailed discussion of
this subject.
Approved For 169LAM ET9t0T: 8R
W
0400270002-0
 Approved For Rqrk" 2Pf(IVVIAi- OTU0 1]R1OA0400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
manpower the advantage rests--as it always has--
with the GVN; its ground combat forces total some'
287,000 men while the Communists have only about
163,000 men despite the infusion of some 85,000
combat personnel since 1 September 1972. (For the
time being, at least, the infiltration flow of com-
bat troops appears to have stopped.) In the admin-
istrative services the GVN has a total of 224,000
men, while the Communists have about 72,000. (In
MR-l, the manpower balance is only slightly in favor
of the GVN.)
3. The balance in firepower between the two
sides is more uncertain. In some categories, the
Communists probably have the edge; their 122-mm and
130-mm field guns, which are present in South Vietnam
in substantial numbers, have an effective range, ac-
curacy, and rate of fire unmatched by anything in the
GVN's arsenal. Moreover, since October 1972, Hanoi
has dispatched some 600 tanks to the South Vietnamese
theater. On the other hand, the GVN's firepower is
also substantial--more than 1,000 tanks, 120 175-mm
guns, and over 2,000 155-mm artillery howitzers plus
425 attack aircraft.*
4. Hanoi's 1972-73 dry season logistics campaign
is now in its final stages. Large quantities of sup-
plies--including virtually every type of ordnance and
military equipment--have been dispatched to South Viet-
nam. The flow of supplies will fall off as the rainy
season begins in the next few weeks, but the Commu-
nists are already in a strong logistical position to
support major military action over the next six months.
Moreover, North Vietnam could move additional supplies
into northern South Vietnam rapidly if they were needed.
The North Vietnamese, of course, have the cap-
ability to mount limited air operations over
South Vietnam; their aircraft inventory includes
about 200 MIGs and eight IL-28 light bombers.
In weighing such a course, however, Hanoi would
have to consider the South Vietnamese air force,
and--far more important--the risk of US retalia-
tion.
Approved For FleQrse Mt : & W?8(W?' &&&0400270002-0
 Approved ForfjYYe,Vs%kQ8WO 1 : ft- f PBU,O,~OFT00400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE 11- COMIINTt'CONITV IROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
5. One important factor favoring the Communists,
of course, is that the GVN is forced to disperse its
troops country-wide and that its forces are now in a
maximum defensive posture. There is no strategic
reserve available for speedy deployment to high threat
areas, as there was at the beginning of the Communist
offensive in 1972.
6. Regional Balance. From the standpoint of
manpower and logistics, the Communists are strongest
in MR 1 and MR 3; indeed in the northern two prov-
inces of MR 1 the balance probably favors the Commu-
nists. Hanoi's forces in both MR 1 and MR 3 have
the capability of severely testing ARVN, threatening
major population centers, and possibly capturing some
provincial capitals. In coastal MR 1 the rainy season
will not begin until next fall, while in MR 3, espe-
cially the northern part, short supply lines will
mitigate the effect of the rainy weather. North Viet-
namese capabilities in the lowlands of MR 2 and prob-
ably throughout MR 4 are limited to road interdiction,
attacking isolated outposts, and tying down ARVN
forces. In the highlands of MR 2, the Communists
could launch multi-regimental attacks, though they
probably could not capture and hold any provincial
capitals. Heavy seasonal rains in this area, however,
will hamper Communist armor and artillery mobility.
7. The, Communist forces in Laos have a clear ad-
vantage over government forces both in terms of ef-
fective manpower and firepower. Although the friendly
regular combat forces total some 68,000 men (51,000
Laotians and 17,000 Thai), as opposed to a combined
NVA and Pathet Lao force of 58,000 men, the govern-
ment's numerical advantage is clearly offset by greater
Communist strengths in leadership, discipline and
morale. The Communists also enjoy superior firepower
on the ground. The backbone of the Royal Lao govern-
ment's large caliber artillery is a total of some 85
105-mm and 155-mm howitzers, which are no match for
the Communists' 122-mm and 130-mm field guns. To what
extent the Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF) can compensate
for the government's weakness on the ground is not
clear; in the past, the Communists' advantage on the
Approved FortesigME(' : R P8DJlj $1!RRO0400270002-0
 Approved For R13
ye ;M fl~/VTCIR OVM71pf 0X0400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
ground has been somewhat offset by US air power. It
is unlikely that friendly forces would fight very well
without the American aerial umbrella.
8. The overall military balance in Cambodia is
also in the communists' favor. As in Laos, the numer-
ical superiority of the government's forces is largely
negated by their poor tactics, weak leadership, and
deteriorating morale. Despite a three-to-one superi-
ority in combat forces, the FANK shows little incli-
nation to fight. Government forces have remained de-
fensively clustered around lines of communication and
major towns, allowing the Khmer Communists (KC) to
roam most of the countryside virtually unchallenged.
Moreover, the KC have become increasingly adept at
concentrating multi-battalion and multi-regimental
forces for attacks against FANK. Over the next few
months, the KC will be able to maintain the interdic-
tion of land routes to South Vietnam as well as har-
assment of Mekong traffic. Other land routes could
also come under heavy pressure, and the government
could lose one or more provincial capitals still in
its hands.
II. COMMUNIST CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY IN INDOCHINA*
9. During the current dry season, the North Viet-
namese have substantially increased and strengthened
their logistic links leading to and within South Viet-
nam. Several hundred miles of new roads have been
constructed and other key routes have been improved.
(See map on following page.) Base areas have been,
upgraded, and many new large permanent storage/support
facilities have also been added throughout the system.
In addition, two new petroleum pipelines (one already
See Annex B for a fuller treatment of this sub-
ject.
Approved For'
t~e?J s 20 ( l : W- 8 1 1 00400270002-0
 ~1D
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved For Rqr 29MV(rCI Tl ftWWW400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
existed) have been extended into South Vietnam's MR 1,
and the Communists are apparently constructing or
refurbishing a series of airstrips in South Vietnam
and southern Laos.
10. Although the Ho Chi Minh Trail network has
been improved, the bulk of the new Communist construc-
tion has been aimed at improving North Vietnamese
access into and between Communist-controlled areas in
South Vietnam. Indeed, a strong case can be made that
the Communists intend to open an in-country motorable
route extending from the DMZ southward along the
western border of South Vietnam into MR 3, possibly
as far as COSVN Headquarters in Tay Ninh Province.
11. This road construction will provide the Com-
munists a major logistical network within South Viet-
nam, linking the major Communist base areas with one
another. In effect, this effort constitutes an east--
ward extension of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. When com-
plete with lateral extensions leading eastward into
the South Vietnam lowlands, the network will permit
flexibility in the deployment of Communist forces.
In particular, it would be possible to move armor
and artillery relatively quickly from one sector to
another. The creation of a major supply route within
South Vietnam would also allow the Communists to
scale down their use of, and forces in, southern
Laos and, by so doing, appear to meet US demands con-
cerning Communist use of the area. In any case, the
Communist construction activity in South Vietnam sub-
stantially augments Hanoi's logistical capabilities
and makes it easier to maintain the option of resuming
major military hostilities at some future date.
III. THE WEATHER FACTOR*
12. Weather has always been a factor in North
Vietnamese military planning. The upcoming South-
west Monsoon (June-September) will bring generally
* See Annex C for additional detail
-5-
Approved For Q`.Jy& /v-1 :1IW-h&8bW X00400270002-0
 Approved For Rle"e S J If.P80 1 (Q0400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
wet weather to Laos, Cambodia, and most of South
Vietnam. The coastal areas of MR 1 and MR 2 will
enjoy clear and dry weather, and the Communists
could use heavy equipment in these areas throughout
the summer. Elsewhere in South Vietnam, however,
as well as in Laos and Cambodia, Communist tactical
and supply operations will be hampered by heavy
rains, particularly in the use of heavy equipment.
The rains would probably limit the duration of
major Communist military action in central and
southern South Vietnam,'but would have negligible
effects in eastern MR 1 and MR 2.
13. The ARVN also suffers from diminished mobility
during the monsoon, although its road network is bet-
ter suited to wet weather use than that of the NVA.
Poor weather does, of course, reduce the effective-
ness of VNAF air support.
14. In light of the Communist activities and
capabilities discussed above, prudence requires
continuing attention to the possibility of large-
scale military initiatives by Communist forces,
particularly in the MR 1 area. There is no argu-
ment on the matter of capabilities, but on the ques-
tion of intentions, there are two schools of thought,
whose reasoning and conclusions are set forth sep-
arately below.
Case A. The "Deferred Major Military Action"
Argument
15. One school believes that despite manifest
capabilities for doing so, the Communists are not
likely to initiate a significantly increased level
of military action in the foreseeable future. This
school's argument runs as follows.
16. There is presently a lack of the indicators
that usually show up a few weeks before large-scale
Communist offensives--forward deployments, stepped
up communications, intense reconnaissance, etc. In
MR 1, the Communists have reduced the number of combat
Approved For R~PJse M&MT AWA ftYi MM 6%0400270002-0
 Approved For "pegMJf j': (RV"M 7$KRA00400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
units by withdrawing a full division and parts of
two others. Elsewhere in the country, the rainy
season will soon begin to impede large-scale troop
and equipment movements as well as the logistic
flows vital to combat support. Based on this evi-
dence alone, the chances of a large-scale, country-
wide Communist offensive before the end of the rainy
season in the late fall now appear slight. This
judgment is reinforced by analysis of Hanoi's cur=
rent strategy in the following paragraphs. Indeed,
this analysis suggests that large-scale military in-
itiatives will be postponed for as much as two or
three years.
17. This does not mean, of course, that Hanoi
has abandoned its objective of taking over the south;
nor has it necessarily lost faith in large-scale mili-
tary action as the key weapon in the struggle. It does
mean, however, that Hanoi has been forced to accept
another delay in the quarter century struggle to im-
pose the rule of the Vietnamese Communist Party on
all of Vietnam.
18. To put recent Communist activities in per-
spective and to assess their intentions, it is neces-
sary to consider the factors which underlay Hanoi's
decision last summer and fall to negotiate seriously,
to reach a tentative agreement in October, and to pay
the additional price required for the January Paris
Agreements. Put briefly, Hanoi finally concluded:
that given the terms available, an agreement and the
cessation of large-scale hostilities were less disad-
vantageous in terms of its future prospects than no
agreement and continued fighting. The following
considerations were relevant:
a.) The failure of the spring offensive to
crack RVNAF and to generate any popular movement to
the Communist side in South Vietnam.
b.) The failure of the spring offensive to
wring concessions from the US Government despite the
impending elections and Hanoi's recognition by the
fall that President Nixon's political position at
home was unique; i.e., he would be able to sustain
Approved For R re" `'se ?~`ff99 Cil~`~~80T-0'~T7t9R~~0400270002-0
 Approved For Re1ee 2001e 10 j ltrf F TlOJ1799RR000400270002-0
SE RE HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
military action against North Vietnam for an extended
period if there were no changes in Hanoi's negotiating
position.
c.) Hanoi's doubts as to the availability of
continuing military aid from the USSR and China in
quantities necessary to support future offensives.
d.) The cumulative stresses and strains of
the war on the people and the party in North Vietnam
which were accentuated in 1972 by the heavy losses of
the spring offensive, closure of the ports, and sus-
tained and heavy bombing.
e.) The prospect, overall, that efforts to
sustain the main force struggle would result in a
net and perhaps irreversible decline in the Commu-
nist military and political position in the South.
19. While the Communists felt compelled to nego-
tiate the Paris Agreements, they remained determined
to retain a viable military and political structure
within South Vietnam. This required a strategy that
took account of certain realities such as:
a.) The degraded condition of Communist forces
in the South due to extended combat.
b.) The demonstrated weakness of PRG and VC
political forces.
c.)' The enhanced strength and confidence of
the RVNAF and the GVN administration.
d.) The danger that under the terms and con-
ditions of an agreement, the strength and morale of
Communist military forces and the party apparatus
in South Vietnam would decline.
20. The strategy designed to protect and advance
Communist interests can be discerned from the pattern
of Communist activities since January 1973 and the
available documentary evidence. The core of this
strategy involves the creation in South Vietnam of
a type of Communist presence not envisaged by the
Approved For FF e,% `. C jWfM003g 1 `lk00400270002-0
 Approved For seg rj~~. ( 80U PP0400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
Allied side under the Paris Agreements. In essence,
the Communists are bent on establishing an enclave
extending southward from the DMZ into MR 3 and with
close administrative links across the DMZ into the
DRV. At present, the primary effort remains that
of consolidating and strengthening the enclave. At
the outset, this effort required extensive and gross
violations of the Paris Agreements as Hanoi sought
to bring military units back to normal strength and
to build large stocks of military and other supplies.
But Hanoi probably calculates that once the current
supply push is complete, future violations of this
nature can be held below the level likely, in their
view, to provoke major US military reaction.
21. The effort at consolidation also requires
some military actions which violate the ceasefire.
GVN pockets and salients within Communist-controlled
territory must be eliminated, base areas in the Delta
need to be enlarged, logistic routes have to be secured,
and efforts by the ARVN to extend its area of control
must be repulsed. These tasks require that Communist
armed forces be maintained at full strength and not
permitted to weaken through attrition.
22. To support these forces and the administrative
apparatus which will be strengthened by cadre sent down
from the north, the Communists will continue with a
vigorous road building effort; in time, the road net
under Communist control within South Vietnam will ex-
tend all the way from the DMZ to Tay Ninh Province,
reducing or eliminating the need to make significant
use of routes in the Lao panhandle. Access to Com-
munist units in the Delta may require continued use
of Cambodian soil, and territory in both Laos and Cam-
bodia may still be exploited as rear support areas,
but so long as large-scale hostilities are not planned
or anticipated such use will become far less essential
than in the past.
23. As time goes on, this Communist enclave in
South Vietnam will take on the appearance of a south-
ern extension of the DRV, complete with a civil admin-
istrative structure and a partially self-sufficient
economy based on the production of some food and the
Approved For RTI~'a'~e 2AAM 1: C -U J0' #.#000400270002-0
 Approved ForWei : RIF81JM-O00400270002-0
,Wf HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
development of small scale production enterprises.
If challenged on these developments, Hanoi might argue
that nothing in the Paris Agreements specifies how
or by whom Communist-controlled territory should be
administered and that Article 15 does specify that
the DMZ is not a political or territorial boundary.
24. Concurrent with the consolidation and internal
development of this enclave, it will, be used as a secure
base from which political, terrorist and propaganda
operations will be launched against the GVN, the ARVN,
and the South Vietnamese population. It is doubtful
that Hanoi expects to make any rapid progress through
these various techniques in undermining the GVN.
Specifically, there is no sign that the Communists
suddenly became disillusioned with their political
prospects after 28 January and decided to reverse.
course in favor of large-scale hostilities. On the
contrary, the factors which impelled them to sign
an agreement are still operative and one of those
factors was recognition of their lack of political
strength and appeal in the South.
25. Still, it has been argued that the lack of
Communist political appeal in the South gives the
GVN the edge in any situation in which Hanoi "defers"
large-scale military action for an extended period
of time. It is said that such a "deferral" spells
acceptance of "defeat" by Hanoi because the Communist
apparatus and military force would tend to lose its
strength and commitment while confined to the sparsely
populated backwoods and highlands. The argument here
is that Hanoi in recognition of this dilemma has de-
vised a strategy which it believes will avoid the trap.
In other words, it believes it can experiment for
some time with political, psychological, and terrorist
techniques without suffering a loss in its basic
strengths and that it can defer the question of a
resort to large-scale action for some considerable
period.
26. In the meantime this presence will appear
increasingly to the South Vietnamese as solid, per-
manent, and above all, threatening. It will grow
in visibility and its identity as an extension of
r '" ID
Approved For RIQse M' CtA` bfto+0'9'I`fi &&400270002-0
 Approved For F e / : gtPtW8(fTM7$ 200400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
the northern administration will gradually emerge
for all to see. Meanwhile, if things evolve as
Hanoi expects, the US presence will fade, and the
South Vietnamese will feel increasingly insecure.
In due course, as this process goes on, Hanoi would
plan to intensify the pressures on the South Viet-
namese by stepped-up terrorist, political and dip-
lomatic actions, and by incremental military pres-
sures. And, of course, Hanoi will review period-
ically the option of a resumption of full-scale
hostilities.
27. As noted at the beginning of this section,
Hanoi's present strategy reflects a number of con-
straints which militate against the early resumption
of such hostilities. Of these, the risk of renewed
US military intervention and uncertainty as to the
availability of military supplies from the USSR and
China are probably the most important. Obviously,
any change in Hanoi's assessment of these factors
could result in another change in strategy. On
present evidence, it would seem that the interests
of Peking and Moscow in discouraging a renewal of
general hostilities in Indochina will, if anything,
increase over the next year or two. Hanoi's view
of the risks of US intervention are more difficult
to forecast, particularly since such a forecast in-
volves assumptions about the US posture a year or
two hence. For the moment, however, Hanoi appears
convinced that the risks are high.
28. In general, it would appear to be in Hanoi's
interests, within the limits imposed by its deter-
mination to maintain a secure and viable base in
South Vietnam, to appear cooperative in working out
the Paris Agreements. In particular it will be
concerned that as its intent to maintain military
forces at a high strength level in South Vietnam is
confirmed, President Thieu will pressure the US to
countenance or support efforts by the ARVN to in-
vest and destroy Communist base areas. Such action
by the ARVN might, from Hanoi's point of view, require
a premature return to large-scale conflict. By
adopting a "reasonable" posture once the current
Approved For RTIQIe Mcf /b1TC k-WE*O N'F9i 0400270002-0
 Approved For sMiTIRE 910 1 .: ~IQT 8Q~~1 1R Q00400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE I- COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
supply push is completed, Hanoi might expect to dis-
courage a decision by Thieu to take forceful action.
Hanoi could afford to take some or all of the fol-
lowing actions:
a.) Reaffirm its support for the ICCS and
permit its teams to operate selectively at desig-
nated entry points while continuing to frustrate
coverage of many other entry points along the DMZ
and opposite Laos.
b.) Permit an agreement on Laos to be con-
summated and provide a show of removing its forces
from north Laos as well as the Laos Panhandle once
the internal routes in South Vietnam are developed.
c.) Make a similar show of withdrawing its
forces from Cambodia, and relax its terms for a
Cambodian settlement to some extent, permitting a
solution which did not involve a clear-cut ascendency
for its Khmer Communist allies. Of course, a Com-
munist or pro-Communist regime in Phnom Penh would
be more to Hanoi's advantage than some type of coali-
tion on the Laos model. But this is really not a
critical or vital matter in the near term and in terms
of the requirements of the Communist position in South
Vietnam. For no matter what kind of government exists
in Phnom Penh, it will pose little risk to Communist
use of essential base areas and logistic routes in
that country. And Hanoi does not need access to
Cambodian ports to maintain its forces in southern
South Vietnam as has been demonstrated for several
years. Moreover, Cambodian nature being what it
is, the Communists will always be able to purchase
and secure delivery of large quantities of food,
medicines, and other necessities from or through
Cambodian agents.
d.) In direct relations with the US as well
as in the face it presents to the rest of the world,
Hanoi can emphasize its interest in the reconstruc-
tion of the north and seek assistance, on relatively
severe terms, for that endeavor. This interest is,
indeed, genuine; some individuals in Hanoi may wish
to give it priority for many years and others might
Approved For' s MPEOjl` : R1V PBQ 'y00400270002-0
 Approved For F, , laase g WIQ C,SIQff-P. 0f Zfi 00400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
in time be converted by involvement in the effort.
and by the passage of time. For the present, however,
there is little basis for concluding that the Com-
munists are playing the game in South Vietnam for
any purpose other than to win.
Case B. The "Higher Military Posture" Argument
29. The other school takes the same set of agreed
facts (particularly the evidence on current Communist
capabilities) as its point of departure, but inter-
prets them somewhat differently and reaches some-
what different conclusions. The Case A and Case B
analyses are not entirely antithetical. There is
much overlap and common ground between them. Case
B's proponents, however, rate considerably higher
than Case A's the chances of the Communists' ini-
tiating major offensive military activity over the
next few months, i.e. before October, and certainly
before the end of this calendar year. Case B's pro-
ponents do not believe Hanoi intends to rely for any
prolonged period primarily on political, psychological
and terrorist techniques (or that the Communists can
afford to do:so). Nor do Case B's proponents be-
lieve Hanoi can, or will, long defer the question of
a resort to large scale military action. The Case
B analysis and argument runs as outlined below.
30. A major determinant of Vietnamese Communist
strategy, and shifts therein, is the Hanoi Politburo's
position--and shifts therein--on the issue of basic
Party goals and their relative priority ranking.
For almost two decades, the Party has officially
had three basic goals: (1) protecting and developing
the north, (2) liberating the south and (3) reunifi-
cation. Since (3)'s achievement is contingent on
achievement of (2), the two operative current goals
are liberating the south and protecting/developing the
north.
31. In theory, these two goals are co-equal and
to be simultaneously pursued. Severe problems arise
for the Politburo, however, in situations in which
these goals cannot be assigned equal weight, i.e.
situations in which pursuit of one inevitably pre-
judices pursuit of the other. In such situations,
Approved For I F s e S E r J ' : R44ff 80JM 00400270002-0
 Approved For f6ips~ fOQ1(Q,9,/,Qa :iff?P$OrT00400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOOLE1Y- COOLMINTt'CONTROL 'I,ZRSYSTEMS JOINTLY
these goals have to be given some form or degree of
interim priority ranking. Agreeing on any such re-
lative ranking has been a particularly difficult gnd
awkward problem for the Politburo since Ho Chi Minh's
death in September 1969.
32. So long as he was alive, Ho served the party
as an umpire whose rulings all other Politburo mem-
bers, and other senior party and military leaders,
would unhesitatingly accept, without further argu-
ment or challenge. Thus Ho's prestige and presence
insured that debates over or decisions on policies,
strategy and basic priorities would always stay with-
in bounds and could not become divisive to a degree
that threatened basic party unity, cohesion or dis-
cipline.
33. Ho has been dead for over three and a half
years. His Party Chairman's chair is still empty:
and no one now on the Politburo has the unchallengable
authority or prestige necessary to fill Hots umpire
role. In this post-Ho interregnum, the Politburo
has a presiding officer (First Secretary Le Duan),
but in many respects it is a chairmanless committee--
a type of body ill-suited to handling or coping with
intense debate on fundamental issues. Furthermore,
all members of the Politburo must be aware of the
divisive, corrosive potential, in this context, of a
head to head debate on basic goals and their rela-
tive priority ranking, particularly since policy
positions in any such debate inevitably get as-
sociated with individuals and such debates hence
risk opening the Pandora's box of individual rivalries
and contests for primacy.
34. Several aspects of the situation prevailing
in the summer of 1972--the checking and containment
of the offensive the Communists launched on 30 March,
the GVN's reasonable solidity under pressure, the
vigorous U.S. response (mining and LINEBACKER I),'
President Nixon's commanding and improving domestic
political position, the posture of Moscow and Peking--
impelled the Politburo to face up to (among other;
things) the fact that continued pursuit of the south-
ern liberation goal and struggle in its then current
IR1 q R 0 MVQ0400270002-0
Approved For F pe g9H
 Approved Fol?sg~LQ1f/Q,1fpPI( M'000400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE 11- COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
form would inevitably entail severe, continuing and
probably increasing punishment to the north. Hanoi's
negotiating nibbles of September and negotiating be-
havior in October strongly suggest a Politburo de-
cision that, at least for the time being, the goal
of protecting the north had to be pursued even at the
cost of some prejudice to southern prospects.
35. Chairmanless committees are not very adept at
making--or sticking to--hard choices, particularly
ones of an "either/or" variety. Committees are al-
ways inclined to seek the middle ground of ambiguous
(something for everyone) compromises, frequently ones
containing contrary elements. Some elements of
Hanoi's behavior in November and early December
suggest that the course of the negotations led the
Politburo to think it might be able to protect es-
sential northern equities without materially
jeopardizing southern prospects by attempting to
exploit the negotiations themselves as a vehicle
for driving a wedge between the US and the GVN. In
any event, Hanoi's intransigent posture in November
and early December certainly seems to have been
motivated by this desire (among others).
36. December's events and US actions, notably
LINEBACKER IT, apparently induced the Politburo to
shift ground once again. Whatever may have been
the rationale or motivation, the Politburo acqui-
esced in--and, on 27 January, its representative
signed--a set of agreements which, if strictly
applied in their entirety, certainly protected the
north and held the prospect of major improvement
there, but would have had a devastating impact on
the capabilities, morale and prospects of the
Communists' southern organization. In fact, really
living up to all of these agreements' major pro-
visions would have entailed, for Hanoi, an inde-
finite postponement of the party's goal of liberating
(i.e., conquering) the south. The Hanoi Politburo
must have realized this, and the southern organiza-
tion's leadership certainly did.
37. Though it clearly felt a need to protect the
north, the Politburo was not willing to undercut the
Approved For F `? a dUd1 C UFFF$0 0400270002-0
 Approved For i (aa e SEURET RUFF UMBRA 400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
southern struggle's prospects any more than was ab-
solutely necessary. What Hanoi therefore needed to
do--and immediately set about doing--was to initate
actions which (if successful) would collectively
achieve the following results: reassure the south-
ern organization that it had not been abandoned,
improve its military capabilities (much depleted
by the battles of 1972), advance the "PRG's" in-
terests and political strengths (including its con-
trol.of populated areas and strategic terrain),
undercut the GVN's position and resources, minimize
the adverse potentialities of the Paris Agreements
by hampering the implementation of their inhibiting
provisions (e.g. ICCS inspection), ascertain--by
probe and test--the real limits of US tolerance, and
establish, via this device, a minimally restrictive
plateau of "accepted" Communist behavior. Overall,
Hanoi wanted to create a climate and situation in
which the Agreements' net practical effect--despite
their actual language--was to establish a trade-off
exchange of US prisoners for US military disengagement
and to impose constraints on the GVN's actions while
placing a minimum of effective constraints on Commu-
nist behavior.
38. In the period since 27 January, two things
must have become increasingly evident to the Politburo
in Hanoi and the leadership of the Communists' south-
ern organization on the ground. First, the Commu-
nists' land grab attempts in late January/early
February and the pattern of subsequent military action
has shown that the GVN can cope fairly handily with
Communist military pressures of the nature and scale
essayed to date. Second, in the political sphere,
the GVN's position is so strong and well consolidated
that Communist prospects of early success in this
arena are negligible under present circumstances.
39. It is within this overall context that the
past few months' build-up of Communist military cap-
abilities in South Vietnam ought to be assessed. The
Communists are certainly developing and consolidating
a connected series of enclaves running from the DMZ
to MR 4. They are also developing on a crash basis
a road and logistics network within South Vietnam
Approved For RF e@e 48WJ E'j'. F80tf'f QQ0400270002-0
 Approved For Re a 28ILleytl3CltfffpT&PMW400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
that, when completed, will make these connected en-
claves one vast base and staging area, or redoubt.
Their force and capabilities build-up--in logistic
supplies, manpower and, especially, fire-power--
undoubtedly has its prudential and defensive aspects.
But there are several factors that need to be con-
sidered before dismissing the thesis that Hanoi has
in mind something more militarily ambitious than
defense and concluding that Hanoi's current mili-
tary intentions are limited to probes and "nibbling"
within what has become the normal range since 27
January:
a.) Though both Moscow and Peking (each for
its own reasons) may not want Hanoi to initiate a
fresh round of larger scale combat in South Vietnam,
the current state of relations between these two
major Communist powers is hardly conducive to re-
ciprocal private dialogue and even less to concerted
action. Neither Hanoi's overall behavior nor the
limited amount of available direct evidence on cur-
rent Soviet and Chinese aid pattern provides much
support for the argument that the Soviets and Chinese
will prevent the North Vietnamese from embarking on
further military adventures.
b.) Hanoi is unquestionably interested in as
much foreign aid as possible, but the way Hanoi has
treated prospective Free World donors--including the
US--indicates that Hanoi wants this aid only on its
own terms. It also indicates that Free World aid--
again, including that of the US--does not rank near
the top of the Politburo's priority scale. Under the
present situation, North Vietnam is not under attack,
hence minimal northern equities are already amply
protected. There is no indication that the Politburo
has put the goal of developing the north so much ahead
of liberating the south that it would be willing to
curtail the actions it considered necessary in the
south to get increased economic aid for the north.
Furthermore, Hanoi probably recognizes that the
likelihood of the US Congress approving aid for
North Vietnam--particularly on the latter's terms--
is not very great in any event.
Approved ForTpe'as~ o'6"u( l : B11- ili[ BF00400270002-0
 Approved For L Rek
,,, se ffV ft9fQ,f : CIA-Rpf 8Q O 71199R0~00400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
c.) Any significant increase of Communist
military activity in the south would clearly raise
the risk of US counteraction, including resumed
bombing. But within the Politburo and Central Com-
mittee in Hanoi it could be plausibly argued that
this risk is not all that great. The US has pro-
tested Hanoi's post-January actions in a variety bf
channels but, to date, these protests have been
largely verbal. US actions so far have been limited
to continued bombing in Cambodia (which CongressiQnal
action may soon complicate), two brief sets of raids
in Laos, two reconnaissance overflights of North Viet-
nam, suspension of mine-clearing operations (offsgt
by the fact that the port of Haiphong is already
demonstrably usable) and suspension of aid negotia-
tions (which, given the mood of Congress, were un-
likely to bear fruit anyway). None of these actions
has really hurt North Vietnam and the Politburo prob-
ably assesses the US threshold of tolerance as
fairly high. Furthermore, at least some within the
Politburo would be likely to argue that in light of
recent domestic developments within the United
States, President Nixon--this time--really would be
reluctant to embark on a course of action sure to
provoke additional public and Congressional outcry.
d.) In South Vietnam, the longer the Commu-
nists continue on their present course of action, the
more Thieu's and the GVN's internal position is
likely to improve. If the Communists concentrate
for six months on improving their capabilities (e.g.,
developing their enclaves and base areas) without:
changing their pattern of pressures against the GVN,
Thieu will have six more months to strengthen his 'own
government. The longer the Communists leave Thieu
in relatively undisturbed control over most of South
Vietnam's population and all of its major cities
and towns, the worse will become the actual and
image disparity between the GVN and the PRG. (The;
claims of a "government" whose major town is Loc Ninh
are not very impressive to Vietnamese, or foreign,
eyes.) Furthermore, though a near-term step up in
military pressure could be defended as a response
to post-January GVN provocations, a resumption of
larger-scale military activity after a prolonged
Approved For] J'asS11ZQJ(R14 1 j jAJRPPqgM'g]k8PL000400270002-0
 Approved ForTOPs%MWET RUFF BUMBRAoo4oo270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
period of "normalcy" (i.e., action within the post-
January range) will look very much like a case of
classic military aggression, not an internal polit-
ical struggle spilling over into armed conflict.
40. None of the above proves that the Communists
plan to launch a major offensive within the next few
days or weeks. Given the situation and outlook with-
in the Politburo, however, the Party's scale of
priorities, the Communists' overall situation vis-
a-vis that of the GVN, especially in the political
sphere, and the whole pattern of Communist behavior
since 27 January, it is hard to assess North Viet-
nam's rapid build-up of its southern organization's
military capabilities to their present levels as
primarily prudential or defensive. Instead, those
who subscribe to the Case B analysis would argue
that the odds are at least even that within the
next two to three months, the Communists will in-
itiate military action within South Vietnam of a
type unambiguously different in kind and scale from
that which has become "normal" since January. The
odds that the North Vietnamese will initiate such
action before the end of this year--i.e., early in
the next dry season--are even higher.
41. By Case B's analysis, Hanoi does not intend
to let the Thieu government grow undisturbed in mili-
tary and political strength a day longer than the
Politburo deems necessary. The Communists' actions
of the past few months look very much like their
traditional'practice of preparing the battlefield.
The Politburo itself may not have finally decided
just how ambitious its forces ought to be in the
military arena. In estimating North Vietnamese
intentions and probable Communist actions, however,
it is important not to get hung up on our own
terminology or enmeshed in the ambiguities of the
label "offensive." The kind of actions the North
Vietnamese need to achieve and probably intend to
essay include isolating and (if possible) overrunning
Quang Tri, capturing a major provincial capital such
as Tay Ninh, establishing and holding a coastal
salient in some area such as Sa Huynh, and opening
access to populated areas such as the coastal MR 2
Approved Foi- R sQ]gQqR(Rfp`1 P$T41ff., 000400270002-0
 Approved For,-8sS1fAr :IgP8tTM01tWO00400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
lowlands or the western Mekong delta. Any such
actions, or combinations thereof, would undoubtedly
be accompanied by widespread heavy harassment else-
where designed to tie the GVN down and inhibit its
reinforcing places under direct attack. Whether
this is an "offensive" is a matter of terminological
preference. This is the type of military action
Case B's proponents feel could be initiated at any
time, may well be initiated within the next two
months, and probably will be essayed before the end
of this calendar year.
42. In general, Case A reflects the views of
the Office of National Estimates and the Office of
Current Intelligence. Case B reflects the views of
the DCI's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.
The Operations Directorate's East Asian Division
and Vietnam Station subscribe to much of the Case
A argument as a short term assessment valid through
this rainy season (i.e., through September) but the
Division and the Station have reservations about
extending this line of argument beyond that time
frame. The Office of Economic Research (OER) is in
general agreement with Case A as it applies to the
next one month or so; but on the basis of emerging
Communist capabilities, OER considers it risky to
discount.the possibility of Hanoi's electing to
initiate major military action within this calendar
year.
Approved For FIeQ se W t: `-%F80V*VA0%0400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
A
N
N
E
X
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000400270002-0
 Approved Flr(Wea3EM0F0R.IgffiRDBRIIR000400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
ANNEX A
Net Assessment of Military Capabilities
I. The Manpower Balance in Indochina
South Vietnam
1. The Communist offensive in 1972 precipi-
tated very high losses for both South Vietnamese and
Communist regular combat forces. Despite such losses,
both sides kept their main forces intact and during
the 1972/73 dry season have been refitting depleted
combat units as well as upgrading their respective
military capabilities.
2. Since 1 September 1972, North Vietnam has
dispatched some 85,000 men in regular infiltration
groups and organic units to South Vietnam. Currently,
Communist regular combat forces number about 163,000
men in 13 NVA Infantry Divisions as well as numerous
independent infantry, armor, artillery and air defense
units for a total of 379 maneuver battalions. How-
ever, the overall military manpower balance remains
decidedly with the GVN. Comparable figures for the
Government of Vietnam's forces show 287,000 men in
13 infantry divisions as well as several independent
infantry, armor and artillery battalions for a total
of 461 maneuver battalions. The GVN also has a
larger administrative services support structure
than do the Communists. The GVN has a total of
224,000 administrative services personnel compared
to the Communist total of about 72,000 men.
3. The quantitative balance of forces in South
Vietnam is shown in the table below:
Approved FcWWeak 4 T/04RUk-kDF &fdiV44R000400270002-0
 Approved Fxf6yeft1J101RID1AR000400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
Comparison of South Vietnamese and Communist
Military Forces by Military Region 1/
May 1973
MR 1
MR 2
MR 3
MR 4
Total
Regular Combat Forces
South Vietnamese
85,000
57,000
67,000
78,000
287,000
VC/NVA
80,000
29,000
27,000
27,000
163,000
Administrative Services
South Vietnamese
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
224,000
VC/NVA
23,000
18,000
17,000
14,000
72,000
1/ Communist regular combat forces include personnel in VC/
NVA combat, combat support, and air defense units and in local
force companies and platoons. There are approximately 16,000 men
in air defense units. South Vietnamese figures are based on
present-for-duty strengths of ARVN/VNMC combat and combat service
support units, 33 Ranger, and 262 Regional Force battalions.
4. In Laos, the regular combat forces support-
ing the Royal Laotian Government slightly outnumber
those of the Communists. Currently the friendly regu-
lar combat forces in Laos total some 68,000 men
(51,000 Laotians and 17,000 Thai), while the Commu-
nist regular combat forces total some 58,000 men,
(38,000 North Vietnamese and 20,000 Pathet Lao). In
addition to the regular combat forces, there are an
estimated 25,000 friendly administrative services
troops in Laos as opposed to 57,000 support troops
for the Communists. However, some 45,000 of these
Communist administrative services troops are located
in the Laotian Panhandle and are responsible for op-
erating the Ho Chi Minh Trail to South Vietnam and
Cambodia. Therefore, only a small portion of these
administrative services troops in South Laos are
actually supporting the Communist combat units there.
Approved For1j0jiseMJIOM61: &Uff&8Ubff&;&00400270002-0
 Approved Foag6V
,8Jfl1RiFFR000400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
5. In northern Laos the Communists have a total
combat force of some 31,000 men. Of this total 16,000
are NVA organized into nine regiments and independent
battalions, and 15,000 men are in the numerous Pathet
Lao and Dissident Neutralists units. Communist combat
forces in southern Laos number about 27,000 men, some
22,000 NVA and 5,000 Pathet Lao. A comparison of Com-
munist and friendly forces in northern and southern
Laos is presented in the table below:
Communist and Friendly Forces in Laos
May 1973
Total
North
South
Communist Regular Combat
Total
58,000
31,000
27,000
NVA
38,000
16,000
22,000
Pathet Lao
20,000
15,000
5,000
Friendly Regular Combat
t
l
68,000
N/A
N/A
a
To
Laotians
51,000
N/A
N/A
Thai
17,000
13,500
3,500
Communist Administrative
Services
Total
57,000
12,000
45,000
NVA
47,000
6,000
41,000
Pathet Lao
10,000
6,000
4,000
Friendly Administrative
Services
l
000
25
N/A
N/A
Tota
,
Approved For f , 0fte8t, : &&&P8dfX00400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
Cambodia
6. In Cambodia, the government holds a decided
numerical superiority over the Khmer Communists.
FANK is estimated to have a regular ground combat
strength of from 125,000 to 150,000 men while the
KC are estimated to have only 40,000 to 50,000 men
in that category. However, 70,000 to 85,000 of
FANK's combat strength lies in territorial companies
and battalions whose primary mission is the defense
of fixed positions. The remaining 55,000 to 65,000
men are incorporated into a mobile reserve force built
around four infantry divisions. It is this 55,000
to 65,000 man force that is generally called upon to
conduct offensive operations against positions held
by the KC.
7. In addition to regular combat strength, FANK
is supported by some 60,000 administrative services
personnel, while the KC are backed by an unknown num-
ber of support and guerrilla/militia personnel. There
are also some 5,000 VC/NVA combat troops and 28,400
VC/NVA administrative services personnel in Cambodia,
but most of these personnel are engaged in supporting
Communist operations inside South Vietnam. A compari-
son of FANK, KC and VC combat and administrative
services strengths is shown in the table below:
Comparison of FANK and Communist
Military Forces May 1973
KC
V'C/NVA
Regular Combat 125-150,000
40-50,000
5,000
Administrative Services 60,000
N/A*
28,400
*There is not enough information available
cation of KC administrative services.
to permit
quantifi-
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
South Vietnam
8. Hanoi's commitment of tanks and artillery
to Communist military forces in South Vietnam this
dry season appears to have at least equaled the num-
ber sent south a year ago for the Communist offen-
sive in the spring of 1972. Since virtually all of
the tanks and artillery have now arrived, the Commu-
nists will enter the 1973 wet season in probably
their strongest firepower position of the war. Fur-
thermore, the firepower is dispersed more widely
throughout the country this year--as attested by
the large number of tanks and artillery which deployed
to southern South Vietnam--in marked contrast to a
year ago, when the emphasis was on MR 1.
9. Currently, it is estimated that Hanoi has
sent some 600 tanks south since late October 1972,
surpassing the number committed to South Vietnam a
year ago.* Moreover, about one-third of the total
number of regular infiltration groups destined for
South Vietnam and Cambodia this year are estimated
to be artillery groups, both field and antiaircraft
(AAA) artillery. In addition, seven integral air
defense regiments deployed from North Vietnam (four)
and Laos (three) into the northern half of South
Vietnam since early January 1973. Combined, these
artillery groups and units are estimated to have a
total of some 700 weapons--200 field (including
122-mm and 130-mm) and more than 500 AAA guns--com-
pared to about 1,000 such weapons sent south last dry
season.
10. There also have been improvements in the
firepower position of South Vietnam's Armed Forces
(RVNAF). Currently, the South Vietnamese military
forces are estimated to have more than 1,000 medium
*The upward revision of the tank estimate results
from the recent arrival of the 201st NVA Armor Regi-
ment in South Vietnam and the retroactive identifica-
tion of two infiltration groups as armor groups.
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
and light tanks, 120 175-mm guns, and over 2,000
155-mm and 105-mm artillery howitzers. In comparing
field artillery, however, the Communists' 122-mm and
130-mm guns are superior overall with respect to
range, accuracy, and rate of fire to the RVNAF field
guns. Thus, despite the large number of weapons as
well as tanks in the RVNAF inventory, with the with-
drawal of US air assets Hanoi's relative firepower
position is probably better than at any time in the
past.
11. In addition to its armor and artillery,
North Vietnam also has the capability to mount lim-
ited offensive air operations in support of Communist
ground forces in South Vietnam. The Communists cur-
rently have about 200 MIG-15, MIG-17, MIG-19, and
MIG-21 aircraft in the north. Although these air-
craft have been used exclusively in a defensive role
against US aircraft, they could be converted and
used in a tactical support role relatively easily.
North Vietnam also has eight IL-28 light bombers
which have sufficient range to be used against tar-
gets in South Vietnam. Although the South Vietnam-
ese Air Force has some 425 attack aircraft with which
to counter the North Vietnamese, the principal deter-
rent to Hanoi in launching limited offensive air op-
erations in the south through at least this coming
wet season probably is the threat of US retaliation.
12. Combined US and Laotian air power has been
the leveling influence offsetting the Communist ground
superiority in Laos. Increasingly, however, Hanoi
has upgraded its firepower to counteract the friendly
air capability. Although the size and extent of the
Communist deployment of long-range field guns, anti-
aircraft artillery, and tanks to Laos has been far
below the level of its firepower deployment into
South Vietnam, it has had a significant impact in
improving Communist capabilities.
Approved For eS I:KL l : t 8URjV jrr0400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
13. The backbone of the Royal Lao Government's
large caliber artillery is a total of some 85 105-mm
and 155-mm howitzers, which are no match for the Com-
munists' 122-mm and 130-mm field guns. Thus, with
the firepower balance on the ground clearly in favor
of the Communists, the ability of the FAR/FAN to with-
stand enemy action in the future will depend largely
on the augmentation of both the Lao Government's air
power and artillery. Although progress is being made
in both these areas, the prospects through the end of
the 1973 rainy season are not good.
14. With its currently available 82 combat air-
craft, the RLAF will not be able to compensate for
the loss of US air power even if it reaches its full
combat potential. These aircraft would be no match
for the sophisticated North Vietnamese air defenses.
Although North Vietnam has never flown any airstrikes
in Laos in support of PL/NVA ground forces, Hanoi--
as in South Vietnam--has the capability to do so.
Moreover, the current aircraft in the RLAF inventory
are not capable of preventing such airstrikes by the
North Vietnamese.
Cambodia
15. The Communists have not yet employed the
large-caliber heavy weapons against government forces
in Cambodia which they have used effectively in South
Vietnam and Laos. The Khmer Communists are occasionally
noted using 105-mm howitzers and 122-mm rockets, but
their inventory of such weapons is believed to be
relatively small, and most attacks are limited to
mortar and recoilless rifle fire.
16. In contrast, FANK is reasonably well equipped,
but its fire support capability remains limited. The
artillery corps only has a limited number of 105-mm
howitzers and is generally incapable of effectively
supporting troops in the field. Thus on balance it
seems that neither FANK nor the KC appear to have
a clear firepower advantage on the ground.
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01: CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
17. The Cambodian Air Force is fairly competent,
but it is small and flies an average of only 10--15
strike sorties a day. Many of these are against
days-old targets, much to the detriment of ground
forces who are in'need of more immediate close air''
support. Moreover, in the recent heavy fighting,
FANK has relied much more on US strikes than on
less effective Cambodian strikes, which have not
been a key factor in the firepower balance.
III. The Logistical Situation
18. The Communists' 1972/73 dry season military
resupply campaign is now in its final stages, and
large--possibly record--quantities of supplies--in-
cluding virtually every type of ordnance and mili-
tary equipment--have been dispatched to South Viet-
nam, Cambodia, and Laos. Ammunition shipments alone
are estimated to have amounted to from 24,000 to more
than 30,000 tons.
19. Many of these supplies have already moved
into South Vietnam; the remainder either has been
stockpiled or is still moving in contiguous areas.
Deducting ammunition expended or destroyed during
the past six months, we estimate that there is cur-
rently enough ammunition in or en route to South
Vietnam to sustain fighting at recent levels for
12 to 21 months, or at levels comparable to the 1972
offensive for at least six months. Moreover, if the
North Vietnamese were to renew heavy fighting, they
could move additional quantities of ammunition into
northern South Vietnam relatively easily.
20. The first sign of a major pickup in lo-
gistic activity occurred in October, when COMINT
detected a surge in supply shipments through the
Binh Tram 18 area in the central Panhandle of North
Vietnam. By November, the pace of Communist logis-
tic activity in Laos and Cambodia was beginning to
increase. Following initial emphasis on road repair
and local resupply, priority soon shifted to the
southward movement of supplies for South Vietnam.
Approved Fors gM 1 :Al&1ZFiP8 SIB'RRP00400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
The second phase of the Communists' dry season cam-
paign, designed to move a large share of the military
supplies previously brought into the southern part of
North Vietnam, was apparently kicked off in early
February. From 1 February into early March, more
than 9,000 tons of food and ordnance were moved into
Laos via the Ban Karai Pass alone. During that five-
week period the rate of delivery of supplies through
Ban Karai was the highest ever detected there. Mean-
while, large amounts of supplies also were moving
into Laos on roads west of the DMZ and directly across
the DMZ into northern South Vietnam.
21. The third phase of the dry season transporta-
tion effort began in mid-March, with an emphasis on
moving supplies already in Laos into the northern
half of South Vietnam or farther south to Cambodia
and southern South Vietnam. It is scheduled to con-
tinue through May and currently appears to be cul-
minating in a massive supply push through southern
Laos toward South Vietnam's MR-2 and possibly points
south. During this phase Communist logistic activity
appears to have peaked in Cambodia.
22. Although evidence on the quantities of sup--
plies which have actually been delivered to the vari-
ous battlefields of South Vietnam is fragmentary, a
few examples demonstrate the success of this dry sea-
son's resupply campaign. Recent COMINT intercepts
have revealed stockpiles of almost 7,500 tons of
ordnance in northwestern MR-1 (from the DMZ to the
A Shau Valley) alone. Much of this materiel was
moved directly across the DMZ from North Vietnam,
while the remainder arrived by the back door, through
Laos. In the A Shau region roughly 6,000 tons of
supplies, largely rice, are among recent deliveries
reflected in COMINT. Farther south, COMINT of 30
April indicated that at least 1,100 tons of cargo
had already been transported into the central high-
lands, and that an additional 4,500 tons were to be
shipped before 20 May. Most of the goods probably
comprised military equipment and ordnance. This
drive follows a sustained effort directed toward that
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved For Release 200 / 9 054M00400270002-0
TOP SE -
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
area during much of the dry season, despite the rela-
tively low level of fighting there. Backstopping this
activity are large quantities of supplies stockpiled
in southern Laos: one logistical element near the
tri-border, for example, recently reported having
about 2,500 tons of supplies--both food and military
supplies--on hand.
23. By June, the cumulative effect of seasonal
rains will reduce Communist capability to truck sup-
plies through the Laos Panhandle. Many units will
remove vehicles from use until September or October
and logistic activity will be at a relatively low
level. The Communists could, however, maintain lies
through the summer a substantial movement of supplies
across the DMZ into MR-1 and, by using waterways be-
tween Laos and Cambodia.
Regional Analysis
Summar
24. From the standpoint of manpower and logis-
tics, cone communists have the best capability for carry-
ing out a major offensive during the summer months
in MRs 1 and 3. Hanoi's forces in these regions could
severely test ARVN, threaten major population centers,
and possibly capture some provincial capitals. In
MR-1 the rainy season will not begin until next fall,
while, in MR-3, especially the northern part, short
supply lines will mitigate the effect of the rainy
weather. In contrast, North Vietnamese capabilities
in the lowlands of MR-2 and probably throughout MR-4
are limited to road interdiction, attacking isolated
outposts, and tying down ARVN forces. In the high-
lands of MR-2, the enemy could launch multi-regimental
attacks, but could not, capture and hold any provin-
cial capitals. However, heavy seasonal rains would
hamper Communist armor and artillery mobility. South
Vietnamese forces are in a maximum defensive posture
countrywide, and no General Reserve currently exists
for speedy deployment to high threat areas, as was
done in 1972.
Approved For ReleiMf00 BW%- Bfb1 "0270002-0
 Approved For, e?PV1R : R fj 8tTf 1]F 00400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS, JOINTLY
25. The Communists have the capability to under-
take major military activity in either northern or
southern Laos. Although Communist forces will be
increasingly restricted by the coming rains, it seems
likely that the RLG would be unable to cope with such
an offensive without massive outside assistance. In
Cambodia, logistical constraints associated with the
rains probably will reduce only slightly the Commu-
nists' capability to maintain heavy pressure on FANK
and against major LOCs.
South Vietnam
Military Region 1
26. Currently, Communist regular combat forces
in Military Region (MR) 1 are estimated to be about
80,000 men representing the highest level of the war.
The Communist main force threat is highest in the
two northern provinces of MR-1--Quang Tri and Thua
Thien--where an estimated 60,000 regular combat forces
in four infantry divisions* and 15 air defense, two
armor, seven artillery, and ten independent infantry
regiments are opposing roughly 50,000 South Vietnam-
ese combat troops in three infantry divisions. In
the three southern provinces, there are about 20,000
Communist regular combat forces in two infantry di-
visions opposing about 35,000 South Vietnamese combat
troops in two infantry divisions. The military region
net balance of forces, however, is roughly comparable
to that which existed during the 1972 offensve.
27. Nevertheless, compared to last year, the
Communists control most of the rural areas and have
deployed their main force units near major cities and
towns throughout the military region. Moreover, they
have access to large base areas with secure lines of
communication near the Laos/South Vietnam border and
*This does not include any of the 308th Division
or the headquarters and divisional support of the
312th Division which redeployed to North Vietnam in
January and April, respectively.
Approved For Fk a "T: C& 60 0400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
have distributed this year's armor and long range ar-
tillery--130-mm and 122-mm field guns--more evenly
throughout the military region. These factors, to-
gether with the current maximum defensive deployment
of South Vietnamese combat units, would allow the
Communists to concentrate any military efforts, over
the next several months, on key target areas surround-
ing large cities such as Quang Tri, Hue, Da Nang, and
Quang Ngai.
28. Logistically, the Communists are in a very
strong position in MR-1. Large stockpiles of ammuni-
tion and other military goods are now on hand south
of the DMZ and along the western border of the re-
gion, as evidenced by recent COMINT reflecting the
storage of almost 7,500 tons of ordnance in that area
alone. Stocks of this magnitude, together with the
area's proximity to North Vietnam will enable the
Communists to support logistically any level of tac-
tical activity they desire in MR-1.
29. Bad weather, which will not constrain Com-
munist logistical and combat operations in MR-1 un-
til October, will pose fewer problems this year as a
result of extensive new Communist road and base area
construction. The establishment of large storage
facilities, such as those recently identified in
Dong Ha and Khe Sanh in northern
Quang Tri Province, and in the A Shau Valley and near
Kham Duc in western MR-l, will enable the Communists
to rely more heavily upon in-country stocks than in
the past and thus shorten their supply lines to the
major combat areas. Movement along the corridors
will also be eased by important new improvements to
the Communist road system both along the western
border and eastward into the coastal lowlands and
the POL pipelines being extended within northeast
Quang Tri from North Vietnam and along the Routes
922 and 966 entry corridors from Laos.
Approved Fo se.M 0PI9 :fI&FPPBRT RW00400270002-0
 Approved For Rel e~2 s Q9LO IA~RQP80TQ1,Z1 tQ T00270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COKMIINTt''COINITROtL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
Military Region 2
30. At the present time, the Communists have
some 29,000 combat troops deployed in Military Re-
gion 2. Most of the strike force consists of 10 in-
fantry regiments and one artillery and one air de-
fense regiment. Within the military region, the
disposition of VC/NVA combat forces and the relative
main force threat has not changed appreciably over
the past year. More than half--16,000--of the mili-
tary region's combat troops (including two infantry
divisions supported by armor, long range artillery,,
and air defense units) are located in the Central
Highlands area. The other key area in which the
Communists have main force units deployed is Binh
Dinh Province, where the 3rd NVA Division is oper-
ating with some 4,000 troops.
31. Saigon has its forces deployed in an almost
identical fashion to the Communists. The South Viet-
namese have a total of 57,000 combat troops in Mili-
tary Region 2. Roughly 30,000 men are deployed in
the Central Highlands including one infantry divi-
sion supported by armor and ranger units. The other
principal concentration of forces includes the 22nd
Division in Binh Dinh Province.
32. Logistically, the VC/NVA have the capability
to escalate the fighting sharply in the western high-
lands of MR-2, but except for Binh Dinh Province they
cannot support a sustained offensive in the coastal
lowlands. Supplies have been moving into the B-3
Front from Laos and Cambodia at a fast rate through-
out much of the current dry season, which is now
climaxing in this area with a Communist effort to
move over 5,000 tons of supplies--mostly military
equipment and ordnance--into the B-3 Front before
the end of May. This quantity of supplies is far
in excess of current Communist requirements. Ample
stockpiles of food apparently are also on hand. Aerial
reconnaissance over the past several months has re-
vealed a regular flow of supplies eastward along the
Route 19 system from Cambodia--a traditional source
of food---and a recently intercepted message revealed
Approved For ReId
TOO-IO'O1b 11040270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01: CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
that nearly 2,500 tons of supplies--of which 1,000
tons were identified as rice--were in storage in the
tr:i-border area.
33. To house their in-country stocks the Commu-
nists have developed numerous new base camps and
cache sites in northern Kontum Province and along
the western border with Cambodia. The Communists in
MR-2 have also been building new roads to improve
their logistic capabilities in both the highlands
and in coastal Binh Dinh Province.
Military Region 3
34. Communist regular combat forces in MR-3
should be well rested and in good condition for of-
fensive operations during the coming wet season.
Over the last several months the activity of Commu-
nist main force units has been limited to occasional
harassing attacks, training, and integrating newly
arrived personnel from North Vietnam into combat
units.
35. At present there are some 27,000 VC/NVA
combat personnel in MR-3 organized into two divi-
sions, three commands (armor, artillery and sapper)
and six independent infantry regiments. In contrast
to previous years, these personnel are supported by
long range artillery--122-mm and 130-mm field guns--
for the first time, and by many more tanks. While
the mobility of these heavy weapons will be con-
strained during the wet season, they still could be
employed against ARVN forces. Also, low hanging
clouds would retard South Vietnamese air operations.
36. Opposing the Communists in MR-3 are roughly
67,000 ARVN combat troops in three infantry divisions
supported by ranger, armor, and regional force units.
While the government force in MR-3 is more than double
that of the Communists, it is charged with defending
all government-held territory from attack. This would
allow the Communists to concentrate their forces for
Approved Ff)MeW(t%OR.jqIPjKD MA1j IIR000400270002-0
 Approved For ReleMfO(~LQMECFA "Ol j7$ ,QQ.pX0270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
selected engagements. Thus, the Communists will have
the offensive capability to severely test particular
government positions should they decide to do so.
37. The Communists also have been developing
a strong logistical base in MR-3--particularly along
the Cambodian/MR-3 border--this dry season. Their
control of the border area has provided them unre-
stricted use of major roads in northern Tay Ninh,
Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces, which, accord-
ing to almost daily reports from South Vietnamese
aerial observers, have supported a steady stream of
eastbound trucks, many of them towing antiaircraft
or heavy artillery pieces. The Communists have also
newly constructed large, permanent storage and com-
munications facilities east of the Cambodian border.
38. Besides receiving cargo from the north
through the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Communists in
MR-3 have also been acquiring large quantities of
supplies from internal sources in recent months.
Reportedly a flourishing trade with local merchants
has been established, and legally licensed agents
have been used on a regular basis to purchase food
and other goods in Saigon and other urban markets
and deliver the supplies to the Communists.
39. As the dry season draws to a close the
Communists have built up a logistic capability to
launch major offensive activity in MR-3. A capabil-
ity to sustain major operations, however, will be
diminished during the wet season when problems of
supply distribution and weapon maneuverability begin
to appear. In the western border areas, where sup-
plies are both abundant and close at hand, the ef-
fect of the rainy season will be less.
Military Region 4
40. Communist capabilities for large scale of-
fensive activity in the Delta during the rainy season
will be less than those for other areas of South Viet-
nam. Significant personnel losses have continued in
Approved For RAM 2U1/~A "TCIR- b01WfM?0Q400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
the Delta since the ceasefire and most of the combat
units are estimated to be understrength. The heavy
rains and flooding associated with the wet season,
coupled with the open terrain and canals which criss-
cross the area, will limit the concentration of main
force units primarily to GVN controlled lines-of-
communication.
41. Currently, Communist strength in the Delta
is estimated to be about 27,000 men in two infantry
divisions and 11 independent infantry regiments con-
centrated in Dinh Tuong, Rien Phong and Chuong Thien
Provinces, and in the Cambodia border area of Chau
Doc Province. Some increase in the strength of Com-
munist combat forces in the military region can be
expected as recently arrived infiltrators are in-
tegrated into understrength combat units over the
next month or so. On the other hand, South Viet-
namese combat forces are roughly three times that of
the Communists numbering about 78,000 men in three
infantry divisions supported by ranger, armor, and
regional force units.
42. Given the above conditions and barring a
major redeployment of GVN troops out of the Delta, a
significant deterioration of the South Vietnamese
position in the Delta over the wet season appears
unlikely. However, the Communists still retain
enough punch in several areas of the Delta--notably
Dinh Tuong and Chuong Thien Provinces and the border
areas of Chau Doc and Kien Phong Provinces--to over-
run isolated positions and temporarily interdict lines
of communication.
43. The Communists have substantially improved
their logistic position in MR-4 this dry season by
rebuilding stockpiles along the eastern Cambodian
border. They have been relatively less successful,
however, in moving supplies into the interior of the
Delta. Their capability to logistically support of-
fensive military actions is, therefore, strongest
along the Cambodian border and in those areas in the
Delta--Base Area 470 in western Dinh Tuong Province
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved For R?os 200leg/ It-fRfOTt9gf(ge400270002-0
SE RE
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
and the U Minh Forest area of southern Kien Giang
and adjacent Chuong Thien Province--that have con-
tinued to receive regular supply shipments. Although
a shift to waterborne traffic will probably ensure a
continuing flow of supplies into the Delta during
the wet season, localized supply shortages, similar
to those observed last year, will probably reappear.
44. The Communists continue to maintain sub-
stantial combat and administrative services forces
in both northern and southern Laos. NVA forces in
Laos are roughly comparable in equipment and effec-
tiveness to NVA forces in South Vietnam. They have
borne the major brunt of Communist-initiated combat
operations and are the best disciplined and led
troops fighting in Laos. The Pathet Lao (PL) are
used primarily to hold and administer an area, once
taken, and in a sense their role is "pacification."
45. Currently, there are approximately 31,000
Communist combat troops in northern Laos in nine NVA
regiments and independent battalions, as well as num-
erous PL units. In southern Laos, Communist combat
troops number some 27,000 men in nine NVA regiments
and independent battalions as well as PL units. These
troops are opposed by 68,000 friendly ground combat
troops throughout Laos comprised of Royal Lao Army
(FAR), pro-government neutralists (FAN), guerrilla
forces, and Thai troops.
46. It is clear that friendly forces have been
outmatched by the combined combat forces of the NVA
and the PL. Apart from the element of firepower, the
most serious liability facing FAR/FAN forces has been
the lack of motivated leadership and fighting spirit.
The morale of FAR/FAN troops reached its nadir imme-
diately before the ceasefire and has risen somewhat
since that time. The basic problems of low pay, poor
training, and inadequate leadership, however, continue
unabated. The combat effectiveness of the Meo--gen-
erally considered to be the best of the Laotian troops--
has declined considerably during the past two years of
Approved For Relea` OO g -F O1 R84o0270002-0
 Approved For Re e?OgVVAL4 f V CoWff~400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
heavy fighting. Moreover, the Thai forces cannot be
counted on to resist any sustained NVA pressure with-
out US tactical air support. By comparison, there
have been relatively few signs of morale problems
among either the PL or the NVA troops serving in Laos.
Both forces have, in general, fought effectively and
well, even under difficult combat conditions. Al-
though the tactical initiative during the previous
wet season has traditionally rested with the friendly
forces, Communist forces do have the capability to
launch major offensive activity in northern and south-
ern Laos. It seems likely that the RLG would be un-
able to cope with such an offensive, barring massive
outside assistance.
47. An important by-product of North Vietnam's
extensive use of the Laos Panhandle as a supply cor-
ridor to South Vietnam is that all types of supplies,
well in excess of requirements, are readily available
to Communist tactical forces in southern Laos. Be-
cause of the dual role of the logistical system through
southern Laos, it is impossible to delineate exactly
which supplies are earmarked for internal use and which
are to be transshipped to South Vietnam. In any case,
there has never been any evidence of serious shortages
of supplies for the tactical forces in the Panhandle.
48. The current picture is no different. With
the heavy dry season effort behind them, and in the
absence of US bombing, the Communists' position in
southern Laos is certainly very strong. Many of the
thousands of tons of supplies that have moved into
southern Laos this dry season remain there now, either
because they were delivered for use there, or because
Laos now provides a bomb-free sanctuary adjacent to
important areas of tactical activity in South Vietnam
and Cambodia. These stockpiles give the Communists
in southern Laos the capability to support logistically
any foreseeable level of combat for an extended period.
49. The Communists also are in a strong logistic
position in North Laos. The North Vietnamese are just
completing a successful dry season resupply campaign
Approved For Reler'-QIbOg1&GRA- 1W01li04bO270002-0
 Approved For Flee gMff J fSOUT( 1~7hf900400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
in the North, much of it directed toward the PDJ area.
From 1 October through the end of January, some 2,000
tons of ammunition and more than 800 tons of food,
petroleum, and unidentified cargo were detected moving
out Route 7--a more or less routine resupply effort.
After the ceasefire in South Vietnam went into effect
on 27 January, however, the urgency of resupplying
NVA units in northern Laos became more pronounced.
Intercepted communications disclosed a campaign to
move an unprecedented quantity--6,600 tons--of materiel
to northern Laos during the first 22 days of February.
Subsequent intercepts detected about 2,000 tons being
moved in the period (virtually all of it identified
as ordnance) and it seems likely that a large part
of the remaining tonnage also was moved into northern
Laos undetected.
50. Since 1 March, supplies have continued to
be shipped to northern Laos although at a pace well
below that observed in February. Also, roads to the
PDJ have been upgraded this spring, easing the move-
ment of supplies to forward areas, and there have
been indications that the movement of supplies west
from storage areas at Ban Ban is at high levels.
51. All things considered, the Communists prob-
ably have sufficient supplies in northern Laos to
cover almost any option they might choose in the next
several months, including major offensive operations.
Cambodia
52. Despite a three-to-one superiority in combat
forces, it appears unlikely that FANK will be able to
substantially improve'its position during the current
rainy season, and further deterioration cannot be pre-
cluded. Since the collapse of operation CHENLA II
in late 1971, FANK has displayed a lack of offensive
spirit, and has remained defensively clustered around
lines of communication and major towns. With increasing
emphasis on the defense of fixed positions, mobility
has declined, and reaction to enemy initiatives has
been sluggish and poorly planned. The KC, on the
Approved Fob asA6MW1 REU P 4Mf 000400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
other hand, have become increasingly adept at. con-
centrating multi-battalion and multi-regimental forces
for attacks against FANK and have taken advantage of
the unrestricted movement throughout most of the coun-
try afforded them by FANK's lack of aggressiveness.
53. During the current rainy season, the Com-
munists should be capable of maintaining the inter-
dictions of Routes 1 and 2 and cause continued dis-
ruption along--if not the interdiction of--the Mekong.
With on-going improvement, they probably will be cap-
able of bringing heavier pressure to bear against other
land routes as well. Moreover, the loss of one or
more provincial capitals now in friendly hands cannot
be precluded. The loss of Phnom Penh, on the other
hand, appears highly unlikely, provided the bulk of
its defensive garrison is not deployed elsewhere and
is competently led.
54. KC forces face few logistical constraints
over the next several months. They are virtually
self-sufficient in non-military supplies such as food,
clothing, medicine, and POL, but rely heavily on the
i VC NVA for weapons and ammunition.
a part of the large quantities
of supplies moved south through southern Laos and
eastern Cambodia by the North Vietnamese this dry
season was earmarked specifically for the KC. When
a ceasefire agreement appeared imminent late last
year, the North Vietnamese relocated most of their
force strength back to their old base areas along
the eastern Cambodia border. This VC/NVA departure
from the west bank of the Mekong has not visibly af-
fected Communist supply traffic in the central and
western provinces; in fact, aerial observers report
waterborne and overland traffic over known LOCs to
the west has not diminished, indicating that the NVA
probably left some of their rear services units be-
hind and are still maintaining direct ties to the
main NVA resupply conduit--the Mekong, and overland
Routes 97/975 and 13. Several low level sources also
have described the existence of separate KC supply
lines leading from major Vietnamese supply depots
in Kratie and Kompong Cham Provinces. Thus, al-
though our information is fragmentary and incomplete,
it appears that the KC also still maintain joint KC/
NVA ordnance stockpiles west of the Mekong which they
can draw on.
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved ForIReeinlOO11 /.Q1 : 6- P$.Q.TQ.'1,~ 9000400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
ANNEX B
Recent Communist Construction Activity
1. During the current dry season the North
Vietnamese have substantially increased and strength-
ened their logistic ties to South Vietnam. Although
substantial improvement was again made to the Ho Chi
Minh Trail running through southern Laos and eastern
Cambodia, most construction this year--particularly
since the cease-fire--has been aimed at improving
North Vietnamese access into and between Communist
controlled areas in South Vietnam. Indeed, if the
LOC improvements already detected in South Vietnam
during the past 6-8 months are pieced together and
several gaps extrapolated, a strong case can be
made that the North Vietnamese intend to open a
motorable in-country route extending from the DMZ
southward along the western border of South Vietnam
into MR-3, and possibly farther on to COSVN Head-
quarters in Tay Ninh Province--a total distance of
some 450 miles.
2. This season has also seen the addition of two
new petroleum pipelines into GVN MR-1, complementing
the original pipeline pushed quickly through the
eastern DMZ during the 1972 spring offensive. Ad-
ditionally, there are indications that the North
Vietnamese intend to open a series of airstrips in
South Vietnam and southern Laos, presumably to
ferry priority cargos and prominent personnel be-
tween major Communist base areas on small transport
aircraft.
3. The extension and linkup of in-country truck
routes and petroleum pipeline between VC/NVA main
force strongholds is a marked change from past Com-
munist dry season efforts which kept their logistic
activities in South Vietnam at a low profile because
B-1
Approved For RI"]Re 1ffT] C$00'h0400270002-0
 Approved For RRahma~( QQ~/ q1 RGIA DP T ~7Rgt000400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT p- KEYYY::HIIOLEII- COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
of the threat of Allied air and ground attack. The
recent emphasis on in-country LOC development is
significant both in terms of Communist military
strategy and in legitimizing Communist presence in
South Vietnam. Militarily, the North Vietnamese have
committed themselves to a conventional warfare stance
with the introduction this season of heavy modern
mobile systems. With their large arsenal of tanks,
heavy artillery, SAMs, and fleets of trucks, they
require: (1) well protected, high-capacity resupply
lines with large storage facilities, and (2) tactical
mobility, or high speed arteries for rapid movement
of armor and troops between battlefronts. No longer
does the motorable part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail end
at or near the western South Vietnam border crossing
points. Now, as a result of recent construction,
North Vietnamese supplies and troops can be trucked
directly into all but a few of the major Communist
strongholds in South Vietnam.
Construction of Facilities in South Vietnam
MR-1
4. North Vietnamese construction units have
been active this dry season--especially after the
January cease-fire date--in each of the four GVN
Military Regions, but by far the major effort has
been detected in MR-l, and has touched all modes of
transport--air, water, and road. Most significant
has been the construction of a roadnet stretching
from the DMZ south along the length of the western
MR-1 border, making connection with each of the
still heavily traveled cross-border routes extending
from the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos. A gap
of only some 10 miles south of A Shau remained un-
completed on this network as of late April (see
map).
B-2
Approved For R SEOILBTCINLW&FO-WMI~"400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
5. The northern half of this new "in-country"
north-south system (north of A Shau) was one of
several motorable roads pushed across the DMZ to
support the Communist armored offensive in Quang
Tri in 1972. Since early this year, large sections
of this part of the system between the Route 9 junc-
tion at Khe Sanh and the A Shau Valley have been
extensively repaired, realigned, and upgraded by
the application of a bitumen all-weather surface.
New road construction work has been concentrated
south of the A Shau, with the reopening and realign-
ing of abandoned parts of Routes 548, 614 and 14
which together provide access into GVN MR-2. Road
construction detected farther south along the western
MR-2 border strongly suggests the southern terminus
of this new network may be several hundred miles
south in MR-3. More important for the near term is
the persuasive evidence from photography and agent
reporting that the Communists intend the MR-1 por-
tion to become a major resupply corridor serving a
number of new or upgraded motorable feeder roads
leading east into the coastal lowlands. This
western MR-1 north-south routing paralleling the
alternate Laotian Panhandle road system would pro-
vide a more direct route from North Vietnam storage
depots, and would not be subject to the rainy season
hazard that cripples truck transport in southern Laos
during the summer months.
6. With one exception, the lateral extensions
leading eastward into the South Vietnam lowlands
generally follow existing GVN roads now under Commu-
nist control; consequently, only minimal road repairs
were required to make them serviceable for trucks.
Route 547 leaves the north-south corridor north of
A Shau and provides access into the outlying dis-
tricts of Hue. "Gorman's Road." is the second active
lateral offshoot, leading out of the mountains
some 10 miles south of Route 547 and extending into
central Thua Thien Province where it presumably
supports NVA main force units west of Hue.
B-3
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
-country roads into a major resupply route.
7. The two southernmost feeder routes exit the
still uncompleted Route 14 part, of the north-south
system, indicating truck traffic currently flowing
eastward in this area is still. coming across the
border from southern Laos via Route 165/966. The
first of these two routes fed from Laos is Route 534
which leads on into Que Son Valley base camps bor-
dering east central. Quang Nam and Quang Tin Prov-
inces. Aerial photography of mid to late February
revealed the Communists for some time had been con-
structing a new road from the Route 165-966 border
crossing point some 70 miles southeastward into the
coastal lowlands of Quang Ngai Province. The photo-
graphy indicates that the western half of the road
was already sustaining vehicle traffic. Construc-
tion is still underway on the eastern half which
branches northward to within 24 miles of Quang Ngai
City. A southern branch extends southeast of the
city and probably will link up with Communist-con-
trolled Route 5B, which leads farther south along
the Quang Ngai/Kontum Province border where the
VC/NVA maintain support bases.
8. Evidence of pipeline construction in MR-l
from Laos near cross-border exit Routes 9222 and
165/966 is additional evidence that the North Viet-
namese intend to turn their newly built and acquired
both lines doubtless extend from the trun
pipeline in central Laos and probably already lead
some distance into MR-1.
9. Rounding out recent Communist logistic develop-
ments in MR-1 are the continuing refurbishing of the
airstrips at Khe Sanh and Dong Ha, and the opening
of a small coastal transshipment facility at Dong
Ha for the receipt of seaborne deliveries from
B-4
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE .. COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
and can accommodate small fixed wing transports like
the AN-2. When fully completed, the airfield could
be used by MIGs.
southern North Vietnam ports. At
Khe
Sanh,
a new
5,200-foot PSP runway is now more
than
60%
complete
MR-2
10. In MR-2 logistical improvements have been
centered in the B-3 Front area in Kontum and Pleiku
Provinces. As in Quang Tri Province, extensive new
road construction activity was detected some months
before the start of last year's offensive. During
the offensive the roads supported the tank and heavy
artillery assaults launched around the Kontum and
Pleiku Provincial capitals. Since the Vietnam cease-
fire aerial reconnaissance has shown extensive new
road clearing and road improvement near the Route 19
exit into Pleiku Province. New road construction in
this area may have been undertaken to provide the
North Vietnamese with bypass routes around the Commu-
nist legal entry point at Duc Co.
25X1D The major construction effort was south of
Route 19 where between 29 March and 16 April some
52 miles new road alignment was observed. Al-
VAMW precluded a
25X1D determination of the extent of this new road, it
probably extends beyond this point, possibly down to
Route 14, sections of which in northern MR-3 they may
control. When added to the much improved Route 613/615
system extending north of Route 19 to the tri-border
and Route 14, this 52-mile segment could be considered
as the southern extension of the new north-south,
route leading from the DMZ through MR-1. A sizable
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : GdA2DP80T01719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
gap of about 60-70 miles along Route 14 north of the
current motorable parts of
tri-border separates the
this system; however,
some 25 miles of this gap was being c ears .
12. In northern coastal Binh Dinh Province other
VC/NVA units reportedly are building a new motorable
road extending northeast from Route 514 to within 5
miles of the small sea port of Sa Huynh.
MRs 3 and 4
13. Although recent Communist logistic-related
construction in MRs 3 and 4 has been less than in MRs
1 and 2, the difference in scale is misleading be-
cause the highly developed road and water transport
systems in the southern regions obviate the need for
major new construction. The most significant construc-
tion project in the southern part of the country has
been the building of a secret cross-border truck route
from Mimot in Kompon Cham Province, Cambodia, into
T Ninh Province.
a this construction is intended to permit continued
movement of military supplies into Tay Ninh, once the
nearby parallel legal entry Route 22 is finally manned
by ICCS personnel. As of late April, however, both
the legal route and the new road from Mimot were still
supporting considerable military truck and tank traffic.
In neighboring Binh Long and Binh Duong Provinces, the
VC/NVA are reopening an abandoned route leading south-
ward from Route L13 to their base camps and storage
areas near the Saigon River in northwestern Binh Duong.
14. In MR-4, there have been few and relativel un-
important Communist logistic improvements.
"Sampan Alley,"
a long-used cross-border water supply corridor leading
from Cambodian border base areas into Dinh Tuong Prov-
ince is being deepened so that larger capacity boats
can use it. Of more significance to the Communists'
military resupply posture in MR-4 are the decaying
WANK defenses opposite the GVN border and along the
.r
B-6
Approved For Reip2f IT(~1 ~j~400270002-0
Ell
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
Gulf of Thailand. Currently FANK holds only a few
isolated outposts and population centers in south-
eastern Cambodia, most of which are under siege and
in mid-April the coastal town of Kep in Kampot Prov-
ince was captured without a fight. Kep has a long
history as a major supply base for the Communists
and as a source for seaborne infiltration boats going
to the U Minh and other VC/NVA "secret zones" in the
lower Delta.
Southern Laos and Cambodia
15. Communist logistic improvements in Laos and
Cambodia this dry season generally reflect a carry-
over of last year's'impressive campaign to expand and
upgrade the overland supply system extending through
southern Laos and eastern Cambodia to the B-3 Front
and COSVN areas. Measured in miles of new construc-
tion, road building in southern Laos and Cambodia
during the 1972-73 season falls considerably short
of past achievements. Aside from a major new road
construction project in eastern Cambodia, the North
Vietnamese focussed on maintaining and streamlining
the existing roadnet. New connector roads were built
between major corridors, new bypasses were built to
shorten distances, and improved bridging facilities
were added.
16. Beginning in October last year, aerial recon-
naissance reports began noting the existence of a
new road across the Bolovens Plateau and linking up
finally with Route 97 in Cambodia. Because of a
lack of photographic coverage over this area, it is
impossible to determine when the road was built;
however, it was not until this dry season that its
use was reflected in COMINT. Even now this road is
seeing only light use.
17. Probably the most significant new Communist,
construction project noted outside South Vietnam this
B-7
Approved For Relq"fO08V A-JW01 840270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
season has been the 80-mile extension of cross-border
Route 97/975 from the vicinity of Stung Treng south
to Route 132, which joins with Route 13 to which
joins with Route 13 to provide a direct route into
VC/NVA border base areas opposite GVN MR-3. The con-
struction undertaken prior to the cease-fire was com-
pleted in early March. Since then the road has been
heavily used. Coincident with the completion of this
road, signs of vehicle traffic on parallel Route 13
began to diminish, and pilots recently reported that
this once heavily traveled road is now carrying light
traffic and shows little maintenance work. The new
road offers not only better concealment from aerial
detection, but traverses terrain nearly free from
watercrossings, which will promote rainy season use.
18. The North Vietnamese have also steadily im-
proved Route 19 leading east of Stung Treng to the
South Vietnamese border this dry season. New align-
ments have been cleared under the dense canopy to
hide vehicle activity, and bypass bridges, ferries,
and fords have been added to ease through truck move-
ment in the event of bombing, and numerous under-
ground revetments have been dug by bulldozers along-
side the eastern half of the road for additional pro-
tection of trucks and supplies.
Approved For Relea 0 19 -FR"PTjP 1 1 ft41k0270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 CIA-RDP80T01719R00040027000$-0
III
it
it
I!i
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 CIA-RDP80T01719R000400270002~-0
 Approved For Relea QQ~/Q~LQ1 Clp~ pP,8,gTpJITOO0400270002-0
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE Y,jOL~l- COMIIN'Tt'COUNITV1RtOLL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
ANNEX C
The Weather Factor
1. Historically, the alternating periods of dry,
wet, and transitional weather in Indochina have played
an important role in the timing and duration of Commu-
nist offensive operations. Weather has always been
and will continue to be an ingredient in North Viet-
namese contingency planning for exercising their mili-
tary options. Weather in the area is governed by the
Southwest (June-September) and Northeast Monsoons
(October-May). Currently the area is in a transitional
weather phase ushering in four months of generally
wet weather for Laos, Cambodia, and all but the northern
part of South Vietnam.
2. Rainfall patterns do not necessarily coincide
with the monsoonal wind flow, however. The rugged
topography of the area causes many variations in the
pattern. Thus, the approaching Southwest Monsoon
produces generally wet weather throughout most of the
area, but these winds dry out as they cross the Annam
Range, bringing clear and dry weather to the northern
region of South Vietnam. Rice paddies are baked dry,
providing the best conditions for ground campaigns
while the clear skies facilitate air operations. In
most of central and southern South Vietnam and in Laos
and Cambodia the same monsoon brings heavy rains that
constrains Communist tactical and supply operations.
In mountainous areas the rains trigger landslides and
floods which close many roads and make foot travel
difficult. Cross-country movement also becomes
difficult through the lowlands, and some areas are
inundated.
3. Wet seasons are not uniformly wet even in
those areas affected, and some seasons are wetter than
others. On some days no rain falls and on others,
C-1
Approved For f&e 9Jf: ( -JVF8CTj 0400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
after a heavy rainfall, there are many hours of
generally good weather. Although these variations
could permit local military initiatives and resupply,
they are too sporadic and temporary to be used to
mount sustained high points.
4. Manpower considerations aside, Hanoi's 1972
offensive is a good guide on how crucial an ingredient
weather is. From late March through September the
Communists sustained an offensive in MR-1 where weather
was dry, inhibiting neither military activity nor logis-
tic support. Similarly, fighting did not diminish in
the central coastal area, where weather conditions were
favorable, until August. In all other areas of South
Vietnam major Communist military initiatives stopped
by the end of June when heavy rains made tactical and
logistic movement (except minor movement on waterways)
difficult. In the B-3 Front, the offensive ground
to a halt in June. In MR-3, most Communist ground
assaults also had stopped by mid-June. In MR-4, al-
though no major offensive ever got underway, stepped-
up fighting occurred for the most part before rains
inundated the area after June. In general, in Laos
and Cambodia the wet summer months occasioned lighter
levels of Communist tactical and logistic activity.
5. The Communists in South Vietnam enter the
coming wet summer months in probably their strongest,
firepower position of the war as a result of the de-
ployment south of significant numbers of armor and
heavy artillery since October 1972. Rains.and water-
logged roads, however, would constrain mobile use
of the armor and towed artillery in MRs 2, 3, and 4,
although the T-63 amphibian--an improved Chinese
version of the Soviet PT-76--could be utilized
effectively in some areas there (during the offen-
sive last year, for example, the Communists suc-
cessfully used amphibians to cross marshy approaches
to the My Chanh River'in MR-`-I). -On?the other hand,
the North Vietnamese could make extensive use of this
equipment in MR-1 and coastal MR-2 throughout the sum-
mer should they opt for offensive activity there.
C-2
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
6. In the areas affected by the Southwest Mon-
soon, the summer wet months will impact on both the
NVA and ARVN, although ARVN has control of better
roads over which to move supplies than do the Commu-
nists. (Poor weather would also retard VNAF air
support.) The rains probably would limit the dura-
tion of major NVA offensive activity in central and
southern South Vietnam. In eastern MRs 1 and 2, how-
ever, the summer months will offer few weather problems
for any offensive options the Communists might elect.
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400270002-0